Abstract
The review attempts to place the contributions of Ananta Kumar Giri, the editor of the three volumes, and the writers who contributed to the volumes in the debate on the relations between epistemology and ontology that has been going on in social sciences. sciences. The above-mentioned three volumes have been included in this review.
Social science research in contemporary times is faced with several challenges—epistemological, theory-research praxis, researcher–researched interrelations and research for policymaking. Epistemology deals with questions such as what is knowledge, what counts as knowledge, how knowledge claims are justified and nature of explanations, subject–object relations and fact–value relations. In other words, epistemology deals with theories of knowledge. Ontology is concerned with the existential conditions related to material, social, cultural and political contexts. Hence, the question of relations between epistemology and ontology assumes importance. In other words, relations between knowledge and the context of its production and relations between facts and values have become important issues. Contributions to the three volumes under review address some of the challenges and point to some new directions to understand the relations between epistemology and ontology.
The first volume has twenty-five articles divided into four parts with a preface and an afterword. The second volume has twenty-eight articles divided into three parts with an introduction and an afterword. The third volume has seventeen articles, divided into two parts with the introduction and the afterword. Given the space constraint, it is a daunting task to review seventy articles and do justice to the contribution of each of the authors and the editor, who also contributed ideas in addition to his editorial remarks on the contributions. What I will do is briefly present my observations on each of the volumes and relate the contributions to the debate on the relations between epistemology and ontology. To do this, a brief summary of the debate, the relations between epistemology and ontology, that has been going on in social science is necessary.
The positivist–empiricist theory of knowledge based on Francis Bacon’s (1561–1626) assertion that our sense perceptions can generate valid knowledge about the world around by observing the world. Observations have primacy and all phenomena are governed by laws, and the task of the scientist is to discover the laws. Inductive method, based on observations and verification, is deployed to make general statement about the natural world. According to the rationalist theory of knowledge, for which Descartes (1596–1650) laid foundations, scientific knowledge is universal, objective, invariant and atemporal. In contrast to the positivist theory, rationalist theory holds theory-laden observations and hence presuppositions in the form of conjectures or hypotheses are conceived to understand the world. The hypothesis is constructed in such a way that it is falsifiable by appropriate test (Popper, 1963, 1968). If the test results refute the hypothesis, it is rejected and if the test results confirm the hypothesis, it is admitted to the body of knowledge. However, confirmation is tentative. In the natural science, both empiricist and rationalist theories are used to describe the world and provide explanations about the relations between phenomena. Kuhn (1962[1970]) argued that positivist and rationalist theories do not see scientific knowledge in its historical integrity. He argued that in addition to logic and evidence, scientific community considers factors such as simplicity and elegance while accepting a new theory or paradigm. Though Kuhn’s work focused on the internal world of science, the post-Kuhnian approaches to scientific knowledge focused on the relations between the internal world (concepts, theories, models of science and formation of scientific community that subscribed to the world view of a paradigm) and the external world (polity, economy and culture) of science. The divide between the external world of science and the external world is not rigid but a permeable membrane that allows traffic between the two worlds.
In the beginning of the formation of social sciences as empirical sciences, they were modelled by the pioneers, along the lines of natural sciences and utilised positivist–empiricist theories of knowledge and associated methods as cannons/standards to understand social reality. The earlier positivist–empiricist tradition espoused by the social sciences, such as economics, sociology and political science, subscribed to the view that observations have primacy over theory, and the social phenomena like natural phenomena are governed by laws, and the task of the social scientist is to discover the laws by making unbiased and presupposition-less observations in a wide variety of contexts. Comte (2009[1853]) and Durkheim (1982[1895], 1952[1896]) subscribed to the positivist–empiricist theory of knowledge and applied the theory in their attempts to understand society and its dynamics. We find that both Comte and Durkheim believed in maintaining the distinction between fact and value, the subject (researcher) and society (object), and the process of production of knowledge about society. The positivist tradition maintains that facts have an objective existence, and values are subjective preferences.
Karl Mannheim (1936), who founded the specialty of sociology of knowledge, argued that all knowledge, except scientific knowledge, is socially and culturally conditioned as the persons who produce knowledge about society and culture are part of the society and culture, and their social and cultural background (existential conditions) influence their perspective about social and cultural phenomena. However, he argued that scientific knowledge is rational, universal, atemporal and objective. In the natural sciences, the practitioners and philosophers have realised that fact and value are related. The post-Kuhnian approaches to the study of scientific knowledge demonstrated that all knowledge including scientific knowledge is socially caused (Bloor, 1976; Latour 1983).
Karl Marx’s (1973[1939–1941], 1979[1845]) contributions are based on the materialist theory of knowledge, according to which material world and social world are intimately connected and in fact society should be seen as a product of evolution of matter. Knowledge is generated by interacting with nature on the one hand and fellow human beings on the other. He argues that in order to live, men produce their own means of subsistence—food shelter and clothing—by interacting with nature. In the process of production, they not only transform nature but simultaneously also transform social relations as well by expending their labour and accumulated knowledge and enter into specific relations of production in a given epoch of human history. Marx gives primacy to matter, in contrast to the idealist theory of Hegel according to which ideas have primacy over matter. Marx argues that there is a dialectical relation between knowledge/theory and practice/praxis. In order to generate knowledge about society and culture, one's engagement with society and social movements is essential.
Max Weber (1964) proposed that the subject matter of sociology is social action. He argued that the task of the social scientist is to interpret the meaning of social action at the level of individual's action by employing Verstehen as a methodological strategy, which produces a different kind of knowledge. Social institutions, according to Weber, which are constellations of these meanings create conditions for the objective existence of institutions at macro level. He also argued that the causes of social action also form the subject matter of sociology. Here, the subject–object relation is differently conceived in which the subject has to develop empathy to interpret the meaning of social action. To interpret and understand the meaning of social action in a given cultural context, the researcher has to undergo secondary socialisation, which involves unlearning of the researcher’s culture, and learning the culture and language of the community being studied.
The interpretive tradition (which many of the contributions turn to in the three volumes under review) holds that objectivity in research can be maintained by declaring the values that guide the selection of the phenomenon for investigation. For example, Max Weber attempted to understand the spirit of capitalism and its antecedents because capitalism was seen as a culturally significant phenomenon in Western Europe during his time.
With the above brief summary of the debate on epistemology–ontology relations in social sciences, let us now turn to the volumes under review. Giri (Vol. I, p. 4), the editor of the three volumes, proposes ‘ontological epistemology of participation (OEP)’ which, according to the editor, ‘presents some pathways of rethinking theories and methods’ for creative research. The phrase requires some elaboration at this stage. According to Giri, in the introduction to the first volume, OEP embodies,
[D]eep and rigorous engagement in epistemic learning as well as in ontological self- cultivation as a creative way of doing research as well as thinking about the world. It also seeks to cultivate non-dual modes of understanding, a new comparative global learning nurtured by creative transdisciplinary interpenetrations such as between philosophy and fieldwork, a new vocation of social research and learning, a new art of wholeness and integration. (Vol. I, p. 4)
Giri uses the term ontology to refer to the ‘common conditions of our life at present’ (Vol. I, p. 16). ‘Epistemology of participation may be understood as theory or theories of participation in knowledge production.’ In other words, OEP refers to as to how and in what ways common conditions of our life influence production of knowledge about social phenomena and natural phenomena. In other words, in the process of production of knowledge, epistemological and ontological factors interact. Giri, the editor of the three volumes, includes two more elements: holism and spirituality in the process of knowledge production by researchers.
The contributors, drawn from various academic disciplines—philosophy, social sciences and literature, and intellectuals and leaders engaged in social, political and environmental movements in different parts of the world, seek to explore pathways of creative research in the social sciences in the three volumes by examining the interrelations between epistemology and ontology. One can discern a trend derived from Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism, which is a critique of positivist and rationalist theories of knowledge and incorporates elements of spirituality in the quest for knowledge.
Volume I: Pathways of Creative Research—Towards a Festival of Dialogues
The volume begins with an introductory essay by Giri calling for OEP. The essay attempts to define the terms of discourse, OEP, as aforementioned. Some essays respond to the call of OEP and others deal with challenges of creative research, the goal of which is understanding and transformation of the world. Giri’s opening essay pleads for rethinking of theories, methods of research, society and self.
Giri points out, ‘So far theory has been thought of as a body of prescriptive and predictive rules and regulations.’ While he mentions theories—structuration theory, theories of reflexivity, varieties of postmodernism and post-structuralism—which are responses to classical theories, he argues, ‘Now theory has to be thought of in a new way as a companion rather than as a master, as a moving light house which gives possible direction in the sea of complex reality, rather than a fixed star’ (Vol. I, p. 23). He also suggests that we should rethink and reconceptualise society and understand ontological sociality in self, culture and society, and there is a need to ‘transcend the dichotomy of individual and society’. Giri argues,
Ontology in ontological epistemology of participation is not an escape from modernity, especially its epistemology; rather, it is a creative mode of living with modernity but not solely on its terms. The vision and practice of ontological epistemology of participation helps in realizing that one is not condemned to live with and in modernity only in a modernistic way. One can embody and inhabit plural ways of being and knowing in this contemporary world with creative crossing of boundaries between ontology and epistemology; between modern; non-modern and postmodern ways of living and with linked border crossing between art, science, religion and spiritualism. (p. 13)
This is in essence of how Giri conceptualises the relations between ontology and epistemology. It means that ontology and epistemology are not distinct domains, as positivist theory of knowledge holds, but domains that allow two-way traffic between the two domains. Giri endorses the view of Knorr-Cetina (2001) that social reality should not be restricted to merely the human social world but we should also include the non-human and non-social reality. In today’s consumer culture, objects occupy an important place in social life. Regarding rethinking of subject, he suggests that we should ‘conceptualise self not only as a techno-practitioner but also as a transcendentally real self’ (Vol. I, pp. 30–31). While arguing for rethinking methods, Giri argues that one should aim at non-duality in the world of duality.
In Part II of the volume, Markus Molz and Mark Edwards (pp. 65–95) suggest the need for crossing boundaries to produce integral knowledge and they suggest a framework of integral meta-studies that has three layers—meta studies, layer of middle-range studies and a layer of empirical studies. These levels have corresponding behavioural, experimental, sense-making and social engagements, and levels of analysis, interpretation and theoretical generalizations. Besty Taylor (pp. 97–109) points out that we should understand the ‘violence of absolutism in politics and knowledge’ and pleads for the non-absolute and non-violent ways in science, politics and culture, religion and spirituality. She introduces a novel conception of ontology in terms of a folded ontology rather than a flat ontology. Folded ontology has several ontologies that should be appreciated by the researchers. Scott Schaffer (pp. 111–129) points out that conceptualising the present not only in terms of temporal category but also in terms of spatial category helps us in understanding the circles of autonomy and interpenetration of various interrelated dimensions of self and society. Conceptualising the present in terms of temporality and spatiality helps us to rethink society, subjectivity and social theory. Gasper (pp. 147–165) points out that the emphasis on ontological sociality has to confront the ‘centralised power structures of the day that demand for generalised forms of knowledge’. The author makes use of discourse analysis to argue that the discourse is not a source of data but it is the object of study and shows how the discourse is an iterative process. For example, if one looks at the scientific papers that are published in journals, the article that appears finally in the journal would have undergone many revisions to make it presentable to the community of scientists. Peter Herrmann (pp. 165–185) talks of concept control. What it means is that the concepts are defined a priori and the world has to be seen through these conceptual boxes, as it were. We should understand that the social world is more dynamic because members of the society are creative subjects and they not only react to situations but also create new situations. Mihir Shah (pp. 187–215) raises the fundamental question: ‘What is the way to act in a world beset by fundamental uncertainty?’ The question of uncertainty has assumed significance in the context of technologies such as nuclear energy, for example, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and genetic engineering technology.
Part III of the volume deals with real-time experiments in social and political arena, on the basis of initiatives of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Ivan Illich, Vygotsky, Raimon Panikkar and others. For example, M. K. Gandhi’s experiment such as Satyagraha in real time is an example of interaction between ontology and epistemology. Ase Moller-Hansen (pp. 222–232) argues that, to create a better world, Gandhi’s legacy can provide more direction in the areas of (a) inter-religious dialogue and ethics, (b) sustainable development, (c) inclusive economies, (d) conflict resolution and non-violence and (e) the art of democracy (pp. 231–232). Anthony Savari Raj (pp. 295–207) argues that each tradition/culture has to ‘innovate, transform and regenerate itself not only from within but also from without, that is, by accepting inspiration, influence and even correction’. He says that the external influence should resonate with the tradition or be compatible with it. It means that the plurality of cultures gain by learning from each other. Binod Kumar Agarwala (pp. 312–333) from a Gadamerian perspective argues that ontology of humanities and social sciences has six important modes of being: (a) play as a presentation by the players and representation for the spectators, (b) language—social, cultural and historical world is sustained in language, (c) radical temporality of human actions and events, (d) the world is ‘not an object in itself’, (e) belonging—transcendental relations between being and truth and (f) the world in its being is speculative meaning ‘the opposite of dogmatism of everyday life’.
Piet Strydom (pp. 335–349) points out that the editor’s proposal for OEP needs to be clarified. He says, on the one hand, Giri ‘gestures towards a pluralist philosophy of social science but on the other stresses interpretative philosophy’. Strydom says that Giri has a more expansive notion of ontology. Giri’s conception of the relations between ontology and epistemology is a two-way street as we have seen above. Strydom argues that the perspective on ontology that sees ‘social science as discursive practice participating in the process of world creation’ is appropriate one.
Neela Bhattacharya Saxena (pp. 386–405) presents the Indic Mother God to explore the possibilities that she opens for one’s understanding of self, culture and action. The author says that only in the Indian civilisation one finds a Mother God rather than one-sided Father God as in other religions. The other contributions in the volume point out the significance of ‘listening to the subject matter’ and ‘sharing’ for creative research.
Volume II: Cultivating Pathways of Creative Research—New Horizons of Transformative Practice and Collaborative Imagination
Strydom (p. xiv) in his Foreword to the volume points out that there was an ontological turn or internal turn or immanent turn in the late 1980s and the 1990s. There was a shift from the externalist standpoint of the representation/epistemology/theory to objectivity in favour of the adoption of internal standpoint or interpretive turn or the ontological turn. Contributions in Part I of the volume reflect this shift. Chitta Ranjan Das (pp. 13–17) pleads for a new way of identifying with people we do research with and underlines the significance of myths in social life that are transmitted orally. Daniel Rycroft (pp. 19–40) points out the need for building bridge between anthropology and the people with which anthropology learns, and this calls for the practice of Satyagraha, truth force. Roy Burman (pp. 41–50) suggests creative ways of going beyond conflicting positions of the government and the Maoists in the tribal areas in India. Nicos Timklitotis and Wiebe Keim (pp. 51–74) propose reconciliation ‘from below’ to deal with situations of conflict and social movements. Basically, the set of articles suggest that sociology and anthropology have to adopt an ‘emic’ approach rather than an ‘etic’ approach to understand and interpret the world from the point of view of actors/communities. Mukul Kumar (pp. 75–98) points out the need for a context-specific anthropological account of poverty to understand its multidimensional phenomena rather than merely depending on a quantitative measurement of poverty. Similarly, Maxwell Ekor (pp. 97–112) points out that mathematisation of economics would take it away from every day economic reality which in the last analysis is social in nature, for example, informal arrangements of tenancy in rural India. Sai Thakur (pp. 133–141) emphasises the need for bringing historical dimension to sociology and anthropology rather than cross-sectional studies. In fact, classical sociologists subscribed to different theories of history, as we have seen above. There are five more essays in Part I which make use of new theoretical insights to look at kinship relations, relations between kinship and political system, transnational diasporic communities and the interface with the state in their destinations, adaptation strategies accumulated over time employed by communities living in desert conditions, and alternate therapeutics based on traditional medicine such as the Chinese medicine.
Contributions in Part II focus on challenges in engaging with theory and practice, and academy and advocacy. The challenges that are confronted by individuals who combine academic pursuit and advocacy is that they have to constantly move between the need for conceptualising and the need to respond immediately to the real world issues that may include confronting the powerful vested interests. The academic has to be aware of the risks to maintain integrity and responsibility. Contributions of Marcin Brocki (pp. 269–281) and Helen Hintjens and Eric Ross (pp. 283–294) bring out these tensions very clearly. These challenges tend to be more pronounced if a researcher is working with heterogeneous communities.
In Part III of the volume, contributions attempt to rethink self, subjectivity and society and emphasise the need to rethinking art, culture, education and human development which are interrelated. John Clammer (pp. 365–379) argues that culture is not only a body of practices but also a body of knowledge. Culture encompasses human experiences in material and non-material domains of life and transformation of these domains. Clammer argues that art moves social theory ‘beyond epistemology to ontology and contributes to the creation of new epistemology of connections’ that are difficult to perceive in the empirical approaches. Mrinal Miri (pp. 381–393) argues that education as a process and practice is ‘impregnated’ with values for both the teacher and the taught. The learning, therefore, is a transformative process that seeks to produce both incremental and fundamental ideas, values and practices. Anne Escrader and Michael Downey (pp. 395–406) demonstrate the transformative potential of education. Elinor Gadon’s (pp. 407–411) experiment attempted to create an ambience that seeks achieve balance among body, mind and spirit. Orla Hazra (pp. 413–437) argues that the mind–body dualism leads to disembodied learning which has to be replaced by embodied somatic learning that makes the learner realise the ‘cosmic nature of our existence’. Vivienne Glance (pp. 439–455) suggests that theatre ‘provides space in which “body and mind come together in new ways” and theatre is an art form that makes to change the way we look at the world and live within it’.
Volume III: Research as Realisation—Science, Spirituality and Harmony
Contributions in Part I of the third volume deal with critical examination of science, and the essence of the contributions is that the reductionist approach, generally adopted in sciences that leads to very narrow specialisations, ignores the whole and also the spiritual dimension of the quest for knowledge. The contributions draw the attention of the readers to the dimensions, spirituality and wholism in the process of production of knowledge about nature and culture. Giri, in his introductory essay (pp. 1–22) observes that conventional theories/knowledge—empiricist theory and rationalist theory—posit that science and spirituality are ‘opposed to each other’. Similarly, constructivism and realism also suggest the dualism (p. 2). He suggests that we should ‘overcome our naive and uncritical bondage to the dualisms and think of our approaches in a more self-critical and holistic manner…’ (p. 2). He argues that we need to be empirical in an ‘open way and try to understand multilayered reality without confining reality only to the visible or the world of senses’. This statement questions the very core of the empiricist theory of knowledge, according to which our sense perceptions—our ability to see, smell, hear, touch and taste—can generate valid knowledge about the world around us. How can one incorporate that what is beyond senses in empiricist theory of knowledge? The question is worth exploring. One can certainly say that not all research is positivist in its orientation, for example, ethnographic research is empirical but is not based on a priori concepts and categories as in the case of positivist research tradition. Concepts are developed in interaction with the subjects/members of a community in real time. Giri (p. 4) suggests that ‘conceiving research as realisation helps not only to realise the structures of social and epistemic domination (caste, class, gender and absolutism) but also to transform them’.
Mathew Chandrankunnel (pp. 25–43) points out that modern science with the increasing atomistic view of the world undermined the holistic view that characterised the thought of philosophers like Aristotle. However, the author’s atomistic view, that has led to reductionism and narrow specialisations, has reached its limits and the ‘future will be for a vision which is biological in nature and which will give priority for holism incorporating the success of atomism’. It should be mentioned here that reductionism helps in gaining a deeper analytical understanding of an object or phenomenon. However, the analytical understanding must lead to a synthesis that helps to gain an understanding of the whole. Contributions of Soren Brier (pp. 53–96) argue that science and religion are fallible systems of beliefs. He further states: ‘The analysis of the results of science that the scientific method of self-correction produces leads our analysis to develop a theory of the divine.’ Nadkarni (pp. 111–121) applies the three gunas or qualities—sattvik, rajasik and tamasik—to ways of understanding and methods of research. Subhash Sharma (pp. 45–52) suggests that science is based on senses—vigyan is acquired through mind and gyan is acquired through consciousness. He maintains that one can discern four pathways to reality (a) science/scientific pathway (b) art, (c) philosophy and (d) spirituality. Wisdom, according to Sharma, is a combination of (a) science and art and (b) philosophy and spirituality. In Sharma’s pathways, the term ‘philosophy’ has not been defined clearly. Kapila Vatsayan (pp. 123–143) suggests that the term science indicates analysis—breaking down the phenomenon into observable/measurable parts and synthesis—to centralise, denoted by the Latin word religo. She indicates that in the Indian tradition the terms jnana, vijnana and prajna denote knowledge, comprehension of a high degree and self-awareness respectively, moving from analysis to synthesis. Fredric Vandenberghe (pp. 145–155) traces the evolution of the waves in Roy Bhaskar’s critical realist philosophy and points out that in the first wave (1975–1993) critical realism challenged the philosophies of natural and social sciences, especially positivism, and developed a new philosophy of natural and social sciences. The second wave (1993–2000) initiated the development of dialectical critical realism where dialectics is seen as an ‘open rather than a closed’ circuit, and, in the third wave (2000–2014), critical realism marks a quest for spiritual meta-reality.
In Part II of the volume, contributions deal with notions of self and the other. Johannes (Hans) Bakker (pp. 183–198) argues that we ‘need to cultivate our semiotic self’. He further argues, ‘Our own sense of our future self is our sense of our higher self. Our sense of our higher social self is our semiotic sense of our generalised other.’ Understanding the other requires interpretation of meaning of symbols, and this can only be achieved through dialogue. Enrique Dussel (pp. 199–231) emphasises the need for intercultural dialogue to facilitate understanding the other. It should be mentioned here that the intercultural dialogues are generally mediated by power relations. We should evolve some mechanism to neutralise the power equations to promote a genuine dialogue that is based on cognitive empathy (Haribabu, 2000) and cognitive justice (Visvanthan pp. 247–256). Visvanathan emphasises the need for ‘different forms of knowledge to coexist’ and they should be ‘recognised not merely as methods but as ways of life’. Mohanty (pp. 271–282) emphasises the need for cross-cultural dialogues rather than one-sided domination. Karl-Heinz Pohl (pp. 283–293) points out that dialogue with Chinese civilisation helps us in comprehending the limits of Eurocentric models of development with its emphasis on individualism. Marcus Bussey (pp. 295–312) pleads for neo-humanism that goes beyond humanism or anthropocentrism. Perhaps neo-humanism is needed to achieve a more inclusive planet earth that decentres Homo faber and incorporates non-human life forms.
To conclude, the contributions in the three volumes should be seen as a critique of positivist theory of knowledge and associated research practices mentioned earlier. The contributions in the three volumes take note of the fact that the earlier attempts to reduce questions of ontology to epistemology have not been borne out by histories of natural and social sciences and recognise the dynamic relations between ontology and epistemology. We know that the formation of disciplines in social sciences, as empirical sciences, occurred at a point in time when the society was getting differentiated or modernised in Europe. The disciplinary understanding obviously tends to be confined to description and analysis of one or single dimension of the interrelated multidimensional reality. It is now realised that the compartmentalisation of knowledge in terms of disciplines has reached its limits and there is need to evolve transdisciplines that transcend the existing disciplinary boundaries and conceptualise the social reality. The contributions also suggest the need for transdisciplinary understanding of the reality in non-dualist terms. The question is how can a researcher design and operationalise a research problem in transdisciplinary and non-dualist terms? The values associated with knowledge production ranges from quest for knowledge about the world as an intrinsic value to the utilitarian value of knowledge about nature and society. Giri adds three more values to the pursuit of knowledge—holism, harmony and spirituality. We hope that convergence of values associated with knowledge production in natural sciences and social sciences will pave the way for collaboration between natural scientists and social scientists given the controversies that surround science today.
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