Abstract
Australia’s Intergenerational Reports (2010, 2015) make a case for restraining public expenditure on an ageing population given the sizeable post-WWII baby boom cohort, increasing longevity, and uncertain economic prospects for younger generations. There also is concern for major disparities within older and younger generations resulting from cumulative advantages or disadvantages over the life course. Drawing on national survey data from the Attitudes to Ageing in Australia study, this article investigates perceptions of inequity between age cohorts at two time points (2009–10, 2015–17) focusing on variations by age and gender around lifelong opportunities for baby boomers compared to other groups, share of government benefits, and support for increasing pension age eligibility. The findings indicate a shift in attitudes between 2009–10 and 2015–17 with more in the younger cohorts in 2015–17 reporting better lifelong opportunities for baby boomers; and baby boomers receiving a fair share/more than a fair share of government benefits. With pension age eligibility, there is a small but significant shift in attitudes supporting the increase and a corresponding drop in those opposing it, however opposition is highly gendered with more women in each of the age cohorts opposing it at both time points. While there is a perceptible shift in younger cohorts’ attitudes towards baby boomers’ perceived advantages, overall attitudes are not totally supportive of government arguments for expenditure restraint; although a more overt public discourse on intergenerational inequity is emerging as the declining life prospects of younger cohorts are juxtaposed with tax-advantaged housing and retirement wealth of many older age Australians.
Introduction
Along with other developed countries, Australia faces challenges associated with population ageing, particularly during times of uncertain economic growth. This has posed major questions concerning the sustainability of policies that in previous generations were expected to redistribute resources from younger and middle age cohorts to those in later life; that is, those who may have been disadvantaged by a lack of income security and health risks, or born in a birth cohort with relatively reduced opportunities (e.g. Great Depression). However, Australia’s baby boom cohort, the approximate 5.5 million born between 1946 and 1964, 1 challenges this representation to some extent with baby boomers often viewed as significant beneficiaries of social change, and economic circumstances affording them lifelong opportunities not available to younger and older cohorts (Kendig, 2017a; Rice et al., 2017). Additionally, they are seen as the decision-makers who, in political and economic terms, have taken Australia down a neoliberal pathway resulting in public policies shaped by deregulation and marketisation and, as some would argue, to deepening social and economic inequalities (Western et al., 2007). These two characteristics attributed to baby boomers have resulted in attitudes often less sympathetic to their needs as they enter later life, and to the articulation of concerns around ‘fiscal sustainability’ and ‘intergenerational equity’ with the realisation that the economic and social outlook for future cohorts is likely to be significantly worse (Hurley et al., 2017). There is evidence of these concerns in the international context as governments (e.g. USA, UK, Europe) respond to significant demographic change and associated fiscal pressures combined with slow economic growth (see Albertini & Kohli, 2013; Brandt & Deindl, 2013; Higgs & Gilleard, 2010; North, 2017).
To gain an insight into the attitudes of Australia’s birth cohorts towards the baby boomers and each other, this article draws on data generated at two time points (2009–10, 2015–17) in our study on Attitudes to Ageing in Australia (AAA) This was done to assess whether there has been a shift in attitudes across birth cohorts and, more specifically, to investigate the perceptions of inequity between age cohorts at these two time points. To provide a context for the analysis and discussion, we first outline the social and economic circumstances in Australia informing debates around intergenerational equity and the need for fiscal restraint, and then provide a profile of Australia’s baby boomers that goes some way in challenging the assumed homogeneity of them as a birth cohort.
Intergenerational equity: Australia’s social and economic context
Post-World War II Australia experienced significant economic growth and major policy advances that benefitted the baby boomers now entering later life. These include substantial increases in real incomes, increasing home ownership, and improved provision for income support and health services (Kendig, 2017a). However, the evidence suggests that the advances made by older cohorts in earlier decades are not being achieved by those coming after them and further, that substantial inequalities persist within the older as well as younger age groups (Daley et al., 2014; Kendig, 2017b). Australia in the 1980s and into the 1990s saw a reforming Labor government progressively increase the age pension rate payable, implement national superannuation, and improve health and care programmes (Kendig, 2017a). However, a brief but sharp recession led to the election in 1996 of a conservative government highly critical of the previous Labor government’s spending and resulting national debt.
The ‘intergenerational’ theme emerged in the context of a dominant political discourse around fiscal restraint and has been articulated quite strongly in the national government’s series of Intergenerational Reports (IGRs) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, 2007, 2010, 2015). Piachaud and colleagues (2009) defined four types of intergenerational equity based on public and private transfers: between living generations (e.g. public benefits for different age groups); between living generations and those not yet born (e.g. environmental issues, burden of public debt); private transfers between generations (e.g. financial, caregiving); and public transfers between generations (e.g. government debt, pension costs inherited by younger generations). The use of the term ‘intergenerational equity’ therefore may be applied in different ways, but generally is conceptually applied to understand notions of fairness and reciprocity as they apply to generations and at different life stages (Cannon & Kendig, 2018; Luscher et al., 2016). Equally it helps to understand how substantial inequalities can accumulate between advantaged and disadvantaged social groups within, as well as across, generations as they progress over the lifespan (Cannon & Kendig, 2018; George & Ferraro, 2017; Kendig et al., 2016).
With the IGRs, the emphasis was on the need to exercise fiscal restraint to rein in public expenditure around potentially costly social and care programmes that might not be affordable into a future heavily influenced by an ageing population (Cannon & Kendig, 2018; Woods & Kendig, 2015). Implicit in this ‘crisis’ discourse (Kohli & Arza, 2011) is a representation of ageing as a major threat to economic security and a burden on the country’s future prosperity (Kendig, 2017a). That is, social expenditure on older people requires restraint so that future generations do not bear the brunt of a heavier tax burden and cutbacks in government programmes. More explicit in such a discourse is that restraint in social expenditure means an increase in private expenditure; that is, expecting families and households to pay their own way rather than receiving government support (Fine, 2014).
While shaping public policy debates, responses to the IGRs have been mixed with advocacy groups critical of the government for appearing to scapegoat older people for the consequences of population ageing and ignoring their contributions to society (Woods & Kendig, 2015). Other responses are critical of the focus around fiscal sustainability with little consideration of more fundamental issues around generational relationships and distributive justice (Bessant et al., 2011; Biggs, 2014), constructive action on health expenditure (Duckett, 2015), and more positive action around supporting mature age employment and addressing ageism in the workplace (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015; O’Loughlin et al., 2017a). Fiscal redistribution is used as a political tool including in Australia’s most recent national election (May 2019), whereby the Labor Party largely lost the election on issues around removing tax concessions such as negative gearing on investment properties and franking credits for shareholders – both of which disproportionately advantage the baby boomer generation and not younger cohorts (see Carling, 2019). Therefore, there is an urgent need for a more holistic public policy approach to take into account a range of intergenerational and within generational cohort disadvantages.
The generations following the baby boomers, usually referred to as Generations X and Y or ‘Millennials’ (born before 1980 and after 1980 respectively), are faced with changing social and economic circumstances that are challenging Australia’s relatively stable economic prosperity, and that potentially place them at odds with the post-WWII baby boomers (Daley et al., 2014; Kendig, 2017a). There is increasing recognition that more recent birth cohorts are subjected to downturns in employment markets, expensive entry into the housing market in major urban areas, and the prospects of decreasing public benefits and services together with likely increases in taxation. In recent times the concerns about housing affordability have grown. In 2015, comparative data from OECD countries showed Australia’s ranking changed from 29th to 9th most unaffordable country for housing (OECD, 2017). Similar concerns about housing affordability for younger cohorts have been documented using the Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016 Census data, as well as the longitudinal panel survey Household Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) (Wilkins, 2016). While governments continue to forecast rising real incomes over the longer term, which would advantage younger cohorts, at present older people, including a good proportion of the baby boomers, retain a dominant share of Australia’s wealth (Kendig et al., 2019). This wealth is primarily in home ownership, but also through age-based taxation concessions that have benefitted older Australians but potentially disadvantaged later cohorts (Daley et al., 2016; Ong, 2016). However, a recent Australian report (Wood et al., 2019) provides evidence of variability in wealth across all age groups and ongoing inequalities between generations and within generations; that is, some young people have accumulated wealth at the same time as some older people struggle to make ends meet.
Australia’s baby boomers
The baby boomers are seen as the ‘face’ of population ageing in Australia and the future older generation (O’Loughlin et al., 2018). They have lived through a period of rapid social and cultural change that influenced their attitudes and behaviours and bring to later life a range of life experiences and expectations very different from previous generations (O’Loughlin et al., 2018; Tavener et al., 2014). While far from being a homogeneous cohort, there is evidence that when compared with earlier generations they have higher levels of education (Ryan & Sinning, 2010), higher workforce participation (Gong & Kendig, 2016), especially for women (Warren, 2015), are more likely to have been divorced (Weston & Qu, 2013), be more geographically mobile (McDonald, 2017) and with population ageing are becoming multigenerational carers (Baird & Heron, 2013; Kröger & Yeandle, 2013; O’Loughlin et al., 2017b). Because of this they have different expectations of their own ageing experience, including remaining independent, productive, healthy, and staying out of residential care (Humpel et al., 2010; Loh & Kendig, 2013). However, they are also concerned about income security and being expected to, or needing/wanting to remain in paid work, and dealing with the social, emotional and financial impact of increased caring responsibilities for their partner/spouse, ageing parents, adult children and grandchildren (Hamilton & Jenkins, 2015; Loretto & Vickerstaff, 2013, 2015; O’Loughlin et al., 2017b).
Are Australia’s baby boomers the ‘lucky cohort’?
Consistent with the widespread, but problematic view of ascribing a ‘special’ generational status to post-WWII baby boomers (see Biggs et al., 2007; Higgs et al., 2009; Twigg & Majima, 2014), Australia’s baby boomers are often referred to as the ‘lucky cohort’ living in the ‘lucky country’ with its extensive natural resources and overall social and economic stability (Kendig, 2017b). While this may be true to some extent, such a view obscures the origins and extent of inequalities and divisions based on class, gender and ethnicity within this cohort in Australia and elsewhere (George & Ferraro, 2017; Nazroo, 2017; Noone & Bohle, 2017; Phillipson, 2007).
Our study of Australia’s baby boomers (aged 60–64 years in 2011–12) used a retrospective life course approach to examine the consequences of adversity earlier in life in terms of education, health, employment history, childbearing and caregiving through to middle age. These early and mid-life experiences have continued to influence workforce participation along with its income and social participation benefits on entry to later life (Kendig et al., 2016; Majeed et al., 2015). While the findings indicate the cumulative effects of childhood socioeconomic status and health on wellbeing in later life, they also indicate that childhood effects on both quality of life and life satisfaction in later life are largely mediated by adult exposures (e.g. household income). Findings from this study also show that those with caring responsibilities were more likely to be women, in part-time work or out of the paid workforce completely, and dependent on some form of government support for their income (e.g. age pension, carer allowance) (O’Loughlin et al., 2017b).
Impact of the global financial crisis
Findings from our national survey of Australia’s baby boomers, carried out at the time of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007–8, found that despite the rhetoric and media representations of the ‘lucky cohort’, not all of Australia’s baby boomers were in a strong financial position at that time or expected to be in the future (Kendig et al., 2013). The timing of the crisis challenged plans, especially for those recently retired or planning to retire, with the evidence indicating many decided to continue working longer or, if they had recently retired, were considering a return to work. There were clear gender differences with significantly more women than men reporting being worse off financially and postponing plans to retire. This reflects women’s more marginal employment status through part-time work (Rose et al., 2013), lower retirement income benefits due to an interrupted work history (Warren, 2015) and the gender pay gap (Austen & Mavisakalyan, 2018; Sinning, 2017), and goes some way to explaining why women indicated their trust in the government to maintain income support through payment of a means-tested age pension (O’Loughlin et al., 2010).
As part of the same national study, focus group participants expressed concerns about the impact of the financial crisis on their retirement plans, financial preparedness and resources, and, for some, the loss of control over their personal circumstances (Humpel et al., 2010; Kendig et al., 2013). Participants, particularly women, voiced concerns about Australia’s retirement income system with its emphasis on continued paid employment, and on occupational-based superannuation schemes or self-managed retirement funds linked to financial markets. Participants expressed frustration at a lack of control over their financial situation, of being at the mercy of market forces, and about the complexity and frequency of changes in superannuation policy; they felt that younger cohorts were more likely to benefit from such a system (Kendig et al., 2013).
Homelessness
As reported by the OECD (2020), homelessness has become an issue in many countries and is impacting on more diverse sectors of the population including women, youth, migrants and older people. In Australia, while there is an ongoing focus on the disparity between the baby boomers’ possession of the majority of housing wealth and lack of housing affordability for younger generations, there is an emerging concern over the increase in the rate of homelessness among older Australians, particularly women (Australian Association of Gerontology [AAG], 2018). There are particular risk factors for older women, including women in the baby boom cohort, which can lead to homelessness in later life. These include their socioeconomic position, un/underemployment resulting in fewer personal assets, a lack of affordable housing and possible family violence (AAG, 2018). This is not an image generally associated with Australia’s baby boomers as the ‘lucky cohort’ with significant assets, nor does it fit with the government’s policy responses to population ageing in the form of encouraging people to remain in paid work, increasing pension age eligibility, promoting healthy and active ageing, and supporting older people to age in place in their own home (O’Loughlin et al., 2018). These problems are exacerbated by a significant decline in the provision of public housing, and the introduction of a market-driven system of service provision including community and aged care (Fine & Davidson, 2018).
As outlined above, this article draws on data generated at two time points (2009–10, 2015–17) when baby boomers were moving into their sixties and early seventies and exposed to issues concerning retirement and income security in later life, while Generation X were into their thirties and forties and Generation Y in early adulthood with their life directions being influenced by prevailing employment and housing markets. The AAA study gathered evidence on attitudes and attitudinal change within and between age cohorts across a range of topics (see Hussain et al., 2017; Kendig et al., 2019; O’Loughlin et al., 2017a), however this article focuses on the perceptions of inequity between age cohorts at these two time points and, more specifically, on variations by age and gender around three outcomes: the lifelong opportunities for baby boomers compared to other groups; a fair share of governmental benefits for the baby boomer generation; and the level of support for the increase in pension age eligibility. Along with many developed countries, Australia increased the eligibility age for access to the government-funded age pension. Starting in 2017, the long-established qualifying age of 65 years has been increasing by six months every two years and will reach the new qualifying age of 67 years in 2023 (Department of Human Services, 2019). A policy change such as this has consequences for the future prospects of birth cohorts and can be expected to influence intergenerational attitudes (Kendig et al., 2019).
Methods and materials
This article draws on data extracted from the module on Attitudes to Ageing in Australia (AAA), a component of the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA). The AuSSA sampling frame is a nationally representative sample of Australian adults aged 18 years and over (Australian Consortium for Social and Political Research Inc., 2015). The AAA module was included in AuSSA surveys in 2009–10 and 2015–17. As the AuSSA project is implemented in stages, the completion period for each wave is between 12 and 18 months. The survey is mailed out to eligible respondents aged 18 years and older, and responses collated and cross-verified using standard data-editing techniques for population-based surveys. The chief investigator for each module receives the data files, which include a range of demographic variables and responses for their specific module. The number of respondents for AuSSA modules included in any survey period can vary as respondents may not provide information on all survey components. The 2009–10 survey had 1525 respondents, whereas the 2015–17 survey had 2174 respondents (possibly attributable to a longer time period for data collection).
Here we include a select range of demographic variables relevant to the aims of the article (see Table 1). Age was grouped into four birth cohorts for each survey point – young (born after 1980), mid-age (born between 1965 and 1980), baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964) and older (born before 1946). Education was regrouped based on years of formal schooling (completed high school [12 years]), having a diploma or trade qualification and having university-level or equivalent education. The occupation variable was developed from extensive recoding of all reported professions into a three-category variable (Managerial and professional, Trades and clerical, Machinery and manual work). Housing tenure was a particular focus given the current debate around housing affordability in Australia, particularly for younger generations. The responses were coded to distinguish between those who were homeowners with no mortgage, those with a mortgage, renters and ‘other’ (social/public housing, retirement villages). In an earlier article (Kendig et al., 2019) additional demographic variables were included (marital status, living in cities/regional areas/rural areas, general health), but we did not find them to be of value and excluded them from the present analysis. Mean monthly income was not included as a measure of financial status as the data in the 2015–17 survey had errors that could only be corrected by making assumptions with limited options for cross-verification of the degree of error.
Demographic profile of AuSSA respondents across two time periods.
Note: Numbers may not always add up to the grand total for each survey period due to missing data.
There were three discrete outcomes of interest chosen as a proxy for cohort-level perceived or real inequity:
Perceptions and attitudes on lifelong opportunities for baby boomers compared to other groups, in particular the youngest cohort (born after 1980);
Attitudes towards share of governmental benefits for the baby boom generation;
Support or opposition to an increase in pension age eligibility.
To explore trends and shifts in attitudes for these outcome measures, we undertook separate analysis of the data for the two time periods as well as a pooled analysis to assess the aggregate picture over the nine-year period. All analyses were carried out using SPSS version 25 (IBM Corp, 2017). Univariate analysis was undertaken to look at the data distribution for each demographic variable as well as the three outcome variables of interest (Tables 1, 2). This was followed by bivariate analysis to explore the relationship between demographic variables and each of the three outcome variables for statistically significant differences within and across both time points. As the focus is on intergenerational equity, results are presented as differences by age cohort for lifelong opportunities and attitudes towards share of government benefits, and by age and sex for support or opposition to increasing pension age eligibility (Figures 1–3).
Responses to perceptions about relative lifelong opportunities, share of governmental benefits and increase in pension age eligibility across two time periods.

Trends in perceptions by age cohort about better lifelong opportunities for younger people versus baby boomers (2009–10 vs 2015–17).

Trends in perceptions about share of government benefits across age and survey cohorts (2009–10 vs 2015–17).

Proportion of male and female respondents by age cohort who oppose an increase in pension age eligibility across survey cohorts (2009–10 vs 2015–17).
Results
The demographic profile of the survey respondents at the two time points (2009–10 and 2015–17) is presented in Table 1. The proportional representation of the age cohorts was somewhat different across the time points, which may indicate differences in sampling and/or response rates. For example, the proportion of baby boomers and older group was 31.2% and 39.5% in the 2009–10 survey, whereas the respective figures in 2015–17 were 38.3% and 27.8%. There were proportionately more female respondents in 2009–10 (56.7%) compared to 2015–17 where the distribution of males and females was similar. Regarding educational attainment, the statistically significant difference was in the higher proportion of respondents with tertiary education (28.4% vs 36.5%) across the two time points. Significant differences were also seen in employment status with more people employed in 2015–17, and a significantly lower proportion of respondents, largely females (data not shown), who reported home duties (11.5% in 2009–10, 4.0% in 2015–17). On the other hand, no significant differences were observed by occupational category across the two time points (see Table 1) even though the same recoding schema for generating aggregated categories was used. Similarly, despite some age cohort and sex differences in the two samples, home ownership did not show any significant difference across the two periods.
The responses to the three selected outcome variables across the two time points is presented in Table 2. For the first outcome of interest, perception and attitudes to lifetime opportunities across age cohorts, there was a statistically significant shift with more respondents (49%) in the 2015–17 survey reporting better lifetime opportunities for baby boomers compared to 39% in 2009–10 (p < .000). There was also a statistically significant difference in the proportion of respondents who disagreed with the statement that lifelong opportunities were better for young people (38% and 27% respectively for 2015–17 vs 2009–10). Such results indicate that attitudes have shifted considerably in the nine years across the two surveys (Table 2). On further analysis, a consistent pattern was found across the age cohorts. For example, in the 2009–10 survey, 34% of the young cohort (born after 1980) agreed that there were better lifelong opportunities for baby boomers compared to 58% of the age cohort reporting the same in 2015–17 (Figure 1). A similar pattern, albeit with less dramatic differences, was observed for other age cohorts – 42% vs 52% of the mid-aged cohort, 40% vs 46% of the baby boomer cohort and 39% vs 49% in the older age cohort across the two time points (Figure 1). This is supported by other evidence of shrinking opportunities for younger people in the second decade of the 21st century as elaborated on in the discussion section of the article.
For the second outcome measure, perceived fairness of government share of benefits for baby boomers versus other age groups, the attitudinal change, though statistically significant (p < .000), was not so marked on an aggregate basis across the two survey time points. For example, there was an increase from 3.0% to 6.0% in respondents who reported that baby boomers received more than their fair share, with a similar magnitude of increase in respondents (37% vs 40%) who thought baby boomers received their fair share (i.e. appropriate share). The proportion of respondents who thought baby boomers received less than their fair share dropped from nearly 60% in 2009–10 to 54% in 2015–17 (Table 2). However, the aggregate pattern masks the more striking differences seen by age cohorts. For example, in the youngest cohort (born after 1980), those who considered baby boomers were getting less than their fair share declined from 62% in 2009–10 to 50% in the 2015–17 (Figure 2). A similar pattern was seen for changes in the perceptions of the mid-aged cohort across the two survey time points. However, less marked differences were seen amongst the baby boomer cohort itself and the older cohort (Figure 2).
The final outcome measure was attitudes towards the Australian government’s plans to increase the eligibility age for the state pension (from 65 years to 67 years by 2023). On aggregate there is a small but significant shift in attitudes towards increasing the pension age eligibility with 36% of respondents supporting it in the 2015–17 survey period compared to 33% in the 2009–10 survey, and a corresponding decline in the proportion of respondents who opposed an increase in pension age eligibility (Table 2). However, as with other outcome measures included here, this aggregate pattern masks the highly statistically significant difference (p < .000) in opposition to an increase in pension age eligibility by age and sex of the respondents. In Figure 3, data on respondents who opposed an increase in pension age eligibility are presented separated out by age and sex for each survey period. For male respondents in 2009–10, the highest proportion who opposed an increase was the young cohort (67.4%) and the baby boomer cohort (67.2%), with the mid-age cohort showing a somewhat lower proportion (61.4%). In the older cohort comparatively, fewer respondents were opposed to an increase but the figure was still over half (57.6%). In contrast, the pattern was considerably different for women across all age cohorts (Figure 3). The highest proportion of females opposing an increase in pension age eligibility were the baby boomers themselves (76.2%), with those in the youngest cohort and mid-age cohort not being very different (72.8% and 74.0% respectively) to baby boomers. Unlike male respondents, more female respondents in the oldest age group were opposed to an increase (64.9% vs 57.6% of males). The highly gendered nature of opposing an increase in pension age eligibility is elaborated on in the discussion section of the article.
Discussion
The Australian Attitudes to Ageing survey was carried out at two time points when issues around intergenerational equity and need for fiscal restraint came into clearer focus within the overall ‘crisis’ discourse (Kohli & Arza, 2011) associated with population ageing: in 2009–10 post-GFC and in 2015–17 amid the impact of an economic downturn. The findings on intergenerational attitudes and perceptions of inequity can be interpreted in the context of a range of policy issues around the ageing of Australia’s baby boom cohort; that is, the cohort with substantial retirement wealth for some but not all, but with the majority being homeowners. These market-based life advantages for baby boomers were further supported by policies including tax-free gains from house price inflation and minimally taxed superannuation accumulations – decisions, some would argue, made by baby boomers in their own interests.
Conversely, younger cohorts had been entering employment and property markets that have become far less favourable (Cannon & Kendig, 2018). While there is increased recognition of continued and deepening disadvantage associated with ageing (Smith & Hetherington, 2016), in the policy context there is little acknowledgement of life course influences on age-related inequalities that can start very early in life and accumulate over the lifespan (Dannefer, 2003; Kendig, 2017b; Kendig et al., 2016).
There is a shift in societal perceptions from 2009–10 to 2015–17 evidenced in the increase in the proportions of respondents who felt opportunities were better for baby boomers than for younger people; this was especially evident among the youngest group (born after 1980). This is consistent with the evidence of reduced opportunities for younger cohorts gaining exposure, and the view that as the taxpayers of the future they will be left to foot the bill for the government debt accumulated through funding benefits for older people (Cannon & Kendig, 2018; Daley et al., 2016; Foundation for Young Australians, 2016). At the same time, there was a decline in the proportion of respondents across all age cohorts and at both time points reporting better opportunities for baby boomers compared to those in the older cohort. While this could be interpreted as a suggestion of intergenerational tension on the part of the younger cohorts, it could equally be seen as an acknowledgement that there are inequalities within generations; that is, not all baby boomers are advantaged in the same way (Cannon & Kendig, 2018; Kendig et al., 2013; Nazroo, 2017).
Across both time points a majority of respondents maintained their view that the older cohort were receiving less than their fair share of government benefits, with the strongest support for this coming from baby boomers. An explanation for this could be baby boomers’ concerns about their own financial security and experiences with generational caring responsibilities (e.g. ageing parents, grandchildren) and the need to provide support, often financial (Baird & Heron, 2013; Loretto & Vickerstaff, 2015; O’Loughlin et al., 2017b). However, the 2015–17 responses also provide evidence of a less favourable view of baby boomers in that there is a significant loss of support within the youngest cohort for baby boomers receiving less than their fair share of government support. This may signify the onset of a more unsympathetic view of baby boomers by younger cohorts with the realisation that their own economic and social prospects are worsening (Cannon & Kendig, 2018; Foundation for Young Australians, 2016; Hurley et al., 2017).
In the current study there was a small but significant change in attitudes towards the government’s decision to increase pension age eligibility. Between 2009–10 and 2015–17, there was an increase in respondents supporting the decision to increase pension age eligibility and a reduction in respondents opposing it; however there were significant age and gender differences in those opposing it. In 2009–10, male respondents in the youngest cohort and baby boomers were more likely to oppose it, while significantly more women across all age groups and especially baby boomer women opposed the increase.
While there was overall more support for the increase in the eligibility age and a modest decline in opposing it in the 2015–17 responses, of interest is that women’s continued opposition to the increase showed a similar pattern to 2009–10. In Australia the situation now is that the majority of older people receive a means-tested government-funded pension and, for many, it is their only means of support. The pension is seen as adequate for those owning their home, but those in private rental accommodation, living alone, and in poor health can face considerable financial hardship (O’Loughlin et al., 2018; Smith & Hetherington, 2016). Women’s opposition to an increase in pension age eligibility is understandable in light of the evidence indicating that women as they age are more likely to be dependent on the pension (Kendig et al., 2013; O’Loughlin et al., 2010). As outlined above, this may be due to not being able to capitalise on occupational superannuation arrangements due to an interrupted work history through childcare responsibilities and, for baby boomer women, an ongoing carer role with ageing parents and grandchildren, or a marginal employment status through part-time work (Adair et al., 2013; Warren, 2008, 2015).
Before concluding, we need to outline some limitations in using the AuSSA data. While the findings are based on data from two nationally representative survey samples, the self-completion format used may influence response rates and exclude people with limited literacy (e.g. non-English speakers). The majority of respondents were Australian-born or from English-speaking countries, therefore migration differences are not included due to the small sample size of those with English as a second language. A similar limitation applies with the very small number of respondents identifying as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people at both time points. Finally, many of the issues addressed in this article around perceptions of inequity cannot be adequately explored without including questions to show differences within and between age cohorts. Therefore, further research incorporating a mixed methods or qualitative design is needed to draw out participants’ experiences or perceptions on specific issues to allow for a more in-depth exploration of generational and intergenerational attitudes.
Conclusion
The findings reported here show that there is a perceptible change in the attitudes of younger cohorts towards Australia’s baby boomers, possibly informed by a realisation that they and future generations are likely to live with relatively worse economic prospects than those experienced by post-WWII baby boomers. While the government’s IGRs have raised concerns from a fiscal perspective, the general public may not have been as cognisant of the potential issues around intergenerational equity (or inequity). However, more exposure to these issues is happening among the public, including media coverage (see Hanna, 2019) and recent reports (Daley et al., 2016; Deloitte Millennial Surveys, 2017, 2018) that detail evidence of the significant differentials between younger cohorts’ life prospects and those of advantaged older people. While the younger generations may be reassessing their attitudes on the baby boomers’ situation, there remains a generally sympathetic view that the older cohort are not getting a fair share of government benefits; a view that is not fully supportive of the government’s position on expenditure restraint articulated in the IGRs. However, there is a need for government and public policymakers to acknowledge that social and economic barriers related to employment and housing affordability do exist for younger cohorts, and for some within the baby boomer cohort, and will need to be addressed in an ageing Australia.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Betsy Blunsdon and Adam Zammit at ACSPRI for their support in the collection and provision of the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) 2015–17 data. We also acknowledge the contribution of Lisa Cannon to the overall analysis of the data and input to previous publications.
We wish to acknowledge our co-author Professor Hal Kendig who sadly passed away before the final draft of this article was completed. This article would not have been possible without Hal’s intellectual input in shaping the Attitudes to Ageing in Australia project and the contextualisation of the data around social and policy changes in Australia.
Funding
Our Attitudes to Ageing in Australia (AAA) study was conducted with the support of the ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing (CEPAR; CE110001029). The current article continues on from our CEPAR working paper (Kendig et al., 2015), which reviews the methodology and examines the 2009–2010 survey data.
