Abstract
There is a growing incentive for sociologists to demonstrate the use-value of their research. Research ‘impact’ is a driver of research funding and a measure of academic standing. Academic debate on this issue has intensified since Burawoy’s (2004) call for a ‘public’ sociology. However, the academy is no longer the sole or primary producer of knowledge and empirical sociologists need to contend with the ‘huge swathes’ of social data that now exist (Savage and Burrows, 2007). This article furthers these debates by considering power struggles between competing forms of knowledge. Using a case study, it specifically considers the power struggle between normative and empirical knowledge, and how providers of knowledge assert legitimacy for their truth claims. The article concludes that the idea of ‘impact’ and ‘use-value’ is extremely complex and depends on the policy context of knowledge power struggles, and on how policy makers want to view the world.
Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing demand for academics, including sociologists, to demonstrate the public value of their research. There is a growing incentive for academics and universities to engage in this process as the academy comes under pressure to demonstrate its use-value to technology, social and economic development (Monaghan, 2009; Oreszczyn and Carr, 2008; Rubio and Tshipamba, 2010). Our ability to demonstrate ‘knowledge-transfer’ and the ‘impact’ of our research are now measures used to assess our standing as academics (Browlie, 2009), and it has been claimed that academia is a service occupation (Oakley, 2004). This shift has not come from within the academy in the first instance, but from the wider public. In the UK, the Blair administrations of 1997 and 2001 placed considerable emphasis on ‘evidence-based policies’, and the need for researchers to produce work that was not only ‘useful’ but ‘useable’ (Monaghan, 2009). Reforming and modernising the machinery of government was a central part of their agenda and this emphasised a commitment to policies informed by relevant research (Davies, 2004; Nutley et al., 2002; Young et al., 2002). The Modernising Government White Paper (Cabinet Office, 1999) stated that government policy must be evidence based, properly evaluated and based on best practice. The UK Economic and Social Research Council established a Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice in 2001. Academics are increasingly funded by research bodies to work in government, the private sector and the third sector to provide evidence to inform particular policy questions and problems. As a result of this, an increasingly sophisticated academic body of knowledge has developed, reflecting on the complexities of evidence-based policy. This has developed from the various ways academics are now engaged in the policy process, for example; as policy advisers (Stevens, 2007, 2011), through systemic reviews of policy documents (Monaghan, 2009, 2010), through reviews of Independent Commissions (McLaughlin and Neal, 2007), and by comparative analysis of the ways evidence and policy interact across nation states (Denzin, 2009; Denzin and Giardina, 2008). While evidence-based policy sounds intuitively to be a good thing (Hammersley, 2005), this recent body of knowledge demonstrates the difficulties and complexities of the idea.
Alongside this emphasis on the need for research to demonstrate its use-value has been a vibrant debate on the need for a ‘public sociology’ following Burawoy’s 2004 Presidential Address to the American Sociology Association (Burawoy, 2005). His argument is long and nuanced, but he basically makes a call for sociology to engage in a dialogue with ‘publics’, in a process of mutual education (2005: 8). Engaging in this process, he argues, will make sociology a visible and legitimate enterprise. Engaged public sociologists will strive to create a ‘better world’ (2005: 25). He also outlines a sociological division of labour where he presents four ideal types of sociological knowledge and sociologists: professional, critical, policy and public (see also Burawoy, 2004, 2008). I will not elaborate these here as they are described at length by Buroway and his critics. I simply note and return to the fact that there is a hierarchy to this typology, and what he describes as policy sociology is bottom of his heap. His address has generated enormous debate. 1 While some have welcomed his call for a more engaged sociology (Brewer, 2011; Browlie, 2009; Turner, 2007), it has also been criticised for its arrogance in presuming sociologists as a collective know what constitutes a ‘better world’ (Tittle, 2004), for its unreflexive presentation of the truth claims of sociological research (Holmwood, 2007), and for the spurious division of sociological labour presented (Brady, 2004). Burawoy disdains ‘policy’ sociology (2005: 1634). He presents it as the uncritical, unreflexive provision of knowledge to ‘clients’ and asserts that it gains its status by being accountable to these clients (2004, 2005). He argues they are servants of power, and sell their expertise for a fee (2004). He does not see policy sociology as public engagement, rather as the uncritical sale of knowledge. The reality is very different. Increasingly, given the drive to demonstrate knowledge transfer and impact, sociological claims often conflict with popular beliefs (Turner, 2007). Sociologists struggle to carry their knowledge into public areas and have their claims and legitimacy accepted (Holmwood, 2007). This is not only because of conflicting evidence provided by sociologists or other academics, but also due to the fact that the university is no longer the sole provider of research. All kinds of knowledge production now take place, by a variety of bodies and for a range of uses (Holmwood, 2007; Savage and Burrows, 2007). Savage and Burrows debate the shift of expertise away from the academy, and the need for empirical sociologists to engage with the ‘huge swathes’ of social data that now exist (2007: 887). They argue that while some of this data collection is not subject to the same ethical requirements of the academy, it is not unsophisticated (2007: 885). It is not sufficient to claim theoretical superiority or a critical edge, instead we must engage with the fact that the research generated is productive in meeting a need.
In this article I want to add to the growing debate critically reflecting on knowledge power struggles in the formation of public policy. It is based on my experience of being an ESRC-funded Knowledge Transfer Fellow in a government department, and represents part of the research bodies’ drive to fund research that has use-value and impact. While this would seem to come under Burawoy’s description of policy sociology, my objective is to demonstrate that the process did not involve a simple sale of services or unquestioning acceptance of my expertise. Nor was it a straightforward dialogue with a public, rather it was a power play of different forms of knowledge to inform policy. During the process, I questioned popular belief and offered different sociological interpretations of policy. Other knowledge providers, particularly stakeholder groups, were also engaged in the process. The value and importance of stakeholders knowledge is now well-embedded (Martin and Richards, 1995). My objective here is not to claim the supremacy of one form of knowledge or type of research over another, but rather to look at the dynamics of the power struggles between different forms of knowledge.
This article begins with an overview of the extensive body of literature on the relationship between the academy and research, and policy and government. It reviews research that considers the social construction of public policy and the complexities of evidence, whether it is the power of the idea or the power of the supporter that is most important in shaping policy, the power struggles that emerge, and the importance of context. The article turns to consider the rural policy priorities of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Northern Ireland, where I was a Knowledge Transfer Fellow. It examines the power struggle between normative and empirical knowledge in shaping rural policy priorities in Northern Ireland – specifically, a commitment to tackling poverty and disadvantage. This article makes two main contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First, it develops our understanding of when normative beliefs are more influential than evidence in shaping public policy. Monaghan has demonstrated how, in adversarial areas of public policy, the difficulties of incorporating evidence in policy formation are magnified because of entrenched normative beliefs (2010: 26). This article demonstrates that even when some policies are not contentious, the power of entrenched normative beliefs can adversely impact on the use of evidence in policy. It shows how normative beliefs become historically embedded in an institution over time, and a power alliance develops which is very difficult to question. Second, it examines how providers of knowledge claim legitimacy for their truth claims, and explores the importance of context. The policy process is as value laden and dependent on the social construction of meaning as social and scientific knowledge. To understand which forms of knowledge receive legitimacy and are validated requires critical reflection on the policy process. This contributes to the literature on the power struggles between forms of knowledge, and which voices are legitimately included in the public sphere and which are marginalised (McLaughlin and Neal, 2007: 914).
The article focuses on the power of stakeholder groups to construct a social reality, as well as the means by which they seek and gain legitimacy for their experiential knowledge. The legitimacy of the knowledge of stakeholders is strengthened when it is historically embedded in an institution or government department, and when it shores up preferred policy priorities by policy makers. The article demonstrates that sociology which engages with policy can, through critical reflection, increase understanding of power struggles between different knowledges and how they claim their legitimacy. It also demonstrates that the idea of ‘impact’ and ‘use-value’ are extremely complex and depend in the policy context on how policy makers view, and want to view, the world.
Social Science Research and Policy Making: Reviewing the Literature
Political science and political sociology have long pondered power struggles within the political arena, the sources of power, who exercises it and how, who gains and who loses. It has been concerned with the relationship between social structure and political phenomena (Lukes, 1974; Mann, 1986, 1993; Walder, 2009). The recent debates on the relationship between the academy and research, and government and public policy, combine social policy questions with those of political sociology. It is to an overview of recent literature on the social construction of public policy and the inherent power struggles developed through an analysis of evidence-based policy-making process that I now turn.
Policy Questions and Social Meanings
Burawoy’s (2005) definition of policy sociology implicitly assumes a linear relationship between research evidence and policy formation. It supposes that evidence is provided to answer specific questions and ‘better’ policy is formed as a result. This inherently suggests that the policy-making process is a neutral value-free one. However, the policy process is as value laden and dependent on the social construction of meaning as social and scientific knowledge. Research on evidence-based policy has found the concept to be deeply problematic and to display a lack of understanding of how the policy-making process occurs (Nutley, 2003; Nutley et al., 2003; Pawson, 2006). Policy is political (Cao et al., 2009a; Monaghan, 2010; Stevens, 2007) and politics is by definition premised on beliefs, values and ideology (Shortall, 2012). The difficulty with a simplistic view of evidence-based policy is that it is a traditional, positivist model that presumes the truth is out there to be discovered (Torrance, 2008). This focus on the interlinkage between evidence and policy formation can potentially detract attention from the values and ideology embedded in the policy-making process.
The ‘rational’ textbook approach to decision-making presumes distinct and logical stages through which the policy-making process progresses. These are problem identification, consideration of available options (informed by an evidence base provided by objective experts), consultation, decision-making and finally implementation. It is presented as a rational process, value-free and where the personal beliefs of policy makers and other actors are irrelevant (Wilkinson, 2010). However, research has shown that policy politics is itself about establishing definitions of and assigning meanings to social problems. To neglect meanings and values when looking at policy formulation is to miss the point (Fischer, 1998: 135). It is often the case that policy formulation precedes the search for evidence that is then carefully selected to support the initial policy formed (Monaghan, 2010: 28) or is interpreted in a particular way to support a preferred policy position (Monaghan, 2009; Oreszczyn, 2008; Oreszczyn and Carr, 2008). Of course, there is the added complication that evidence is itself disputed. This is particularly clear around debates about genetically modified crops, drug policy and climate change. While this seems messy, it brings us back to the social construction of knowledge. 2 To presume there is one truth shows blindness to how knowledge is constructed and contested, and presuming there is one right answer makes radical critiques more difficult to mount (Denzin, 2009). There are many difficulties with using evidence to inform policy. It has been argued that, while, in principle, the importance of academic knowledge to inform policy is recognised, what emerges is a ‘best guess’ at what policies will be effective (Cao, 2010).
Burawoy (2005) is right that a simplistic approach to providing sociological expertise to inform policy decisions could potentially direct attention away from the subjective processes by which the policy problem or priorities were defined in the first place. As Fischer (1998) notes, by neglecting or diverting attention away from the set of social and political arrangements that reify a particular social reality, social science can provide ideological support for a configuration of power rather than explaining it. Reflexivity is necessary about the institutional dynamics and ethical challenges of providing an evidence base for policy problems to avoid becoming a legitimating force for prevalent ideologies.
Power Struggles
The policy-making process is shaped by power struggles between the different agendas and objectives of those involved in the process. We know this is the basis of political democracy. What the recent research on evidence-based policy sheds further light on is the struggle between evidence (even commissioned evidence) and parliamentary democracy and public perception. If evidence is unpalatable with the public, or with the ideology and views of elective representatives, they have every right to ignore evidence and follow their instinct (Monaghan, 2009: 1). Evidence itself is never morally or ethically neutral. What becomes important is not so much the evidence, but rather who decides what counts as evidence, and which evidence will be used; which intellectual voices are included and which are marginalised (Denzin, 2009; McLaughlin and Neal, 2007). Effective lobbying by interest groups can be far more influential in shaping policy than ‘robust’ evidence. If a policy stance is politically unpalatable then regardless of the evidence it is unlikely to be implemented because, ultimately, politicians want good press and re-election (Monaghan, 2009, 2010). Similarly, civil servants use evidence selectively to advance their careers. Evidence is used to justify particular policies within government and to develop proposals of use to superiors in order to enhance career progression (Stevens, 2007: 245).
An interesting, and unresolved, element of the debate within evidence-based policy is whether it is the power of the idea or the power of the supporter which has most effect. This is a question addressed head on by Stevens (2007). He presents a Darwinian analysis of the survival of ideas that fit. In other words, he argues that ideas may be findings, facts or recommendations produced by an array of groups, including academics, lobby groups and journalists. Some of these ideas will fit with powerful supporters, others will not. Those that do have powerful supporters have an ‘evolutionary’ advantage, and will survive. Stevens is very clear that it is not the power of the idea that matters, but the power of its supporter (2007: 28), which might be policy makers, business, pressure groups and so on. In their analysis of the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain (FMEB) Commission, McLaughlin and Neal (2007) make a similar argument. They argue it is the power and legitimacy of the individual that matters far more than the idea (but in their case the idea is distorted by the press). The press dismissed many findings of the FMEB Commission by presenting the report as having a minority orientation because of the high-profile black and Asian intellectuals involved. Who the Commissioners were, impacted on how they were heard in the public sphere (2007: 915). Denzin (2009) argues that it is not a question of the evidence or who presents the evidence that matters, but rather who has the power to control what counts as evidence, and who decides what is used as evidence. Given that government strives to control uncertainty, evidence will often be interpreted to justify existing policies (Monaghan, 2009; Stevens, 2011).
The Importance of Context
How evidence is received will depend on the social, economic and political context in which it is presented. In his comparative analysis of evidence-providing bodies, Denzin (2009) argues that epistemological discourses are historically and politically situated. The larger cultural, historical and organisational context within which the observations are made determines how they will be viewed (Altheide, 2008), and this is also argued in terms of how the FMEB Commission findings were received (McLaughlin and Neal, 2007). In their research, McLaughlin and Neal stressed the importance of the British context of the FMEB. The geo-political context, the cultural context and the temporal context all shaped how the report was received (2007: 911). Recent comparative transatlantic research on rural policy demonstrates the importance of the social and cultural context in determining which ideas of power and which actors inform policy (Shortall and Warner, 2012). Research has demonstrated the importance of political context and values in how poverty is interpreted and addressed (Cao et al., 2009b) and also that governments in general do not welcome views that question their practice and that in some cases this is more extreme than others (Guan et al., 2011). Criticism is rarely viewed positively in any context.
Institutions are a key component of any context, and they are shaped over time. Historical institutionalism is grounded in the assumption that a historically constructed set of institutional constraints and opportunities affect the behaviour of political actors and interest groups involved in the policy-making process (Béland, 2008: 5). I want to take this further to argue that normative knowledge is embedded and reinforced over the history of the institution. This is not to overstress a structural interpretation, but rather to argue that current subjective meanings and interpretations of public policy are shaped by historical normative understandings and well-established alliances and networks with groups who share these normative assumptions. Wilkinson et al. argue that policy framing is heavily influenced by existing alliances, networks and normative understandings of social issues, and further argue that ‘once policy is embedded, it can be shored up by specific forms of expertise’ (2010: 345). Again, this is not to present a static view of the policy environment. Change does occur, and this can be both dramatic and incremental. However, change will be shaped by the legacy of previous policy choices and normative assumptions. Rational actors within a policy context will prefer stable institutional arrangements to situations of uncertainty. When it is difficult to assess how palatable changed policy alternatives might be with the public and key interest groups, the status quo may be preferred to change (Hall, 2009; Shortall, 2013; Stevens, 2011).
Stakeholders and ‘Experiential’ Expertise
Along with the questioning by the public of scientific ‘truth’ claims has come a growing demand for, and commitment to, greater public participation in scientific decision-making and policy formulation (Martin and Richards, 1995). Moving beyond technical expertise to include experiential expertise is seen to enhance political legitimacy. Stakeholders contribute essential expert and experiential knowledge about complex policies and programmes. These groups often have detailed knowledge of how policies roll out in practice and can contribute in-depth knowledge of their different impact in particular situations. In order to understand public policy, engagement with those who formulate the policy, who carry it out, and who experience its effects becomes a crucial component of adequate explanation. Stakeholder engagement is now a well-established feature of policy making, and is also a requirement for most research funding bodies when they fund research. Studies have shown that there is more to scientific and technical expertise than that offered by formally accredited scientists and technologists (Collins and Evans, 2003). Experience and practical knowledge are now valued.
Recently, the legitimacy of truth claims of stakeholders is starting to come under the same scrutiny that sociology of scientific knowledge studies brought to the truth claims of science. While the importance of practical knowledge is recognised, distinctions within this form of knowledge and its relative position in the policy process are not clear (Healy, 2008). The case has been made to examine the expertise of stakeholders to contribute to scientific decision-making, in the same way that the expertise of scientists is scrutinised (Collins and Evans, 2003). Stakeholders are frequently interest groups, and use information selectively for their own self-interest (Porter and Shortall, 2009). In addition, how stakeholders legitimise their knowledge when it is contrary to empirical knowledge has come under careful inspection (Perry et al., 2007). Instead of constructing their knowledge as scientific, stakeholders sometimes make their truth claim on the basis of working for the ‘common good’ or adopting a ‘reasonable and balanced’ approach (2007: 3). I want to take this further to explore how the historical alliances and networks between policy makers and stakeholder groups are central components in understanding how the social meanings of policy problems and issues are constructed. Further, empirical sociology that offers alternative interpretations is in a weaker power position when confronted with a historical alliance of policy makers and stakeholders who share normative understandings of policy priorities.
To conclude, policy making occurs in a context of values, ideology and political beliefs. Political ideology is a key driver of policy making and it is the basis on which political parties are elected. There can be a tension between sound empirical evidence and values, ideology and beliefs (Davies, 2004). In this context, how empirical research relates to normative assumptions becomes important (Fischer, 1998). Cognisance must be taken of where policy makers get their views of the world and how it shapes the policy priorities that emerge. This article contends that the use-value of evidence will depend on its interconnections with normative beliefs and the priorities of policy makers. Two aspects of normative knowledge are particularly pertinent: the first is how it is shaped by history and context; the second is the role of stakeholders’ ‘experiential’ expertise and how truth claims gain legitimacy. The article now turns to the case study to examine these questions.
Rural Poverty as a Policy Priority in Northern Ireland
Until relatively recently, there was not a distinct rural policy for Northern Ireland. The region is quite small and no rural area is further than 30 minutes by car from key services (NISRA, 2005). While the distinction between urban and rural is not clear cut, a recent working group was tasked with identifying an agreed default definition for policy purposes. It was agreed that areas with a population of 4500 people or less are defined as rural (NISRA, 2005). In Northern Ireland this means that 35 per cent of the population live in rural areas.
The development of rural policy in Northern Ireland initially began with the European Union. In the late 1980s the European Commission undertook a major rethink of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was to have policy implications for all Member States. There was concern that despite the expensive subsidisation of agriculture, rural areas across Europe more generally were lagging in terms of income and employment. The idea was to develop a more general Rural Development Programme (RDP) for the benefit of rural areas beyond agriculture. This meant that a policy apparatus had to exist to manage the new RDP. It was decided in 1991 that the Department of Agriculture would assume responsibility for rural development. In 1999 it was renamed the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) and has now assumed responsibility for rural policy more generally. When addressing rural policy, the default definition of targeting areas with a population of 4500 people or less is used. Tackling rural poverty and disadvantage, and a commitment to a community development approach have imbued DARD’s rural development strategy since its inception (NISRA, 2010). I now want to turn to examine how this policy priority has become embedded through historical institutionalism and through the legitimacy given to the experiential expertise of stakeholder groups.
The Importance of Historical Institutionalism
During my placement, many civil servants said that the Department of Agriculture felt ill equipped to deal with rural development when they acquired this policy responsibility. DARD had a well-established evidence base on primary production in rural areas, such as farming, fisheries, animal health and forestry, but knew little about rural areas more generally. Other divisions within the Department consulted with people engaged in the relevant industries: agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. But there is no key rural ‘industry’ as such with whom to consult.
Just prior to the Department of Agriculture acquiring responsibility for rural development, a high-profile poverty programme had taken place. It was an action-research programme and was heavily underpinned by a community development philosophy. One component of this programme was the Rural Action Project (RAP) which specifically examined poverty in rural areas. The project ended in 1989, with heightened awareness about poverty and rural poverty. This awareness of poverty and a community development philosophy heavily influenced the new Rural Division within the Department of Agriculture with responsibility for rural development. Rural policy was new, and little other information was available.
At the same time that the Rural Division was created, so too were two rural development organisations, both with a community development and rural poverty brief, informed by the recently completed Rural Action Project. The Rural Development Council (RDC) had a clear brief to conduct community development in areas of poverty and disadvantage. The Rural Community Network (RCN) was set up as an umbrella network for community groups and was tasked with representing the needs and aspirations of rural communities. Both the RDC and the RCN received, and continue to receive, funding from the Department of Agriculture (now DARD). 3 Key players from the Rural Action Project went on to play pivotal roles in the newly established RCN and RDC. The raison d’être for the existence of both the RCN and the RDC is to tackle rural poverty and disadvantage. The RCN’s mission statement, for example, states that it ‘articulates the voice of rural communities on issues relating to poverty, disadvantage and equality’.
The political context of Northern Ireland is one that has led to a very vibrant community and voluntary sector. The UK has supported many NGOs and the sector provides considerable employment in the region. Consultation with stakeholder groups is deeply embedded in the political culture as it was seen as a way around the democratic deficit in the region (Hasenfeld and Gidron, 2005; Knox, 1996). More recently, the development of Northern Ireland’s equality mainstreaming approach requires, by statute, consultation with stakeholder and civic groups in the policy development process. The practical implications of this are that designated public authorities are required to establish relationships with civic actors and groups, who are then treated as equality ‘experts’ to be consulted on policy developments (Donaghy, 2004). This means that in Northern Ireland there is a formal and interactive relationship between civic society and government. The political context is favourable to stakeholder engagement in policy formation, and experiential expertise of the impact of policy is seen as a key form of evidence informing the development of policy.
The Rural Development Division relied heavily on its two key stakeholder groups, the RCN and the RDC, for guidance in implementing the EU-funded Rural Development Programmes. The experiential expertise and ‘evidence’ of the two stakeholder groups emphasised the importance of addressing poverty and social exclusion and the normative understanding of these, as the rural policy priorities have been historically embedded since the emergence of rural policy.
Since 2006, DARD has assumed responsibility for rural policy more broadly, beyond the EU-funded Rural Development Programme. Between 2008 and 2010 I was appointed as an ESRC research fellow to provide an evidence base for rural policy. The Division was not very clear what it wanted, but felt that it needed an evidence base to support its programme of work. The specific policies that it has developed continue to be imbued with a presumption of rural poverty and disadvantage, and very close consultation with the two key stakeholder groups, the RCN and the RDC continues. How this normative understanding of rural areas as poor is established is now examined.
Normative Knowledge Versus Empirical Knowledge
There are many forms of evidence that suggest rural areas are far from poor and disadvantaged. The Annual Family Resources Survey for Northern Ireland and the Multiple Deprivation Measures all indicate the considerable affluence of many rural areas, and within others. A recent public attitudes to the countryside survey showed that most people would like to live in rural areas and believe it offers a better quality of life than urban areas (Shortall, 2006). Those happiest with their quality of life are those living in rural areas. Population projections for the region indicate that the population of rural areas will increase, both for rural areas close to urban centres and for less accessible rural areas (Northern Ireland Assembly Research, 2010). Behavioural patterns suggest people are choosing to live in rural areas. How then is the normative understanding of rural areas as mired by poverty and disadvantage maintained? How is this understanding legitimised?
The legitimising basis for the RCN and the RDC is similar to that identified by Perry et al. (2007); they represent the ‘common good’ and can articulate the ‘hidden’ features of rural poverty and disadvantage. The RCN claims the legitimacy of its knowledge through the fact that it ‘articulates the voice of rural communities on issues relating to poverty, disadvantage and equality’. It further states that: The Policy and Research team in Rural Community Network works with policy makers and rural communities to build up the evidence around the key issues … Policies can be developed ‘top down’ with, for example, government assuming that they know what people want or they can be developed with citizens and local communities with government recognising that people are experts in their own lives and have the right to have a voice in the decisions that shape the quality of their lives.
4
Thus constructed, the legitimacy of its knowledge claims comes from representing the common good. The RCN articulates the voice of rural people. On its webpage, they say ‘it is important that you, as an expert in living in a rural community …’. In other words, they are the legitimate representative of rural experts. In consultation documents this is further advanced by the inclusion of ‘case studies’ of two or three stories of rural dwellers. The selective nature of stories presented is not questioned, rather the legitimacy of the stories comes from their ‘rural voice’. 5 The RDC, on its website, claims to provide ‘objective analysis’ based on ‘clear evidence’. 6 On this basis it ‘takes forward projects and programmes that benefit rural people’.
The alternative forms of evidence questioning the accuracy of claims about rural poverty are dismissed as not having the right instruments to capture and understand rural poverty. How to accurately measure and identify rural poverty is a topic that has received considerable academic and policy attention (Lichter and Parisi, 2008; Milbourne, 2010).There is much wrangling over the use of Multiple Deprivation Measures in a rural context as poverty in rural areas is not concentrated. Reference to statistics or attitude surveys was labelled too ‘academic’ and, similar to McLaughlin and Neal’s (2007) account of the FMEB Commission, this was seen as sufficient grounds to sideline this information, as being labelled academic suggested it was out of touch with the real world. Rural ‘voices’ presented a more legitimate understanding of rural poverty.
Reifying Normative Understandings
The Rural Policy Division commissioned two reports from the RCN and the RDC to underpin the rural anti-poverty/social inclusion programme. In other words, they commissioned ‘evidence’ from the two key stakeholder groups advocating the need to address rural poverty and exclusion, both of which are funded in some capacity by the Department to undertake this activity. Both reports make selective use of available information, and both engage in speculative conjecture, as the examples below illustrate. Stakeholders generate evidence for a variety of purposes, but predominantly to advance their cause. As a senior English civil servant and academic (Davies, 2004) has noted, it is not that lobby groups fail to use evidence to promote particular policies, programmes or projects, but rather that such evidence is often less systematic, and more selective, than that used by other providers of evidence (2004: 6).
The RCN’s report Defining Rural Poverty: An Issues Based Approach (2008) reported that 34 per cent of adults in the Rural West would like to save £10 a month but cannot afford to do so, but omit to note that this figure is higher for the Urban East and the Belfast Metropolitan Urban Area. The RDC’s report Challenging the Rural Idyll suggests that the hidden nature of poverty in rural areas makes it a more pressing social issue than urban poverty, and also states: … attitudes and coping strategies (‘making do’) can lead to disadvantaged rural people not wanting to draw attention to themselves due to fear of marginalisation or indeed it is just taken as a given, it is the way things are. (2008: 21–2)
Whether this is true or not is never established. The same report states that 70 per cent of men in cross-border areas describe their literacy skills to be poor or very poor. The source quoted actually relies on another source, which was based on a very particular survey of 200 men with specific demographic, social and economic characteristics. The power of this selective evidence base in shaping policy is evident in press releases which state the biggest rural policy challenge in Northern Ireland is the need to address equality issues and the quality of life for rural dwellers. 7
Being a rural champion, ensuring equity for rural dwellers, and tackling rural poverty and social exclusion, is an attractive mandate for any Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. The previous DARD Minister time and time again spoke of her awareness of the hidden nature of poverty in rural areas and her commitment to tackling the unique challenges faced by rural dwellers. 8 Reference was made throughout the recent election campaign to the success of the rural anti-poverty and social exclusion programme. 9 In this case, the normative knowledge of policy priorities allows for a political programme that is premised on equality. This is attractive with the electorate and politicians naturally are in favour of policies that appeal to their constituents (Boswell, 2004). Interest groups are likely to have increased impact on policy when their activities provide information relevant to the election campaigns of people running for office (Burnstein and Linton, 2002). This works very well for the rural stakeholder groups in Northern Ireland.
Conclusions
The historical development of rural policy in Northern Ireland embodied a normative understanding of poverty and disadvantage as the key policy priorities. The values and beliefs of key players in the rural policy infrastructure established in the early 1990s all shared and reinforced this understanding of social reality; DARD, the government department with responsibility for rural policy, relied heavily on the two new stakeholder groups, formed and funded to address issues of rural policy and disadvantage. The political context is one that demands engagement with stakeholder groups and the political process of consultation affords them a certain status as ‘experts’. This context enhances the power position of the normative knowledge and evidence of the stakeholder groups.
Different types of knowledge and evidence are available regarding poverty and wealth in rural areas. Statistical evidence suggests there is considerable affluence in rural areas and population projections indicate that people are choosing rural living as a positive life choice. Attitude surveys show that those who are happiest with where they live are in rural areas. Alongside this, the stakeholder groups present evidence of rural areas that are poor and disadvantaged. To some extent both claims may be true, but that is not the point of this article. What is of interest here is which knowledge shapes policy and how knowledge providers claim their knowledge is more legitimate. This is particularly important because the default position of designing rural policy for areas with a population of 4500 people or less means that nuanced differences between and within rural areas cannot be addressed. In this instance, stakeholders claim ‘superior’ knowledge. They argue that they articulate the voice of rural communities. Their legitimacy comes from the voices of ‘real’ rural people, and the fact that they are acting for the ‘common good’.
Rural policy is a contested and vague concept and one that a government department that previously only dealt with primary industries now has to make sense of. The Rural Policy Division has to design rural policy. The social and political context of Northern Ireland is one that gives particular weight to experiential knowledge. Consultation with stakeholder groups is deeply embedded in the political culture of Northern Ireland, as it is seen as a way around the democratic deficit in the region prior to devolution. Since then, it continues to be deeply embedded in the policy-making process and experiential expertise of the impact of policy is seen as a key form of evidence informing the development of policy. In this context, it is sensible and legitimate to rely on the form of knowledge that reinforces the idea that poverty and disadvantage are the key policy priorities for rural areas. Experiential knowledge has more influence.
This article shows that, contrary to Burawoy’s dismissal of policy sociology, sociologists who engage with policy can shed light on how knowledge is used through critical reflection on the legitimacy of truth claims by knowledge providers, and the social construction of the policy process. It also shows that the knowledge of sociologists can be, and often will be, disregarded by policy makers if it does not suit their purposes or world view. This raises further questions for the current emphasis on demonstrating the use-value and impact of our research. It may well be the case that critical reflexive research will not have an impact because it questions popular belief and is therefore sidelined. How is the use-value of this research to be judged? The question of the impact of research must be informed by further critical reflection of power struggles between different knowledges, how they claim their legitimacy and who decides.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Roisin Kelly, Andy Storey, and participants at the International Conference in Interpretive Policy Analysis, Cardiff, 2011, for useful comments. I am very grateful to the anonymous referees for such constructive advice.
Funding
This research was funded by the ESRC/DARD Knowledge Transfer Fellowship ESRC RES-173-27-0096.
