Abstract
Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor is a critical evaluation of Charles Taylor’s (1989) Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, where he explores his concept of ‘selfhood and the good’ (p. 3). Fraser offers a critique of Taylor’s notion of the self, and explores the presence of Marxist ideas in his work. Fraser argues that although Taylor rejects Marxism, there is a ‘continued relevance of the humanist Marxist tradition’ (p. 3) in his manuscript. Moreover, Fraser suggests that in spite of Taylor’s rejection and sympathetic critique of Marxist ideas there are certain elements of Marxism that still haunt his work. Fraser’s book consists of a critical analysis of Taylor’s notion of the self (Chapter 1), arguing that Taylor has a core element of Marxism in his concept of the self.
Taylor recognises the alienating and dehumanising effect of capitalism; nevertheless, he criticises Marxism, arguing that it pays too little attention to the personal level of the individual. Yet Fraser suggests that Taylor, although recognising the alienating effect of capitalism, fails to acknowledge that capitalism must be transcended for alienation to cease. Fraser also discusses Taylor’s argument that successful articulation in moral space depends on language maintained within community; it depends on narrative. Consequently, Taylor argues that the self is not isolated but ‘one is a self only among other selves’ (p. 35). The latter argument, Fraser suggests, was also Marx’s criticism of the idea of an individual being a Robinson Crusoe. Moreover, Fraser highlights that the importance of language that Taylor suggests in the Sources of the Self is also present in Marx’s Grundrisse and The German Ideology.
One of the core elements that links Taylor’s concept to Marx’s notion of the self is the importance of the social in development and construction of the self. Fraser demonstrates this link by analysing separately Taylor’s and Marx’s understandings of the social in the self. One might suggest, criticising Fraser, that Marx is not the only thinker who sees the self as social. For example, Hegel (1807) also had this concept of social in the self, so why cannot Taylor be influenced by Hegel? Hegel suggests that alienation is the primary condition of existence that leads to self-recognition, while Marx identifies alienation of labour within capitalism, rather than spiritual alienation. Taylor, like Marx, acknowledges the idea of the alienation of the self in the capitalist system and realises the link between alienation and fetishism. Fraser analyses this link of Marxism and Taylor’s thought in great detail, bringing forward many arguments to demonstrate his viewpoint.
In Chapter 2, Fraser discusses Taylor’s ‘own Catholic vision as an orientation towards the good’ (p. 4). It is a critique of Taylor’s A Catholic Modernity (1999) where, according to Fraser, Taylor does not practise openness to other belief systems. In Chapters 3-5, Fraser explores Marxist tradition in relation to the concepts of death, transcendence, morality and the role of art in the making of the modern identity. Fraser suggests that thinkers such as Benjamin, Bloch, Adorno and Joyce offer alternative and perhaps better ways of thinking about these questions. Fraser criticises Taylor for failing to examine the concepts of these thinkers and argues that Taylor’s commitment to theism prevents a full and detailed reading of them.
The sixth chapter offers a critical assessment of Modern Social Imaginaries (2004), where Taylor’s notion of the social imaginaries in western modernity is a moral order shaped by the market economy, the public sphere and the self-government of people. Fraser suggests that Taylor understated the role of class struggle in history in the development of his social imaginaries. In the next chapter, Fraser concentrates on the importance of class struggle in the making of working-class identity, where he seeks to show ‘how dynamic class formations can develop into aesthetic selves’ (p. 154). Chapter Seven is a critique of Taylor’s assumption of ‘Marxism … [being] … the enemy of freedom’ (p. 154). It serves as a conclusion and defence of Marxism against Taylor’s concern of ‘unfreedom’ (p. 157), where Fraser discusses the notion of communism and Taylor’s not quite correct, according to him, understanding of this concept.
In conclusion I would like to suggest that Fraser’s book is not only an attempt to show the link between Taylor’s ideas and Marxist tradition, but also the analysis of the notion of modern self. I consider that Fraser’s critique of Taylor’s notion of modern self is one of the important parts of this book. Fraser, here, provides detailed examination of this question and makes sound arguments that illustrate the influence of Marxist tradition on Taylor’s thinking. Moreover, Fraser, in spite of Taylor’s rejection, demonstrates the relevance of the humanist Marxist tradition in Taylor’s notion of the self and shows that this rejection is not total. He highlights Taylor’s long relationship with Marxism and the importance of this engagement that remains, although not acknowledged by Taylor, in his theory. As a reader I see the aim of this book is not to convince the reader as to the absolute truth of Marx’s ideas, because whether or not we see them as valuable depends on our political and life positions, but to elucidate misinterpretations of Marx’s ideas and in doing so to illustrate the strengths of Marxism in its original form.