Abstract
This article examines the interaction of women from Muslim communities with British majority society, the ethnic group and the Muslim group to ascertain enabling factors and obstacles to their autonomisation. It explores how the women navigate through the tensions underpinning the three reference groups to develop their life plan in the private and public space. The empirical research included Touraine’s methodology of sociological intervention.
Introduction
Women from Muslim communities in Britain emerged in the public space in the 21st century, challenging much of the prejudice which posited them as passive and merely home orientated. The subjects of this article are women from Muslim communities whose family background lies in countries where Islam is the majority religion. This includes practising Muslims, believers and non-believers. Hereafter in this article, all are called ‘MC women’. We concentrate mostly on women from the Indian Subcontinent who constitute the vast majority of MC women in Britain. This article aims to elicit obstacles and facilitating factors to their autonomisation in the context of the collectives to which they belong (Allen, 1998: 47). We have identified three major entities that are the theatres of MC women’s action: the ethnic group, the religious group and majority society, which are traversed with contradictions within each and between them. Unequal relations of power characterise the inner workings and the interface between these entities which are also fraught with unequal relations of power affecting the women. The article considers how the women navigate through the tensions underpinning the three reference groups and examines what hinders or propitiates their autonomisation in interaction with the key collectives mentioned. We use the term ‘autonomisation’ to refer to the process by which the women increase their capacity to take decisions and engage in action as autonomous subjects in the realisation of their life plans in the public and private spheres.
McAndrew (2006) warns against the pitfalls of unilateral paradigms regarding ethnicity: whether it be focusing on external boundaries or adopting essentialism. The first option underestimates the capacity of social actors to define themselves and act accordingly; the second one ignores power relations between minority and majority but also within the minority group itself. Drawing on these parameters, our conceptualisation of MC women’s action as collectives and as individuals situates it within the web of contradictions which underpin the relations of power between groups and within each group. These create what Archer (1995: 196) calls a ‘situational logic’ for social actors and led us to locate MC women’s action within the spheres of social relations which framed it, namely the ethnic group, the Muslim group and majority society and then to identify the obstacles and enablers which induced the situational logic of their action. The inner workings of each of these spheres provide them with opportunities and paths of autonomisation but also throw up obstacles and contradictions. This article is based on a large research project comparing women from Muslim communities in France and Britain between 2007 and 2011.
The environment presiding over these women’s life is articulated as two large interconnecting sets. The immediate circle within which they have been socialised consists of the family and the community while they also evolve within wider British society. The reasons behind separating the two go beyond the discrepancy habitually existing between family and societal modes of socialisation since, in this case, the subjects of our study belong to immigrant communities so that specific features of the society of origin may contrast as well as overlap with the characteristics of the society of settlement. Indeed, although many women from Muslim communities were born in the UK, they belonged to families who had immigrated and were newcomers in a given society of reception. Nevertheless, those were not a tabula rasa on arrival but brought with them modes of social interaction and a cultural baggage which were to an extent perpetuated in the society of settlement. Consequently, these populations somehow related to two different societal frameworks. They joined particular strata of the reception society within an established distribution of resources and found themselves slotted into sets of interests which they shared with the majority population while they also partook of specific interests pertaining to immigrant groups. Meanwhile, they carried with them the consciousness of their vested interests in the stratified social world of their society of origin; and the cultural properties associated with it. This created a situational logic to action whereby structure and culture relating to both societies of reference intertwined (Archer, 1995). The modes of social relations pre-dating migration were imparted through the family and community which for most women of Muslim background in Britain involved the extended family (biradari). Those women also forged their life in interaction with wider society. This complex concatenation of parameters must be taken into account in a study of MC women’s autonomisation. Furthermore, one central element and a sine qua non for the development of autonomy is to be found in the women’s self-reflexivity (Archer, 2007: 5) that underpins the meaning of action and lies at the heart of the analysis, rendering possible what Touraine (2013) calls subjectivation. The women nurture projects, hopes and aspirations which come up against constraints and enablements. Notwithstanding, freedom of interpretation is available to groups and individuals (Archer, 1995: 208), thanks to ‘one of the most important differentiating powers proper to people […], their intentionality’ (Archer, 1995: 198). Values, affects and subjective weighting intervene in the equation of choice, on the basis of discretionary judgements.
Sociological Intervention
As a methodology, sociological intervention (SI) derives from a specific theory of social action developed by Touraine (1973) within a Weberian framework: in his view social action is meaningful and subjectively oriented by responses to a situation because it is defined by social actors’ commitment to values, principles and rules. Moreover, social action cannot be separated from the social relations within which it is produced (Dubet, 1999). According to Touraine (1978) action is constructed through the integration of three principles:
Identity: how the actor defines himself.
Opposition: how the actor defines his opponent.
Totality: what is at stake in this relationship.
The collective action being researched is studied through bringing together a group of actors on a regular basis together with researchers and ‘interlocutors’. This method presupposes that actors can know what they are doing and see through ideologies and the spontaneous categories of practices (Dubet and Wieviorka, 1996) and it encourages the subjects’ self-reflexivity. It is grounded on the notion that a debate between actors and researchers within set conditions can produce knowledge, working on what is said, the group’s history and the analyses developed during discussions. What Dubet (1994) calls the sociology of experience enables its subjects to gain greater understanding about themselves and sociologists to acquire knowledge over the course of this transformative process. As the study progresses, the researcher proposes an interpretation of the collective action based on a hypothesis. During some of the sessions, interlocutors who are significant others in the life of the actors and their social relations are invited to debate with the group: they may be allies or opponents of the action. A kind of laboratory condition of the social action is thus created. Those ‘open’ sessions are interspersed with ‘closed’ sessions wherein the group and the researchers make an analysis of previous encounters, with the aim of arriving at an increasingly analytical attitude. The interlocutors place the actors in a social relationship so that the confrontation between the group and the interlocutors may bring out contradictions among members of the group and between rationalised discourse and practice. The variations observed reveal issues which ideology may cover up: Sociological intervention starts from the idea that the nature of a collective behaviour can be best known by interpreting the work performed by a group of actors as it analyses its own actions under conditions created by researchers and managed by both parties. (Touraine, 1978: 296)
One of Touraine’s objectives in the use of SI was initially to test whether social mobilisation could turn into a social movement; studies on new and sometimes incipient social movements such as the students’ movement, the feminist movement and Solidarnosc (Poland). This meant that SI groups were not composed of individuals who necessarily knew one another since one of the aims of the method was to test whether they would tend to coalesce towards a social movement. The method evolved subsequently, in particular with Dubet’s and Wieviorka’s research, to investigate experience and the capacity of individual and collective action, through a notion developed by Touraine himself, the capacity of subjectivation (Touraine, 2013). The method has been applied to study experience and explore the tensions between ‘belonging to a culture or having a sense of identity and […] participating in the world of rationality’ (Dubet and Wieviorka, 1996: 70). Dubet and Wieviorka (1996: 73) stress the need to shift ‘towards the conditions for increasing the capacity of individuals for autonomous actions’. This accounts for our choice of this methodology since one main objective of our research was to examine MC women’s autonomisation and capacity of action to develop their life plan and participation in the public space.
This research was part of a large comparative project on France and Britain. The empirical research for the British component included: a register of 50 associations derived from primary material, internet sites, telephone calls and visits to associations; 20 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with women in positions of influence in associations, campaigns, politics, education, media and so on; 20 interviews with women without such a high profile; 10 participant observations in associations; two SI groups and a questionnaire conducted face-to-face with 119 women (adapted, with Ipsos-MORI’s permission, from their annual Audit of Political Engagement). We found our informants in mosques, associations, political parties and through snowballing among our contacts from previous research. Our empirical research was held mostly in Birmingham and Coventry with secondary sites in London, Bradford, Manchester, Cardiff and Glasgow. The empirical research for this article which only deals with Britain was largely drawn from SI and interviews. The criterion for inclusion in the sample was that the women were part of communities whose background lies in Muslim majority countries, not their degree of practice or belief; Muslim communities in Britain being considered as a sociological category in this piece of research (Bowen et al., 2014: 4). Although a good proportion of those involved in the qualitative part of the research were of modest family background, most had a reasonable or high degree of education either acquired in Britain or prior to migration. The design and the funding of the project did not permit a good sample of women of modest background with a low level of education for a variety of reasons including language barriers. These women suffer from the same type of gender disadvantage as non-Muslim, working-class women. Belonging largely to poorer strata, their capacity to participate was reduced since they were disadvantaged by lack of means, resources, income, education and other tools in the same way as has been shown for women generally (Allwood and Wadia, 2000; Christy, 1994: 36–37). This was compounded for MC women by the probability of having traditional parents and of living in the inner city where tight community control was exercised. Moreover, this section of Muslim communities tended to count a greater number of newly arrived brides who might not speak English and had not been schooled in the UK. This entailed a lessened capacity of autonomisation.
Two SI groups of about 10–12 women each were formed for the benefit of this research. The composition of the groups took into account diversity in terms of ethnicity, country of origin, nationality, branch of Islam, residence status, marital status and age; from Bangladesh, Pakistan (Punjab and Azad Kashmir), India, East-Africa, Bosnia, Turkey and Kurdistan-Iraq. Most were from an Indian subcontinental background, reflecting the majority component of Muslim communities in Britain; largely British born although some were born in the country of origin. There were Sunnis and Shias. Two of the women were refugees. The first group, held in Birmingham with local women comprised mostly married women of varying ages who were or had been in employment, some of whom were first generation migrants. The second group at the University of Warwick (Coventry), included full-time and part-time students. This group was deliberately designed as distinct from the first one, to include women from different British regions, and more importantly, only younger women who were in the process and on the threshold of building their life plans. The fact that the groups differed in their composition allowed for a better grasp of nuances. They met weekly together with the researchers over several weeks (12 for the first group and six for the second group). The whole exercise included open sessions with invited interlocutors, significant others who could be considered as allies or adversaries of the women’s autonomisation and action in the public space; and closed sessions during which analysis was carried out by the members of the group together with the researchers. The interlocutors included: a journalist, trade-unionist, leader of NGO and community associations, leader of a Black women campaign, founder of a MC woman art group, leading member of Muslim Women Network UK, educationalist, imam, politicians (from several political parties), leaders of campaigns (Stop-the-War Coalition, anti-racist campaign) and a lady running a Muslim study group for women and so on. Normally SI meetings would have ceased after the final planned sessions as per the duration indicated above. However, the Birmingham group requested that we continue to meet twice a year after SI was completed. This took place for the following four years until one of the researchers moved abroad. SI involves a long-standing interaction between the researchers and informants. We paid careful attention to the ethical dimension involved in the research as vulnerable subjects were included. All participants to the research were fully informed about the project aims, methods and outcomes and in particular with regards to the SI approach. Researchers also answered any questions that arose in participants’ minds before, during and after the research was undertaken. They were informed that they had the right to withdraw at any point and the right to confidentiality; their identity would not be revealed if they so wished. Names were anonymised in this article.
Majority Society
It is not our purpose to examine all the internal cleavages within British majority society and the potential conflicts arising. They include inter alia regional, class, generational and gender differentiations; persistent inequalities between men and women despite laws, policies and women’s mobilisation to redress the gender balance; and the non-separation of the state and the church. We must not make hasty assumptions. For instance, MC women will not necessarily perceive the feminist movement positively. Likewise, the established church in Britain may be perceived as ally or adversary by Muslim communities (Beckford and Gilliat, 1998). British society is characterised by a number of traits which delineate the women’s sphere of action. This comprises a multicultural environment (Parekh, 2000), anti-discrimination legislation, the recognition of Islam in the public domain (Joly, 2012) and the promotion of political and philosophical liberalism stressing individual rights. British society is also fraught with prejudices and stereotypes based on race, colour, ethnicity and more recently on religious grounds targeting Islam; the latter having much increased since the 11 September 2001 twin tower attacks (9/11) and 7 July 2005 bombs in underground and bus (7/7), respectively in New York and London. Concerning MC women, additional stereotypes operate: the image of the passive, subdued, subordinated woman, incapable of autonomous thinking or action; and more recently, that of the terrorist/extremist such as ‘black widows’ in Tchetcheny and suicide jihadists in several regions of the world (Khiabany and Williamson, 2008; Williamson and Khiabany, 2010).
The women’s relationship to wider society displays complex features so that their interaction with British society sometimes acts as a constraint, their ethnicity or their religion constituting a potential hindrance in the pursuit of their projects. Early SI sessions brought forth several examples of prejudices quoted by the women. When Adelmira took on wearing a hijab ‘people started talking to [her] with words of one syllable!’ (Birmingham). When Reema left hospital after giving birth, a friendly nurse, convinced that she was confined to childcare, discharged her with a ‘see you next year, dear’ (Birmingham). The women took note of enduring racial discrimination based on colour but also dwelt on the anti-Muslim hostility following the 9/11 events, such as Sabreena who was spat at in the Birmingham city centre. They remarked that Islamophobia had been much enhanced by politicians’ discourse and government policies against ‘terrorism’, such as the Prevent Programme. A renewed concern was expressed about the anti-terrorist clamp down against Muslim communities and young men in particular. The women were acutely aware of the gravity of this phenomenon and of its political underpinnings.
Nonetheless, the women laid emphasis on the support they had enjoyed from British society. After comparing notes, all agreed that the situation had much improved over the last 20 years. Tahani (Birmingham), younger than Reema (Birmingham) corroborated that educational opportunities had increased as she experienced none of the dismissive attitude the latter had suffered from teachers. Regarding employment, the situation also seemed to have opened up. Zeinab found that British society considerably counterbalanced the constraints she experienced as a woman in her community: ‘I don’t think I had any obstacles from the wider society, not at all’ (Birmingham).
Moreover, the possibility to engage in work outside home was perceived as bestowing additional life opportunities and a worthwhile path of action: ‘extra training, getting involved with unions’ (Tahani, Birmingham). MC women’s aspirations themselves had changed as a consequence of living in Britain because their horizon had expanded beyond marriage and family (Adelmira, Birmingham). They generally recognised that living in British society granted them greater opportunities as women. In the 21st century, despite an adverse conjuncture with enhanced post-9/11 anti-Muslim prejudice and Muslim community constraints, Sabreena rose to a leadership position largely through the support of white activists who ‘took her seriously’: ‘[i]t’s a lot to do with, ironically, the fact that non-Muslims took us seriously’ (Birmingham). A new reality had been created awarding MC women pride of place in the Stop-the-War Coalition (Stop-the-War), which MC men would have been expected to dominate. This engendered a vast élan of activism on the part of MC women many of whom took part in demonstrations and campaigns related to the war. Observing such events, we witnessed the eruption of MC women’s participation in the public sphere, founding a variety of women’s associations, being active in wider society initiatives, becoming secretaries of Stop-the-War local branches.
For Tahira, one advantage of British society was that it allowed you to be British while keeping your religion (Coventry), a view shared by the women in both SI groups. One striking finding of our research is that the women in SI groups all considered themselves clearly part and parcel of British society. The expression of such sentiment grew as SI sessions progressed. Sabreena rebuked people asking her to choose between being British or Muslim: ‘I start really resenting […] [their question]’ (Birmingham). The majority of the women insisted that they were British Muslims, emphasising their identification with Britain. As seen below, this ‘Britishness’ includes a significant dimension correlated to empowerment within their community. The remainder of this article will show how, as SI advanced, they attained greater lucidity on how they negotiated tensions arising from their dual relationship to Britain and the ethnic group.
Ethnic Group
The ethnic groups that are relevant for our study are those formed from immigrant populations settled in Britain. There is a plethora of literature on the nature of ethnic groups and ethnicity which cannot be surveyed here (Fenton, 2003; Reitz et al., 2008; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). The ethnic group has been often deemed to provide protection and comfort within an unknown or hostile wider society, offering a familiar environment, cultural markers and some forms of solidarity. It has been considered inter alia as an intermediary group between the individual/family and society in the Durkheimian sense (Kivisto, 2007; Rex, 1995). However, one must be wary of essentialising ethnic groups and treating them as a monolith which does not allow for discrete individual or subgroup interests (Macey, 1999). The women risk suffering from the fact that the ethnic groups concerned encase them in a mostly disadvantageous relation of power as they are steeped in a traditional patriarchal culture wherein the extended family is paramount (Yuval-Davis, 1998). A woman faces assignation to well-defined roles according to the group’s conception of the family: as a daughter, a sister, a daughter-in law, a wife, a mother and a mother-in-law, predominantly defined as per the men of the family to whom she is bound by a specific range of duties. The women are also the receptacle of family ‘honour’, izzat, in the Indian subcontinent and much of the Muslim world; they are thus further constrained regarding what is allowed or taboo.
The Immediate Family, Parents and Husbands
The women taking part in SI groups all acknowledged the major role played by ethnic culture and community in their life, over and above religion. Accordingly, parents overwhelmingly influenced the capacity of action of their daughters. Indeed, they largely determined their daughters’ access to education, therefore also conditioning their chances of gaining employment and becoming more autonomous. They were key players in the choice of a husband which in turn governed much of their fate. Parents’ control regarding access to education or employment was sometimes criticised but this remained low-level, the women stressing their emotional bond with parents and close family. Parents and, in particular, mothers were sometimes instrumental in facilitating the women’s autonomisation. Observations about fathers were more ambivalent; they sometimes proved supportive of their daughters’ aspirations, but often restrictive. Occasionally, their very absence facilitated an increased autonomy. Altogether, the women favoured compromise with their parents. For instance, both older and younger women accepted the principle of an arranged marriage if it was ‘reasonably’ formulated, parents consulting the bride on their choice.
Husbands
The fundamental premise substantiated by the women was that they were partners in an unequal relationship with men and in particular with their husband; this is a situation that feminist movements have been fighting world-wide. Of greater interest are the modes and manifestations expressing this inequality and how they are distinctively felt among the subjects of our study. In some cases, the husband proved a complete obstacle to a project. Tahani who had gained a First in her Honours degree was to be sponsored by a firm to complete a highly regarded accountancy course she was keen to pursue. Nonetheless, she acquiesced to her husband’s opposition (Birmingham). With some couples, a compromise could be reached: Reema (Birmingham) was allowed by her husband to study for a degree as long as she took on the entire responsibility of their house and children as well as his parents’ house and care, even at exam time. She was not facing a double but a triple task. Despite her resentment, she accepted it. Married women found themselves weighing up and balancing out to what extent they could push the limits within what would be ‘acceptable to men folks in the family’ (Tahini, Birmingham). Discussions held during Birmingham SI evidenced the women’s compliance which did not seem to decrease over the weeks. Several women also acknowledged that they frequently connived in their own predicament out of an internalised sense of family duty. The SI process contributed to sharpen their own analysis about their situation. Moreover, we subsequently found from our contacts in Muslim communities that some had later increased their capacity of action. Reema eventually succeeded in volunteering with the Samaritans despite her husband’s categorical opposition, while also preserving her marriage. Tahini who had abandoned the accountancy course later set up her own business. The analysis of the women’s autonomisation and capacity of action carried out through SI was thus fed by these extra findings about the action they pursued independently.
Notwithstanding, other comments signalled fathers’ or husbands’ accommodation with what the women wished to undertake. Some husbands granted a great amount of freedom towards their wife’s outside activities and even sometimes supported them, mostly among younger couples. Shula (Birmingham) became a public figure and founded a nation-wide MC women’s association, with her husband’s unqualified support.
Community and Family In-Law
What emerged from SI discussions in both groups was a clear rejection of traditional patterns which concerned the community and family-in-law. The biradari and the community were blamed for engendering obstacles in the path of the women’s aspirations and initiatives. Reema’s husband and parents-in-law were submitted to pressure from community members, mostly elder men who argued against her pursuing her studies: ‘they were saying I was to get totally out of control, I was going to leave him’ (Birmingham). It was remarked that the denser the community the greater the scrutiny and constraints upon women (Andala, Husniya, Coventry). Sultana gave up doing voluntary work with alcoholics on account of the community’s disapproval because ‘it meant working predominantly with Asian men’ (Birmingham).
Concerning employment, similar issues were at stake: working outside home, with whom and doing what, was closely monitored. Sultana’s parents did not allow her to become a nurse because the wider group considered it a low-status job, handling men. Women who decided to take up employment or study had to make extra efforts to deliver their home responsibilities in order to silence the view that they ought to dedicate themselves to home duties. Additionally, they needed to pay special attention to their behaviour and ensure that not only modesty but also the evidence of it were preserved in every way: ‘I think you have to be extra izzat and appear extra izzat [honourable]’ (Sultana, Birmingham).
Marriage remained one of the key concerns. Traditionally, marriage chiefly constituted a biradari’s affair; most of the married women interviewed had accepted an arranged marriage. They commented at length on the implicit or explicit pressure which many young women have to endure so that they marry within the biradari. Those practices were identified readily as deriving from traditional culture, an ‘Asian’ characteristic. The women in SI virulently objected to the biradari’s encroachment in their lives and were adamant that it had no right to do so: ‘women, maybe they need to come to some agreement with their immediate family, but not in terms of the wider community’ (Sultana, Birmingham).
Second, over and above husbands, in-laws were generally targeted as prime culprits for many of the women’s problems at home and outside. According to traditions, a woman once married, belongs exclusively to her husband’s family and the couple lives with his parents. This question unleashed endless protests and complaints on the part of the women. They deemed it an established truth that sharing a house with in-laws was pregnant with difficulties. Women in that predicament were dealing with a trade-off. They might be permitted to engage in outside activities as long as the home front was meticulously catered for. This was the tale of several women. Older women could not be presumed to serve as allies since mothers-in-law stood to gain by the tradition, handing over their chores to daughters-in-law (Zeinab, Birmingham).
Although several women in the group went out to work and some were the main breadwinner, they largely complied with the tradition which placed their income under the control of the family head. However, despite a common baseline, concrete situations introduced nuances related to levels of education, social class and distance from immigration, whether first or second generation. In the meantime, criticisms concentrated on biradari and in-laws while parents and husbands were more indulged, undoubtedly because of the strong emotional bond with the latter two which the women did not wish to jeopardise.
Undoubtedly, many women contested the traditional approach regarding the biradari and the family-in-law. They aspired and drew closer to a nuclear family model, unfettered by community and/or in-laws obligations. This view became increasingly pronounced throughout SI sessions in Birmingham. The Coventry group which counted younger women educated in Britain reading for higher degrees did not contemplate any other option. The women’s identification with British society noted above takes its full meaning in the context of their wish to distance themselves from a traditional ethnic identification.
Islam, Muslim Group
Research has evidenced that religion plays a role in the efforts of immigrants to claim a place in the land of settlement (Warner, quoted in Kivisto, 2007: 1220; Hirschman, quoted in Kivisto, 2007: 1225). In their relationship with majority society in Britain, Muslim communities have come together to promote their interests qua Muslims. They initially organised locally and subsequently mobilised on a national basis: about the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (1988), on educational issues (late 1980s) and to challenge deprivation and Islamophobia (1990s and 2000s). Altogether, they have made a number of gains so that the practice of Islam and adjustments to make it possible are now accepted in most public institutions (Beckford et al., 2005). Muslim communities have joined ranks with sectors of the opposition against the war in Iraq and protested at the suspicions affecting Muslims since 9/11 and the 7/7 events (Joly, 2007; Joly and Wadia, forthcoming).
Muslim communities are fragmented on the basis of ethnic and/or national bases but also along theological lines, which create several communities and groups (Joly, 1995). In Britain the largest of these populations comes from the Indian subcontinent: Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and East African Asians. They are also those who were the first to settle and to make a place for Islam in British society thanks to their status as Commonwealth subjects/British citizens, so that they have achieved a kind of hegemony over other Muslim communities even after the latter increased in numbers; in the same way as Hirschman (quoted in Kivisto, 2007: 1225) describes for the Irish and Roman Catholicism in the USA.
One significant theological discrepancy divides Sufi branches and reform movements. The reformist/political movements are differentiated on the basis of Khalifes, sacred texts and their interpretations. Other Muslim strands purport to represent universalist currents in Islam which assume many hues. In addition, a minority has evolved into radical offshoots. Finally, ijtehad makes it possible to interpret the sacred texts and innovate. Consequently, in-group tensions and contradictions penetrate Muslim communities which give rise to complex relations of power.
Islam against Ethnic Tradition
The relations of power within Muslim communities display potential conflicts of interest between women and men, several of our informants protesting at male domination over Muslim organisations and places of worship. Some studies have depicted how Islam could be harnessed for the control of MC women in British society within patriarchal family/community structures, particularly among socially disadvantaged strata (Macey, 1999). However, Islam can also be appropriated differently by educated women (Amiraux, 2003; Tietze, 2001).
Jacobson (1997) showed how Islam competed with and sometimes superseded ethnic identification. Other researchers pursued this dichotomy between ethnic and Muslim identification, the latter being advanced as an argument to challenge ethnic tradition (Ryan, 2011; Zubaida, 2003). Most of our informants established a differentiation between ethnicity and Islam, finding in Islam a higher code which equipped them to challenge patriarchal ethnic tradition, a prevalent view in both SI groups. This was linked to their strong affirmations about being British, thus parting with some ethnic traditions. Reema chose to create a new type of identification for herself against the wishes of her family: ‘I see myself as a British Muslim, which does cause problems because the family thought that I have abandoned a part of my identity’ (Birmingham).
This identification was underpinned by issues of empowerment. Indeed, Islam was mobilised against tradition by the women with the aim of gaining greater autonomy; whether to further their right to education, to have a say in the choice of a husband or to engage in the public domain. Counterpoising Islam and tradition occupied much of a spirited debate in SI, the women listing cases to illustrate how Islam contradicted ethnic customs with increasing emphasis: for instance, they stressed that the marriages often foisted upon them by family and community contravened Islamic prescriptions. They claimed an Islamic right to their earnings against traditional approaches: ‘Islamically, if a woman works, that money is hers, her husband has no right on it at all!’ (Tahani, Birmingham). Duty to one’s own family stemmed from Islam whereas duty to family-in-law derived from tradition, declared Reema. In other words the women called upon Islam to challenge traditional ethnic practices which stood in the way of their engagement in study, work and participation in civic undertakings.
A Higher Moral Claim, an Individualised Islam
The women in SI groups adhered to different branches and schools of Islam and had expected much disagreement among themselves. They were delighted to discover the commonality of views thrown up in the debates. In particular, the moral dimension of Islam stood out as a feature which gathered quasi-unanimity among our informants over and above any kind of dogma. They found in Islam the guiding principles to ‘differentiate right from wrong’ and Islam was appropriated as a guide for action. Several of the women prioritised what they call ‘individual moral issues’ (Adelmira, Birmingham). Others extended their responsibility as Muslims to wider questions and quoted a ‘humanitarian’ duty (Sabreena, Birmingham) and even environmental issues. Islam was generally perceived as a guide for conduct which universalised rather than particularised their attitudes and actions.
The collective character of Islam was raised in both SI groups by a minority of women who posited that the group had a say in individuals’ modes of practice but discussions were concluded by an overwhelming convergence in favour of an individualised practice. For instance, all stressed that adopting a dress code absolutely derived from a personal choice. Younger women in the Coventry SI group were more resolute about their individual right to elect their mode of practice and several eschewed any outside prying, as did also Lulu in Birmingham: ‘I believe that my religion is between me and God.’ Among younger women, vigorous objections were levelled at what they considered to be normative Islam imposed from without. The ‘worthier than thou’ attitude which they sometimes faced was totally rejected: ‘and who are you?’ countered Tahira in exasperation (Coventry).
What was apparent was that they felt entitled to develop their own understanding of Islam and did not accept prescriptions or restrictions which they generally considered a means of control; males dictating to women. The interpretation and implementation of Islam by some reformist branches thus encountered strong disapproval by the women who did not fail to point out the increased curtailment those entailed for female autonomy. Beyond disagreements about implementation, some women questioned aspects of the Quran itself, mostly on issues of gender equality (Sultana, Birmingham). All opposed the male dominance of interpretations, Ahlam (Birmingham) calling on female initiatives to interpret the sacred text since ‘Quran has always been interpreted by male, never by a woman’. The arguments put forward by some Muslims to keep women out of the public space or to prevent them from leading prayers were flatly rejected by the Coventry group, including the supposed sexual temptation the latter exercised since ‘a woman is not responsible for what a bloke thinks and that’s his thought then that he should be controlling’ (Tahira, Coventry).
Post-9/11 Events
For MC women, the enhanced salience of Islam, exacerbated by 9/11 events, has been the bearer of mitigated outcomes. In the first instance, the 9/11 and 7/7 events brought Islam to the forefront internationally as in Britain, triggering a backlash against Muslims in western societies. The women cogently debated the political dimensions played out on the national and international plane and noted their unintended consequences, namely the promotion of more radical/reformist branches of Islam. They not only condemned the violence emanating from radical Islam but also the rigid dogma of political reformist branches such the Jamaati Islami. For instance, they denounced the separation of men and women which those branches promoted. Furthermore, they pointed to the group enclosure which resulted from the growing anti-Muslim hostility. ‘I think it is because politically we are so intimidated […]. Muslims are sort of sticking together and going back to that [stricter] notion of Islam’ (Ahlam, Birmingham). The women were clearly conscious that criticising Muslim communities’ male control in order to gain greater autonomy became more problematic because of their sense of loyalty to the group under attack.
By the same token, women’s involvement in collective action was promoted by the 9/11 and 7/7 events which acted as catalysers of action for MC women; in the words of Sadiqa ‘I was given a role as a spokesperson’ (Coventry). In an adverse conjuncture whereby the expansion of traditional or radical branches of Islam militated against the participation of women, Sabreena rose to a leadership position in Stop-the-War and then became a founding member and one of the leaders of a new opposition party, Respect. Several SI women had taken part in Stop-the-War demonstrations, a participation which launched them into the public space. A noticeable number of MC women in Britain joined in, taking on regional and local positions in Stop-the-War. Numerous MC women’s associations were also created to pursue a variety of issues such as domestic violence, discrimination, empowerment, education, Islamophobia, social questions, political participation and so on. Funding came forth through the Prevent Programme which although very controversial enabled many MC women’s initiatives, including non-mainstream ones. Nadeema (Coventry) explained that her female Islamic Arts company hitherto ignored was considered worthy of funding after the 7/7 events. MC women’s activism became recognised by the government, British society and their own community. Sabreena herself was amused at the way her public involvement became increasingly acceptable to traditional Muslims when she mustered untold following in Stop-the-War: ‘So then, sort of the theology changed!’ (Birmingham). The women seemed to assert their practice of Islam independently of both ethnic group’s pressure and British society’s prejudice, with a confidence unmatched among Ryan’s (2011) informants.
For our informants, the salience of Islam lies at the interface of contradictions between traditional culture and majority society: it is the sword for their Gordian knot. MC women are confronted with multiple demands and aspirations: the norms of British society, those of the community and family, their own individual and collective projects. Much of our research points to Islam as a significant vector permitting to negotiate diverse influences. For those who had attended women’s Islamic study groups, the strength of the group and its discussions functioned as a consciousness-raising and capacity-building mechanism. Islam thus appears as an instrument enabling greater autonomy and agency while allowing the avoidance of a break with family and community. These findings clearly applied to the vast majority of women in our sample. 1
SI methodology enabled the researchers to present their analysis to the scrutiny of the group in the final session, on the basis of what had emerged throughout SI. One general comment was that SI encounters had clarified their relationship to their reference groups and had informed their aspirations to further deploy their autonomy. As Sultana said humorously: ‘it has ruined us’ (Birmingham). Almost all in both groups stated that Islam helped them to feel part and parcel of British society without the need to break with their ethnic community. Moreover, it provided them with a guide for day-to-day conduct and a moral guide for action within European society in which they ventured. The Birmingham SI group fully embraced the analysis which the researchers proposed in terms of their relationship to Islam, the ethnic community and British society. They concluded with the researchers that Islam was a vector between ethnic community and British majority society: a moral chart and guide in their interaction with both spheres. None were prepared to sever links with their kin and affects, despite their begrudging of traditional culture. They sought a path of action which satisfied deep values they adhered to and would also present parents and community with a legitimate challenge. Islam and its sacred texts lent themselves to be invoked as a guide of action superior to tradition; it fomented values above norms. Calling upon sacred texts, the women counterpoised those to community traditions, while asserting their wish to remain part of those communities. Religion supplied the women with a central site for the dual task of remaining connected to the past while simultaneously preparing for the future. Furthermore, MC women’s religious stance awarded them ‘respectability’, ‘a source of status claim’ within and outside of the ethnic community (Kivisto, 2007: 1231). Such findings challenge assumptions and stereotypes that Islam inherently isolates its believers from the modern world. The women totally supported this analysis and emphasised their determination to reject fundamentalist strands of Islam which worked towards separation from British society.
The Coventry group comprising unmarried students (barring one who was divorced) proposed a slightly different reading of their interaction with the reference groups. For them British society and ethnic community belonged to two different realms. The relationship with family and community was situated on an emotional and personal plane while study, work and activism pertained to British majority society; the twain barely met so that the women did not feel torn between the two. As for Islam, they conceived it as totally individualised. While they deplored and criticised men and community views of how a ‘good’ Muslim woman should behave, they did not let anyone interfere. Their Islam was personalised almost in a secularised form. Regarding gender equality, none of the women had the slightest doubt about being entitled to exactly the same rights and prerogatives as men. They took it for granted that this was acquired and declared that they were not ready to engage into the compromise which many married women had adopted: in the face of a community that would expect them to get married according to traditional formulae, they were not going to let a man stand in the way of their career or their public activities. Those young women were affirmative that they would remain single if acquiring a husband was to result in the denial of equal opportunities and outside activities. All declared a strong commitment to outside activities and displayed an engagement with some aspect of collective action. There is no way to be certain that all or some would strictly observe these pronouncements in the future but there are indications that several might succeed. First, one who had been married had mustered the audacity to obtain a divorce (which caused her much grief from family and community), precisely because she wanted to preserve her capacity to choose. Second, the young women had become increasingly assertive about the will to protect their autonomy as SI progressed. Finally, through contacts, we came to know that one woman had subsequently resisted momentous parents’ pressure and selected a husband who fitted the bill.
Conclusion
Our research squarely challenges prevalent images of women from Muslim communities as passive, subdued and subordinated through evidence of their autonomisation and capacity of action, which are situated at the nexus of multiple tensions and contradictions within and between their various reference groups. While those women may act in solidarity with the ethnic group, they tend to defend their interests qua women although not necessarily within mainstream feminist movements; on the contrary, many prefer to build separate organisations and forms of action, which can take on board their racial, religious and gender disadvantage. They take part in majority society’s public space. In addition, although they may take a stance in defence of their religious group against society’s hostility to Islam, they more often engage in action independently of Muslim communities’ men. Paths and forms of action are thrown up by the enmeshment of multifarious factors deriving from the changing nature of contradictions between and within the different reference groups. In all cases, subjective factors also play a role according to the women’s awareness of and sensitivity to particular issues. Differentiated strategies are developed by the women in relation to the objectives pursued and the meanders of obstacles and enablers they encounter as per their bargaining powers and negotiating strengths. What is noticeable is the expanding presence and participation of MC women in the public sphere, a sure indication of their increased autonomisation and capacity of action.
Footnotes
Funding
This article arose as a result of an ESRC funded research project led by Danièle Joly and Khursheed Wadia: Women from Muslim Communities and Politics in Britain and France [Award Ref: RES-062-23-0380]. My thanks also go to the IEA and the CADIS.
