The Stateless Person,the Citizen and Human Rights: A Revised Neo-Hobbesian Theory of Human Rights for Sociology

Introduction

Apart from a handful of attempts (see, for example, Chernilo, 2013: 97–107; Leahy, 2020; Turner, 1997; Van Krieken, 2002; Wickham, 2014; Wickham and Evers, 2012) to establish the relevance of Thomas Hobbes for sociology, his social theory has generally been ignored or dismissed by sociologists. For the most part, mentions of Hobbes are few and brief within the discipline (Wickham, 2014: 148). Elias (1996: 365), for example, observes in passing that Hobbes theorises power and violence and belongs to a group of thinkers whose ‘writings about society’ were written for ‘members of governments’ (Elias, 2009: 61; see also Wickham and Evers, 2012, who attempt to link key ideas and approaches of Elias and Hobbes).

Ferdinand Tönnies is one notable exception; several scholars (Adair-Toteff, 2019: 70–71; Bond, 2011; Chernilo, 2013: 162; Harris, 2001: x, xii–xiii, xxv; Loomis and McKinney, 2002: 1; Wickham, 2014: 148) point to Hobbes as a major influence in Tönnies’ thought. Harris (2001: ix), for example, notes that Tönnies considered Hobbes to be one of ‘the true inventors and masters of theoretical sociology’ (see also Adair-Toteff, 2019: 70–71; Harris, 2001: xxv), and that Hobbes inspired Tönnies’ use of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft as ideal-typical models (Harris, 2001: xxv). Having been ‘initiated . . . into the social theory of Hobbes’ early in his career (Bond, 2011: 1177, see also 1179), Tönnies held hope of becoming a ‘Hobbes scholar’ (Harris, 2001: xiv–xv).

Besides retrieving several neglected manuscripts of Hobbes, producing a monograph on Hobbes in 1896, and editing Hobbes’ Elements of Law in 1888 (Hobbes, 1928) and Behemoth in 1889, Tönnies’ substantial work on Hobbes can be found in four articles entitled ‘Anmerkungen über die Philosophie des Hobbes’ published between 1879 and 1881 in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie (Adair-Toteff, 2019: 70–71; Bond, 2011; Harris, 2001: xii–xiii). According to Adair-Toteff (2019: 70–71; see also Bond, 2011: 1179), in these articles Tönnies discusses ‘Hobbes’ general political philosophy’, ‘his conception of the will and the discord in social life’, ‘Hobbes’ notion of natural equality, the function of legal contracts, and the role of the sovereign in the state and society’. The translation into English of this Hobbesian scholarship by a founding thinker of the discipline might make an important contribution to the recovery of Hobbes as a social theorist. Indeed, Bond (2011: 1198; see also 1200) argues Tönnies’ engagement with Hobbes is ‘an urgent research desideratum’ both for sociological and Hobbesian scholarship.

Instead, it is Parsons’ (1968: 89–97) interpretation of Hobbes that has enjoyed an enduring influence within sociology and has, as Wickham (2014: 149) argues, had the effect of ‘wiping Hobbes from an entire discipline’. As both Wickham (2014: 149–150) and Van Krieken (2002: 258–260) explain, Parsons ignores the important social and normative elements of Hobbes’ theory and, moreover, portrays the absence of these elements as a major flaw in Hobbes’ work. Van Krieken (2002: 258–261) observes that of the handful of sociologists who engage with Hobbes to any degree, most of them follow Parsons’ influential ‘misreading’ of Hobbes. For example, although Runciman (2010: 5) describes Hobbes’ Leviathan as ‘a work of sociology which must . . . be assessed as such’, he overlooks key aspects of Hobbes’ social thought and argues that Hobbes fails to produce anything of value for sociology (2010: 54–86; see also Habermas, 1996: 90–92, who criticises an absence of social and normative elements in Hobbes’ theory).

A further aspect of Parsons’ reading that is replicated in the conventional sociological treatment of Hobbes (see, for example, Chernilo, 2013: 102–103) is his neglect of the social dimensions of Hobbes’ conception of rights; indeed, Parsons makes no mention of Hobbesian rights. The extent of Parsons’ influence in relation to this disciplinary neglect is unclear, given sociology’s traditional hostility towards rights (see Somers and Roberts, 2008: 386), a hostility that Somers and Roberts (2008: 386, n. 4) argue ‘is a symptom of its neglect of Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and liberal political theory more generally’. In any event, the tendency to ignore Hobbes’ theory of rights extends into the sociology of human rights, where one can find only passing mention (see Carrabine, 2006: 192) of Hobbesian rights among the small number of writers (see, for example, Beck, 2014: 172, 178–179; Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 664, 672, 2014: 3; Smith, 2004: 416) who refer to the work of Hobbes.

This subdisciplinary unwillingness to engage with Hobbes’ theory of rights is particularly evident in the work of Turner (1993, 1995, 1997, 2003, 2006, 2013), who outlines (Turner, 1997) a ‘neo-Hobbesian theory of human rights’ that ignores Hobbes’ treatment of rights, save for a reference (Turner, 2006: 1) to the idea of ‘the universal rights of human beings’ as being relevant to Hobbes’ work. This is a missed opportunity on the part of Turner, as he seeks to highlight the sociological significance of Hobbes and to promote human rights as a social concept. Hobbes’ conceptualisation of rights sits firmly within his social theory and can be seen as an early example of the theorisation of individual rights as a social concept.

The article begins by setting out Turner’s approach to human rights and the Hobbesian ideas he adopts. It then points to elements of Hobbes’ theory that it argues would strengthen Turner’s neo-Hobbesian account. Key among these ideas are Hobbes’ treatment of rights, as they apply to both the citizen and the stateless person, and the importance he places on the social conditions of the rights-bearer. The article also seeks to resolve some perceived differences between the two thinkers that Turner (1997: 567, 2006: 26, 32, 2013: 248) argues prevent him fully embracing Hobbes, including ideas in relation to reason, aggression and individualism. It then looks at the role of normativity in Turner’s theory, which it argues represents a significant departure from a Hobbesian perspective. The article concludes by suggesting ways in which a revised neo-Hobbesian approach that incorporates his rights thought and social thought provides a strengthened theoretical basis for the empirical investigation of human rights.

Turner’s Foundationalist Approach to Human Rights

Turner is among a small number of sociologists who take a foundationalist approach to human rights (see also Sjoberg, 1996: 280–281). He provides a universalist account of the human that is sufficiently minimalist to allow for the universal relevance of human rights. For Turner (2006: 29), a key characteristic of the human is vulnerability, or frailty, which ‘includes the idea that human beings of necessity have an organic propensity to disease and sickness, that death and dying are inescapable, and that aging bodies are subject to impairment and disability’. As a biological feature of all individuals, vulnerability represents a ‘minimal criterion of commonality’ (Turner, 1993: 505, see also Turner, 1995: 4) and is therefore ‘the common basis of human rights’ (Turner, 2006: 1).

Vulnerability is also a fundamentally social condition, as the human response to vulnerability is to establish a protective canopy in the form of social institutions, including ‘courtship, the family, religion, rituals, eating patterns, sleeping arrangements, and political ceremonials’ (Turner, 2006: 28). However, the inherent precariousness of these institutions in turn impacts human vulnerability (Turner, 2006: 28). This ongoing relationship between vulnerability and social precariousness is a universal feature of the human condition (Turner, 1993: 501–503, 2006: 126) and represents Turner’s ‘foundational justification’ (Turner, 1995: 4) for human rights ‘defined as universal principles’ (Turner, 2006: 6).

Turner’s minimalist approach allows for flexibility in relation to the content of human rights; different categories of rights accord to the different kinds of circumstances that render the human vulnerable. A number of human rights may be necessary in order to ensure the security and well-being of the individual, including rights relating to both physical and mental well-being (Turner, 1997: 566), as well as environmental, indigenous, cultural, reproductive and sexual rights (Turner, 1997: 567–568, 2001: 206, 2006: 36–37, 46–49, 69, 109–110). This minimalist approach is also flexible in relation to the form human rights might take, including as formal laws, as ‘social claims for institutionalised protection’ (Turner, 1993: 489), as ‘entitlements’ (Turner, 1995: 6) and as ‘protective institutions’, that is, ‘human rights as a protective canopy’ (Turner, 2003: 278).

Turner’s Neo-Hobbesian Approach

Turner argues his foundationalist approach mirrors key ideas in the natural law theory of Hobbes, particularly Hobbes’ depiction of the vulnerable individual and theorisation of a protective canopy established to secure the individual’s safety. He asserts (Turner, 1993: 504) ‘the frailty of human beings can be summed up in the Hobbesian phrase of “nasty, brutish and short”’ (see also Turner, 1995: 4, 1997: 567, 2003: 276–277, 2006: 26), recalling Hobbes’ well-known depiction of the life of the individual in the state of nature (see Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 89), an important conceptual device in Hobbes’ work. For Turner (2006: 32), the Hobbesian state of nature is an account of vulnerable individuals living in the absence of a protective canopy. He describes (Turner, 1993: 503) his twin concepts of vulnerability and social precariousness as ‘a version of Hobbesian responses to the state of nature in terms of the creation of political order through a contract’ (see also Turner, 1997: 567, 2003: 278, 2013: 248). The Hobbesian state of nature and social contract are discussed in more detail below.

However, missing from his neo-Hobbesian theory is an account of Hobbes’ conceptualisation of rights. This is in keeping with Parsons’ (1968: 89–97) influential reading of Hobbes that similarly ignores Hobbes’ treatment of rights. Regardless of the possible influence of Parsons, it is not surprising Turner overlooks Hobbes’ theory of rights, given Hobbes’ well-known depiction of rights in the state of nature. A central feature of his natural law theory is that the exercise of individual rights in the state of nature leads not to social cooperation but perpetual war, which entails, at the very least, mutual distrust among people (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 88–89, 1998[1642]: 29–30). Hobbes’ treatment of rights is ostensibly incompatible with a sociological approach that promotes the treatment of human rights as a social concept.

The Vulnerable Human in the Hobbesian State of Nature

The Hobbesian state of nature is to be understood, according to Wrong (1994: 16), as akin to a Weberian ideal type. It is a depiction of social life among ‘fragile’ humans outside the state (Hobbes, 1998[1642]: 26, see also 11–12; Van Krieken, 2002: 259). In short, it is a portrayal of the extreme vulnerability of statelessness. The state of nature is a lawless space, characterised by ‘the absence of a central authority’ (Van Krieken, 2002: 259; see also Halldenius, 2007: 703; Wickham, 2014: 147). As such, it is also a morally relativist space (see Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 90). Hobbes opposes the traditional assumption in natural law thought that there is a moral order ‘inherent in the structure of the world’ (Haakonssen, 2002: 28, see also Haakonssen, 2004: 93–94). He instead produces a subjective account of morality: perceptions of good and evil differ from one person to the next (Tuck, 1989: 52–53) and are usually based on their personal ‘desires’ and ‘aversions’ (Hunter, 2011: 480; see Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 39). In the absence of law, therefore, ‘nothing can be Unjust’ (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 90, see also Hobbes, 1998[1642]: 28–29). This subjective account of morality has implications for Hobbes’ treatment of rights.

Hobbes (1996[1651]: 91, 93, 96) holds that individuals possess an inalienable natural right to self-preservation. In the morally relativist Hobbesian state of nature, therefore, individuals can subjectively interpret their natural right to self-preservation; they can rightly act in any way they see fit to secure their own survival (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 91, 1998[1642]: 27–28; see also Tuck, 1989: 60–64). This effectively amounts to ‘a Right to every thing; even to one anothers [sic] body’ (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 91). Individuals therefore remain fearful of each other’s willingness to use force to survive (Raphael, 1977: 31).

In this relativist environment, conflict also frequently emerges among individuals in relation to ‘passionately held beliefs and opinions’ (Van Krieken, 2002: 259) particularly in relation to ‘what is good’ (Wickham, 2014: 143). Indeed, Hobbes well understood the lethal power of moral conviction; his major relevant works were written during a period of violent religious sectarianism in Europe that included the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) and the English Civil War (1642–1651). The first edition of De Cive, or On the Citizen, was published in 1642, a precursor to Leviathan, published in 1651. A driving concern of his was to consider how people holding differing religious and moral beliefs might live together in relative peace (Wickham, 2014: 141–144, 151). His stated aim in On the Citizen (Hobbes, 1998[1642]: 21), for example, is to ‘lay out the conditions of society’ so that people can preserve ‘themselves from each other’s violence’. In his Preface to the readers (Hobbes, 1998[1642]: 15) he states that his ‘passion for peace’ underlies his work.

For Hobbes (1996[1651]: 92), seeking peace is a key self-preserving action; in the terminology of natural law, it is a ‘Fundamentall Law of Nature’. However, when faced with conditions where peace cannot be obtained, the individual has a right to ‘see, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre’ (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 92). Given the uncertainty and danger that persists in the Hobbesian state of nature, it is prudent to be prepared to use violence in order to protect oneself (Curley, 1994: xxi–xxiii; Sorell, 1991: 96; Thornton, 2002: 618). This leads to the infamous war of all against all (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 88) that characterises social relations in the Hobbesian state of nature. It is important to add that Hobbes (1996[1651]: 88–89, 1998[1642]: 29–30) makes clear that the warring state of nature is not one of endless violence, but the constant threat of violence arising out of a pervading mutual distrust.

Hobbes’ treatment of natural rights would seem therefore to be fundamentally incompatible with Turner’s (2006: 34) argument that human rights ought to be universally applied to protect the vulnerable human. Hobbesian natural rights, as they operate in the state of nature, effectively intensify the vulnerability of individuals. Indeed, Hobbes (1998[1642]: 29, emphasis in original) argues that in that space it is ‘almost the same as if there were no right at all’. However, a more detailed reading of Hobbes’ treatment of rights takes into account not only their operation within the state of nature, but within the space Hobbes calls society.

The Rights-Bearing Citizen in Hobbesian Society

As his depiction of the state of nature makes clear, Hobbes rejects the idea that society naturally forms among interacting people (Haakonssen, 1996: 35; Wickham, 2014: 143). Although the Hobbesian state of nature depicts a social space, it is not to be considered a society in any sense (see Hobbes, 1998[1642]: 11–12; Wickham, 2014: 143). As Westerman (1998: 182–183; see also Chernilo, 2013: 98) notes, society for Hobbes is ‘artificial’. Wickham (2014: 140), who promotes the use of a Hobbesian conception of society in sociology, observes that the social space Hobbes calls ‘society’, and at times ‘civil society’, is ‘a distinct domain of peaceful, secure human interaction’ secured by the sovereign state.

Hobbes depicts the establishment of the state as occurring via the social contract. Like the state of nature, the social contract, according to Wrong (1994: 16), functions as an ideal type. Hobbes acknowledges that as an origin story, it diverges considerably from the conditions of formation of many states (Wrong, 1994: 16; see also Ewin, 1991: 19). The Hobbesian social contract merely highlights key characteristics of the state; it is a model employed ‘to show that social life must have certain features the presence of which would be guaranteed if a contract had been the method of generation’ (Ewin, 1991: 2, emphasis in original).

The Hobbesian social contract is a broad agreement among individuals to leave the state of nature by installing a civil authority (see Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 121). Individuals residing in the state of nature come to understand that only in conditions of social peace will their natural right to self-preservation be safeguarded (Arblaster, 1984: 136). They therefore covenant, ‘every one, with every one’ (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 121), that is, ‘each individual with everyone else’ (Skinner, 1996: 312; see also Raphael, 1977: 36), to lay down their subjective power of ‘private judgement’ in relation to that right (Tuck, 1989: 64). It is an agreement that fundamentally alters the operation of rights.

The Hobbesian state secures the rights of its citizens via positive law, or what Hobbes (1996[1651]: 185) calls ‘Civill Law’, that is, the law of the civil authority or state. The state safeguards the natural right of self-preservation by rendering it a ‘civil right’, as Kriegel (1995: 40, emphasis in original) points out; it ‘confers reality on a right that remained virtual in the state of nature’. Thus, it is only when natural rights are rendered positive rights under state law that the rights of all individuals are realised. In the relative safety of society, rights are exercised within the limits of the law (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 185); they no longer represent a threat to others. In society, therefore, sociability, rather than distrust, is conducive to one’s self-preservation (see Schneewind, 1998: 90). Hobbes’ contrasting depictions of the operation of rights in the state of nature and society point to the important social dimensions of his model of rights: the exercise of individual rights is always played out within a social context.

Turner (1993: 503) touches on some of the social elements of Hobbes’ theory; he notes that Hobbesian individuals in the state of nature ‘create an authority . . . in order to establish the conditions of social peace’, and that Hobbesian individuals ‘create a state through a social contract, which organizes social space’ (Turner, 2013: 248). However, his neglect of the role of rights in Hobbes’ theory compromises his neo-Hobbesian position.

Turner (1993: 501, 503, 1997: 567, 2003: 278–279, 2006: 33, 2013: 248) argues that the Hobbesian state illustrates rather too well his core idea of the inherent precariousness of the social canopy. For Turner (1993: 504; see also 1997: 567, 2003: 278–279) the strong Hobbesian state that necessarily holds a monopoly on the means of violence is ‘quintessentially precarious’: as it must be ‘sufficiently powerful to regulate social space’, it can ‘evolve in an authoritarian direction which will come to destroy or oppress, the very citizens who, by mutual contract, put it in place’. He argues (Turner, 2006: 32–33) vulnerable individuals therefore require the protection of rights to counter this dangerous Hobbesian tendency. For Turner (1993: 502) human rights, which exist ‘beyond the state, are crucial in protecting individuals against state violence, or at least in providing the normative grounds on which individuals could be protected against state violence’.

However, as Turner neglects Hobbes’ theory of rights, he fails to notice that Hobbes (1996[1651]: 150–151) theorises important limitations on state power in the form of rights. A core duty of the Hobbesian state is to safeguard the rights of its citizens (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 153, 202; see also Carmichael, 1990: 12; Kriegel, 1995: 41). Hobbesian citizens therefore have a right to resist the state when it fails to honour this duty (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 151; see also Carmichael, 1990: 4–6; Kriegel, 1995: 40). Indeed, to surrender the right to self-preservation would be to negate the state’s reason for existence (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 153, 202; see also Kriegel, 1995: 40–41, 2002: 15). While the circumstances for resisting the state are extremely narrow – the right to resist is held only by those whose natural right to self-preservation is threatened by the state (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 150–154) – the right of resistance nevertheless operates as a check on state power.

Certainly, it could be argued that the limited circumstances in which the right of resistance arises demonstrate that it is a less than reliable means to offer effective protection against state power. However, this article suggests that a revised neo-Hobbesian theory of human rights can treat the right of resistance as a theoretical concept emblematic of more expansive rights enjoyed by citizens of contemporary states. Indeed, Carmichael (1990: 4–6) points out that Hobbes lists a range of rights that derive from the right of resistance, all of which are ‘equally permitted’, including the right of non-incrimination and the right to steal if one is destitute (see also Curley, 1994: xxxviii; Tierney, 1997: 81). In a contemporary context, more expansive rights may include those relating to both physical and mental well-being. This approach resembles Turner’s concomitant minimalist and yet flexible approach to human rights explained earlier (see Turner, 1997: 566).

The Importance of Enforceable Law

Hobbes’ account of the means by which the state secures rights points to a further contemporary parallel: key differences between international human rights law and state law in the 21st century mirror those between natural law and state law in Hobbes’ work. Hobbes highlights the impotence of natural law. He argues (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 111) that natural law contains merely ‘Conclusions, or Theorems’ regarding actions conducive to self-preservation relevant to one’s social circumstances (see also Curley, 1994: xxxi). It does not act as law per se. For Hobbes (1996[1651]: 185), laws that do not produce obligations ‘are not properly laws’. As detailed earlier, the fundamental natural law to seek peace does not oblige individuals to do so. Indeed, it is unwise to seek peace in the state of nature. It is only when natural law is ‘collapsed into the sovereign’s law’ (Condren, 2002: 68) that the natural law to seek peace is secured. For Hobbes (1996[1651]: 185, 202), enforceability requires a ‘sovereign Power’ capable of producing obligation to laws.

Just as the Hobbesian individual in the state of nature cannot rely on natural law for protection, the contemporary stateless person cannot rely on international human rights laws for protection. They cannot rely on laws that exist outside or above a sovereign body. A number of human rights sociologists (see Hajjar, 2005: 207; Morris, 2010: 1–7; Nash, 2011a: 2, 2011b: 6, 2015: 41–66) point to the importance of the sovereign state for the enforceability of human rights, including Turner (2006: 3), who notes that ‘human rights without the support of a sovereign state . . . are merely abstract claims that cannot be enforced’. However, while he acknowledges (Turner, 2013: 250) that ‘the problem of the enforcement of human rights in the absence of global governance remains an important practical concern’, he appears to turn away from the practical nature of this problem, and indeed further away from his Hobbesian position, when he appeals to the ‘possibility’ of ‘international law and human rights as the common basis of morality’.

Resolving Some Perceived Differences between Turner and Hobbes

Before discussing Turner’s normative position, it is necessary to examine briefly some prima facie differences between himself and Hobbes that Turner seeks to assert. Turner (1997: 567, 2006: 32, 2013: 248) argues Hobbes’ theorisation of a ‘rational’ and ‘antagonistic’ individual is incompatible with a minimalist account of the vulnerable human. He further argues (Turner, 1993: 505–506) that Hobbes’ focus on reason as a way to resolve ‘human nastiness’ is incompatible with a sociological approach, as are the ‘individualistic assumptions’ (Turner, 2006: 26) of Hobbes’ contractarian theory (see also Turner, 2003: 277, 2006: 32). However, a closer look at Hobbes’ approach to reason, aggression and sociability reveals that the two authors’ approaches have more in common than Turner’s reading suggests.

Given his portrayal of social life in the state of nature, it is clear that for Hobbes, reason cannot resolve nastiness. In keeping with his subjective account of morality, the exercise of reason in the state of nature amounts to ‘whatever reasoning the agent thinks right’ (Schneewind, 1998: 89). The subjective exercise of reason is in part the basis for the misery that prevails in the state of nature and cannot be relied on as a basis for sustained peaceable social relations (Wickham, 2014: 143–144). Hobbes (1996[1651]: 91) argues that as long as people are left to use their ‘own Reason . . . there can be no security to any [person]’.

Turner’s (1993: 503) suggestion that in Hobbes’ narrative ‘it is difficult for rational humans to live amicably . . . because competition drives them against each other’ accords too great a significance to rationality as a characteristic of the Hobbesian individual. For Hobbes, people possess just enough reason to agree on the need for the establishment of a civil authority in order to leave the state of nature (Condren, 2002: 69–70; Wickham, 2014: 140). The agreement requires that individuals put aside their personal, subjective exercise of reason to secure social peace (Tuck, 1989: 64). Hobbes’ position thus supports Turner’s (1993: 505–506) assertion that to point to rationality as a way to resolve ‘human nastiness’ is doubtful. As Wickham (2014: 144) points out, Hobbes ‘warns his readers that if they allow too much of a role for reason, they will themselves be reasoning erroneously’.

Perceived differences between the two authors in relation to aggression are similarly resolved on a closer reading of Hobbes. Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature makes clear that aggression is not a natural demeanour of the individual. He portrays the resort to aggression as a prudent response to particular social conditions (see Hobbes, 1998[1642]: 10–12; Schneewind, 1998: 90). As Van Krieken (2002: 259, emphasis in original) explains, the Hobbesian state of nature is inhabited by ‘entirely socialized individuals’.

Similar observations can be made in relation to the so-called individualism of Hobbes’ theory. Turner (2003: 276–277) contrasts Hobbesian individualism with his own emphasis on ‘intimacy and sociality in the midst of hardship’ and ‘trust and solidarity in patterns of friendship’ (see also Turner, 2006: 26). However, Hobbes (1998[1642]: 31) too emphasises the importance of sociality and seeking peace when it is safe to do so (see also Sorell, 1991: 96). The establishment of society allows for the emergence of the sociable, peaceable citizen (see Hunter, 2011: 480–482; Schneewind, 1998: 90). Hobbes (1998[1642]: 25) provides a non-essentialist view of sociability; he argues that individuals are ‘made fit for society not by nature, but by training’.

In his descriptions of both the state of nature and society, Hobbes depicts a socially embedded individual. As Van Krieken (2002: 259) observes, ‘[l]ike any sociologist, Hobbes took it for granted that humans are made – by discipline, education or as we would call it today, socialization – rather than born’. Hobbes’ state of nature, a concept that illustrates the uncertainties of social life outside the state, would not function as intended if it ignored the social embeddedness of the individual. Hobbes’ depiction of the vulnerable individual in the state of nature grounds his theorisation of the importance of society (Wickham, 2014: 140), just as Turner’s theorisation of the vulnerable individual grounds the importance of a social canopy in his work. Hobbes’ non-essentialist view of sociability, however, points to a more enduring difference between the two rights theorists in relation to the role of normativity in their respective approaches.

Turner and Hobbes on the Power of Values

For Hobbes, given the power of moral convictions to inspire violence among individuals in the state of nature, the establishment of social peace via the state is necessarily underscored not by an appeal to values that transcend the state, but by minimalist, civic values relating to ‘peace and security’ only (Wickham, 2014: 140; see Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 121). The state puts an end to the dangerous moral relativism of the state of nature by creating a minimal ‘moral consensus’ (Tuck, 1989: 58) in the form of ‘Civill Lawes’ (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 185; see also Skinner, 1996: 314). It tolerates differing religious and moral views among its citizens, so long as those views are not invoked to incite violence or otherwise threaten social peace or the safety of fellow citizens (Wickham, 2014: 150). The Hobbesian state thus allows for a pluralist society; those who seek to impose their ‘visions of the good life’ represent dangerous threats to social peace (Wickham, 2014: 151; see also Van Krieken, 2002: 259–260; see also Levy and Sznaider, 2014: 8 in relation to human rights).

Hobbes therefore limits the normative significance of rights, which is also consistent with his subjective account of morality (see Haakonssen, 2002: 28). The rights that are secured in society are grounded not in universalist normative principles, but in the narrow purpose for which the state is established, and they are realised via their codification in positive law. This includes the Hobbesian right of resistance, which is grounded in the state’s duty to secure the safety of its citizens (see Carmichael, 1990: 4–6), as explained earlier. Although the right of resistance recalls an original universal and inalienable right, it does not rely on laws or values that exist above the state.

Turner (2001: 206–207), by contrast, argues that in a globalising world that has seen the emergence of issues that transcend the state, the laws of the state ‘cannot adequately respond to the vulnerability of human beings’ and that ‘our ontological security can only be safeguarded by a new set of values’. Turner (2002: 47, 57–60, 2006: 23–24, 61–67) advocates ‘cosmopolitan virtue’, an umbrella term for a collection of normative principles designed to foster respect for human rights among individuals and peoples. Sympathy is an important component of his normative argument (Turner, 1993: 489, 1997: 568–570, 2003: 279). The recognition of shared vulnerability generates a feeling of sympathy and recognition of the other as a worthy bearer of human rights (Turner, 1993: 506, 2006: 54–58).

For Hobbes, however, sympathy and sociability do not follow a recognition of shared vulnerability; they are instead cultivated under certain social conditions. Turner’s (2013: 250) promotion of human rights values ‘in the absence of global governance’ and in the face of inadequate state law represents a significant departure from a Hobbesian perspective. This article argues that a genuinely Hobbesian account of human rights recognises that values cannot be relied on to safeguard human rights in the absence of enforceable law at a global level.

This is not to suggest that the global spread of universalist human rights values has not had an influence on state practices. Nash (2011b: 2), for example, points to the use of ‘shame’ to ‘pressure’ states in relation to human rights (see also Altman, 2020; Cole, 2012). Certainly, Turner’s appeal to values takes place within a contemporary context significantly different to the world in which Hobbes was writing. Sociologists of human rights (see Beck and Levy, 2013: 13; Cole, 2005: 492; Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 659; Nash, 2011b: 4–5; Stampnitzky, 2016: 174–176), Turner (2006: 140) among them, note that state legitimacy is increasingly dependent on the state’s willingness to adhere to ‘international human rights standards’ both in its ‘domestic and foreign policy’.

Also well documented by sociologists of human rights (see Berkovitch and Gordon, 2016; Clark, 2010: 67–68; Cole and Ramirez, 2013; Elliott, 2014; Hafner-Burton and Tsuitsui, 2007), however, are significant levels of decoupling or loose coupling on the part of states that ratify international human rights treaties and provide verbal support for human rights values, but whose practices do not honour those treaties or stated values. A Hobbesian approach to human rights recognises the clear distinction between laws and mere ‘Theorems’ (see Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 111, see also 185). International human rights treaties fall into the latter category; states can choose whether or not to honour them. The above sociological research illustrates an important point made by Turner (2011: 1): that while sovereign states enforce human rights, they ‘are also the main perpetrators of human rights abuses’ (see also Næss, 2020: 978; Shannon, 2016: 800). As explained in the concluding remarks below, a Hobbesian understanding of this enduring problem points to the importance of an empirical approach to human rights rather than the theorisation of a normative basis for rights protection.

Conclusion

Turner’s foundationalist approach to human rights assumes the validity of the category ‘human’, which necessitates a minimalist universalist position that allows for social and biological variation, hence Turner’s (2006: 29) conception of universal vulnerability. Turner (1997, 2006: 26, 2013: 248) describes his approach as Hobbesian, as both thinkers conceive of a vulnerable human and share a commitment to exploring how human beings can be protected. This article has further noted that Hobbes, like Turner, conceives of the relationship between vulnerability and protection in terms of rights. It has also pointed to a major difference between their responses to this foundationalist conception.

Turner (2001: 206–207) theorises a set of universalist values that would safeguard human rights. For Hobbes, however, given that values differ from individual to individual, the safety of the vulnerable human cannot be secured via universalist values. It can only be established through laws, which rely on sovereignty for their enforcement (Hobbes, 1996[1651]: 185, 202). In short, the only response to a foundationalist conception of universal vulnerability is to embrace constructionism rather than double down on universalism.

The longstanding sociological dismissal of the state of nature as a non-empirical, fictional account of natural rights-bearing individuals (Somers and Roberts, 2008: 396–397) ignores the ways in which Hobbes’ model supports a constructionist approach to rights. What is more, the portrayal of the state of nature as an asocial or pre-social state (see, for example, Chernilo, 2013: 102) ignores Hobbes’ depiction of socially embedded individuals (Van Krieken, 2002: 259). It overlooks Hobbes’ distinction between two ideal-typical social spaces, defined by the presence or absence of enforceable law. To recognise that human rights rely on enforceable law and sovereignty is not to confine human rights to the disciplines of law and politics. It is, rather, key to understanding the sociological significance of human rights.

A revised neo-Hobbesian approach provides a useful basis for the empirical investigation of the interconnections between sovereignty, law, society and human rights. A Hobbesian approach can examine, for example, ways in which sovereign states deliberately construct or oversee what might be called states of nature; spaces of exclusion that hold people outside society. The offshore immigration detention camps maintained by the Australian government are one example, as are its immigration detention centres located within its own geographical boundaries (see Briskman, 2020: 102–103). Another example is US immigration prisons, which Longazel et al. (2016: 990) describe as ‘lawless spaces’. States also create quasi outside spaces experienced at an individual level, ‘hostile environment[s]’ (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018: 233–234) in which resident non-citizens experience sustained uncertainty and are denied basic rights, for example, to work or receive state benefits (see Fleay and Hartley, 2016; Morris, 2010: 32–36).

Rather than advocating human rights values, a Hobbesian approach can investigate the operation of values: important drivers of solidarity and division, and indeed state action, yet impotent in the sense that appealing to states’ better nature does not safeguard human rights. Despite international outrage, for example, over what has been described as attempted ‘genocide’ against the Rohingya population in Myanmar’s Rhakine state in 2017 (UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, 2019), appeals to universalist human rights values did not persuade the Myanmar military to cease its operations, nor persuade its state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi to condemn the violence. It was only when Gambia brought a claim alleging genocide to the International Court of Justice, that Aung San Suu Kyi was brought to The Hague (Amnesty International, 2020). A Hobbesian approach can explore the kinds of measures that may bring states closer to the ideal typical model that is duty-bound to safeguard lives and social peace. In the absence of sovereign global governance, multilateral international bodies might place restraints on the state’s power to violate human rights (see Blau, 2016: 1130; Gregg, 2016: 909–911; Nash, 2011b: 2–3).

The presence in the early 21st century of large numbers of displaced persons across the globe (UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, 2021) has highlighted both the vulnerability of human beings, and the enduring power and authority of the state in relation to that vulnerability. As Turner (2006: 1) asserts, ‘[a]ny analysis of human rights raises questions central to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: the sovereignty of the state, the social contract, and the universal rights of human beings’. This article has made a case for a revival and strengthening of Turner’s approach. A revised neo-Hobbesian theory of human rights that incorporates Hobbes’ social conception of rights has much to contribute to the study of human rights in sociology.