Pope Francis and Economic Democracy: Understanding Pope Francis’s Radical (yet) Practical Approach to Political Economy

Introduction

Pope Francis’s pronouncements in Evangelii Gaudium and Laudato Si’ have renewed the debate regarding the Catholic Church’s social teachings on political economy and economic justice. In critiquing the current capitalist economic system, Francis has drawn criticism from some who have worried that he is in some way undermining the market economy and/or imperiling economic prosperity. In various contexts, the critics have charged the Pope with failing to understand economic history or current economic realities, ¹ holding only a provincial (Argentinian/Peronist) understanding of economic matters, ² as well as being biased against business and entrepreneurial activity. ³

Fortunately, the worries expressed by these critics are overblown, and they reflect a misunderstanding of Francis’s project, imputing to him an anti-market economic ideology that is simply not present in his thought. Francis’s criticisms do not challenge the legitimacy of a market-oriented economy, but rather identify significant deficiencies with the current neoliberal capitalist paradigm in a constructive effort to produce socioeconomic outcomes that are responsive to fundamental Church values including the common good, human dignity, equality and opportunity, meaningful or dignified work, ecological responsibility, and solidarity.

This article has three main aims. The first aim is to expose Francis’s method of critique and identify the underlying themes that unite his various criticisms of neoliberal capitalism. In this section, two key ideas emerge. The first is that Francis is offering a “radical” yet “practical” critique of neoliberal capitalism. His views are practical in the sense that they are sensitive to social realities, not theoretical abstractions; and his views are radical in the sense that they undermine or, at least, eschew traditional economic and political ideologies at a time when those ideologies are dominant. So although these terms may seem quite colloquial, they are useful insofar as they identify key pillars in Francis’s approach to matters of political economy. The second idea is that Francis’s various criticisms of neoliberal capitalism are unified in challenging what the social theorist André Gorz has termed “economic rationality.” ⁴ As I demonstrate below, economic rationality is a mode of thought, characteristic of capitalism, that reduces or subsumes normative and evaluative thought into quantifiable economic categories.

The second aim is to furnish Francis’s pronouncements with some concrete economic and philosophical content. Unfortunately, some of Francis’s criticisms and suggestions are quite general. But if his arguments are to prove influential, especially in the largely secular realm of political economy, it is important that they are linked with more concrete proposals. To be specific, I contend that Francis’s pronouncements are broadly consistent with what is typically termed “economic democracy.” In an economically democratic system, capital is not concentrated in the hands of private banks, investors/owners, or managerial elites. Instead, capital in the form of cash, stock, real property, and other productive assets is widely dispersed in a manner that grants workers and the larger public substantial control over important aspects of economic and social development.

The third aim is to show briefly that in both Evangelii Gaudium and Laudato Si’ Francis emphasizes and further develops the Catholic Church’s support for economic justice. Although Francis’s statements do not represent a departure from Church teachings or positions of previous pontiffs, they do push the Church in a slightly revised trajectory by emphasizing the necessity of structurally reforming the economy.

Francis’s Radical yet Practical Critique

In Evangelii Gaudium and Laudato Si’ Francis provides a critique of the current capitalist system, constituted as it is in a relatively neoliberal form, ⁵ which is both practical and radical. ⁶ It is practical because it is focused on the economic and social realities confronting persons and communities, and radical because, unlike much thought in political economy, there is no commitment to any alternative ideological perspective that would assess matters from the perspective of one dominant value. According to Francis, we should not accept the pervasive neoliberal perspective that economic growth will magically solve all problems, nor should we be swayed by the lazy claim that more government intervention and extensive welfare programs can secure things like human dignity and the common good. As Francis states, it is necessary to realize that “growth in justice requires more than economic growth,” it requires “an integral promotion of the poor which goes beyond a simple welfare mentality.” ⁷ Francis’s approach to socioeconomic matters is guided, then, not by prevailing economic ideologies—it is neither welfarist nor neoliberal (nor for that matter Marxist) ⁸ —but by practical realities regarding the failure of the economy to secure the common good, human dignity, equality and opportunity, solidarity, ecological responsibility, and meaningful or dignified labor (“human ends,” for short).

An important component of Francis’s practical yet radical approach is his refusal to accept that capitalism, especially as it is currently constituted, is the best way to secure valuable human ends. In other words, he does not assume that the current capitalist system is the best economic system available and then prescribe remedies for particular oversights or failings so that it can be better molded to achieve outcomes consistent with Catholic social teaching. Instead, he emphasizes that the economy must be moralized so that economic structures and policies are first and foremost designed to secure fundamental human ends, even if efficiency is in some ways reduced. For instance, he claims in EG that “the dignity of each human person and the pursuit of the common good are concerns which ought to shape all economic policies.” ⁹ Similarly in LS, he argues that “politics must not be subject to the economy, nor should the economy be subject to the dictates of an efficiency driven paradigm of technocracy.” ¹⁰

But although Francis faults the dominant neoliberal economic perspective for failing to attend properly to fundamental human ends, his criticisms are not directed against economic activity or the market more generally. In several places he notes the importance of properly managed economic growth ¹¹ and responsible entrepreneurship. ¹² He also accepts the vital role that technology has played in improving the lives of many. ¹³ His major concern is to address the seeming acquiescence by society to the dictates of neoliberal forms of capitalism, which has led to a blindness regarding unequal access to fundamental goods and opportunities, questions about the sustainability of the environment, and a devaluing of human community and solidarity.

It is also requisite to mention that Francis’s criticisms offer a rebuke to a somewhat influential interpretation of Catholic social teaching emphasized, for instance by Michael Novak and Martin Rhonheimer among others, that asserts that a relatively unfettered and efficient market system can best secure prosperity, and with it important human ends. ¹⁴ Although this view is not neoliberal in the strict sense because Novak and Rhonheimer acknowledge a significant role for human ends, it is certainly influenced by that economic perspective since heavy emphasis is placed on the importance of a relatively unregulated capitalist market. Instructive in this matter is the following quote from Rhonheimer:

The conclusion is thus: the goal of state politics ought to be to render the market an efficient tool by securing the correct functioning of the market mechanism. This is not equal to creating “social justice” but to efficiently coordinating individual interests and the allocation of resources . . . Nobody is really able to clearly define the content of “social justice,” because it is a matter that—in a world of limited and even scarce resources is by its nature highly controversial . . . ¹⁵

And later:

Social justice and social love may come in and perhaps correct the outcome of market processes or else compensate for their undesired side effects. They are unable, however, to replace free competition and the price system—and with them the laws of supply and demand—as the directing and regulatory principle of the economy without gravely damaging the common good. ¹⁶

Here, the emphasis is on ensuring the smooth functioning of the capitalist market system as a means to providing goods and services that support human ends; intervention is acceptable only as a means of correcting market failures and ensuring an adequate distribution of resources. So although Rhonheimer is not a neoliberal, he seemingly accepts the idea that neoliberal forms of capitalism are the best economic game in town. From his perspective, a relatively hands-off approach to the economy ensures productive efficiency, which is considered the best way to secure human goods. The problem with this approach is that it seemingly adopts the neoliberal faith in capital market efficiency, while relegating concerns about social justice to matters of mere remedial regulation.

Clearly Francis’s approach to the economy diverges fairly sharply from Rhonheimer’s understanding. According to Francis, the economic structures and policies that give rise to poverty must be modified—we must do more than simply engage in corrective forms of welfare or redistribution. He states,

The need to resolve the structural causes of poverty cannot be delayed, not only for the pragmatic reason of its urgency for the good of society, but because society needs to be cured of a sickness which is weakening and frustrating it . . . Welfare projects, which meet certain urgent needs, should be considered merely temporary responses. As long as the problems of the poor are not radically resolved by rejecting the absolute autonomy of markets and financial speculation and by attacking the structural causes of inequality, no solution will be found for the world’s problems . . . Inequality is the root of social ills. ¹⁷

In contrast to Rhonheimer and others like him, who privilege the workings of the capitalist market system, Francis is urging a revision of economic structures and policies so that the evils of poverty and inequality simply do not arise as they do in the current capitalist system. In other words, Francis is seeking a transformation of the economic system so that poverty and inequality can be overcome organically, instead of through remedial action. This is one reason why he emphasizes in this quote and several other places overcoming “the structural causes of poverty [and] inequality.” ¹⁸

Moreover, Francis clearly notes the importance of the concept of justice. For example, as quoted earlier, he claims that it is necessary to realize that “growth in justice requires more than economic growth,” it requires “decisions, programmes, mechanisms and processes specifically geared to a better distribution of income, the creation of sources of employment and an integral promotion of the poor which goes beyond a simple welfare mentality.” ¹⁹ So in contrast to Rhonheimer’s analysis, economic justice is for Francis not an empty concept that admits of endless dispute, but a fundamental concept that orients one’s approach to the economy. Of course, this is not to deny that there exist very real debates over the nature of a just economic system. However, as I explain in the next section, Francis provides strong clues to what a just economy may look like or include.

But if Francis is correct in criticizing the current neoliberal capitalist system as ideological, what exactly renders it ideological, and why does that ideology limit or close off alternative approaches that focus more directly on human ends? Here I think it is helpful to supplement Francis’s analysis and critique with the concept of “economic rationality” as developed and elucidated by the social critic and reformer André Gorz. ²⁰

According to Gorz, “economic rationality” represents a form of thinking, necessarily predominant in a capitalist society, characterized by an obsessive emphasis on productive efficiency, quantification, calculation, and profit. Value or significance is assessed in numerical terms by measuring things like the number of hours saved, the number of items produced or owned, and the profit obtained. According to Gorz, economic rationality leads to the acceptance of what he calls “the more is better attitude.” His description is worth quoting at length:

The rationalizing passion (of capitalism) became autonomous with respect to all determinate goals. In place of the certainty of experience that “enough is enough” it gave rise to an objective measure of the efficiency of effort and of its success: the size of profits. Success was no longer therefore a matter for personal assessment and a question of the “quality of life,” it was measurable by the amount of money earned, by accumulated wealth. Quantification gave rise to an indisputable criterion and a hierarchical scale which had no need of validation by any authority, any norm, any scale of values. Efficiency was measurable and, through it, an individual’s ability and virtue: more was better than less, those who succeed in earning more are better than those who earn less. ²¹

For Gorz, economic rationality is invasive: because quantitative assessment is relatively easy and not subject to evaluative disagreement, it ends up infecting and altering human value judgments such that persons come to evaluate worth in terms measurable economic outcomes.

In fact, as Gorz contends, economic rationality stands in and replaces our moral evaluative schemas and personal value judgements:

Quantitative measurement as a substitute for rational value judgement confers supreme moral security and intellectual comfort: the Good becomes measurable and calculable, decisions and moral judgments can follow from the implementation of a procedure of impersonal objective quantifying calculation . . . ²²

And later:

Thus rationalized, economic activity could henceforth organize human behaviour and relationships “objectively,” leaving the subjectivity of decision-makers out of account and making it impossible to raise a moral challenge on them. It was no longer a question of good or evil but only correct calculation. “Economic science,” insofar as it guided decision-making and behaviour, relieved people of responsibility for their acts. They became “servants of capital” in which economic rationality was embodied. ²³

Economic rationality, therefore, establishes itself as the autonomous arbitrator of all value. The moral and religious ends of human life are either ignored or subsumed into the economic realm. Per economic rationality, persons are to be served by the increase in productivity, wealth, and consumption options. Ironically, this calculative process is advertised as liberating. Since economic measures of wealth and productivity provide clear and definable measures of value, persons and societies no longer need fret about the ends they should pursue or the normative and ethical validity of life or social choices. The goals for society and persons are laid out and defined in terms of quantifiable economic outcomes, such as GDP. ²⁴ The end result is a society wholly devoted to material wealth and productive efficiency, but lacking the critical awareness or normative evaluative schemas that would enable it to coherently assess the importance of noneconomic goods. Consequently, economic rationality fails to account for the value of human ends such as the common good, human dignity, equality and opportunity, meaningful or dignified work, ecological responsibility, and solidarity because these things cannot be easily quantified and are not readily scalable.

Although Francis would certainly not agree with all of Gorz’s philosophical positions, the dangers inherent in economic rationality, which Gorz identifies, help to illuminate Francis’s concerns regarding the social outcomes of neoliberal capitalism. Moreover, Gorz’s ideas can be linked to thinkers that have directly influenced Francis, especially Romano Guardini. ²⁵ For instance, in his analysis of human power contained in Power and Responsibility, Guardini contends that the coercive aspects of power and development are often “hid[den] behind aspects of ‘utility,’ ‘welfare,’ ‘progress,’ and so forth . . . Thus power has come to be exercised in a manner that is not ethically determined; the most telling expression of this is the anonymous business corporation.” ²⁶ So, just as Gorz argues that economic rationality subsumes or replaces ethical value judgments, Guardini asserts that power is inappropriately employed when it is simply accepted on the grounds of economic or other forms of advancement, without further ethical reflection. In both Guardini and Gorz, then, one finds a deep concern about the dangers of relying exclusively on economic or utilitarian assessments of progress.

Francis’s proclamations strongly echo Gorz’s criticisms of economic rationality and Guardini’s sentiments about anonymous power. When Francis says that “the ancient gold calf (cf. Ex 32:1–35) has returned in a new and ruthless guise in the idolatry of money and the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose . . . (that reduces man) to one of his needs alone: consumption,” ²⁷ he may be interpreted as demonstrating how persons and societies have become blinded by economic rationality and swayed by the attractions of material gain. Money, productive efficiency, and technological advancement have established themselves as dominant values while the moral, social, and psychological complexity of the human person, along with its ends, are ignored or discounted. And importantly, since capitalism is the predominant economic system, economic rationality has filtered into much of everyday social life and thought. For instance, Francis criticizes the failure to look beyond economic outcomes or the increase in consumer goods as measures of progress. According to Francis, “The culture of prosperity deadens us; we are thrilled if the market offers us something new to purchase. In the meantime all those lives stunted for lack of opportunity seem a mere spectacle; they fail to move us.” ²⁸ For Francis, then, capitalism and the economic rationality that it establishes, have distorted human value judgments and ethical sensibilities. Persons have lost sight of important human ends, the needs of others, and important elements of human flourishing.

Gorz’s concept of economic rationality and Guardini’s assessment of power can also assist in understanding Francis’s criticisms of the “technocratic paradigm” most predominantly expressed in Laudato Si’. In his critique, Francis expresses the worry that technological advances are made “only with a view to profit without concern for its potentially negative impact on human beings.” ²⁹ This perspective is readily explained in terms of economic rationality and Guardini’s assessment of power: since technology increases productivity and leads to creation of new commodities that supposedly advance society, its creations are often accepted without reflection on the noneconomic costs and burdens. It is important to note here that Francis is not arguing against technological advancement in general, rather he is arguing for a more responsible and thoughtful approach that takes into account technology’s impact of important human ends and relationships. In Francis’s view, technological advancement must be integrated more holistically into human life and must pay heed to noneconomic values. For instance, he contends that the “the goal should not be that technological progress increasingly replace human work, for this would be detrimental to humanity.” ³⁰ Rather, according to Francis, “work should be the setting for this rich personal growth, where many aspects of life enter into play: creativity, planning for the future, developing our talents, living out our values, relating to others, giving glory to God.” ³¹ Francis, therefore, urges us to recover a broader, more encompassing account of advancement that measures progress not entirely in terms of productive efficiency or technological know-how, but rather in terms of human flourishing.

So Francis can be interpreted as offering a criticism of the economic rationality accepted by neoliberalism that has seemingly come to dominate or subdue moral frameworks. So what are the solutions? True to his radically practical approach, Francis does not adopt an alternative ideology. In essence, his message is to urge us to develop whatever economic structures and social mechanisms are capable of securing the common good, human dignity, equality and opportunity, meaningful or dignified work, solidarity, and the natural environment. In other words, he argues that noneconomic criteria should serve as the criteria for economic success. As he states, “on many concrete questions, the Church has no reason to offer a definitive opinion; she knows that honest debate must be encouraged among experts, while respecting divergent views.” ³² So the point is not to prescribe a specific solution, but to illuminate a blind spot, created by economic rationality, in an attempt to recover a broader, more ethical perspective that is appropriately responsive to important human ends.

All of this is consistent with the idea that Francis is taking a practical line, sensitive to the realities of the world. He seems cognizant of the danger of adopting or advocating a doctrinaire approach to socioeconomic matters, recognizing that it may lead to an ideological reliance on an idea or system that eventually comes to hinder or constrain future options or is inadequately flexible. In this manner, Francis’s argument derives from one of the core principles in his thought, namely the principle that “Realities are more important than ideas.” ³³ For Francis, ideologies are intellectually and normatively constraining, and they can blind individuals to realities on the ground. ³⁴ Ideological commitment leads to an inhibited analysis in which all social and economic issues are collapsed in order to fit into a preordained narrative, for example in the case of neoliberalism, quantifying noneconomic human ends in economic terms. But such ideologically driven analysis leads to a stunted and caricaturized view of social issues and their potential solutions. A large part of Francis’s aim in both Evangelii Gaudium and Laudato Si’ is to expose this danger. ³⁵

I began this section with the claim that Francis’s approach to economic matters was both radical and practical. First, it is radical in the very fact that it rejects the terms and theoretical assumptions that often characterize discussions of the current economic system. The issue is not a theoretical one of whether the state should be more involved or less involved in the regulation of economic life or whether a particular economic theory is best; rather, the question is a practical one about determining how economic and social structures can best secure important human ends. This goal does not require ideological purity, but outcomes responsive to human ends and the realities of the world. Second, in criticizing neoliberalism, Francis offers what I have argued is a radical challenge to the prevailing system of economic rationality that has become endemic in social modes of thinking, and which leaves little room for human goods. Again, the solution is not a new economic ideology, but a practical emphasis on the need to open up modes of thought and evaluation—a reconnection with the ideas of the common good, human dignity, meaningful work, equality and opportunity, solidarity, and environmental responsibility. Third, Francis’s approach is radical in that there is no attempt to prescribe a specific, all-encompassing solution; instead there is an effort to demonstrate the practical necessity of developing credible policies oriented around valuable human ends that are flexible and sensitive to the needs of persons. For Francis, blind reliance on a system leaves society vulnerable to the type of myopia that characterizes economic rationality.

Economic Democracy

If I am correct that Francis’s criticism of neoliberal capitalism is best understood as a condemnation of what amounts to the ideological acceptance of economic rationality, then it is necessary to reevaluate the current institutional frameworks characterizing the system. Hence, in this section I briefly canvass some concrete proposals that revise economic structures in a bid to render the economy less subject to economic rationality. Importantly, these proposals start from the presumption that there are important human ends that ought to be secured, and they are, consequently, much more responsive to values like the common good, human dignity, solidarity, meaningful work, environmental sustainability, equality, and fair opportunity. In fact, I use these human ends as touchstones to evaluate the proposals and connect them to Pope Francis’s thoughts on matters of economic justice.

Loosely, I classify the proposals under the heading of “economic democracy” because, in general, they seek to grant persons greater control over their economic and working life by creating structures that distribute wealth and ownership more equally. But although I am arguing that economic democracy is consistent with the valuable human ends that Francis seeks to promote, it should be clear that economic democracy does not amount to an ideology because it does not evaluate outcomes in terms of one overriding principle . The proposals recognize a plurality of important human ends and structure the economy in divergent manners. Nevertheless, all the proposals envision an economy that does not conform to the dictates of economic rationality. In that way, they help to open up thinking and provide a mechanism for eliminating the blind spot created by economic rationality. Importantly, they also provide specific content to Francis’s more general thoughts, linking his idea to influential proposals in the secular realm.

Emphasizing Economic Justice

Although some critics have expressed shock at Francis’s strongly worded denunciations of capitalism and the economic rationality that characterizes the current system, his criticisms should come as no surprise because they are consistent with a long line of papal documents that challenge the fairness of neoliberal forms of capitalism and worry about its negative impacts on valuable human ends. Even though this is not the place to exhaustively trace the affinities and linkages between various papal and Church documents, the themes in both Evangelii Gaudium and Laudato Si’ are not exceptional. They are very much in line with and reflective of established Church teachings since Rerum Novarum that address concerns about economic relationships and the human good. ⁶⁷ Nor are they, as Michael Novak insinuated, the untutored musings of a Pope finding his feet on economic matters. ⁶⁸ As I discussed in the previous section, the concerns and values illuminated by Francis are consistent with legitimate and influential proposals for economic reform. So Francis’s pronouncements should not be viewed as unanchored in economic realities, nor as representing a significant shift in the Church’s approach to socioeconomic issues.

However, to read Francis as offering nothing new on matters of Catholic social and economic thought would be to bowdlerize his writings, separating them from his larger concerns. Even though Francis’s message is consistent with his predecessors, there is a subtle shift of emphasis that needs to be elucidated. In particular, Francis appears to reinvigorate or reemphasize the importance of social and economic justice, pushing for a recognition of the impact of economic structures on human life. So while there is continuity, there is also development. Let me briefly make this last point about continuity and development by comparing Evangelii Gaudium and Laudato Si’ with John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus (CA). ⁶⁹

Although some have interpreted CA as a direct apology for capitalism and entrepreneurial freedom, ⁷⁰ in reality, the document is more subtle. Alongside praise for fair and properly regulated market forms of capitalism, there are also stern warnings regarding “the human inadequacies of capitalism.” ⁷¹ In particular, it is possible to observe a denunciation of economic rationality in several passages, ⁷² but perhaps most directly in the following:

. . . economic freedom is only one element of human freedom. When it becomes autonomous, when man is seen more as a producer or consumer of goods than as a subject who produces and consumes in order to live, then economic freedom loses its necessary relationship to the human person and ends up by alienating and oppressing him. ⁷³

Here, John Paul II expresses the worry that when unregulated, capitalism can neglect the needs of the human person and instrumentalize them as means to greater productivity. So like Francis, John Paul II is concerned to demonstrate that capitalism should not be accepted ideologically and without reserve, otherwise society runs the danger of becoming unresponsive to important human ends.

However, Francis’s writings portray an important shift of emphasis, which leads to a subtle, but strong departure from the message of CA. Where John Paul II often seeks to highlight the positive, creative side of capitalism, offering tempered praise with some perspicuous warnings, Francis is more intently focused on rendering clear capitalism’s deficiencies, offering criticisms, and calling for reform. Importantly, this shift shows Francis to be intently focused on matters of economic justice. As argued above, a large part of Francis’s project in Evangelii Gaudium and Laudato Si’ seems to be to expose the injustices that develop when economic rationality holds sway. Hence, Francis issues various statements about the “socioeconomic system [being] unjust at its root,” ⁷⁴ of “inequality [being] the root of social ills,” ⁷⁵ and recognition that the common good calls for “particular concern for distributive justice.” ⁷⁶ In these and analogous passages, Francis is identifying the injustice that characterizes current forms of capitalism, namely the inequality, violence, and exploitation it has engendered.

Francis uses this critique to point out the necessity of rectifying injustice by reorganizing the economic system so that it is no longer held under the sway of economic rationality. Of particular importance are the following statements, quoted more extensively in Sec. II, where Francis points to the need for deep structural reform in order to guarantee justice: “Growth in justice requires more than economic growth . . . it requires decisions, programmes, mechanisms and processes specifically geared to a better distribution of income, the creation of sources of employment.” ⁷⁷ And earlier, “as long as the problems of the poor are not radically resolved by rejecting the absolute autonomy of markets and financial speculation and by attaching the structural causes of inequality, no solution will be found for the world’s problems.” ⁷⁸ These passages demonstrate Francis’s recognition that, to the extent that poverty and extreme inequality are produced by capitalism, they are injustices that can only be adequately addressed through a revision of the economic system. ⁷⁹ A similar argument occurs in LS, where Francis claims that “we urgently need a humanism capable of bringing together the different fields of knowledge, including economics, in the service of a more integral and integrating vision”; ⁸⁰ the point being that we must develop new social and economic systems devoted to the promotion of human dignity and the common good. As I argued above, there are numerous proposals that would meet Francis’s concerns.

So in contrast to the message of CA, Francis’s writings emphasize more strongly the rectification of injustice through the revision of an economic system that in many cases has become detached from the true needs of the human person. Consequently, Francis’s approach is a good deal more radical than that of John Paul II, because he does not simply aim to rein in capitalism or warn of potential dangers, but rather to express the need for a reevaluation of our relationship with capitalism, at least as that system is currently constituted. This, as the proposals canvassed above have shown, does not mean rejecting a role for the market. However, it does mean implementing structural economic reforms designed to ensure the economic system is guided by and sensitive to concerns about equality and opportunity, human dignity, the common good, meaningful or dignified work, and the environment. According to Francis, capitalism, as currently constituted, does not promote an ethical and flourishing society; so it cannot be the end of our search for a just and good economy. Instead, society must look to develop an alternative realization of the market system, where economic rationality cannot easily become dominant.

Conclusion

I have argued that Francis’s radically practical vision for a more ethically responsible economy is consistent with proposals that fall broadly under the label of economic democracy. What is unique about these forms of economic organization is that while they accept the need for the market and capital investment in some form, they structure the financial system in a way designed to ensure fundamental human ends. In that way, they are consistent with Francis’s rejection of economic rationality, as well as his emphasis on social and economic justice. Of course, the transition to economic democracy may not be simple, but if Francis’s principle that “time is greater than space” ⁸¹ is true, then there is no reason not to engage in that process of transition.