Abstract
In modern times, the papacy has consistently advocated peace, disarmament, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, limiting the scope of traditional just war theory, particularly in the era of weapons of mass destruction. However, no pope has gone as far as Pope Francis, who has stated that there is no such thing as just war and that “Only Peace is Just.” This contribution examines how Francis expressed and developed his thought in the context of his humanitarian diplomacy and theological thinking during the first ten years of his pontificate. In the last part, I argue that the Ukraine war is a test for Pope Francis, who has repeatedly called for peace negotiations and condemned arms supply, while recognizing the moral right for Ukrainian self-defense. While this may seem contradictory, his policy shows Francis’s deeper conviction that “war is always a defeat for humanity.” More interested in peace-making and assisting victims than in doctrinal issues, Francis has not jettisoned the just war concept in theory, but has done so in his witness and actions.
In the ten years so far of his pontificate, Pope Francis has been consistent in advocating peace, disarmament, a ban on weapons of mass destruction, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. 1 In doing so, he has followed a solid tradition of the modern papacy that, at least since the loss of temporal power in the nineteenth century, has generally privileged the prophetic language of peace to the moral justification of warfare. 2 “The prophecy of peace by popes has been intensive. Seeking peace and warning humanity against the danger and tragedy of war have become part and parcel of the ministry of the Bishop of Rome,” writes Andrea Riccardi in a recent book. 3 However, until now, the Magisterium has never fully disavowed Aquinas’s theory on just war, though it has been gradually reducing its scope. In particular, the risks of nuclear war and total destruction have led the Catholic Church, since Vatican II, to reject the morality of such warfare.
In regard to issues of war and peace, Pope Francis, even more so than his predecessors, has blended different positions: that of the prophetic advocate of peace, whatever it takes; that of the moral voice that sides with the victims of war, violence, and injustice; and that of the “bridge-builder” (pontifex in Latin) who engages concretely in dialogue and peace-building. This article maintains that the war on European soil in Ukraine (a new phase of which started with the Russian invasion in February 2022), an epoch-shifting event, constitutes a difficult test for Pope Francis’s discourse and action, forcing him to walk a thin tightrope between the dream of peace and the logic of war. Amid the difficulties of today’s world, it is argued that Francis, especially through his very personal commitment, has been pushing the boundaries of Catholic thought and action by further constraining the idea that warfare can ever be “just” and expanding the pope’s role as active peace-maker.
A “Third World War”?
From the outset, Francis’s pontificate has been accompanied by a series of outbreaks of war, violent conflicts, and terrorism. This pontificate has not only been marked by the complex civil war in Syria, ongoing since 2011, but also by other violent conflicts (including those in Iraq, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic), by acts of terrorism in many parts of the world, and by religious and ethnic persecutions—often targeting Christians, but not only.
Early on, Pope Francis—the first non-European pope in modern times and also the first pope since the council who has not personally experienced the Second World War—referred to this worsening international situation as a “Third World War, fought piecemeal.” Though one could question if this striking expression accurately describes the current state of world affairs, Francis has used it several times since 2014, 4 including in his 2020 encyclical Fratelli Tutti: “In today’s world, there are no longer just isolated outbreaks of war in one country or another; instead, we are experiencing a ‘world war fought piecemeal,’ since the destinies of countries are so closely interconnected on the global scene.” 5
For Pope Francis, this “world war” is not limited to the different scenes of violent conflicts and persecution in today’s world. Unjust economic systems, which create a great divide between the world’s rich and poor, as well as the ecological “war” being waged against mother earth are, according to the pope, part of this global war. In the encyclical letter Laudato Si’, he wonders, quoting the bishops of New Zealand, “what the commandment ‘thou shall not kill’ means when ‘twenty percent of the world’s population consumes resources at a rate that robs the poor nations and future generations of what they need to survive.’” 6 Johan Verstraeten reminds us that peace for Francis necessarily implies “integral human development in the perspective of the preferential option for the poor.” 7
What has been Pope Francis’s reaction to this current situation of the world? I suggest that Francis’s characteristic way of witnessing to the Gospel’s call operates at three levels: (1) a vocal prophetic advocacy for peace; (2) a vocal condemnation of acts of violence combined with concrete solidarity with victims; and (3) an agent in international diplomacy.
Those three levels are not new, as they have been practiced by all popes in one way or another since the last century. I argue, however, that Pope Francis has been more straightforward and outspoken, expressing himself less diplomatically than popes have typically done, and that he has also tried to commit himself to concrete peacemaking, performed in a more personal manner than that which characterized his predecessors. This remains, however, more a matter of shift of style and communication, rather than a change of content or social doctrine.
These three distinctive domains of action are of course interconnected. But they also sometimes conflict with one another, at least on first glance. For example, the act of openly condemning a government or group for wrongdoing is often at odds with playing a mediating role, which requires a certain degree of impartiality and equidistance. 8 In the twentieth century, the price for impartiality and readiness to play a mediating role has often been a certain degree of silence or diplomatically softened language, even in the face of transgressions of international law, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. But the experience of both World Wars and the criticism of the pope’s presumed silence in the face of the Holocaust has taught the papacy that this attitude is no longer an option. 9 With this note of the tensions at play in the three domains of action, we turn now to examine each of them.
The Advocate of Peace
Pope Francis has been an outspoken apostle of peace in different war settings. In particular, he has advocated peace in the Syrian conflict, in contrast to the readiness of other powers to intervene with the use of force. For instance, in September 2013, after Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad had used chemical weapons—thus crossing a “red line” set by US President Barack Obama—Pope Francis urged the United States not to intervene in the war. On September 7, he proclaimed a day of fasting and prayer for peace and observed: There [in the Cross], we can see God’s reply: violence is not answered with violence, death is not answered with the language of death. In the silence of the Cross, the uproar of weapons ceases, and the language of reconciliation, forgiveness, dialogue, and peace is spoken. This evening, I ask the Lord that we Christians, and our brothers and sisters of other religions, and every man and woman of good will, cry out forcefully: violence and war are never the way to peace!
10
For Francis, peaceful ways were still possible and should always prevail. In the offer that was subsequently made by the international community—through Russian president Vladimir Putin—to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons under international control, some observers thought that the pope was right and his effort had been impactful. 11 Rather than defending a just war intervention—and stopping a civil war that was taking the lives of thousands of innocent people—Francis defended the position that the use of force would only multiply violence and would in the end do greater harm. Obama’s backing down from retaliating against Bashar’s regime was welcomed with a sigh of relief by those who believed it helped avoid an escalation of the war.
On some occasions, Pope Francis has spoken about “the abolition of war” and dubbed it “the ultimate aim, and most worthy” for humankind. 12 However, this does not necessarily mean that Francis would never accept the use of force. Speaking with journalists on his flight back from South Korea in the summer of 2014, he answered positively to whether he approved of the American bombing of the Islamic State in Northern Iraq to protect threatened minorities: “In these cases, where there is an unjust aggression, I can only say that it is licit to stop the unjust aggressor. I emphasize the word: ‘stop.’ I’m not saying drop bombs, make war, but stop the aggressor. The means used to stop him would have to be evaluated. Stopping an unjust aggressor is licit.” However, he immediately cautioned, “But we also need to remember! How many times, with this excuse of stopping an unjust aggressor, the powers have taken over peoples and carried on an actual war of conquest! One nation alone cannot determine how to stop an unjust aggressor.” 13
In a recent article, Christian Nikolaus Braun has argued that Francis, like his predecessors, de facto still accepts the just war theory. It may seem that modern popes have moved away from just war theory since they “have emphasized their role as spiritual leader speaking in a ‘prophetic’ voice. However, through this tribute to the pacifist stream the popes do not alter the doctrinal status of just war thinking. What they really have done is forcefully stress the tools of nonviolence within the just war framework.” 14 It is true that Francis basically adheres to the basics of just war doctrine, understood as the moral legitimacy to use force to stop an unjustified aggression. Yet, he shows reluctance to speak about “just war.” After declaring, in a conversation with French author Dominique Wolton, that “he does not like to use” the concept of just war, preferring instead the concept of “defensive war,” he went on to state: “No war is just. The only just thing is peace.” 15
This reluctance to connect “war” and “just” into one concept also found its way into a text of much greater weight, the 2020 encyclical letter Fratelli Tutti. Here Francis notes that “the Catechism of the Catholic Church speaks of the possibility of legitimate defense by means of military force, which involves demonstrating that certain ‘rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy’ have been met.” But he immediately goes on to caution that “it is easy to fall into an overly broad interpretation of this potential right. In this way, some would also wrongly justify even ‘preventive’ attacks or acts of war that can hardly avoid entailing ‘evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.’” 16 This caution is all the more important in light of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which give to the machinery of war “an incontrollable destructive power” without any corresponding guarantee “that it would be used wisely.” Francis concludes that “we can no longer think of war as a solution, because its risks will probably always be greater than its supposed benefits. In view of this, it is very difficult nowadays to invoke the rational criteria elaborated in earlier centuries to speak of the possibility of a ‘just war.’” 17
Another area where Pope Francis emphasizes the prophetic-utopic line over and against the pragmatic-political line is his fierce criticism of arms production and the arms trade. According to Francis, “countries that sell arms have no right to talk about peace.” 18 On many occasions, he has insisted on the immorality of spending on arms production and trade in a world where resources are lacking in the struggle against hunger, sickness, and poverty. 19 In his traditional New Year’s speech to the diplomats accredited to the Holy See in 2022, Francis commented on an array of current conflicts and then observed, “Naturally, these conflicts are exacerbated by the abundance of weapons on hand and the unscrupulousness of those who make every effort to supply them. At times, we deceive ourselves into thinking that these weapons serve to dissuade potential aggressors. History and, sadly, even daily news reports, make it clear that this is not the case.” 20
Disarmament is particularly needed in the field of weapons of mass destruction. Often times Francis has advocated the abolition of nuclear arms. For him, not only the use of nuclear arms, but even the mere possession of them is immoral. Though the papacy has been consistent in advocating nuclear disarmament, Francis’s condemnation goes further than those of his predecessors. 21 In Hiroshima, during his 2019 trip to Japan, he said, “The use of atomic energy for purposes of war is immoral, just as the possessing of nuclear weapons is immoral, as I already said two years ago. We will be judged on this. Future generations will rise to condemn our failure if we spoke of peace but did not act to bring it about among the peoples of the earth. How can we speak of peace even as we build terrifying new weapons of war?” 22
The Moral Voice and Actor
Francis often condemns violent acts committed by warring parties and terrorist groups. He does so, of course, when Catholics or Christians are targeted—for instance, the 2019 Easter bombings of Catholic churches in Sri Lanka 23 —but not only then: he expresses sadness for all kinds of violent crimes that take the lives of innocent people. 24 Moreover, following the Christian approach that “hates the sin, but loves the sinner,” it is, typically, acts that are condemned in papal decrials, not the perpetrators.
In addition to denouncing acts of violence, Pope Francis has been particularly vocal in his support for their victims, defending the rights of those who are fleeing war, violence, persecutions, and poverty. 25 The choice to be in genuine solidarity with the victims of wars, oppression, and economic injustices requires the moral choice, not only to speak out for them, but also to act in their favor. Humanitarian action in favor of victims is part and parcel of papal leadership and the many institutions and organizations of the Catholic Church. This fits well with Francis’s often-quoted vision of the church “as a field hospital after battle.” 26 Pope Francis has given this humanitarian side a very personal touch. For example, in a 2016 visit to the refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, he spoke out in defense of the refugees, criticized the inhuman politics against migrants, and then brought back twelve refugees on his papal plane and offered them shelter in Rome. Such a personal, symbolic, and concrete action was an unprecedented move in the history of the papacy. 27
The Diplomatic Actor
Francis has also used the sovereign status of the Vatican and its diplomacy as a tool to offer concrete mediation between parties in conflict. As “pontifex maximus,” a pope sees it as his role to be a bridge-builder between antagonists to promote peace in a very concrete way. This is often done discretely: think about how the papal diplomacy of Secretary of State Cardinal Parolin played a vital role in the conciliation between Cuba and the United States, which led to the reopening of the American Embassy in Havana in 2016 and to President Obama’s historic visit to Cuba in the same year. Pope Francis has also embodied, in a very personal way, this peace-building role of the Catholic Church, even taking the risk of exposing himself to failure and criticism. For instance, shortly after his visit to the Holy Land in 2014, he invited the president of Israel, Shimon Peres, and the president of the Palestinian State, Abu Mazen, to Rome for a prayer moment in the Vatican gardens, in a move to try to create a breakthrough in the Isreali–Palestinian conflict. He pursued a similar course of action when he chose to open the Holy Year of Mercy in 2017 in Bangui, the capital of the civil-war-torn Central African Republic. Security concerns did not keep him from travelling to convey a message of peace, which indeed seems to have had some impact on the ongoing peace process. He travelled to Iraq in spring 2021, even when the COVID-19 pandemic was hampering international travel. His visit was seen by the many different parties and communities in Iraq as a moment of national reconciliation and indeed a harbinger of peace. The most spectacular action of Pope Francis in his peace-building efforts, however, was probably his gesture to the leaders of South Sudan, whom he had invited for a retreat in the Vatican. Urging them to be responsible and peace-loving leaders, and imploring them to restore peace, the pope, on a whim, knelt down before them and kissed the feet of the surprised and embarrassed political leaders. 28
What can we conclude from these actions? In his radical talk of peace and rejection of war, in his solidarity with the victims of war and terror, and in his attempts to be a peace-bringing actor who mediates between warring parties, Francis stands in a solid papal tradition, shaped during the last century and in particular by the Second Vatican Council. What is new, however, is the very personal interpretation he gives to it, which I have elsewhere described as “idiosyncratic”: 29 he is not merely a moral voice, sticking to the level of principles, and the head of an institution that in its various ranks realizes these actions on the ground; he also engages himself personally, often in unprecedented ways. In doing so, he dares to get his hands dirty and does not shy away from personal risk. With his unexpected and often radical actions and statements, he hopes to awaken consciences and set processes in motion—and in this he partly succeeds—but in doing so, he also makes himself vulnerable and exposes himself to failure and criticism. Put simply, in the eyes of his critics, he sells out the dignity of the papacy; in the eyes of his admirers, his actions and speech are in line with those of Jesus of Nazareth. These differences are sometimes acute in the very polarized, intra-Catholic perception of this pontificate, especially in the United States.
The War in Ukraine
Here we shift out focus to the conflict in Ukraine—which dramatically entered a new phase with Russia’s invasion on February 24, 2022—and Pope Francis’s view of it. I argue that this war for Ukraine—which has clearly one aggressor and one victim, engages various Christian traditions and their members, and has brought nuclear superpowers into conflict—presents Francis with a grave moral and political dilemma, for which there are hardly any easy solutions. In the first section, I analyze this situation in terms of the three levels of papal action: the diplomatic, the moral-humanitarian, and the prophetic peace role. In the section that follows, I examine whether the Ukrainian defensive war could, even for Francis, meet the criteria of a just war.
Various Levels at Which Francis Acts
The diplomatic side: Which mediating role?
Pope Francis has, from the start, wanted to keep open the possibility that the Holy See could assume a mediating role in this conflict between two Christian (albeit predominantly Orthodox) nations. This is evident from his reaction to the news of the invasion: in an unprecedented gesture, he went to the ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Holy See the very morning of the Russian invasion and personally tried to speak to President Putin by phone. The latter, however, was not reachable. Subsequent attempts to get in touch with Putin also appear to have failed. Francis also tried to speak to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. The latter is known to be a close ally of President Putin and supports the “special military operation” in Ukraine, which he seems to consider as part of a wider civilizational war of Christian Russia against the secular and decadent West. 30 A Zoom meeting with Patriarch Kirill, assisted by Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev), then the head of the Office of External Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, was organized on March 16, 2022. The conversation was not very fruitful, showing how their respective understandings of the war in Ukraine also partly reflected a “clash of theologies.” 31 Though acknowledging that this is a fratricidal war and that war never can be “holy,” Kirill has defended Putin’s military campaign in Ukraine in terms of a justified civilizational clash against decadent Western globalization, credited it with “metaphysical significance,” blessed the Russian army, and declared that soldiers dying in battle will have their sins washed away because of their sacrifice. 32 Efforts by Francis to meet Kirill in person, including at the September 2022 peace conference in Kazakhstan, proved vain. His repeated willingness to travel to Moscow has also been rebuffed. This should not be surprising: never before has a Roman pontiff been welcome in Moscow. Francis was, nonetheless, the first pope to meet the Patriarch of Moscow, which happened at the Havana airport in February 2016. The context of the war in Syria and the defense of persecuted Christians created the conditions for a general rapprochement between Rome and Moscow. Francis’s attempts to stay on speaking terms with Moscow explain why he was long reluctant to mention Russia and Putin by name when talking about the war in Ukraine. That reticence met with fierce criticism from the Western, pro-Ukrainian camp. Perhaps this is more than a tried-and-tested diplomatic tactic: Francis has also shown an appreciation for certain parts of the Russian narrative—for instance, when he spoke about the confrontational attitude of NATO “that went barking at Russia’s borders.” 33
Be that as it may, so far Francis’s attempts to stay on speaking terms with the two warring camps have met with no success. They are also unlikely to be successful in the future, given the historical aversion between Rome and Moscow, which has only eased somewhat in recent decades (and that mainly because of developments in Rome and the wider Catholic community). These attempts did earn Pope Francis criticism from Ukraine, especially from the influential Greek-Catholic Church, and from Europeans and Americans, for being too sympathetic to Russia, the aggressor in this conflict. This has gradually led Pope Francis to abandon his initial reserve and to name Russia and Putin, even if always in a balanced manner. 34 Throughout this conflict, Francis was in contact with the Ukrainian side: on several occasions he spoke to President Zelensky on the phone, and his willingness to visit Ukraine was also welcomed there. In Russian eyes, however, such a visit would be a definite act of support for Ukraine and the Western camp, and thus a hostile act by the pope of Rome—not a favorable position for those wishing to play a mediating role. In fact, while urging Patriarch Kirill not to be “Putin’s altar boy,” Francis also clearly refuses to be “the chaplain of the West.” 35
Siding with the victims
From the beginning, Pope Francis has condemned the invasion in unequivocal terms: he has called the Russian invasion “unacceptable,” “senseless,” “barbaric,” and “sacrilegious,” among other things. 36 Time and again, he has pointed to the inhuman consequences and human suffering that the violence has produced. He also has called on Europe to show solidarity with all those fleeing the violence in Ukraine. At the same time, he has taken humanitarian actions of his own to support the suffering Ukrainian people. On several occasions, for instance, he sent the papal almoner, Polish Cardinal Konrad Krajewski, to Ukraine, along with ambulances and other relief supplies. Other envoys included Cardinal Czerny and Monsignor Gallagher, the Vatican Secretary for Relations with States. Yet, despite the many humanitarian actions, critical voices from Ukraine, Poland, and other eastern European countries have complained that the pope has not fully endorsed the Ukrainian national cause. This is not different from Belgian complaints during the First World War or Polish complaints during the Second World War: the international super partes approach of the Holy See means that its position will often be different from those of local Catholic churches, which tend to be loyal to their own countries—a form of patriotism and loyalty that is also tolerated, and even encouraged, in Catholic thinking as long as it does not entail enmity toward other countries and peoples. This apparent contradiction is part of what Carl Schmitt a century ago called the Catholic Church’s complexio oppositorum (unity of opposites). 37
Naive pacifism or far-seeing realism?
From the beginning of the war, Pope Francis has called for peace, a cease-fire, and the resumption of negotiations. He regularly repeats this call, even if he is quite alone on the world stage in doing so, and does so amid the many political and social voices arguing that a cease-fire, before the invader is driven from Ukrainian territory, would be giving in to aggression and would thus send the wrong, counterproductive, signal. Moreover—at the time of this writing, December 2022—Western arms deliveries also seem to be having the desired effect and seem to be tipping the balance in favor of Ukrainian troops. Though Francis is usually very critical of arms deliveries (“a business of assassins”), in the case of Ukraine he had to admit that arms deliveries can be judged moral if the intention is purely one of self-defense. 38 Above all, Francis fears the escalation of the war and the nuclear threat associated with it. Therefore, to stop the hellish logic of warfare, Francis calls for an immediate cease-fire and the start of negotiations, “even if it stinks.” 39 This position has been criticized by the anti-Russian camp, including voices within the Catholic Church. The Catholic bishop of Kyiv, Vitaliy Kryvystkyi was quoted as follows: “People have long since stopped talking about peace at any cost. They speak about victory. Giving up part of Ukraine in the name of peace will not bring a real end to the war, it will only freeze the conflict. Naive pacifism will not change the situation.” 40
A Just War?
Ultimately, Francis’s moral dilemma comes down to a judgment on the war: for the Ukrainian side, can one speak of a just war? If so, is Western political and military support for Ukraine the morally right choice? And are the pleas for peace, for stopping the arms supply, for an immediate cease-fire, and for a negotiated political solution, the right or wrong moral choices in the fight against evil and the breaching of international law? The fundamental texts of the Catholic Church affirm, on the one hand, the possibility of the use of force to stop an unjustified aggression, and, on the other hand—especially in times of weapons of mass destruction—a clear rejection of the means of war to settle conflicts. Thus, the Second Vatican Council document Gaudium et Spes states that “as long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted.” 41 However, two years earlier, Pope John XXIII’s encyclical letter Pacem in Terris had a different tone: “In this age which boasts of its atomic power, it no longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice.” 42 As Massimo Faggioli notes, “the Church’s teaching on peace and war, and in particular on nuclear weapons, is inseparable from Vatican II’s shift on the morality of war and the impossibility of imagining a nuclear conflict that fits the pre-Vatican II doctrine of ‘just war.’” 43
Technically, one could still note a number of traditional ad bellum criteria of just warfare that are met in Ukraine’s case, particularly when examined from a Western moral viewpoint: “just cause,” “declaration by a lawful authority,” “last resort,” “reasonable chance of success,” “proportional use of means.” The question of whether “the war could have been avoided” will remain debatable. Have Russian worries about the treatment of the Russian-speaking population in eastern Ukraine been addressed properly by the Ukrainian government? Have Russian fears of Ukraine being incorporated—formally or informally—into the Western military alliance of NATO been taken seriously? Moreover, in the reasoning of proportionality—which is key in just war theory—there is still another, and often overlooked, element to consider: the harm and disorder that is caused by the war should not be greater than the harm one is looking to bring to an end. This is probably why, in the First World War, Pope Benedict XV was long reluctant to explicitly condemn the German invasion of neutral (and Catholic) Belgium: not because he was pro-German—as was assumed then—but because he, rightly, foresaw that in the long run the continuation of war would cause greater harm. 44 Similar reasoning seems to apply to the thoughts and actions of Pope Francis: guided by history and by the knowledge of the incredibly destructive capacity of modern warfare, he foresees a possible escalation of the war, which might end up in a full-blown third world war, no longer fought only piecemeal. Such a war might even turn nuclear, thus threatening the survival of humanity. This is too great a risk for humanity to take, whatever the just causes might be at stake for Ukrainian self-defense. In the Angelus prayer of October 9, 2022, Francis—referring to the anniversary of the start of the Second Vatican Council and to the Cuban missile crisis—said, “at the beginning of Vatican II sixty years ago, the danger of nuclear war menaced the world right at that time. Why don’t we learn from history? Even at that moment, there were conflicts and huge tensions, but the way of peace was chosen.” 45
In this sense, one does not have to be a “coward” or a “naive pacifist” to advocate for a cease-fire and a return to diplomacy and to the negotiation table. Just as in the case of Amoris Laetitiae, so too in the case of the just war theory and the ius ad bellum, Pope Francis might not be keen on changing moral doctrine. He is, however, committed to restricting its scope as much as possible to enable a “just peace theory” and an ius pacis in practice. It is not excluded that this viewpoint is not only the more utopian-prophetic, but, in the face of Armageddon, also the more realistic-rational political stance to take.
Footnotes
1
See, for example, the recent Italian compilation of papal texts on peace: Francis, Contro la guerra. Il coraggio di costruire la pace (Milan, Vatican: RCS Media Group, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2022). I thank John Steffen for his editing help, and David Cloutier, David Collins, SJ, and Christopher W. Steck, SJ for their useful comments on my initial paper, proposed (online) during the Workshop Francis@10 at Georgetown University on November 16, 2022.
2
See for instance, Gregory M. Reichberg, “Discontinuity in Catholic Just War Teaching? From Aquinas to the Contemporary Popes,” Nova et Vetera 10, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 1073–97.
3
Andrea Riccardi, La scelta per la pace. Meditazioni tra Bibbia e storia (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2022), 12–13.
4
The expression was used for the first time on September 13, 2014, in Redipuglia, Italy, on the occasion of the commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the First World War: “Even today, after the second failure of another world war, perhaps one can speak of a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction.” Francis, “Homily” (September 13, 2014), https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2014/documents/papa-francesco_20140913_omelia-sacrario-militare-redipuglia.html. Francis has since used it several times, e.g., in his “Message for World Peace Day” (January 1, 2016), 
.
5
Francis, Fratelli Tutti (20 October 2020), (hereafter cited as FT), §259. See also FT, §25: “War, terrorist attacks, racial or religious persecution, and many other affronts to human dignity are judged differently, depending on how convenient it proves for certain, primarily economic, interests. What is true as long as it is convenient for someone in power stops being true once it becomes inconvenient. These situations of violence, sad to say, ‘have become so common as to constitute a real “third world war” fought piecemeal.’”
7
Johan Verstraeten, “It Is Better to Build Bridges than to Build Walls,” in The Geopolitics of Pope Francis, Annua Nuntia Lovaniensia 77, ed. Jan De Volder (Leuven: Peeters, 2019), 199–208 at 206.
8
There is a recent example where Francis, with a slip of the tongue, deviated from this principle. In an interview with the Jesuit magazine America, speaking on atrocities committed in Ukraine, Francis said, “When I speak about Ukraine, I speak about the cruelty because I have much information about the cruelty of the troops that come in. Generally, the cruelest are perhaps those who are of Russia but are not of the Russian tradition, such as the Chechens, the Buryati [sic] and so on.” “Exclusive: Pope Francis Discusses Ukraine, U.S. Bishops and More,” America Magazine (November 28, 2022), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2022/11/28/pope-francis-interview-america-244225. Naming and blaming Chechens (Muslims) and Buryats (Buddhists) proved to be a mistake, one that provoked a furious reaction from Russia. The Vatican later had to apologize. Elise Ann Allen, “Vatican Confirms Papal Apology; Russia Praises ‘Ability to Admit Mistakes,’” in Crux (December 15, 2022), .
9
The literature on Pope Pius XII’s attitude to the Holocaust is abundant. I found Riccardi’s recent work on the pope’s “silence” insightful: Andrea Riccardi, La guerra del silenzo. Pio XII, il nazismo, gli ebrei (Bari-Rome: Laterza, 2022).
11
12
13
14
15
Francis: “Even today, we have to think in terms of the concept of the ‘just war.’ We have learned in political philosophy that, in order to defend yourself, you can make war and consider it just. But can you speak of a ‘just war’? Or even a defensive war? [the French original version has: ‘Ou plutôt une guerre de défense?,’ meaning ‘Or (can you) rather (speak of) a defensive war?’] Because the only just thing is peace.” Dominique Wolton: “You mean you can’t use the term ‘just war,’ is that it? Francis: “I don’t like using it. You hear people saying, ‘I make war because I have no other possible way of defending myself.’ But no war is just. Only peace is just.” Francis, with Dominique Wolton, The Path to Change: Thoughts on Politics and Society (London: Pan Macmillan, 2018), 27.
16
FT, §258.
17
FT, §258.
18
19
For instance: “Certain choices are not neutral: to allocate a large part of spending to weapons means taking it away from something else, which means continuing to take it away yet again, from those who lack the basic necessities. And this is a scandal: spending on weapons. How much is spent on weapons, terrible! . . . What is the use of solemnly committing ourselves all together, on an international level, in campaigns against poverty, against hunger, against the degradation of the planet, if we then fall back into the old vice of war, into the old strategy of the power of armaments, which takes everything and everyone backwards?” Francis, “Address to Members of the Voluntary Organization ‘Ho Avuto Sete’” (March 21, 2022), .
21
In a message to the United Nations, in 1982, in which John Paul II heavily and insistently pleaded for (nuclear) disarmament, he wrote: “In current conditions ‘deterrence’ based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable.” John Paul II, “Message to the United Nations” (June 7, 1982), .
23
“I would like to again express my spiritual and paternal closeness to the people of Sri Lanka. . . . I pray for the countless victims and wounded, and I ask everyone not to hesitate to offer all the help necessary to this dear nation. I likewise hope that everyone will condemn these never justifiable terrorist acts, inhuman acts.” Francis, “Greetings after the Angelus-Regina Coeli” (April 22, 2019), .
24
25
27
28
Jan De Volder, “Francis’s Idiosyncratic Approach to Vatican Geopolitics: An Introduction,” The Geopolitics of Pope Francis, 1–23 at 10–11.
29
De Volder, “Francis’s Idiosyncratic Approach.”
30
In a much-quoted sermon, pronounced on March 6, 2022, Patriarch Kirill framed the war against Ukraine as part of the Russian and Christian resistance to a decadent world dominated by Western liberal values, exemplified for him in “gay pride parades.” Jack Jenkins, “How Putin’s Invasion Became a Holy War for Russia,” The Washington Post (March 21, 2022), .
31
After Kirill had read his justifications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Pope Francis reportedly answered, “I don’t understand any of this. Brother, we are not state clerics, we shouldn’t speak the language of politics, but rather the language of Jesus. We are shepherds of the same holy flock of God.” Francis added, “For this reason, we must look for a path to peace, we must stop the fighting. A patriarch can’t lower himself to become Putin’s altar boy.” Quoted in “Russian Orthodox Church: Pope Francis’ Comments about Talks with Patriarch Kirill ‘Regrettable,’” Catholic News Agency (May 4, 2022), .
32
See the following online articles: “His Holiness Patriarch Kirill Meets with WCC Acting General Secretary Archpriest Ioan Sauca,” Official Website of the Moscow Patriarchate, http://www.patriarchia.ru/en/db/text/5969693.html; “War Cannot Be Holy, but . . .,” Orthodox Times (October 19, 2022), https://orthodoxtimes.com/patriarch-kirill-war-cannot-be-holy-but/; “Patriarch Kirill: Gay Pride Parades Are to Blame for the War in Ukraine,” Orthodox Times (March 8, 2022), .
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34
See for instance: “My appeal is addressed first and foremost to the President of the Russian Federation, imploring him to stop this spiral of violence and death, also for the sake of his own people. On the other hand, saddened by the immense suffering of the Ukrainian people as a result of the aggression they have suffered, I address an equally confident appeal to the President of Ukraine to be open to serious proposals for peace.” Francis, “Angelus” (October 2, 2022), .
36
“Ho definito l’invasione dell’Ucraina una aggressione inaccettabile, ripugnante, insensata, barbara, sacrilega.” To the Jesuits in Kazakstan, La Civiltà cattolica (October 1, 2022).
37
“One might say,” wrote Carl Schmitt in his 1923 Romischer Katholizismus und politische Form, “that there appears to be no antithesis it [the church] does not embrace.” Carl Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 7.
39
Press conference, September 15, 2022.
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44
I dealt with these themes in my studies on the church in the First World War. See for instance: Jan De Volder, Cardinal Mercier in the First World War: Belgium, Germany and the Catholic Church (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018).