Abstract
The author is a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London. It is his first book and a revised version of his dissertation done at Durham University. Braun has actually written two essays inside one cover. As the title states, one concern is to reflect upon the development of what has come to be called jus ad vim, the right to use force in a limited way, short of full-scale war. B.’s second concern is to analyze and resolve what he sees as a split within the just war tradition between Michael Walzer and his followers, the “traditionalists” (32), and Jeff McMahan and others whom B. labels “revisionists” (22). This second concern is the focus of the opening chapters, as B. lays out the views in what he calls the “fight” for the just war tradition.
While acknowledging insights from both sides of the debate, B. prefers neither camp. He views Walzer as insufficiently in touch with the historical sources of the tradition, and too indebted to a legalist, rather than moral, paradigm of analysis. B. accepts some points made by the revisionists against Walzer, but maintains that they, too, ignore the historical tradition with their penchant for abstract ethical theory and hypothetical cases that provide little assistance to those seeking to determine the morality of an actual violent conflict. In these opening chapters, B. also presents his own position which he hopes will bridge the divide.
B. claims the historical tradition in its classical phase was connected to the practice of statecraft and sought to provide practical moral guidance to those making decisions about war. The author prefers a return to the classical tradition, particularly as presented in Aquinas, to argue for what he calls a “neoclassical” or historical approach. James Johnson is a major source of influence here. B.’s reading of Aquinas on just war is much influenced by G. Reichberg’s studies. After distinguishing his approach to that of Walzer and the revisionists in chapters 2 and 3, B. lays out his case for his Thomistic neoclassical approach in chapters 4, 5, and 6. A big reason for relying upon Aquinas is B.’s interest in rehabilitating the idea of retribution as an appropriate cause for limited force. In the modern era, that treatment of just cause no longer holds for many due to the slaughter and devastation that modern weaponry and strategy bring to noncombatants. Instead, self-defense has become the chief, even single, just cause for war in the minds of many. The author wishes to change that, and here the jus ad vim topic comes to the fore.
The final four chapters of this closely reasoned book is an enlightening casuistical presentation of the legitimate use of limited force in two cases: targeted killing of terrorists and limited strikes to enforce international standards, such as bans on genocide or use of chemical weapons. B. presents the details of several cases under each heading in chapters 7 and 9; while in 8 and 10 he develops a general norm based upon the preceding cases. On that basis B. makes his argument for accepting that retribution played a part in the decisions of leaders to employ limited force and that it was appropriate for that to be a rationale. Throughout his argument he uses examples drawn from US policy due to the accessibility of information about the main protagonists and their decision-making processes (123). The work of D. Brunstetter looms large in B.’s treatment of jus ad vim.
The book reflects its origin in a doctoral dissertation. It is clearly written, but at times a tedious read as B. makes some points repeatedly. Much of the literature covered will be known to scholars in the field, though there is an absence of reference to many theologians who have worked on the topic. This shows up in the claim that the US bishops introduced the phrase “a presumption against war” in their 1983 pastoral letter, when James Childress discussed the idea in his influential 1978 essay published in this journal. In his discussion of Aquinas on right intent, B. makes no mention of J. Murphy’s 2014 volume War’s Ends, which addresses the topic at length. And there is no engagement with the theological voices challenging the ongoing utility of just war categories for our present situation.
B. is an intelligent scholar, fair-minded in his treatment of those with whom he disagrees. Too much space is devoted to B.’s effort to broker a peace between the combatants regarding the just war tradition, but the discussion of limited force and the use of casuistry to make his case is a solid contribution.