Humour: A signpost virtue for authentic Christian moral conversion

Introduction

The notable nineteenth-century German Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche offered the telling remark that he might be inclined to believe in the Redeemer if his followers had the outward appearance of being ‘more redeemed’. ¹ While much indeed could be made of Nietzsche’s blatant bias against and persecution of Christianity, his observation is not without merit and should give human persons great pause theologically, ethically and spiritually. In terms of the narrative of human existence, such a comment gives rise to authentic questions regarding the engagement, acceptance and embrace of the gracious mystery of Christian conversion. Simply stated, those persons who lay claim to an experience of on-going conversion ² in their lives should manifest certain appropriate characteristics that attend to and bear witness to this reality. Many persons would point to virtuous behaviours such as the exercise of agapic love and the promotion of justice in the world as valid hallmarks of such a modality. While providing an accurate assessment of true conversion to a degree, such actions are always open to question for they are often indicative of watershed moments rather than the daily grind. This leads one to question whether there are other, ‘lesser’ virtues that testify to authentic conversion on the part of individual believers that exist in the regularity of the unfolding dynamic of life and as such are often overlooked and undervalued. Such virtues, if viewed critically and embodied appropriately, may not only signify one’s own genuine conversion but also invite other ordinary women and men to accept and enjoy this grace as true gift.

A ‘serious’ contender for just such a virtue is that of humour. While often relegated to the level of feeling, humour appropriately fits within the boundaries of the contemporary theological tradition regarding the nature of virtue as ‘an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving such goods’. ³ Simply stated, virtue is a moral disposition that practically orients one towards the good, that is, eudaimonia or ‘happiness’ vis-à-vis the divine, rather than being a basic feeling that results from external promptings. This is clearly the case with humour, for, as discussed below, a virtuous disposition such as this clearly manifests the possibility of perfecting the person in pursuit of joy on anthropological and existential levels. With this note of preface in mind, the present thesis will unfold in the following manner. First, a simple yet thorough overview of the key components marking Christian moral conversion will be outlined. Second, humour or eutrapelia, under the more precise heading of virtue, and within the context of reflections by Aristotle and Aquinas, will be discussed as one potential means of evidencing genuine conversion in the exigencies of the on-going narrative of human existence. Third, and finally, the connection between humour ‘as virtue’ and the other virtues, most importantly the theological virtues of faith, hope and love will be explored. Such a proposal will allow believers to regard humour as a relatively uncharted paradigm signpost of virtuous conversion, making the ‘good life’ a truly desirable goal replete with lively undertones in the convergence of spirituality and morality on a practical level. ⁴

Conversion: an emerging conclusion in the narrative of the Christian moral life

If James P. Hanigan is correct that ‘conversion is the fundamental experience of Christian life and so of Christian ethics’, ⁵ it is essential to discern the origin of its most basic meaning, to discover the biblical warrant for its embrace, and to articulate a helpful contemporary design for its theological and pastoral actualization. The term ‘conversion’ is derived from the Latin, conversio, which indicates ‘a turning around’ thereby suggesting movement from some reality which fails to satisfy – on both existential and transcendental levels of being – towards a renewed modality marked by genuine human happiness and fulfilment. Individuals often point to the ‘conversion’ of Paul as the paradigmatic manifestation of such an experience, attested to three times in the Acts of the Apostles (9.1–31; 22.6–16; 26.12–18) and once by the apostle himself in Galatians (1.13–24). Unfortunately, persons and periods associated with the evolution of Christianity have been caught up in the sensationalism associated with this event, relegating it to a singular and unique transformation which, in a sense, may lead to stagnation in terms of an individual’s moral and spiritual status before God. It is much more helpful to view the conversion of Paul as a process marked by faith, reconciliation and discipleship, ⁶ resulting in the development of a liminal spiritual and moral personality which is not wedded exclusively to one particular encounter or event. ⁷ Rather, the conversion of Paul is best viewed as a comprehensive and evolving metaphor coloured by a plethora of theological discoveries and insights, personal triumphs and frustrations, and unparalleled experiences of both love and rejection, all within the context of a new-found relationship with Christ which is mutually inclusive and thoroughly life-giving for all those who travel ‘along the Way’. Thus, the legacy of Paul’s correspondence with the communities that he founded and with whom he maintained a relationship gives testimony to the aforementioned progressive and inclusive nature of authentic moral and spiritual conversion.

Contemporary theologians and ethicists have attempted to identify and unpack the shape and nature of this transformative invitation and response, for, in the case of Paul’s paradigmatic conversion experience, much like the parables of Jesus, ‘it affects one’s imagination, enlarges one’s perspective, expands the considerations, and maybe even shocks the reader without telling her or him precisely what to do’. ⁸ As a result, the Christian theological and moral tradition provides the faithful with a profusion of images and metaphors for conversion. Bernard Häring speaks of conversion, employing the metaphor of dialogue with the aim of highlighting the dynamic interplay of Christ, the divine word and the human response. For Häring, the focal point is Christ, the original and perfect embodiment of God’s offer of conversion. ⁹ Christ is the prophet who offers invitation to enter the kingdom of God through proclamations of both challenge and mercy; he is the great reconciler who overcomes sin as alienation from all right relationships; he is the liberator from sin as enslavement. ¹⁰ Unfortunately, Häring’s description of conversion is not without limitation, two facets of which are worthy of consideration in the present context of conversion informed by virtue. First, Häring’s notion of conversion seems to lack appreciation at times of the role played by particular historical contingencies in the acquisition and practice of virtue in the process of conversion. ¹¹ Second, and related to the first, Häring seems to avoid the idea that suffering, tragedy, ¹² and even spontaneous joy (e.g., humour properly understood as free ready wit as witnessed below) are critical for virtue formation necessary to receive and embody the gift of redemption, that is, conversion.

Another Roman Catholic theological voice who is well known for his ruminations on conversion is Josef Fuchs, who equates it with the formation of a new and authentic ‘fundamental option’ allowing human persons to fulfill their dignity and destiny by giving themselves over completely to God, thereby transcending the boundaries of the sinful self. ¹³ At first glance, such a change seems helpful in the advancement of a theology of conversion informed by individual virtuous acts and dispositions. Rahner’s theory of fundamental option is fuelled by his understanding of freedom. Human persons, as innately spiritual beings, are constituted by a desire for and openness to ultimate reality, that is, God, through knowledge and love. No categorical object can satisfy this yearning completely; however, human finitude allows one to move forward in knowledge and love of the divine through finite choices and postures, under which falls the category of virtue. Since human persons, left to their own limitations, cannot access the divine, God provides an offer of Godself through an infinite horizon of intellect and will, known as the supernatural existential – God’s free gift of grace offered to human persons. The response comes as a result of what Rahner calls an exercise of transcendental freedom which results in the development of a fundamental option wherein one opens or closes oneself to the grace of conversion. ¹⁴ Again, it seems that the assimilation and practice of particular virtues are categorical choices that orient the fundamental option of persons towards ultimate transformation.

Jean Porter finds difficulty with Rahner’s treatment of fundamental option, specifically in its understanding of exercises of categorical freedom which ultimately impacts on the current discussion of conversion that is accessed through virtue. Specifically, she contends that:

The language of freedom, which is so central to Rahner’s theology, finds its immediate and natural context in a wider discourse about human action, the ways in which people are restrained or prevented from acting, the extent and limits of accountability, and other related issues … The central difficulty with Rahner’s account of transcendental freedom is that it employs the language of freedom, while at the same time systematically stripping that language of the context that could give it meaning and point. Transcendental freedom, as he understands it, is a capacity that is exercised apart from any categorical act … how are we to understand an exercise of freedom that has no necessary connection to any observable action or object of choice at all? … In other words, the language by which Rahner speaks of transcendental freedom takes its meaning from its place in a highly referential system, which has very little grounding in actual observations or concrete experiences. ¹⁵

Bernard Lonergan and Walter Conn speak specifically and similarly of ‘moral conversion’ in ways that may be much more helpful in the present context which seeks to connect particular virtue to the dynamics of conversion. Conn views Christian conversion as having four constitutive dimensions: intellectual, affective, moral and religious transformation. ¹⁶ It is difficult to differentiate completely among the four since informed affectivity grounds spiritual ontology and action, and serves as its ‘structural antecedent’. ¹⁷ Moral conversion for Conn is marked by a particular emphasis upon the moment when an individual becomes a self-aware, self-determining, autonomous agent. This is a progressive movement in the process of personal becoming leading to an authentic existence as ‘an originator of value’. ¹⁸ While perhaps placing too much emphasis upon the human movement in the process of moral conversion, Conn’s observations allow for two distinct variables necessary for conversion to appropriate virtue in its embodiment, namely, imagination ¹⁹ and the ability to discern what is of value for self-transcendence that leads to true happiness in a teleological vein: knowledge, love and enjoyment of God made manifest in human interaction. Moral conversion seems to lead students of Conn to see eschatological fulfilment of the person both immanently and eternally in their access to the beatific vision unhindered by traditional otherworldly theological boundaries. ²⁰ Moral conversion is then both observable and attractive, especially in the imaginative embrace of particular virtues.

It is often said that Conn offers a more comprehensive study of conversion than Lonergan; ²¹ however, the latter seems to be more explicit in terms of the religious nature of moral conversion, more attentive to that which is valuable or virtuous, and more aware of the impact of moral conversion on moral action. Simply stated, for Lonergan, moral conversion represents a profound movement on the horizon of human existence from what merely satisfies personal desire to what is truly valuable, for example, the authentic experience of joy associated with humour properly understood. The quality of moral conversion is contingent upon the experience of salvation in Christ Jesus, who not only images but also makes God truly present in the Incarnation. ²² Moral decisions and actions are determined by such conversion which itself is manifested in particular expressions of virtue of varying categories and degrees. Given Lonergan’s tremendous perceptiveness with regard to moral conversion, including the overt roles of the human and divine participants, the narrative component of moral conversion requires even greater transparency to discover the importance of particular virtues in the discernment of the attractiveness of such conversion.

Although anachronistic in some regards, an appeal to Stanley Hauerwas serves as a bridge from all of the aforementioned reflections upon conversion (particularly moral conversion) to the importance of the embodiment of particular virtues making the process both desirable and authentic. Hauerwas understands conversion in narrative terms first in the believer’s coming to know the person and event of Christ through the narrative of Scripture which serves as the lens through which one must view reality. He proceeds to note that ‘the convictions that form the background for Christian growth form a narrative that requires conversion, since the narrative never treats the self as completed’. ²³ For Christians, this requires a renewed form of existence, ‘a transvaluation of their past reality’. ²⁴ Accordingly, Hauerwas employs the language of journey with regard to conversion for a number of reasons. First, it points to the reality of gradual transformation on the part of individuals that occurs over the course of life in relationship to one’s teleological end, that is, God. ²⁵ Virtues that are acquired and practised during this pilgrimage result in the transformation of the whole person. While it is true for Hauerwas that reconciliation or, to employ his Protestant terminology, Justification, precedes converted character formed by virtue, the on-going narrative of conversion is maintained by virtuous disposition and action. Hauerwas then has accomplished two things. First, he in the collaborative ecumenical theological spirit of Vatican II successfully harmonizes Catholic and Protestant approaches, even in the presence of some notable difficulties. Second, he lays the groundwork, that is, the narrative horizon, for viewing ordinary virtues such as humour as extremely helpful in embracing the call to conversion.

Thus the present, necessary overview of conversion in the modern tradition has yielded several conclusions. First, the conversion of one’s personal narrative is inspired by the biblical narrative. Second, free human choice of virtuous action and disposition on the categorical level is essential for valid self-transcendence and transformation. Third, and related to the second, autonomous, imaginative appropriation of value must keep eschatological fulfilment always in view. Fourth, personal satisfaction must always give way to what is truly valuable for moral conversion to occur. Fifth, and finally, all aspects of one’s personal narrative, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, must be attended to for conversion to be meaningful for oneself and recognizable to others.

Humour: a virtue for ordinary Christians seeking lively conversion

With everything that has been said regarding the connections between virtue and conversion, it is appropriate for Christians to discern particular virtues to assist them ‘along the Way’. As suggested earlier, virtue is ‘part of human flourishing and the call of God to strive for perfection in response to God’s gift’. ²⁶ Immediately, the mind is drawn here to larger idyllic virtues such as exercises of kenotic love for others, working for justice and speaking prophetic truths as likely candidates. But what is to be said of ordinary virtues for ordinary Christians seeking an authentic life? As indicated at the commencement of this study, one such virtue often overlooked, yet immensely popular (albeit on a pre-cognitive level), is that of humour. It is to the specifics of this particular lively virtue that our attention now turns.

The virtue of humour that is the subject of our musings is that articulated by Aristotle as eutrapelia, roughly translated by the term ‘liveliness’ or ‘ready wit’. ²⁷ It serves as a means between the two extremes of an overly grim or morose seriousness (sometimes referred to as ‘boorishness’) and inane foolishness (or ‘buffoonery’). Along these lines, some philosophers and spiritual authors have equated humour with the virtue of mirth; however, this term consistently carries the connotations of ‘high-spirited amusement often accompanied by laughter’, ‘merriment’ and ‘frivolity’, ²⁸ all of which may suggest irresponsible and irreverent behaviors and attitudes. Perhaps this is the reason that the Philosopher is clear that, rather than availing itself to self-serving happiness discovered in amusements, humour is better comprehended as a unique form of rest that is used as a means to further activity. Part of this rest is the development of a balanced and well-rounded persona that assists one in the cultivation of pleasant and advantageous relationships with God, neighbour, self and world. ²⁹ It should be recalled here that Aristotle is very concerned with the acquisition and maintenance of conscious virtuousness, primarily, but not exclusively, by the upper class. ³⁰

Aquinas thoroughly Christianizes eutrapelia and would appear to envision it possessing an existential connection to the virtue of joy which is well established at this point in the tradition. ³¹ In his considerations of humour, that is, eutrapelia, and the relaxed state associated with it, he highlights its etymological rootedness in the term etrapelos which means ‘well-turning’, thereby suggesting a connection between humour and the transformation of actions and attitudes into experiences of relaxation. This movement allows the believer entrenched in humour to have a transhistorical encounter with joy and relaxation in memory, in present encounter and in anticipatory excitement. Clearly, for Aquinas and his contemporaries, humour was necessarily marked by natural cheerfulness and affability. ³² Its focus is not that associated traditionally with virtue, that is, isolated self-perfection (although ‘self-perfection’ is part of the process of conversion). More appropriately the goal of eutrapelia is that of generous allocation of overflowing and redeemed goodness that makes right relationship with Christ as a redeemed, fully human person attractive and cheerful.

Given the reflections of Aristotle and Aquinas, it is irrefutable to claim that humour is a virtue of the converted. Clearly, it reflects awareness of Christ made present in the biblical meta-narrative. Additionally, it is expressive of personal freedom on the categorical level and awareness of that which is truly valuable. In providing rest for future activity, it reflects a converted anthropology wherein persons image God in whose likeness they were created, a God who ‘rested’ on the seventh day at the onset of salvation history. Humour, in a similar vein, points to humans as co-creators who fulfil their divinely willed dignity and destiny by engaging fully in the narrative they pen in life, full of as many cheerful moments as challenging ones for those with discerning intellects and affections. Humour is therefore perhaps the most attractive virtue of conversion and a signpost for its lively pursuit and adherence.

The person and event of Jesus the Christ give paradigmatic witness to this claim, seeing that, while he is in no need of conversion, he does stand as the perfect model for it ‘being fully and perfectly human’ and ‘fully and in principle virtuous’. ³³ Through his use of irony, that is, his articulation of the difference between appearance and reality through moral injunction (the adulterous woman; cf. John 8.7); and his differentiating between splinters and logs in moral culpability (Matt. 7.3), Jesus models conversion of individuals through humour cleverly crafted. This skill is cultivated through detachment and freedom, no doubt gained through the rest associated with humour suggested above. To be humorous then is to be Christlike, and to be Christlike is to be converted.

A quick note on humour and the theological virtues

In the broad school of virtue, to be one of the most authentic hallmarks of conversion, humour or eutrapelia must be connected to the theological virtues both to avoid extremes and to allow the divine to be the telos and centre of the conversion process. Accordingly, a few brief observations will be offered regarding the correlations between humour and faith, hope and love, respectively.

Faith manifests itself in the fundamental recognition of and allegiance to God in Jesus through the Spirit as creator, redeemer and sanctifier of all with whom we find ourselves in relationship. ³⁴ It is marked by dependent trust and provides persons with direction, solidarity and meaning on our earthly pilgrimage. It is essential for ‘good humour’ as a virtue of moral conversion. Without faith, eutrapelia is a pale expression of irreverent, isolated, barbarous scorn.

Hope, a virtue thoroughly grounded in the biblical witness is the theological virtue that authentically promises fullness of life in God. ³⁵ It bridges the gap between the eschatological future and contemporary historical realities, ³⁶ marked by significant suffering and uncertainty. Hope gives meaning to the struggle to be completely converted to Christ. Humour requires it, for without hope eutrapelia would be merely a disposition of pessimistic cynicism.

Love, the signature theological virtue, avoids any simple definition. ³⁷ It reflects the deepest form of friendship through kenotic activity and inclusivity. Love is God incarnate in the person and event of Jesus the Christ and the essence of the nature that we are invited to embody in time and eternity. All of Scripture and theology skim the surface in attempting to articulate the meaning of love and to encapsulate portraits of its defining and liberating power. However, one thing is certain when it comes to eutrapelia. When love is absent from humour, it may be safely assumed that it is nothing more than callous, egocentric and existentially costly self-amusement.

Conclusion

Nietzschean naysayers be warned. You are clearly being called to task in terms of conversion and its external manifestations. The redeemed are truly converted in that they have freely chosen to venture forth on a journey to the fullness of the kingdom of God with both creative fidelity to truth and a sense of reality that is truly of value. Their personal narratives can be greatly influenced by the virtue of humour, informed by and infused with faith, hope and charity that is both divinely willed and contagious. Thus, potential eutrapelic moral conversion is alive, well and cheerful, as well as deserving of the last laugh.