Abstract
Carl Olson, The Allure of Decadent Thinking: Religious Studies and the Challenge of Postmodernism, Oxford University Press: Oxford and USA, 2013; 224 pp.: 9780199959839, £29.99/$45.00 (hbk)
Religious studies and postmodernism have long been uneasy bedfellows. The former is, after all, the creation of the very intellectual, philosophical and cultural milieu that the latter has been concerned to interrogate. Some religious studies scholars have sought to respond creatively to the challenges laid down by postmodern thought, showing how the field may adapt itself to new conditions and shed some of the more problematic baggage from its Enlightenment heritage. Others have resolutely defended the integrity of religious studies against what they perceive to be the malign decadence of postmodern thought. Carl Olson, in this book, places himself resolutely among the latter. He is willing to concede that postmodernism has contributed some insights that are of value to religious studies, acknowledging, for instance, that ‘it can help us to recognize that old academic tendencies, such as the pursuit of the possibility of a science of religion and the evolution of the designation “world religions,” have outgrowth [sic] their usefulness’ (p. 141). But ultimately, he concludes that ‘postmodern approaches to the study of religion have limited utility’ (p. 148).
If the conclusion is clear, what of the execution? After considering the thought of several postmodern theorists (especially Bataille, Derrida, Said and Spivak), Olson says that ‘Before jumping on the postmodern bandwagon, I think that a scholar should self-administer the following pragmatic test: Does the approach that I adopt enhance the understanding of the subject of religion or any other subject for me or my potential reader?’ (p. 138). Such a test would, indeed, seem relatively uncontentious. But one should also bear in mind that an important test of the effectiveness of any thoroughgoing criticism is: to what extent does the critique present the thought of its opponent in its strongest and most persuasive form? Judged by this test, Olson scores less well.
Although he has clearly engaged with numerous primary texts, his expositions, often quite rapidly executed, too often succumb to caricature. Postmodernism, for instance, is characterized as a ‘radical skepticism embedded in relativism’ (p. 149); Derrida is said ‘to demonstrate the bankruptcy of the philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment’ (p. 57). While not wholly misleading, such statements are at least partial and need to be placed in the context of a wider and more nuanced analysis. Furthermore, Olson's criticisms of his opponents, thus presented, are often executed in a quick and superficial way. When discussing Spivak, for instance, he says that a problem with her argument ‘is that the notion of intellectual “unlearning” exposes a basic contradiction within her position because her anti-individualism conflicts with her assumption about the fundamental homogeneity of the subject. Moreover, her call for the intellectual to “unlearn” is rather utopian’ (p. 71). These may well be legitimate criticisms, but Olson fails to unfold them, as one quickly discovers when the next sentence begins: ‘Another problem arises … ’ On the next page, he deems Spivak ‘inconsistent’ for adhering to both Marxism and deconstruction simultaneously (p. 72). Undoubtedly, there is a tension between these two approaches, but much more would need to be said about how Spivak attempts to reconcile the two before the charge of ‘inconsistency’ could be persuasively sustained. Limitations of space preclude the enumeration of further examples. But suffice to say that such rapid movements and hasty judgements abound. These, alas, weaken the force of Olson’s argument considerably.