Abstract
In English language analytic philosophy, the idea of naturalism rules. Although there is disagreement as to what naturalism means, it is generally held that naturalism and religious belief are not compatible. Nature is what the natural sciences say that it is and with this declaration comes a conclusion that nature is thereby disenchanted. It is to the great credit of this remarkable book that this mutual incompatibility is challenged by Fiona Ellis and a powerful argument advanced for a religious – indeed, theistic – naturalism.
What naturalism means, and what implications this has for theories of moral value, has already been raised by philosophers – the work of John McDowell is here central. The story might go like this: scientific naturalism claims that nature is what scientific naturalism says it is. A broader naturalism – here called an expansive naturalism – is concerned that such scientific naturalism offers no account of value – that is, of the way that things in the world (especially human beings?) command our attention and call for our respect. How is this to be accounted for? Some philosophical defenders of naturalism are alert to this difficulty and wish to defend a naturalism that is hospitable to objective value but refuses ‘cosmic excess’ and ‘occult power’ associated with ‘the supernatural’.
Ellis takes this discussion as her starting point and argues for a more ‘expansive naturalism’ that retains some of the features of naturalism but also shows that a reading of naturalism is compatible with theism. More than this, she argues that naturalism is compatible with Christian theism – and the negotiation is partly achieved by a critical reading of Levinas. This is a remarkable achievement.
We might expect religiously affiliated philosophers of religion to welcome this book most warmly. It remains in the realm of philosophy and conducts its argument as if the discussion of theistic naturalism were internal to the debates on naturalism. (There is a discussion of the doctrine of creation but the focus here is – although not in name – on ex nihilo.) This is very impressive. Yet, as Ellis explicitly says at both the beginning and the end, one of the audiences of the book is the philosopher who is committed to naturalism and yet is concerned by naturalism’s tendency to a reductionism in connection with moral value. The argument is then also an enquiry in natural theology in the best sense: a proposal as to how theology might amplify a philosophical discussion.
God, Value and Nature is a challenging read in more than one sense. It certainly provides a high-level and complex argument. It also, however, offers a challenge to philosophical defenders of naturalism. It will be interesting to see if any take up the challenge.