Divorce and remarriage after abuse: Conservative Protestant responses

Abstract

Conservative Protestant scholars’ views on divorce and remarriage after abuse vary significantly, each with its strengths and possible deficiencies. A more holistic virtues-based approach may assist.

Keywords

abuse conservative Protestants divorce remarriage

Introduction

Domestic abuse will affect one in four women and one in six men in their lifetime. It leads, on average, to two women being murdered each week and 30 men per year, and accounts for 16 per cent of violent crime in England and Wales.¹ Physical abuse is the obvious headline-making statistic. More subtle, but no less toxic, is emotional or psychological abuse, now an offence in the UK under the Serious Crime Act 2015 (section 76).² Abusers, though sometimes appearing to exhibit outward change, may have deep-seated issues at the root of their behaviour, so that remaining in marital or close relationships with their victims may enable their behaviour rather than motivate genuine repentance.

Mainstream Christian thinking on divorce, however, tends strongly to advocate full marital reconciliation when issues arise, and holds out for the possibility of repentance whenever there is abuse or unreasonable behaviour, often without taking other factors into account. While reconciliation, forgiveness and repentance are indeed to be encouraged and are applicable generally in the large majority of marital contexts, I contend that situations of persistent abuse, neglect or unreasonable behaviour, giving rise to challenging contexts not originally addressed by Jesus’ teachings on marriage and divorce, form important grounds for divorce and remarriage on a case-by-case basis.

Key Protestant Christian approaches to questions of divorce and remarriage (based on significant studies, monographs or articles) include those from Richard Hays, Gordon Wenham, Carl Laney, William Heth, Thomas Edgar, Larry Richards, Craig Keener and David Instone-Brewer. The spectrum of views on divorce and remarriage, even among conservative Protestants (mostly male) who take Scripture seriously, is striking.

Briefly, the main conservative views are as follows:

They allow for divorce only in cases of adultery (based on Matthew 5 and 19), or desertion by an unbelieving spouse (based on 1 Corinthians 7), and do not allow remarriage.

They allow for divorce for those two limited situations of adultery and desertion, and allow for remarriage only for those two cases – excluding all other circumstances, including notably where there is significant marital abuse.³

Wenham holds to position (1) above. Laney defends a stricter variation of (1), allowing neither divorce nor remarriage.

Heth, who changed positions from (1) to (2),⁴ and Edgar argue for (2): that is, allowing for both divorce and remarriage on the two grounds of adultery and desertion. This position has sometimes been described as the ‘standard Protestant view’, although it is not necessarily accepted as the prevailing or ‘official’ view.⁵ It usually takes the form of a ‘rules with exceptions’ formulation: that is, that the general rule in Scripture is no divorce (and no remarriage), but with exceptions to the rule, particularly in cases of adultery and desertion. All these views base their positions primarily on a conservative interpretation (though with some variation in exegesis of verses, hence the differing conclusions) of Jesus’ and Paul’s teachings on marriage and divorce.

Keener, Instone-Brewer and Richards argue for divorce and remarriage to be permitted in a wider range of cases beyond adultery and desertion, including, notably, in cases of abuse and also, possibly more controversially, in cases of neglect. While Keener and Instone-Brewer base their views on their particular interpretations of Scripture, Richards takes a wider, more flexible ‘grace’-based approach, acknowledging the ideal of lifelong monogamy but also the reality of human sin and frailty.

Below, I consider Wenham’s, Keener’s and Instone-Brewer’s views further.

Wenham

Wenham discourages divorce and argues that there should be no remarriage after divorce, whatever the circumstances.⁶ Points he shares in common with his conversation partners (Heth and Keener) are as follows:

Scripture promotes ‘lifelong, monogamous heterosexual marriage as best for human welfare’ (Mark 10.6–7, Matthew 19.4–5, Genesis 1.27–28, Genesis 2.24).

Marriage is an image of the relationship between God and Israel in the Old Testament, and between Christ and his Church in the New Testament (Ephesians 5.25–32).

‘Divorce is a failure due to sin’ (quoting Jesus in Matthew 19.8, referring to Moses permitting divorce because of hardheartedness).

There is widespread instability in Western society caused by sexual permissiveness, marital breakdown and loss of traditional family values.⁷

Wenham argues the points set out below for his position:

None of the early Christian writers (in the first three centuries of Christianity) permitted remarriage after divorce.

All the teaching of New Testament texts except Matthew (Wenham cites Mark 10, Luke 16, Romans 7 and 1 Corinthians 7) have a blanket ban on remarriage after divorce, permitting no exception.

The only apparent exceptions to the blanket prohibition on remarriage after divorce – in Matthew 5.32 and Matthew 19.9, where Jesus appears to allow divorce for sexual immorality – should not be interpreted as an exception to the prohibition as such, since that would make Jesus contradict himself. This is more consistent with the other New Testament texts and ‘the text makes much better sense if Jesus is understood to prohibit remarriage after divorce in every case’.

Despite the fact (which Wenham does not dispute) that the Old Testament and first-century Judaism permitted remarriage after divorce, it cannot be assumed that Jesus agreed with that position; in fact, ‘one of the fundamental themes of the Gospels is Jesus’ conflict with Jews of his day’.⁸

Wenham holds that this (his conclusion that marriage is essentially indissoluble, hence there can be no valid remarriage after divorce) is the orthodox (theologically correct) position of the Church and of mainstream Christianity through the centuries, that Jesus taught this, and that early church leaders taught this. He relies on a combination of interpretation of Scripture, tradition and reason.

While I appreciate Wenham’s concern to uphold lifelong monogamy as God’s original design for marriage and for the flourishing of humankind, his interpretation of Jesus’ teachings on divorce does not sufficiently consider key aspects of the patriarchal and historical context, including the ‘Hillel’ and ‘Shammai’ debate on Deuteronomy 24.1 (discussed below) and the Herodias controversy (Mark 6). Moreover, there is a strong basis for saying that Jesus’ teachings were not exhaustive, since Paul extends the grounds for divorce (and remarriage) by allowing it in situations of desertion by unbelieving spouses, as evident from the wording of 1 Corinthians 7.15 (discussed below when considering Keener’s views).

Further, Wenham’s views may be inadequate for addressing cases of real abuse, harmful neglect or unreasonable behaviour in marriage. His emphasis on forgiveness and reconciliation is laudable and should be the first-instance response to the breaking of marital vows. However, where such abuse, neglect or unreasonable behaviour persists and continues to cause real harm to the innocent partner,⁹ there surely has to be a deeper and stronger recourse for the innocent partner that accords with justice and wisdom.

Reconciliation itself is potentially complex, where real human beings are involved, and its various levels of meaning need to be considered carefully. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between reconciliation at the level of supportive friendship (or as fellow humans or brothers or sisters in Christ, as clearly advocated in Scripture) and reconciliation at the level of marital intimacy – which can be patently dangerous to victims of abuse, placing them in situations of unjustified vulnerability, which Jesus’ teaching was not intended to endorse. The virtue of wisdom or prudence is also important here. Not all relationships are suited to the closeness and challenges of marital intimacy. We need to distinguish between reconciling to be friends who get along and live in peace (which ideally all estranged or divorced couples, especially those with children, should be encouraged to work towards), and ‘reconciling’ to the far deeper level of marital intimacy, which in situations of abuse can cause serious harm to victims.

Wenham raises valid concerns about social stability, pointing to the biblical ideal of family and society characterized by good order, sustainability and stability. However, it is important not to stretch this argument too far, so as to justify, for example, even tyranny and abuse in the name of promoting good order. It is pertinent to note that divorces are also frowned upon in many conservative Asian and non-Christian contexts – particularly for reasons of social stability and maintaining social norms, sometimes (and in some contexts, often) at the expense of and in priority over doing justice or promoting freedom from oppression, exploitation or abuse. Christians should not adopt such a mentality without discernment. While social stability or cohesion is important, the spirit of Judeo-Christian Scripture is clear that this cannot take precedence over virtues of justice and freedom from oppression, exploitation and abuse (as passages such as Isaiah 58.1–10 and 61.1–8 and Amos 5.7–15 and 22–24 emphasize). God’s priorities are often not the world’s priorities. Christians need to be careful of how their priorities may be shaped by, even unconsciously, or mirror pagan (rather than truly Christian) values.

Keener

Keener argues for divorce and remarriage to be permitted in some circumstances beyond adultery or desertion, particularly where there has been abuse, but ‘not … for such contemporary claims as “incompatibility” or “growing apart”’.¹⁰ He proposes to expand on Scripture-based arguments, to allow for divorce on the grounds of abuse, relying on Scripture (particularly Jesus’ and Paul’s teachings), experience (including pastoral practice) and reason. He adopts an expansive approach to interpretation of the texts, particularly following Paul’s approach in 1 Corinthians 7.15. He also refers to the debate between Hillel and Shammai as context for the question posed to Jesus. This concerned the interpretation of Deuteronomy 24.1 as to whether it allows husbands to divorce their wives ‘for any reason/cause’ (following Hillel) or only for marital infidelity (following Shammai). Keener argues that Jesus supports the Shammaite position, ‘though his hyperbole states the matter far more strongly than any Shammaite would’.¹¹

Referring to Paul’s allowance for divorce in 1 Corinthians 7.15, Keener asserts:

If Paul had to reapply Jesus’ teaching in a new way for a situation Jesus did not directly address, we may be called on to do the same.¹²

He therefore suggests following the example of Paul, who created a new exception to Jesus’ rule against divorce, applying Jesus’ teaching to a new set of circumstances. He relies on the precedent that Paul does allow for divorce and remarriage in 1 Corinthians 7.15 in cases of desertion by unbelieving spouses, pointing out that the phrase ‘not under bondage’ in that verse is the ‘exact language in ancient divorce contracts for freedom to remarry, and one could not expect his words to mean anything else in this context’.¹³

Concerning Luke 16.18 (and other similar verses) where Jesus reportedly says, ‘Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery, and the man who marries a divorced woman commits adultery,’ Keener observes:

In view of the rest of Jesus’ teaching on the subject, the case is much stronger that he was using hyperbole, i.e., rhetorical overstatement.¹⁴

Both Heth and Keener argue that:

Jesus’ statement, ‘What God has joined together, let no one separate’ [Mark 10.9], does not mean that the marriage covenant cannot be broken but that it should not be.¹⁵

Keener argues that marriage is ‘ontologically dissoluble’, asserting:

There is little point in forbidding a separation that cannot occur in any case. Jesus forbids it because it can but should not occur.¹⁶

Relying on Scripture (including 1 Corinthians 7.15), experience and reason, Keener argues firmly that physical abuse should be grounds for divorce, then further notes:

Between harsh words and physical abuse lie a variety of difficult situations … How do we evaluate the genuineness or extent of abuse?¹⁷

He thus notes the difficulty of determining genuine abuse, where divorce should be supported. He points out the need to be neither too strict nor too lenient,¹⁸ and acknowledges the challenge of knowing where to draw the line. I suggest that this is where the ‘secular’ legal system – particularly, for example, in England (which has been developed with some good Christian grounding, historically) – may be helpful. English law has a long history of looking at what amounts to unreasonable behaviour. Though not perfect, it can be a helpful guide. For example, spurious claims of ‘abuse’ will not cross the threshold for the court’s requirement of ‘unreasonable behaviour’. Sometimes drawing on such ‘secular’ expertise where much work has been done with valuable accumulated experience – comparable perhaps to reliance on scientific discoveries – may be God-honouring.

Instone-Brewer

Instone-Brewer proposes allowing divorce (and remarriage) in cases of unrepentant infidelity, abuse or neglect. Differing from Wenham, he argues that Exodus 21.10–11 provided Old Testament grounds for divorce that were not rejected by Jesus. He asserts that these grounds were affirmed by Paul, though in terms of a positive formulation of marital obligations in 1 Corinthians 7.1–16 and Ephesians 5.21–33 rather than as an outright statement on divorce, and should remain valid in our contemporary context.¹⁹

Instone-Brewer’s main claim is that the grounds set out in Exodus 21.10–11 continue to be valid grounds for divorce – in Jesus’ time, in New Testament (including Paul’s) times and hence also in our times. He relies on Scripture and Rabbinic sources.²⁰ In interpreting the relevant texts on divorce and marriage, he notes that Jesus appears to be silent in the gospels about the Exodus 21.10–11 grounds and argues that this is because those grounds were the accepted grounds (for the validity of divorce for neglect and abuse) in those times, for which there was no controversy.²¹

Instone-Brewer also recalls the Hillel–Shammai debate, arguing that Jesus’ answer focuses on interpretation of Deuteronomy 24.1 and is not meant to exclude other grounds for divorce, including in Exodus 21.10–11. He argues that Exodus 21.10–11 clearly sets out three basic rights within marriage for even a slave wife – food, clothing and ‘conjugal love’ (understood to include marital intimacy and emotional support) – and that failure to provide for these could form a legitimate basis for divorce in Old Testament times.²² He concludes that, considering the relevant Scripture (Deuteronomy 24.1, Exodus 21.10–11, Jesus’ teaching and Paul’s teaching), divorce (and consequently remarriage) should be allowed on the following four grounds: adultery, infidelity or unfaithfulness; deprivation of ‘food’; deprivation of ‘clothing’ (amounting to neglect of material needs); and deprivation of ‘conjugal love’ (amounting to neglect in providing physical or emotional affection). He reasons that abuse (physical or emotional) is like an aggravated form of neglect, and that desertion (allowed by Paul as a basis for divorce in 1 Corinthians 7.15) would also obviously fall under the grounds of neglect.²³ He makes clear that such a position should still not approve of a groundless divorce ‘which does not involve the breaking of vows or any actual harm to either partner’.²⁴

On the validity of a subsequent remarriage, Instone-Brewer, considering passages such as Luke 16.18 and Matthew 19.9, argues that a valid divorce implies the right to remarry, distinguishing this from situations in which the divorce is on invalid grounds.²⁵

Instone-Brewer does highlight, however, Jesus’ emphasis in his teachings in the gospels (which in significant ways departed from both the positions of the Hillel and Shammai schools) that marriage was intended by God (as clear from the Genesis 2 account) to be based on lifelong monogamy, that marriage is not compulsory, that divorce for adultery is not compulsory, that he opposed ‘any cause’ divorces, and that divorce should be avoided unless there has been hardheartedness or unrepentance.²⁶ He also emphasizes, following Matthew 19.8, that divorce should occur only where there has been hardheartedness: that is, unrepentant breaking of marital vows (to love, cherish and honour one’s spouse), such as through stubborn infidelity, abuse or neglect. As to the difficult question of what constitutes unrepentance permitting divorce, when forgiveness and reconciliation to marital intimacy are no longer viable options, Instone-Brewer holds that it is for the victim to decide – in private between him- or herself and God – when it is time to say ‘enough is enough’.²⁷

Evaluation

Wenham, Keener and Instone-Brewer all rely on Scripture to authorize their proposals, but they place different weight on various parts of Scripture, and also have different approaches to interpreting that Scripture, arriving at different conclusions. Wenham gives weight especially to Mark 10, Luke 16 and 1 Corinthians 7, alongside early church tradition, to reach his conclusion of no remarriage after divorce, despite the exceptions stated in Matthew 5 and 19. Keener relies on all of Jesus’ and Paul’s teachings as support, but pays particular attention to interpreting those passages in historical context, including by explaining Jesus’ use of hyperbole and especially noting Paul’s approach in 1 Corinthians 7.15. Instone-Brewer highlights Exodus 21.10–11 as providing grounds for divorce, on the bases of abuse and neglect, which he argues remained applicable in Jesus’ and Paul’s times and should therefore also apply today.

Laudable as their strengths are, all these scholars’ views leave substantially unaddressed the pertinent issue of character formation – which in the Christian context includes spiritual formation, particularly in virtues described in Judeo-Christian Scripture. I argue that a Christian virtue ethical perspective helps further illuminate the way forward for addressing the often perplexing and complex issues involved in matters of divorce and remarriage.

On such questions, Wright describes an example of a heated debate between ‘Jenny’ and ‘Philip’ at a church meeting regarding a proposed appointment of a divorced and remarried man as pastor. In deontological mode, Jenny emphasizes the rules and duties she sees clearly in Scripture, asserting that ‘Jesus himself had insisted that divorcing your spouse and marrying someone else was adultery’, and sees Philip’s position as moral relativism.²⁸ Philip, in contrast, in consequentialist mode and emphasizing authenticity, sees Jenny’s position as legalistic, and reminds her that Jesus resisted legalism and hypocrisy:

Jesus came to help us discover who we really are … and sometimes, as with Jesus’ first followers [and the prodigal son in the parable Jesus told], it takes a while for people to figure it out … but they’ll get there eventually.²⁹

Wright identifies the way through this impasse in terms of formation in Christian character, noting that ‘Jesus himself, backed up by the early Christian writers, speaks repeatedly about the development of a particular character’,³⁰ and going on to describe a Christian version of virtue ethics.³¹

Of course, flourishing, sustained first marriages are preferred and ideal, but the reality in our world is that not all first marriages – and indeed many first marriages in our contemporary world, for various reasons, may not – start off on good foundations, and over time these marriages may become seriously detrimental to the well-being of the spouses or children involved, due to deep-seated problems. A Christian virtue ethical approach should involve considering each situation in its own unique set of circumstances, and accepting that in some cases remaining married and ‘working at it’ may be the best recourse while in other cases divorce may be the best recourse, with a view towards the long-term well-being of all parties concerned. Alongside the vital messages of creation, atonement, redemption and reconciliation, I argue that the good news of Christianity is also about second chances, hope, and giving people a real opportunity to begin again, and the area of divorce and remarriage in the Church is a key area in which Christianity surely should have a clear message of hope too for families in pain. This should be deeply connected to the character of the God we worship as Christians – the God of compassion, love, justice and hope.

Footnotes

Notes

Author Biography

Rebecca Leong is a PhD candidate in theology at Durham University.