Abstract
Robin Attfield’s latest book distils a lifetime of philosophical reflection on this topic in clear, lucid prose, drawing on vivid historical and contemporary examples. It will be an ideal primer for those approaching environmental ethics for the first time, laying out not just current debates on the topic, but also a reasoned case as to why those debates have emerged in the way they have, and which ones are the most convincing. Scientific discussion is touched on throughout as a context for and illustration of philosophical concepts. Having painstakingly cleared up some common confusions in nomenclature, Attfield turns to the importance of giving moral value to future generations. He makes a convincing argument that their exclusion makes no sense in the current ecological context. The pivotal chapter is that on principles for right action. Here he dispenses with some typical misconceptions about the purpose of philosophical approaches to ethics, which need, he suggests, to be based on solid, reasoned arguments, rather than opinions. He then takes each philosophical option in turn, showing their appeal, but also highlighting flaws in their reasoning. John Rawls comes under the hammer as showing a lack of adequate consideration for the importance of social bonds. Virtue ethics is exposed as being ‘promising’, but inadequate for complex scenarios where one virtuous action may have unwanted impacts in another arena. Attfield is rather too harsh in this case. A virtue ethic approach can include the virtue of justice, and that of practical wisdom, which, when combined, could take account of unfortunate global consequences. Attfield is correct, however, to suggest that virtue ethics is often individualistic. Like Attfield, I agree that a rule-based Kantian approach puts too heavy an emphasis on human reason at the expense of giving sufficient value to other animals. He supports broad consequentialism rather than a narrow utilitarianism. He is correct that, given the future orientation of environmental ethics, a principle of consequentialism of some sort cannot easily be avoided, even though he would resist making it an absolute requirement. This raises the question, however, as to what exactly needs to be given value. One of the most interesting debates raised early on is that between Holmes Rolston, who presses for giving value to ecosystems and species, sometimes referred to as ecocentrism, and the author, who argues against such a view in favour of biocentrism, which attributes value to the lives of individual life forms. While I agree with Attfield that Singer’s sentientism fails in environmental ethics as it is insufficiently broad, I am less sure that resisting giving ecosystems value on the basis that they cannot act as moral agents is convincing. An entity can have moral considerability even if it cannot be an agent. His chapter on religion and environmental ethics will be cursory for those working in this field, and his favourable stance towards stewardship is inclusive of the Abrahamic faiths but certainly not necessarily the most significant aspect of their teaching. Overall, theologians reading this book should read it for what it claims to be: namely, an erudite review of the philosophical issues. The critical need to address this problem now, in this generation, given the extreme pressures on the earth system, is a matter far more theologians need to take seriously.