Abstract
Where are the dead? If they are not annihilated at death, in what form do they exist? Most cultures ask this type of question, and the Christian creeds teach the resurrection of the body. There is some ambiguity in the New Testament as to whether we ‘sleep’ until the general resurrection at the last day, or whether, like the thief crucified along with Jesus, we are with God immediately after death. Popular belief interpolated ideas of purgatory, and often adopted the idea of an immortal soul. The author of this book argues both that we are with God immediately after death, and that we have to think of the resurrection of the whole person, body and soul. The latter view is, of course, orthodox, but it is defended in various ways. Turner champions the Aristotelian view, as adopted by Aquinas, and known since the nineteenth century as ‘hylomorphism’ – the idea that the soul is whatever it is which gives form to the body. He writes as an analytic philosopher who prefers to couch propositions in abbreviated form (so ‘theological affirmation’ becomes TA1, TA2, etc.) and often states his arguments in equation form. The advertisement for the book on Google describes the genre as ‘exegesis’. This it is not, and references to Paul take the form of proof texting – odd for a sophisticated thinker. The book is emphatically not for the general reader but engages with, and will primarily be of interest to, Christians who seek to think through their faith using the lens of analytic philosophy.
The book is not an apologetic, but is directed at those Christians who believe that humans are made up of body and soul, and that the soul departs to be with God at death until the general resurrection at the last day. From the second century onwards, worries about the resurrection focused on the question of personal identity: if I am raised, who am ‘I’, given the difference between my infant and my aged self? This seems not to be Turner’s principal concern, although he tells us that his metaphysic provides criteria for diachronic identity. He engages with the metaphysics of time, rejecting ‘presentism’ and ‘eternalism’ – the views that only the present is real or that all times are equally real respectively – and developing a version of ‘compound presentism’ – the idea that time can be affirmed because time overlaps in ‘slices’. His own view is ‘eschatological presentism’, which allows him to argue that at death our body–soul persons are immediately with God.
The book assumes that we must get our metaphysics right in order for our theology to make sense. Many theologians, on the other hand, assume that our understandings of matter, time, human nature and so forth should all be understood in terms of God’s creative word. Questions about the whereabouts of the dead are really questions about God’s gracious intent and the central issue of resurrection is new creation. The question of the relative priority of metaphysics and theology has been with us since Luther raised it in 1517, and it clearly does not go away.