Abstract
Comparison of Exodus 22.19 with the later legislation of Leviticus 20.15–16 raises a number of difficulties as to how the former text should be interpreted. It is suggested that this sole sexual crime in the Book of the Covenant was designed to prevent a physical union with Yahweh through intercourse with a sacrificial animal.
Keywords
On the face of it, Exodus 22.19 (Exodus 22.18 MT) seems straightforward enough: Whoever lies with a beast shall be put to death. If a man lies with a beast, he shall be put to death, and you shall kill the beast. If a woman approaches any beast and lies with it, you shall kill the woman and the beast; they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them.
First, it is generally agreed that the Book of the Covenant (Exodus 20.22—23.33) was addressed to adult males and that only later legislation made women equally liable as men under Israel’s criminal law. So both Leviticus and Deuteronomy spell out the liability of both parties where adultery occurs (Leviticus 20.10; Deuteronomy 22.22) Previously, the husband’s remedy was to divorce his wife for her adultery (Hosea 2.2–3; Jeremiah 3.8), which explains why Bathsheba is nowhere condemned for her adultery with David (1 Samuel 11—12). We should then assume that the woman’s liability for bestiality is also a later extension and understand the original offence in Exodus 22.19 to concern only men.
Second, later legislation makes it plain that an animal subjected to bestiality, like all engaged in a forbidden sexual union, must be put to death (Leviticus 20.10–16). That no such provision is made in Exodus 22.19 is surprising unless its fate had already been sealed.
Third, Exodus 22.19 does not appear in a list of prohibited sexual relations but as part of a small coda of three crimes (Exodus 22.18–20), probably a later addition to the Book of the Covenant. These require the death penalty for a sorceress, one who commits bestiality and one who sacrifices to any god other than Yahweh. It would be most natural to take these provisions together and see them as legislating against improper actions involving Yahweh himself, as is plain from the third provision concerning sacrifice.
This is certainly true of the activity of a sorceress, who was understood to use supernatural powers alien to the power of Yahweh, as in the case of the witch of Endor (1 Samuel 28). In what way could bestiality threaten Yahweh?
Although precise evidence is lacking, the suggestion has been made that the aim of the perpetrator was to attempt physical union with the deity through a sacrificial animal, culminating with the sacrifice of the beast itself. This would explain why Exodus 22.19 had no need to prescribe for the fate of the beast and also the placing of this law alongside another law concerning sacrifice. Indeed, Exodus 22.19 may well reflect earlier Canaanite practices in which the Hebrews were forbidden to engage.
This submission receives some support from Hittite Law (HL 187f., 199f.), concerning which it has been suggested that the reason why it was only copulation with cattle, sheep and pigs that constituted bestiality, and not horses or mules, was that the former were sacred animals.
It would then be an attempted union with Yahweh that was the concern of the legislator of Exodus 22.19. Hence this one sexual criminal act finds its isolated place in Israel’s earliest law code, even though sex itself was not the concern of the legislator but the improper worship of Yahweh. If this note has done nothing more than show how the simplest text may pose difficulties in interpretation, it will have served its purpose.