Abstract
Rooted in the postsecular turn of the study of religion and society, postsecular theology is conceptualized in this article as an umbrella term for theologies offering hybrid interpretations of religiosity and spirituality within a framework that adopts numerous ostensibly secular values and perceptions. In this article, I apply postsecular theological reading to two pairs of thinkers: post-Christian feminist theologians Mary Daly and Daphne Hampson and non-Orthodox Jewish philosophers A. D. Gordon and Martin Buber. Assessing the similarities between them, I sketch the details of their common “postsecular” ground, aiming at enrichment of our understanding of postsecular theology. I then discuss differences between the theologians from a feminist perspective, suggesting that Daly’s and Hampson’s feminist sensitivity exposes Buber’s and Gordon’s gender blindness, while Buber and Gordon introduce Jewish-oriented ideas that may enrich the Christian-dominated field of postsecular feminist theology.
Postsecularism and theology
The postsecular turn in the study of religion and society undermines the conventional understanding of religion and secularism as mutually exclusive dichotomies. Instead, critics call for a new sociology that would challenge such rigid distinctions and enable study of the hybridity of the secular and the religious. 1
One major claim expressed by the postsecular school rejects a declared or implied identification between secularism and atheism. From a postsecular perspective, secularism is not “the disenchantment of the world” that replaces spirituality with scientific and instrumental rationality. Instead, the so-called “secular” is full of faith, spiritual feelings, and a sense of the sacred. “Spiritual but not religious” or “secular-believers” are thus not oxymorons but terms that describe substantial social groups. 2 Within this framework, secularism has even been interpreted as a theological transition from transcendent approaches to immanent ones, from theocentricity to anthropocentricity and from perceived divine origin of sacred writings to human creation. 3 Theology, then, has its place within the secular.
In this context, I introduce the postsecular theology approach, noting that the perspectives mentioned in the article are usually combined in different ways in other theological propositions. I use “postsecular theology” as an umbrella term for theologies that preserves a sense of the sacred while adopting meaningful insights associated with enlightenment secularism. 4 It refers to attempts at proposing a more or less coherent set of beliefs, while maintaining that past religions are incompatible with contemporary knowledge and ethics (although they may manifest some attempt to express awareness or feelings relevant to the secular individual). The prefix “post-” has two meanings in this case: First, it articulates the connection between the above perceptions and a postsecular understanding of the hybridity of religiosity and secularism. Second, it differentiates postsecular theology from secular theologies of “the death of God.” 5
Postsecular theology is “secular” in the sense that it adopts secularism’s critique of classic religion, identifies repressive elements within it, and refuses to accept religious authority as binding. Furthermore, it does not consider the Scriptures to be a source of authoritative information (nor even of particularly high quality), declaring human experience to be its key methodology rather than hermeneutics (critical or otherwise) of the religious canon. At the same time, it is theological in its opposition to the atheistic demand for obliteration of the Godhead concept. It proposes that forgoing the divine to liberate oneself from the religious establishment, as propounded by atheism, constitutes “throwing the baby (belief) out with the bath water (religion).”
To broaden and deepen our understanding of postsecular theology and the way it brings very different theologies together, I read two pairs of thinkers from a postsecular perspective: Post-Christian feminist theologians Mary Daly and Daphne Hampson and non-Orthodox or post-traditionalist Jewish philosophers Martin Buber and A. D. Gordon.
The application of a postsecular theological perspective to these four may be considered problematic in several respects. First, of the four, only Hampson defines herself as a “theologian.” Nevertheless, as all writings examined concentrate on the relation between people and God, as shown below, I suggest that understanding them as theologians is appropriate and useful. Second, none of the four identifies him- or herself as “postsecular.” Indeed, applying the postsecular perspective, which was introduced in academic studies of religion only after the turn of the millennium, to writings from the 1920s and the 1970s may appear problematic and anachronistic. I suggest, however, that the endeavor may indeed prove fruitful. I do not claim that Buber, Gordon, Daly, and Hampson are postsecular theologians but aim to apply a postsecular theological reading to their works. I inquire how each pair contributes to our understanding of the other and how their encounter on the shared ground of post-secularity helps reveal their basic theological assumptions.
Post-Christian feminist theology: Mary Daly and Daphne Hampson
The American post-Christian theologian Mary Daly (1928–2010) is a highly influential feminist thinker. 6 Born and raised Roman Catholic, she left the church publicly in a historic speech at Harvard’s Memorial Church in 1972, in which she called for a women’s exodus from patriarchal religions. 7 Although she prefers to be labeled a “philosopher” or “feminist ethicist,” in the sense that theology is theory with a commitment to belief, Daly might still be considered a theologian.
Recognizing that theology itself is a metaphor that enforces social structures, Daly’s primary concern in her most influential book, Beyond God the Father, is in transforming God-language in a way that will “encourage human becoming toward psychological and social fulfillment.” 8 Naming thus stands at the core of her theology, referring to women’s owning and transforming language. 9 Claiming that “to exist humanly is to name the self, the world, and God,” 10 she insists that the power of naming was stolen from women throughout history, leaving them in a state of non-being. Re-naming, or re-metaphoring, is “women’s active process of self and social construction, [that] relocates women on the map of being, from objects to living, world-making subjects.” 11
For Daly, God is no longer a noun, an object of masculine projections, but rather an intransitive verb—be-ing. “Be-ing is the verb that says the dimensions of depth in all verbs, such as intuiting, reasoning, loving, imaging, making, acting, as well as the couraging, hoping, and playing that are always there when one is really living.” 12 The verb can encourage women’s becoming toward transcendence, as they rebel against a male-ordered model in their struggle to become. 13 “Women now who are experiencing the shock of nonbeing and surge of self-affirmation against this are inclined to perceive transcendence as the Verb in which we participate—live, move and have our being.” 14
The verb metaphor provides a way to think about ultimate/intimate reality as a process, rather than as unchanging substance. 15 “Be-ing, the Verb, cannot without gross falsification be reified into a noun, whether that noun be identified as ‘Super Being,’ or ‘God,’ or ‘Goddess’ (singular or plural).” 16 The process of be-ing, of verb-ing, is a process of transcendence. It is not “transcendent in the old sense of ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the world of our lives, but transcendent in a new sense—a way of be-ing that we participate in and that is constantly transformative.” 17 The metaphor of metabeing points to “participation in the Powers of Be-ing,” to a transformative verb-ing, that is available to women after they have recognized that patriarchal blockage of their powers is insufferable. 18
Daly thus offers a complex, innovative, and consciously political feminist theology that aims at empowering women “by the help of God,” wherein God is understood as a verb, a continuous, active process of and in human life.
Almost thirty years after Daly’s dramatic departure from the church, another prominent feminist theologian, Daphne Hampson, announced her shift from a Christian to a post-Christian position. In her well-known book After Christianity (2002), Hampson, who was born and raised Anglican, announced that Christianity, and indeed all Abrahamic religions, are untrue and unethical. Like Daly, Hampson offers an ethnocentric theology, considering people, rather than God, to be her starting point. Unlike Daly, however, Hampson does not focus on women but rather human beings as a whole (or at least some of them, and some certainly more than others), who possess an awareness of God.
For Hampson, God is a dimension of reality beyond that which meets the eye, an “ultimate sense of things,” a “dimension of the totality, everywhere and all times available.” 19 However little we may understand this dimension, awareness to it denotes a fuller sense of reality and connectedness. It is crucial because “without … that ultimate sense of things that humanity has variously called ‘God’… we cannot hope to be free.” 20 When we are aware of God, we become “integrated but, also and therefore, profoundly open” to “that which moves between people, to which we can be present, as to that with which we are profoundly interconnected …. There is a process of osmosis between self and that which lies immediately beyond self, which is God.” 21 God thus exists in the world, but Hampson also wants to maintain “a sense of God as being transcendental” nonetheless. 22
“In being most fully ourselves,” Hampson states, “we are also realizing God in the world.” 23 She determines that this awareness exists before and beyond language, although “how we speak of God is fundamental to what ‘God’ is to us.” 24 Because of their awareness of that which we call God (or synonyms for God), human beings have always tried to find ways to refer to this dimension by adopting different “vehicles” (sets of myths, concepts, and manners of beliefs) that are by no means as neutral as they appear.
Christianity is a particular vehicle that must be rejected on both ethical and epistemological grounds, according to Hampson. Ethically, Christianity is to be rejected because of the scandal of patriarchy, as it was “that ideology that has served to keep woman in her place: ‘man’s world, woman’s place’.” 25 Epistemologically, Christianity is based on revelation, the claim of a particular, unique break in the causal nexus through which God’s knowledge was revealed to humanity. Taking the Enlightenment and modern scientific knowledge into account, however, claims of an “interruption of history” that is the “locus of knowledge as to what is the case” 26 are no longer valid. Furthermore, in view of contemporary thinking about space and time, it makes little sense to speak of God as “in some way ‘outside’ or ‘before’.” 27
Thus, the mission, as Hampson sees it, is “to shift one’s conception of God” and to “find ways of speaking that honor the integrity of all of us.” 28 Indeed, “if all theological language is metaphorical (there may be wisdom in the theological adage that language and concepts will always be inadequate for God), let us at least exercise judgment as to what might be true metaphor and what is palpably false.” 29 As such, theology should be treated like any other discipline. It should reject the claim of unique revelation and the authority of texts that purport to lean on such revelation. “Theology can draw on its past insofar as that still seems relevant or true.” But, as in all other disciplines, “the criterion must lie with us.” 30 “Human beings are left in the center, which I take for granted in a post-Enlightenment age.” 31
Hampson also discusses ethics, leaning heavily on the feminist ethic of care and the attendant psychological understanding of self-in-relation. 32 The self-in-relation theory claims that a woman’s life tends to be centered on the “situated” and relational self, manifested through a network of connections, while ethics of care maintains that attention to the contextual details of a situation is necessary to safeguard and promote the actual specific interests of those involved. 33 Discussing ethical features, Hampson claims that such activity is also a spiritual practice, as “one’s sense of God is fundamental to one’s sense of self.” 34
Both Hampson and Daly thus offer viewpoints imbued with spiritual feelings but reject traditional religion with its anthropomorphic, androcentric, and chauvinist theology. As such, they may be perceived not only as post-Christian, but also, in a broader sense, as post-traditional feminist theologians. 35 Their views share three claims with other post-traditional feminist theologies: First, they claim that monotheism is so infected by patriarchy, not only in its laws and rituals but also by its mere perception of the divine, that it must be rejected as a source of social identity and knowledge. Second, they suggest that seemingly atheist secularism itself is not a safe shelter from the patriarchy of monotheism, as traditional monotheism is embedded in secularism. Third, they posit that faith itself may be a liberating praxis for women, as “spirituality may be our source of power.” 36
Hampson’s and Daly’s self-definition as post-Christian, however, denotes not only their leaving traditional religion but also their awareness of their Christian origin. Daly, for example, cites Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich, while Hampson develops her theology in dialogue with Friedrich Schleiermacher. Christianity remains the primary source of reference against which they construct their theologies. In fact, it serves as the dominant frame in which most post-traditional feminist theologians operate—the “tradition” they discuss is (almost exclusively) the Christian tradition.
Postsecular Jewish theologians: A. D. Gordon and Martin Buber
Bearing Hampson’s and Daly’s Christian orientation in mind, I introduce two prominent Jewish thinkers to the discussion—Aharon David Gordon (1856–1922) and Martin Buber (1878–1965). Buber was internationally recognized and his writings were translated into dozens of languages, while Gordon, who influenced Buber considerably, is familiar only within Israeli cultural space. 37 As in the case of Daly and Hampson, at the heart of both Gordon’s and Buber’s writings is a deep spiritual attitude toward the world and a sense of divinity, accompanied by rejection of traditional (Jewish) religion. They reject Jewish law (Halakha), rituals, and theology, as well as organized, hidebound religion.
Gordon maintained that the supreme objective of humanity is to experience divinity, because “the human spirit … cannot be calmed without religion.” 38 A religious sentiment or attitude “originates in human nature, at its point of intersection with worldly nature,” 39 in the human soul’s aspiration “to live within the very life of the world … not only its limited individuality but also the infinite generality of worldly life, to live infinitely.” 40
Gordon’s conception of divinity is pantheistic, identifying it with nature and addressing divine immanence at all levels of creation. 41 He employs various cognomens for godhood, including the Kabbalistic concepts of hidden wisdom (sekhel ne’elam) and the infinite (einsof), as well as creation (bria) and the mother of all life (em kol chai). Its immanent manifestation is called nature or being (havaya in Hebrew, derived from the Hebrew name of God—YHWH—and thus bearing a sense of the sacred).
For Gordon, contact with God is accomplished through Chavaya (literally: experience), a word he coined as a portmanteau of chayim (life) and havaya (sacred being or existence). 42 Experiential knowledge is contrasted with conscious-intellectual knowledge, which forms a mechanical connection with nature and has no idea or concept of God and its presence. People, however, “live only to the extent that they live beyond the boundaries of limited individuality, to the extent that they live or aspire to live the life of all that lives and exists infinitely.” 43
“It is absolutely clear that the key element is unknown. The unknown may be called ‘God,’ but according to the meanings of these concepts, one cannot say whether or not it exists at the boundaries of awareness,” wrote Gordon. 44 He thus presents faith in a benevolent, comprehensive, practical, and subjective unity of divine natural processes that human beings attract to themselves and their environment through their actions, first and foremost through their work in nature. In this manner, they ascend, fill with vitality and coalesce with godhood. 45 Atheistic narcissism, by contrast, leaves human beings alone, in a deep spiritual void.
In his renowned work I and Thou, Buber proposed a conception of God as the eternal Thou, manifested in human life in the I–Thou dialogic relationship, to be differentiated from the instrumental I–It relationship. God is made present at rare, special, and sanctified moments—which are firmly implanted in everyday life—when one proceeds from the I–It to the I–Thou relationship. Whenever we address the other as Thou, rather than as It, we also address the eternal Thou, that is God. “The lines extending from [the I–Thou] relationships intersect in the eternal Thou.” 46 People who are yearning for the deep sense of the I–Thou relationship are yearning for God, as “The Thou-sense of the man [sic] … aspires toward the eternal Thou.” 47
The eternal Thou is an interlocutor in all (what Buber sees as) authentic dialogue with another (person or animal) and the full realization of the I–Thou relationship. The I–Thou relationship is thus the manifestation of God in creation. Hence “Whoever wishes to speak with human beings without speaking to God will not achieve completeness in speaking,” claims Buber, as one then lacks the ability to realize the longing to establish a living communion with God. 48 On the other hand, to believe in God is audacious, because maintaining and revealing a relationship with another being demands faith in and openness to the other. 49 Consequently, “whoever wishes to speak with God without speaking with people is on the wrong path.” 50
Buber calls God, the eternal Thou, “the Creator,” but makes no cosmological claim by doing so, especially regarding creation of the world as described in the Torah. 51 Rather, he asserts that creation means saying ‘Thou’ to the world on the part of God. 52 God, then, is a personal God, who creates and who reveals himself (sic). The relationship with God, that is a “relationship of nearness,” accords the human subject full self-awareness. 53 At the same time, God himself is beyond the conception of human beings.
Like Hampson, Gordon and Buber are also concerned with revelation and reject its traditional understanding. To Gordon, idolatry is “faith in revelation of eternal faiths and a living Torah from heaven, with all the commitment it demands and implies”—the commitment that religion maintains toward what it ostensibly received from a transcendental source, to which a claim of divine truth is ascribed. 54 Buber, in turn, states that the mighty revelations on which religions are based essentially resemble the covert revelations that take place everywhere, at all times. 55 Revelation is thus not the giving of the Torah but realization, here and now, of the encounter of the individual with God. This is clearly a non-verbal revelation: “The eternal source of strength flows, the eternal touch is waiting, the eternal voice sounds, nothing more.” 56
Buber and Gordon resolved the tension between the spirit of faith reflected in their writings and their rejection of establishment religious Judaism by differentiating between religion and religiosity (Buber) or religious sentiment (Gordon). Gordon, who understands religious sentiment as an authentic sense of human unity with the universe and responsibility for all that thrives therein, observes that a religious attitude, “like all living sentiments, requires a living and self-renewing manifestation.” 57 Buber adds that religiosity is “man’s sense of wonder and adoration, an ever anew becoming, an ever anew articulation and formulation of his feeling.” 58
Both Buber and Gordon use sacred Jewish texts—especially the Hebrew Bible, Kabbala, and Hasidic works—as sources of reference to their theological ideas. They are highly selective, however, in their use of these texts. Gordon, for example, was described as one who would derive a kernel of moral or religious truth from the text to which he absolutely agreed, or would grasp at an expression of living emotion that he found particularly appropriate to his own feelings. Once he connects his “inner self” to the Bible in this manner, he consciously allows himself simple expression of all it arouses within his soul.
59
There is consensus among scholars that both Gordon and Buber should be read as Jewish not only by virtue of their ethnic origin but also because their philosophies were conceived within the interpretive framework of Judaism. 60 They are by no means post-Jewish, as they perceive themselves as operating within Judaism, which is not only a religion and culture, like Christianity, but also an ethnic and national identity with a particular history. They are willing to leave the Jewish religion but not the Jewish identity. Furthermore, it may be claimed that Buber and Gordon incorporate “Jewish-oriented ideas” in their works. Referring to such ideas as “Jewish-oriented” does not imply that they are exclusive to Judaism or that they constitute some “essence” of Judaism (whose existence I doubt). Rather, I acknowledge that these ideas appear many times, using different terminology, within Jewish theological writings.
Perhaps especially important to our discussion is the manner in which the theologies of both Gordon and Buber incorporate the categories of relationship (with the world, the other and God); responsibility and moral obligation (to the world, the other and God); and labor toward (the world, the other, and God). Both suggest that Jewish religiosity is not an isolated and passive individual unification with God (or a wait for such unification), but rather exists in the realm of responsible relationships with others that demand deliberate action. In other words, both Buber and Gordon maintain that a person has to “work toward God.” For Gordon, this is accomplished primarily in agriculture, while Buber takes the term “work” less literally and concentrates on emotional effort.
The emphasis on work is deeply connected to the Jewish theological conception of Avodat Hashem, literally translated as “the work of God.” This, however, should not be confused with the Protestant perception of the term, as described by Weber. 61 Avodat Hashem is not the work that God is doing or the source of God’s blessing, but rather denotes the work a person should do to materialize God in the world. Thus, a person should not passively accept the world as it is or await the next world, but work to improve it, to repair the world (Tikun olam), to work toward God. For Buber and Gordon, carrying out such work is a moral obligation that originates in one’s deepest sense of responsibility to all that is around us. This is, if you will, our original mitzva (commandment) as people—to work toward “creation” as a way to work toward God.
Buber places particular emphasis on the role of relations: “Meeting with God” cannot occur without another entity. The “It” that becomes “Thou” is essential to the meeting, for it is in the dash in the I–Thou relationship that God exists in the world. This is not to say that relationships are less important to Gordon, however. Indeed, as contrasted with Buber, who aspired to create a “universal” theology, Gordon aimed his theology at a particular community—young Jewish Zionists who came from Europe in the early 20th century to build a Jewish state in Palestine. 62 The intimate relationships among the members of this avant-garde community constitute a pillar of Gordon’s theology. While articulating and creating the theological and moral fundamentals of the group, he insisted that people cannot maintain a relationship with God without having a relationship with their nation and the land of their people.
Thus relationships are crucial for both Gordon and Buber. Echoing many previous Jewish theologians, they emphasize that work toward God is a collective effort. It is within creation, within the human sphere, within relationships, that human beings realize their moral obligation to work responsibly toward the world, people, and God.
Common ground: Postsecular theology
Despite the clear differences among Daly, Hampson, Gordon, and Buber in their background, motivations, perceptions, metaphors, and conceptualizations of God (as a verb, dimension, nature, or that which exists both immanently and transcendently in I–Thou relations, respectively), one may address several similarities among them as well.
First, an examination of their spiritual or religious attitude toward the world reveals that God (however this notion may be metaphorized) is central in their writings—that can easily be called theology—particularly in their analysis of the relationship between huwomanity and God. 63 On the other hand, while the centrality of the theological component cannot be challenged, several characteristics stand out in the philosophy of Buber, Gordon, Daly, and Hampson that may be perceived as “secular.” For example, all four diverge from the monotheistic perception of God as an entity that created the world and operates within it according to “His” will, suggesting a new, non-Orthodox conception of the divine. They also reject the traditional metaphors of their respective original religions and suggest new images of God that are amorphous rather than anthropomorphic.
Gordon’s theology perceives immanence alone, while Hampson, Daly, and Buber also preserve some notion of transcendence. Thus, various combinations of the immanence v. transcendence notions cross religious orientation lines. The two categories, however, are not perceived as a mutually exclusive dichotomy, but as a contiguity. Hampson, Daly, Gordon, and Buber emphasize first and foremost the immanent presence of God in the world, nature, and huwoman relationships. As such, their theologies may be described as leaning toward immanence rather than transcendence.
Daly’s, Hampson’s, Gordon’s, and Buber’s theologies are clearly anthropocentric, considering people’s (and in Daly’s case, women’s) interests rather than God’s will, needs, or demands. Buber and Gordon both seek to distinguish their theology from the Orthodox Jewish perception by reconceptualizing the category of revelation, much as Hampson did in her own way. This category, a central and highly significant pillar of Orthodoxy, posits a one-time, decisive and obligatory revelation of “Torah from heaven” that constitutes Judaism’s infrastructure. As this understanding is rejected, the “word of God” is no longer manifested in the biblical description of revelation, but in life itself.
All four philosophers reject organized and institutional religion(s). Hampson and Daly announce it officially as they leave their churches. Buber was described as “the only Jewish philosopher who has no connection with any synagogue whatsoever, be it ultra-Orthodox or otherwise …. He is more removed from the organized religion of Israel than any other Jew who does not reject Judaism but believes in it.” 64 Gordon fiercely attacked the establishment nature of Halakha and perceived blind submission to its interpreters as a kind of idolatry. 65
Considering the question of practices of be-ing in relationship, Buber, for example, discusses the quite ambiguous notion of “dialogic relation” that creates the I–Thou position, while Hampson speaks of attention, honesty, and ordering when discussing practices. Like them, Daly and Gordon are also not interested in establish obligatory and unified practices, as manifested in synagogues or congregations. Since for all four “work toward God” and ethical decisions are always situated and demand constant renewal, no universal concrete manual of behavior may be presented without the danger of becoming hidebound and oppressive.
This raises a question about the ability of communal “work toward God.” It is safe to say that Buber, Gordon, Daly, and Hampson emphasize first and foremost, person-to-person relationship and understand spiritual work as something that occurs between individuals. We can see, however, two different, cross-pairs positions here. Daly and Gordon preserve a notion of spiritual community: Daly proposes the feminist movement should be considered a church, while Gordon’s support in the establishment of small socialist agriculture Jewish settlements in the land of Israel reveals his aspiration to communal “work toward God.” Hampson and Buber, on the other hand, focus only on relations between individuals.
Buber and Gordon de jure and Daly and Hampson de facto resolve the tension between the spirit of faith reflected in their writings and their rejection of establishment religious monotheism by differentiating between religion and religiosity, spiritual feelings or religious sentiment. They consider the essence of religiosity or faith to be a religious attitude or religious sentiment. Buber and Gordon differentiate between religion as a “vehicle” and religiosity as sense of God, much as Daly and Hampson did.
Another “secular” characteristic of these four theologians is their common perception of sacred writings as created by human beings (and as Daly and Hampson note, men). Adopting a less radical stance than Hampson and Daly, Buber and Gordon do not reject Scripture altogether. Instead, they use Jewish sacred texts as a source of reference to their theological ideas. Their reading of these texts, however, is highly selective. As a source of knowledge, these writings are considered only to the extent that they reflect human experiences of contact with the divine during specific historical periods.
Understanding sacred writings as a human creation that may be ignored or selectively approached strips these works of their status as an obligatory—and even satisfying—source of knowledge. Thus, the theological methodology is no longer hermeneutical, and human (in Daly’s case, women’s) experience becomes the primary source of knowledge. The way to “know God” is thus first and foremost a subjective path of concrete life experiences rather than interpretation of canonic sacred texts.
Considering the similar elements in Gordon’s, Buber’s, Daly’s, and Hampson’s works, we can identify the postsecular tendency in their theologies. This helps to suggest a more sophisticated and detailed understanding of postsecular theology. We may now conclude that postsecular theology includes anthropocentric theologies that offer different amorphous metaphors about the more, reject traditional organized (monotheistic) religion, separate “religion” from religious feeling, reject the Scriptures or use them selectively, and perceive human experience as their epistemological source. Postsecular theology emphasizes “be-ing in relations” as the vehicle for “work toward God,” mostly in person-to-person situated relations.
Differences: A feminist lesson
This postsecular common ground facilitates further investigation of differences among the four. Prominent among issues to be examined is the respective theologies’ sensitivity (or lack thereof) to gender, gender justice, and gender politics. Although Buber and Gordon were read as “feminists,” I suggest that Daly and Hampson offer far more sophisticated feminist insights than do Buber and Gordon, although the latter two do have much to contribute to feminist postsecular theology. 66
One may claim that the critique of Gordon’s and Buber’s lack of feminist sensibility—and in particular of their patriarchal use of language, as discussed below—is anachronistic. After all, feminism, especially its radical and cultural branches with which Daly and Hampson are connected, was developed decades after Gordon’s and Buber’s time. While this claim may well be justified, it has no bearing on the lack of feminist sensitivity that Gordon and Buber manifest in their patriarchal orientation. I believe that current postsecular theology requires feminist sensitivity, as gender equality is a cardinal principle of enlightenment “secularism.” If we are to apply Buber’s and Gordon’s writings to current postsecular theologies, we need to expose their gender blindness.
Hampson’s and Daly’s starting point is the patriarchal nature of traditional religion. Their former religion is thus declared unethical. Gordon and Buber, on the other hand, object to institutional religion because of its fossilization. To them, organized religion is no longer an “authentic” experience of the sacred but lies within the realm of cold intellectual consciousness that nullifies religious sentiment in favor of hierarchical idolatry, alienating human beings from themselves. 67 Consequently, although all four come to the same operational conclusion and detach themselves from traditional religion, their respective motivations differ. Buber and Gordon fail to perceive any patriarchy in the religion they espouse and oppose.
Another aspect of Daly’s and Hampson’s feminist perspective is attention to women’s experience(s). Buber ignores this issue completely, while Gordon relegates women to the realm of motherhood only, which he considered the utmost symbol of natural love of one creature for another. By idealizing motherhood, however, Gordon ignores the complexity of the labor of mothering and accords no place whatsoever to women’s experiences of any other type.
As language is a primary tool of gender politics, it is not surprising that Daly and Hampson are deeply concerned about it, especially its political character. They realized that the human world is “created with a word” and that wording is crucial in attempting to create a just theology. By contrast, Buber and Gordon overlook the patriarchal nature of language, treating it as neutral and natural. Furthermore, as evident in the above citations, their use of language essentially identifies humanity with men, rendering males the human standard and allocating virtually no space to women’s particular position(s) and experience(s) within huwomanity.
From a feminist perspective, Buber’s and Gordon’s theologies thus lack crucial elements. For women (and men) to derive benefit from their works, we should be aware of their gender blindness and very cautious in adopting their description of the “(gender-universal) humanity” and “human experience.” This does not mean that feminist theology has nothing to learn from Buber and Gordon. First, their writings introduce us to new and inspiring worldviews and metaphors of divinity that are free of traditional patriarchal images and may touch the hearts of Jews and non-Jews alike.
Furthermore, I believe that Buber’s and Gordon’s Jewish-oriented ideas about relationships, responsibility, and work toward the world and God may be highly beneficial to feminist postsecular theology. Such perceptions echo feminist understandings of self-in-relation and the ethics of care, as discussed above, demonstrating an experience-oriented ethical perception focusing on responsibility to the other (human, nature, world, God). This perception is highly contextual, leaving ethical decisions to one’s own responsibility in a given situation rather than to some universal a priori set of ethical values.
Summary
In this article, I read Mary Daly, Daphne Hampson, A. D. Gordon, and Martin Buber with two goals in mind: First, I sought to present and analyze the concept of postsecular theology as a term describing theologies that combine secular and religious components. I propose that such theologies, which echo the hybrid religious–secular relations portrayed by the postsecular paradigm, may suit many secular-believers.
There is no doubt that more research is required if we seek to understand the postsecular theological phenomenon to the fullest and not limit it to the post-Christian and Jewish spheres. Postsecular theologians from other traditions and religions ought to be studied, enabling more voices to be heard. I submit, however, that even at this preliminary stage, theologies that offer deep spiritual perspectives while rejecting traditional organized (monotheistic) religion and its Scriptures and separating “religion” from religious feeling may constitute new and inspiring ways to think about the sacred in a postsecular age.
My second goal was to crosscheck feminist Christian-oriented and non-feminist Jewish thinkers to learn what each orientation can contribute to the other. I showed how both types of theologies focus on relations situated in particular circumstances, in the here and now. From this point of view, I suggest that deep-rooted Jewish notions such as “work toward God” and responsibility to “repair the world” may enrich and broaden feminist Christian-oriented theology. At the same time, a deep sensitivity to gender politics and gender justice may contribute substantially to postsecular Jewish theology.
Taken together, the two orientations can lead us to the creation of postsecular Jewish-oriented feminist theologies that manifest both Jewish and feminist ideas. Perhaps “be-ing in relation toward God,” partly manifested in a gender-just society, is not the worst starting point for such a quest.
Footnotes
1
See, for example: Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2003); Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditionalist World (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1991); Peter L. Berger, “Secularism in Retreat,” The National Interest 46 (1996), 3–12; Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism For?,” in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (Oxford: Oxford University, 2005), 486–511; José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994); William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1999); Phillip Hammond, The Sacred in a Secular Age: Toward Revision in the Scientific Study of Religion (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1991); Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, “Times Like This,” in Secularisms, ed. Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham, NC: Duke, 2008), 1–38; John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Rodney Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.,” Sociology of Religion 60(3) (1999), 249–73; William H. Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano, “Introduction—Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept,” Sociology of Religion 60(3) (1999), 209–28; Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2007).
2
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other Writings (New York: Routledge, 2012 [1905]). Robert C. Fuller, Spiritual, but Not Religious: Understanding Unchurched America (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001). Hagar Lahav, “Postsecular Jewish Theology: Reading Gordon and Buber,” Israel Studies 19(1) (2014), 189–213.
3
Ron Margolin, “The Implicit Secularism of Martin Buber’s Thought,” Israel Studies 13 (2008), 64–89.
4
Lahav, “Postsecular Jewish.”
5
See, for example: John D. Caputo, “Atheism, A/theology, and the Postmodern Condition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007); Clayton Crockett, Secular Theology: American Radical Theological Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo, The Future of Religion (New York: Colombia, 2005).
6
Sarah L. Hoagland and Marilyn Frye, “Introduction,” in Feminist Interpretations of Mary Daly, ed. Sarah L. Hoagland and Marilyn Frye (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 2000), 1–26.
7
Gayle G. Yates, “Spirituality and the American Feminist Experience,” Signs 9(1) (1983), 59–72.
8
Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1973), 21.
9
Wanda W. Berry, “Feminist Theology: ‘Verbing’ of Ultimate/Intimate Reality in Mary Daly,” in Hoagland and Frye, Feminist Interpretations, 27–54.
10
Daly, Beyond God, 8.
11
Hoagland and Frye, “Introduction,” 3.
12
Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon, 1978), 40.
13
Daly, Beyond God, 21.
14
Ibid., 34.
15
Berry, “Feminist Theology.”
16
Mary Daly, Pure Last: Elemental Feminist Philosophy (Boston: Beacon,1984), 26
17
Hoagland and Frye, “Introduction,” 3.
18
Daly, Pure Last, 26.
19
Daphne Hampson, “That Which Is God,” in Women and the Divine: Touching Transcendence, ed. Gillian Howie and J’annine Jobling (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 172. Ibid., 182.
20
Ibid., 172.
21
Ibid., 175. Ibid., 195.
22
Ibid., 247.
23
Ibid., 250.
24
Ibid., 173.
25
Ibid., 172.
26
Daphne Hampson, After Christianity (London: SCM, 2002), xiii.
27
Hampson, “That Which Is,” 173.
28
Ibid., 171. Ibid., 173.
29
Ibid., 173.
30
Ibid., 184.
31
Hampson, After Christianity, xix.
32
Tsippi Kauffman, “The Yemina Methods as a Contemporary–Hasidic–Female Movement,” Modern Judaism 32(2) (2012), 95–215.
33
See for example: Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1978); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1982); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1984).
34
Hampson, “That Which Is,” 171.
35
Carol Christ, “Feminist Theology as Post-traditional Thealogy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Theology, ed. Susan F. Parsons (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002), 79–96.
36
Hampson, After Christianity, xxi.
37
Avraham Shapira, “Whole Systems in Twentieth-Century Jewish Thought: Buber and Gordon—Between Parallelism and Affectism,” Research in Jewish Studies 16–17 (1990), 697–722.
38
Aharon D. Gordon, The Writings of A. D. Gordon, Vol. 2: Man and Nature (Tel Aviv: The Zionist Library, 1951), 89.
39
Ibid., 120.
40
Ibid., 274.
41
Eliezer Schweid, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1990).
42
Gordon, The Writings, vol. 2, 87.
43
Aharon D. Gordon, The Writings of A. D. Gordon: Vol. 3: Letters and Notes (Tel Aviv: The Zionist Library, 1956), 167.
44
Gordon, The Writings, vol. 2, 114.
45
Schweid, A History.
46
Martin Buber, I and Thou (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1970), 123.
47
Ibid., 128.
48
Martin Buber, Secret of the Dialogue (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1973), 124.
49
Dan Avnon, Martin Buber: The Hidden Dialogue (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
50
Buber, Secret of the Dialogue, 124.
51
Rivka Horowitz, “Developments in Martin Buber’s Conception of Godhood,” in Here and Now: Studies in the Philosophy of Mordechai Martin Buber, ed. Idan Yaron (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1982), 116–28.
52
Danny Stetman and Avi Sagi, “Studies of the Question of the Relationship between Religion and Morality in Buber’s Philosophy,” Daat 17 (1986), 110.
53
Buber, Attestation and Purpose, vol. 1, 195.
54
Gordon, The Writings, vol. 2, 120. Gideon Katz, “The Secular Basis of Aharon David Gordon’s Thinking,” Yiunim Be’tkumat Israel 11 (2009), 465–85.
55
Buber, On Judaism, 161.
56
Buber, I and Thou, 160.
57
Einat Ramon, A New Life: Religion, Motherhood and Supreme Love in the Works of Aharon David Gordon (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2007). Gordon, The Writings, vol. 2, 330.
58
Buber, On Judaism, 80.
59
Eliezer Schweid, The World of A. D. Gordon (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1970), 89.
60
Lahav, “Postsecular Jewish.”
61
Weber, The Protestant Ethic.
62
Shalom Ratzabi, Anarchy in “Zion”: Between Martin Buber and A. D. Gordon (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2011).
63
Derived from feminist sensitivity to the ways language constructs our being and to the gender politics embedded therein, “huwomanity” is a term that aims at emphasizing women’s presence in “humanity.”
64
Ernst A. Simon, Aims–Junctures–Paths: The Thinking of Martin Buber (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1985), 87.
65
Ramon, A New Life.
66
James W. Walters, Martin Buber and Feminist Ethics: The Priority of the Personal (New York: Syracuse University, 2003). Ramon, A New Life.
67
Katz, “The Secular Basis”; Ramon, A New Life.
