A Matrix of Ontology,Epistemology,and Mystery in Karl Barth and Karl Rahner on the Immanent–Economic Trinity Relation

Introduction

Since the explicit formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity by the Council of Nicea in 325 and the Council of Constantinople in 381, it has been “believed, taught and confessed” ¹ throughout the whole history of Christianity. But at the same time, it has been challenged, criticized, and attacked as well. This was especially the case during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the doctrine was severely called into question in all areas of theology. However, the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have witnessed a rediscovery of the doctrine of the Trinity in all areas of theology. And this contemporary rediscovery not only restores the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity from its eclipse, but also goes further to approach every theological locus in the perspective of trinitarian theology. Christoph Schwöbel calls this new interest in the doctrine of the Trinity “the renaissance or revival of Trinitarian theology.” ²

This article places itself within the contemporary renaissance of trinitarian theology. Since it was initiated by Karl Barth and Karl Rahner, it has been nurtured by Eastern Orthodox theologians such as Vladimir Lossky and John D. Zizioulas, and it has been further advanced by Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Robert W. Jenson. And also it has been widely extended by some process theologians such as William Norman Pittenger, Joseph A. Bracken, and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, and by some others such as a feminist theologian Catherine Mowry LaCugna, a liberation theologian Leonardo Boff, and an Asian-American theologian Jung Young Lee.

One of the major issues animating contemporary discussions of trinitarian theology is the relation between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity. The immanent Trinity generally refers to the inner relationships within the Trinity; whereas the economic Trinity broadly denotes the Trinity active and revealed in creation, redemption, and consummation. There are several different positions on the relation, two representatives of which are Barth’s mutual correspondence and Rahner’s identity. This article focuses on Barth and Rahner by explicating each position in terms of ontology and epistemology. In this article ontology is generally concerned with ontological status of the Trinity, and epistemology is broadly related to our knowledge of the Trinity. Through a critical analysis of each position, this article shows that ontology and epistemology are intricately woven into each discussion on the immanent–economic Trinity relation, and goes further to show that a concept of divine mystery, though not in the same sense, is also intimately involved in each position, functioning to resolve certain ontological or epistemological tensions.

Barth’s Mutual Correspondence

According to Benjamin C. Leslie, Barth is reluctant to use the terms “the immanent Trinity” and “the economic Trinity,” because the immanent–economic distinction tends to imply an essential distinction within God. ³ But Karl Barth actually employs the term “the immanent Trinity” seven times ⁴ and uses the term “the economic Trinity” four times ⁵ in the entire Church Dogmatics. And both “the economic Trinity” and “the immanent Trinity” appear simultaneously three times in the whole Church Dogmatics. Some of them bring to light what Barth means by “the economic Trinity” and “the immanent Trinity.”

First, when Barth argues for the free grace of God’s Word against Erich Przywara’s criticism that the Trinity for him dissolves into revealer, revealing, and revealedness, he agrees to “make a deliberate and sharp distinction between the Trinity of God as we may know it in the Word of God revealed, written and proclaimed, and God’s immanent Trinity, i.e., between ‘God in Himself ’ and ‘God for us,’ between the ‘eternal history of God’ and His temporal acts.” ⁶ Second, when Barth analyzes the biblical concept of revelation and leads to the concepts of God’s Triunity, he insinuates that the Trinity can be understood not only as the economic Trinity but also as the immanent Trinity. He states his position by saying, “God’s triunity is to be found not merely in His revelation but, because in His revelation, in God Himself and in Himself too, so that the Trinity is to be understood as ‘immanent’ and not just ‘economic.’” ⁷ Third, when Barth discusses the Filioque issue in preference for the Western Church tradition over that of the Eastern Orthodox Church tradition, he applies the immanent–economic distinction to the Filioque and makes a differentiation between “the immanent Filioque” ⁸ and the economic Filioque. Here the immanent Filioque refers to the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of both the Father and the Son in all eternity, whereas the economic Filioque refers to the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of both the Father and the Son in God’s revelation.

Considering these points, for Barth, the immanent–economic distinction centers around God’s revelation. And the immanent–economic distinction is in accord with the eternal–temporal distinction and with the ad intra–ad extra distinction. Thus the economic Trinity is the Trinity in God’s revelation, the Trinity in God’s temporal acts, and the Trinity in God’s work ad extra and God’s work for us. On the other hand, the immanent Trinity is the Trinity antecedently in Godself, the Trinity in God’s eternal history, and the Trinity in God’s work ad intra and God’s work within Godself. More specifically, with regards to each person of the Trinity, the economic Trinity is concerned with God our Father and our Creator who is the Lord of our existence, whereas the immanent Trinity is related to the eternal Father who is the Father of the Son of God. The economic Trinity is concerned with God our Reconciler who reconciles us to the Father, whereas the immanent Trinity is related to the eternal Son who is the Son of God the Father. And the economic Trinity is concerned with God our Redeemer who sets us free, whereas the immanent Trinity is related to the Holy Spirit who is the Spirit of the love of the Father and the Son. In addition, with regards to the Filioque, the economic Trinity is concerned with the economic Filioque, whereas the immanent Trinity is related to the immanent Filioque.

Next, Barth argues that there is a corresponding relation between the two. On the one hand, it comes as no surprise that several passages in Church Dogmatics advocate the correspondence of the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity. It is so, because Barth starts with the reality of revelation, proceeds through an analysis of revelation, and leads to the recognition of the economic Trinity and then that of the immanent Trinity. First, Barth states that the unity and distinction of the three modes of being in God’s revelation point to the corresponding difference and unity among the three modes of being in Godself. ⁹ Second, Barth remarks that the unity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit ad extra corresponds to the unity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit ad intra. ¹⁰ Third, Barth mentions that the involution and convolution of the three modes of being in God’s work exactly corresponds to those of the three modes of being in God’s essence. ¹¹ Fourth, with regards to each person of the Trinity, or each “mode or way of being” (τρόπος ύπάρξεως, modus entitativus), ¹² Barth maintains that the content of creation in the economic Trinity refers back to a corresponding inner possibility in the immanent Trinity. This means that God our Creator and God our Father of the economic Trinity corresponds to the eternal Father of the immanent Trinity. ¹³ Likewise, God our Reconciler and God our Redeemer correspond to the eternal Son and the eternal Spirit, respectively. Fifth, with regards to the Filioque, Barth asserts that the love in reconciliation corresponds to the eternal Spirit as the love of the Father and the Son. ¹⁴ All these passages affirm a correspondence of the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity.

On the other hand, there are some passages as well which support the converse direction of correspondence, that is, the correspondence of the immanent Trinity to the economic Trinity. For instance, first, with regards to God the Father, Barth argues that the eternal Father corresponds to our Creator and our Father. ¹⁵ He states that God the Father is already the eternal Father who corresponds to our Creator and our Father. Second, with regards to the Filioque, Barth states that the full consubstantial fellowship between the Father and the Son as the essence of the Holy Spirit corresponds to the fellowship between God and human beings as the work of the Holy Spirit, with the former being the prototype of the latter. ¹⁶ These points are in accord with Barth’s own statement that whatever is said about the immanent Trinity are “confirmations [Bestätigungen],” “underlinings [Unterstreichungen],” and “the indispensable premises [die unentbehrlichen Vordersätze]” of the economic Trinity. ¹⁷ And also, these points are in accord with Barth’s “basic rule [die grundlegende Regel],” which pervades the whole Church Dogmatics, which says, “statements about the divine modes being antecedently in themselves cannot be different in content from those that are to be made about their reality in revelation.” ¹⁸

These examinations show that Barth holds a position of mutual correspondence between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity. Such a position is clearly disclosed with regards to God the Son, for he states both that God the Son is our Reconciler, “because He [the Son] is so antecedently in Himself as the Son or Word of God the Father,” ¹⁹ and that “as Christ is in revelation, so He is antecedently in Himself.” ²⁰ The same is so of the Holy Spirit, as well, because he clearly states, “What He [the Holy Spirit] is in revelation He is antecedently in Himself. And what He is antecedently in Himself He is in revelation.” ²¹ These statements obviously confirm the mutual correspondence between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity.

But there are some scholars who interpret Barth’s correspondence not as mutual but as unilateral. For example, first, Eberhard Jüngel, in his interpretative paraphrase of Barth on the Trinity, summarizes that God corresponds to Godself (Gott entspricht sich). This puts more focus on the correspondence of God’s being ad extra, namely, the economic Trinity, than on God’s being ad intra, that is, the immanent Trinity. ²² Second, Jürgen Moltmann, though acknowledging that Barth breaks through the unilinear view of correspondence only in his account of Christ’s death on the cross, asserts that Barth maintains “the Platonic notion of correspondence” in his distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, and thus for Barth, “what God revealed himself as being in Jesus Christ, he is in eternity, ‘beforehand in himself.’” ²³ Third, Leslie, though admitting that Barth’s thought may not be reduced to a Platonic-style dualism, adheres to one part of the thesis, by stating that, for Barth, the economic Trinity corresponds to the immanent Trinity. ²⁴

Despite these interpretations, Barth holds a position of mutual correspondence. And this position is firmly grounded in his understanding of the unity between essence and work, and of the oneness between being and act. God’s essence is God’s work, and God’s work is God’s essence. ²⁵ God’s being and God’s act are not twofold but one. ²⁶ God’s revelation is God in Godself and God in Godself is God’s revelation, because God does and reveals that which corresponds to God’s divine essence, and because God’s work is grounded in God’s divine nature. ²⁷

However, Barth’s mutual correspondence does not mean that the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity are exactly identical in all aspects. If so, it would then be the case either that the economic Trinity is immersed into the immanent Trinity, or that the immanent Trinity is absorbed into the economic Trinity. But this is not what Barth intends to advocate. Rather, he wants to maintain both the distinction and unity between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity. In order to do so, he holds the unity or sameness of them in content, but he takes the difference between them in form. In other words, Barth’s notion of mutual correspondence is asymmetrical, which means that the way in which the economic Trinity corresponds to the immanent Trinity is not the same as the way in which the immanent Trinity corresponds to the economic Trinity.

On the one hand, with regards to the correspondence of the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity, Barth clearly formulates that the economic Trinity corresponds to the immanent Trinity as its “prototype.” ²⁸ More specifically, he adds that the immanent Trinity is the “reason,” “way,” and “basis” ²⁹ of the economic Trinity. These terms imply an ontological sense of correspondence. In this sense, the economic Trinity ontologically corresponds to the immanent Trinity, but not conversely. For example, with regards to the Holy Spirit, he explicates as follows:

Thus God—… God the Holy Spirit—is “antecedently in Himself” the act of communion, the act of impartation, love, gift. For this reason and in this way and on this basis He is so in His revelation. Not vice versa! We know Him thus in His revelation. But He is not this because He is it in His revelation; because He is it antecedently in Himself, He is it also in His revelation. ³⁰

On the other hand, with regards to the correspondence of the immanent Trinity to the economic Trinity, Barth means that the immanent Trinity corresponds to the economic Trinity, for the latter is the epistemological gateway to the former. God our Creator and God our Father epistemologically refer us back to the eternal Father of the eternal Son. Jesus Christ in revelation leads us to perceive the eternal Son of the eternal Father. The Holy Spirit takes us to the recognition of the eternal Spirit of the Father and the Son. In addition, the love which meets us in the economic Filioque carries us into seeing the eternal love in the immanent Filioque. Thus, for him, the immanent Trinity corresponds to the economic Trinity epistemologically.

Therefore, Barth’s notion of mutual correspondence specifically means that the economic Trinity ontologically corresponds to the immanent Trinity, and simultaneously, that the immanent Trinity corresponds to the economic Trinity epistemologically. What is more important, the intent of Barth in his mutual correspondence is both to maintain the unity or sameness in content between the two, and also to maintain the distinction or differentiation in form between the two.

Rahner: Identity

With regard to the relation between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, Karl Rahner formulates his “basic thesis,” or “basic axiom [Grundaxiom]” in his book The Trinity as follows: “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.” ³¹ The basic thesis or axiom is also called “the guiding principle,” or “the methodical principle” by Rahner himself, ³² and it is widely known as “Rahner’s Rule.” ³³ As a matter of fact, Rahner’s book The Trinity was originally based on his 1960 essay, “Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate.” ³⁴ In this essay, Rahner’s rule was formulated as follows: “the Trinity of the economy of salvation is the immanent Trinity and vice versa”; ³⁵ “Thus we have the identity of the immanent Trinity with the Trinity of the economy of salvation.” ³⁶ These observations indicate that Rahner’s distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity entirely hinges on the economy of salvation, or salvation history. For him, the economic Trinity, which is also called “the Trinity of the economy of salvation,” ³⁷ “the Trinity of salvation,” ³⁸ or “the salvific Trinity,” ³⁹ is the Trinity manifested in salvation history. On the other hand, the immanent Trinity is the Trinity apart from salvation history. The economic Trinity is “the Trinity of God’s relationship to us,” ⁴⁰ whereas the immanent Trinity is “the reality of God as he is in himself.” ⁴¹ The economic Trinity is the Trinity “outside the intra-divine life,” ⁴² whereas the immanent Trinity is the Trinity within the intra-divine life. The economic Trinity is the life of the Trinity ad extra, whereas the immanent Trinity is “the life of the Trinity ad intra.” ⁴³

But it is notable that Rahner’s rule affirms the reciprocal identity between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity. According to Fred Sanders, interpreters of Rahner’s rule are divided into two groups, the radicalizers who argue for a strong identity and the restricters who contend that Rahner goes too far and thus call for a restriction of Rahner’s rule. ⁴⁴ The former group includes Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Robert W. Jenson, Catherine Mowry LaCugna, and so on, while the latter group includes Yves Congar, Walter Kasper, Hans Urs von Balthasar, T. F. Torrance, Paul Molnar, and so on. ⁴⁵ However, Rahner himself tries to keep the balance, because he is concerned that his position of identity may jeopardize divine freedom, by saying as follows,

The identity does not of course mean that one denies that the “economic” Trinity, one with the immanent Trinity, only exists by virtue of the free decree of God to communicate himself (supernaturally). But by virtue of this free decree, the gift in which God imparts himself to the world is precisely God as the triune God, and not something produced by him through efficient causality, something that represents him. ⁴⁶

In this way, Rahner’s rule of identity comes down to his understanding of a hypostatic union between the Logos and human nature. Notably, Rahner addresses acrid remarks against three lines of understanding of a hypostatic union in the history of theology. The first line of thought regards a hypostatic union as an instance of a general situation. In contrast, however, Rahner firmly maintains that a hypostatic union cannot be an example of a general situation, because there is only one hypostatic union of the Logos. ⁵¹ The second line of thought considers that every divine person might assume a hypostatic union. Being rigidly opposed to this line of thought, however, Rahner asserts that, if a hypostatic union might take place in every divine person, then the incarnation of the Logos would reveal properly nothing about the Logos, that is, about the Logos’ own relative-specific features within the Trinity. ⁵² And the third line of thought understands the human nature assumed by the Logos only as something which rests in its separate essence, namely, something as having nothing to do with the Logos. On the contrary, Rahner insists that the human nature of the Logos is not a mask assumed from without but “the constitutive real symbol” of the Logos. ⁵³

With regard to the last point, Rahner’s concept of symbol has further implications on his understanding of the hypostatic union of the Logos. According to him, symbol is the supreme and prime representation in which one reality renders another present. ⁵⁴ The humanity of the Logos is the self-disclosure of the Logos. ⁵⁵ In turn, the Logos is the symbol of God the Father. Conversely, God the Father is expressed through the immanent Logos which is, in turn, expressed through the economic Logos in humanity. God can utter Godself outwardly, because God expresses Godself inwardly. It means that, as the immanent Logos is the inner constitution of God the Father’s image, likeness, reflection, representation, and presence, so the economic Logos is the outer continuation of the immanent constitution. ⁵⁶ Furthermore, the immanent self-utterance of God in divine eternal fullness is the condition of the self-utterance of God outside Godself. ⁵⁷ The economic Logos not only expresses the immanent Logos as it is, but also the economic Logos is the very constitutive way in which the immanent Logos is expressed as it is.

Rahner’s way of understanding of the incarnation of the Son runs parallel to his way of understanding of the descent of the Holy Spirit. As the economic Logos is the immanent Logos, the Holy Spirit which we experience in the salvific history is the Holy Spirit within the Trinity. As the hypostatic union is innerly grounded in the proper character which the Son has in relation to the Father, the descent of the Holy Spirit is also intrinsically grounded in the proper character which the Spirit has in relation to the Father and the Son. As the Son is begotten from the Father as the image and likeness of the Father and thus the Son represents the Father through the hypostatic union, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the love between the Father and the Son and thus the Holy Spirit communicates God’s grace to humans.

Likewise, this way of understanding of the incarnation of the Son and of the descent of the Spirit essentially runs parallel with his way of understanding of the Father. Following the Bible and the Greek Fathers, Rahner regards God (ό θεός) as the one unoriginate Father. As the Father is the unoriginate one, from whom the Son is begotten, and from whom the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well, so the Father is the one who reveals and communicates Godself through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. God, whom we experience in the economy of salvation through the Son and in the Holy Spirit, is the unoriginated God the Father who begot the Son and let the Spirit proceed.

Based on this way of understanding of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Rahner leads to the doctrine of grace, that is, the grace of God’s threefold self-communication. In this threefold self-communication, each of the three divine persons works in and through each one’s own relations to the other persons. In other words, the unoriginated Father imparts Godself in two different modes, namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Rahner succinctly expounds God’s threefold self-communication as follows:

The Father gives himself to us too as Father, that is, precisely because and insofar as he himself, being essentially with himself, utters himself and in this way communicates the Son as his own, personal self-manifestation; and because and insofar as the Father and the Son (receiving from the Father), welcoming each other in love, drawn and returning to each other, communicate themselves in this way, as received in mutual love, that is, as Holy Spirit. ⁵⁸

More importantly, what is communicated in such divine self-communication is precisely what God is in Godself. God’s threefold relationship to the world is not merely “a copy or an analogy of the inner Trinity,” but exactly the Triune personal God, because the divine self-communication occurs exactly according to the intra-divine manner of the two communications of the divine essence by the Father to the Son and the Spirit. Precisely in that way, God can communicate Godself. For this reason Rahner states as follows,

God has given himself so fully in his absolute self-communication to the creature, that the “immanent” Trinity becomes the Trinity of the “economy of salvation,” and hence in turn the Trinity of salvation which we experience is the immanent Trinity. This means that the Trinity of God’s relationship to us is the reality of God as he is in himself: a trinity of persons. ⁶⁰

Ontology, Epistemology, and Mystery in Barth on the Relation

As has been discussed previously, Barth’s notion of mutual correspondence means both the ontological correspondence of the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity and the epistemological correspondence of the immanent to the economic Trinity. On the one hand, in an epistemological aspect, God our Creator and God our Father refer us back to the eternal Father of the eternal Son. Jesus Christ in revelation leads us to perceive the eternal Son of the eternal Father. The Holy Spirit takes us to the recognition of the eternal Spirit of the Father and the Son. The economic Filioque carries us into seeing the immanent Filioque. On the other hand, in an ontological aspect, the three divine modes of being antecedently in Godself are the ontological prototype of the three divine modes of being in revelation. The eternal Father is the ontological reason of our Creator and our Father. The eternal Son is the ontological way of our Reconciler. The eternal Spirit is the ontological basis of our Redeemer. The immanent Filioque is the ontological prototype of the economic Filioque.

However, Barth’s position that the immanent Trinity is the ontological prototype of the economic Trinity unavoidably gives an erroneous impression that there are two ontologically different Trinities. This is one of the main reasons why several theologians such as Moltmann ⁶¹ and Pannenberg ⁶² criticize Barth for holding a Platonic sense of distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity. However, Barth’s own immanent–economic distinction is not the same as Plato’s distinction between eidos (είδος) (idea or form) and phenomenon (φαινόμενον). For Plato, phenomenon is a copy of eidos and they are different in degree. On the contrary, for Barth, the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity, although they are different in form, nevertheless have the sameness or unity in content. ⁶³ In addition, Barth’s own eternal–temporal distinction is not the same as Plato’s own eternity–time distinction. ⁶⁴

Nevertheless, Barth’s position inexorably leads towards an implication that the immanent Trinity is ontologically apart from and prior to the economic Trinity. This point is clearly shown by Barth’s own statements in Church Dogmatics. First, God is our Father, because God is already the Father of the Son. God is the Father of the Son “even apart from the fact that He reveals Himself as such.” ⁶⁵ Second, Jesus Christ does not first become the Son of God or the Word of God in the event of revelation. Jesus Christ is already the Son of God, “before, even apart from this event.” ⁶⁶ Third, the Holy Spirit does not first become the Spirit of God in the event of revelation. The Holy Spirit is God the Spirit even “within the deepest depths of deity.” ⁶⁷

In addition, the point of the ontological independence or priority of the immanent Trinity is affirmed by Barth’s own other documents. First, in his 1924 letter to Eduard Thurneysen, Barth mentions, referring to the immanent Trinity, that he comes through his hard struggle to the right key of theology, which is “A Trinity of being, not just an economic Trinity!” ⁶⁸ Second, in his 1964 letters to Moltmann, Barth expresses his concern that Moltmann subsumes all theology in eschatology by baptizing Bloch’s principle of hope to the extent that theology becomes largely a matter of eschatological principle. Then Barth calls his attention to the immanent Trinity by stating, “Would it not be wise to accept the doctrine of the immanent Trinity of God?” ⁶⁹ For Barth, Moltmann may only thereby achieve the freedom of three-dimensional thinking in which the eschaton retains its whole weight while the same honor can still be shown to the kingdoms of nature and grace.

However, such ontological independence or priority of the immanent Trinity is inevitably incomparable with Barth’s own theological method. When it comes to his theological method, it is noteworthy that Barth starts with the reality of revelation which is Jesus Christ, proceeds through an analysis of the biblical concept of revelation, and leads to his concepts of the Trinity in revelation, namely, the economic Trinity, and then finally his concepts of the Trinity in Godself, namely, the immanent Trinity. ⁷⁰ But, as far as it is concerned with the doctrine of the Trinity, or, at least, with the immanent Trinity, Barth actually presupposes something of the immanent Trinity from the outset. Barth postulates an ontological state of the eternal Father, the eternal Son, and the eternal Spirit, even before and apart from the reality of revelation. This presupposition, in turn, wrongly implies that, for Barth, everything has already happened in eternity and, by implication, in the past. In this regard, some criticisms of Barth for his orientation to the past might not be totally irrelevant. ⁷¹

For this reason, Barth’s theological method accords better with the order of the epistemological aspect of Barth’s position. As we can know God only in revelation and know the Trinity of God only in the Word of God revealed, written, and proclaimed, ⁷² Barth is right in that he claims that the economic Trinity is the epistemological gateway to the immanent Trinity, but not the other way around. The economic Trinity epistemologically refers us back to the immanent Trinity, but not vice versa. Despite such an accord, however, the epistemological side of Barth’s position does not perfectly agree with his theological method. The former means that the three divine modes of being in revelation epistemologically refer us back to the three divine modes of being in Godself. On the contrary, the latter is so much reserved in an epistemological sense that it merely maintains that biblical revelation is implicitly or explicitly “a pointer” to the doctrine of the Trinity, and that an analysis of revelation leads us merely to “our concepts” of the economic Trinity and further “our concepts” of the immanent Trinity. ⁷³ There is a qualitative gap between the epistemological side of Barth’s position and Barth’s theological method. That is the reason why Barth’s basic rule does not say that the immanent Trinity is the same as the economic Trinity, but that “statements” about the immanent Trinity cannot be different in content from “statements” about the economic Trinity. ⁷⁴

Due to such an epistemological gap, Barth cannot avoid making another further distinction between God’s primary objectivity and God’s secondary objectivity, with an implication that the latter is ultimately grounded in the former. God’s primary objectivity refers to God’s own knowledge of Godself and thus it is concerned with the immanent Trinity. On the other hand, God’s secondary objectivity denotes our knowledge of God and thus it is related to the economic Trinity. Barth explains that they are distinguished only by the fact that God’s secondary objectivity has its particular creaturely form suitable for us. God is objectively immediate to Godself, whereas God is objectively mediate to us. God’s primary objectivity is direct, whereas God’s secondary objectivity is indirect, in such a way that God is clothed under the sign and veil of other objects different from Godself.

Barth persistently denies that there is any difference of degree between God’s own knowledge of Godself and our knowledge of God in revelation. As God gives Godself to be known by us as God knows Godself, the secondary objectivity of God is not distinguished from the primary objectivity of God by a lesser degree of truth. God’s secondary objectivity is fully true, too. Nonetheless, Barth locates the ultimate ground of God’s secondary objectivity in God’s primary objectivity, by insisting that God’s secondary objectivity has its correspondence and basis in God’s primary objectivity. ⁷⁵

So far this article has shown that Barth’s position of mutual correspondence is complicated by certain tensions: a tension between the ontological side of Barth’s position and his theological method, and a tension between the epistemological side of Barth’s position and his theological method. These tensions fundamentally result from his theological method which starts with the reality of revelation and proceeds through an analysis of it to several concepts about the Trinity. Such a method produces those tensions, but cannot answer them. Rather, it only defers and resolves those tensions into the locus of absolute divine freedom, lordship, and divine autonomy. ⁷⁶ They are always kept in the foreground in Barth’s theology, although Barth in his later period comes to put more and more focus on “the humanity of God” by which he means God’s relation to us and turning to us. ⁷⁷

For Barth, “Godhead in the Bible means freedom, ontic and noetic autonomy.” ⁷⁸ All these concepts converge on the subjectivity of God in an ontic and noetic sense. Ontically, God of the Bible as the Creator of the world is different from the world. Noetically, God in revelation is essentially inscrutable and hidden. God is both Deus revelatus and Deus absconditus. ⁷⁹ Even in the self-revelation of God, God constantly tells us afresh that there is no human knowing that corresponds to the divine telling and that there is no assuming of God’s nature into human knowing. ⁸⁰ God in revelation refuses to be objectified. ⁸¹ Thus when he finds the theological “key” for which he has been searching, which is “A Trinity of being, not just an economic Trinity,” he, two months later, comes to understand the Trinity as “the problem of the inalienable subjectivity of God in his revelation.” ⁸² “God’s revelation has its reality and truth wholly and in every respect—both ontically and noetically—within itself.” ⁸³

This subjectivity of God who has ontological reality and epistemological truth in revelation leads Barth to have resort to “analogy,” ⁸⁴ not analogia entis but analogia fidei and analogia relationis, for a connection between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity on the one hand, and to consider analogy as not abandoning but denoting “mystery” ⁸⁵ on the other hand. In this regard, for Barth, analogy and mystery go together with “ignoramus.” ⁸⁶ For example, regarding something of the immanent Trinity, he states that we cannot establish the “How” of the divine processions and of the divine modes of being, and that we cannot define the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Instead, we can state only the fact of the divine processions and modes of being. He continues as follows:

What has to be said will obviously be said definitively and exclusively by God Himself, by the three in the one God who delimit themselves from one another in revelation. … The ignoramus which we must confess in relation to the distinction that we have to maintain between begetting and breathing is thus the ignoramus which we must confess in relation to the whole doctrine of the Trinity, i.e., in relation to the mystery of revelation, in relation to the mystery of God in general. ⁸⁷

Ontology, Epistemology, and Mystery in Rahner on the Relation

As has been discussed previously, Rahner’s rule of identity means that the economic Logos is the immanent Logos and conversely, that the Holy Spirit which we experience in salvific history is the Holy Spirit within the Trinity and vice versa, and thus that God the Father communicates Godself through the incarnation of the Son and the descent of the Holy Spirit. Like Barth’s position of mutual correspondence, Rahner’s rule can be critically approached both in its ontological aspect and in its epistemological aspect.

First, with regards to an ontological aspect, Rahner’s rule asserts that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, that the immanent Logos is the economic Logos, and further that the hypostatic union of the economic Logos is the constitutive way of expressing the immanent Logos. It is noteworthy that Rahner bases this ontological claim on his ontology of symbol, for which he draws on some insights from Thomist ontology, including analogia entis. ⁸⁸ According to the first basic principle of his ontology of symbol, “all beings are by their nature symbolic, because they necessarily ‘express’ themselves in order to attain their own nature.” ⁸⁹ This is true in an epistemological sense. However, Rahner does not stop here.

Instead, he goes further to make a differentiation between merely arbitrary symbols and really genuine symbols. The former, including signs, signal, and codes, are “symbolic representations,” whereas the latter are “symbolic realities.” Then he seeks for “the highest and most primordial manner” of symbolic reality, and calls “this supreme and primal representation, in which one reality renders another present (primarily ‘for itself’ and only secondarily for others), a symbol: the representation which allows the other ‘to be there.’” ⁹⁰ Thus comes the second basic principle of his ontology of symbol: “The symbol strictly speaking (symbolic reality) is the self-realization of a being in the other, which is constitutive of its essence.” ⁹¹ In this way, Rahner’s notion of symbol connotes an ontological sense as well as an epistemological sense. For him, “A being can be and is known, in so far as it is itself ontically (in itself) symbolic because it is ontologically (for itself) symbolic.” In other words, “the essence is there … precisely through its appearance.” ⁹²

In terms of such an ontology of symbol, Rahner’s rule of identity focally means that the immanent Logos is the symbol of the Father and that the economic Logos in a hypostatic union with humanity is the symbol of the immanent Logos, and further that the human nature in a hypostatic union with the economic Logos is “the constitutive, real symbol [Realsymbol] of the Logos himself.” ⁹³ However, a careful analysis reveals an ontological tension, which lurks in his ontology of the symbol. According to Rahner, as a being expresses itself, it is multiple in itself and it has a plurality in unity. Its supreme mode is the Trinity. A plurality in unity indicates something negative regarding finiteness and deficiency, whereas a plurality in unity for the Trinity is something positive. ⁹⁴ Within the Trinity, then, the Logos, namely, the immanent Logos, is the symbol of the Father in such a way that the Logos and the Father are multiple but in unity. On the contrary, the economic Logos goes beyond the unity in plurality. To say the least, the human nature in a hypostatic unity with Logos is the exteriorization of the Logos and thus of the Father.

In Rahner’s own differentiation, the immanent Logos is “the inward symbol” which remains distinct from and within what is symbolized. On the other hand, the economic Logos is the outward symbol. ⁹⁵ As has been mentioned previously, Rahner firmly criticizes the Augustinian position that every divine person might assume a hypostatic union, for the economic Logos would then reveal properly nothing about the Logos and thus about the Father. Considering this critique, Rahner’s intent could be at least understandable, which is to establish a link and continuity between the inward symbol and the outward symbol:

… one needs have no difficulty in thinking that the Word’s being symbol of the Father has significance for God’s action ad extra …

It is because God “must” “express” himself inwardly that he can also utter himself outwardly; the finite, created utterance ad extra is a continuation of the immanent constitution of “image and likeness”—a free continuation, because its object is finite—and takes place in fact “through” the Logos (Jn 1:3), … we could not hardly omit this link between a symbolic reality within and without the divine … ⁹⁶

Second, with regards to the epistemological aspect, Rahner’s rule of identity means that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, that the economic Logos is the immanent Logos, that the Holy Spirit which we experience in salvific history is the Spirit of the Father and the Son within the Trinity, and thus that we experience God the Father through the incarnation of the Son and the descent of the Holy Spirit.

For such epistemological claim, Rahner appeals to the threefold self-communication of God. According to Rahner, God’s self-communication is “a quasi-formal causality,” rather than “efficient causality.” ⁹⁷ By this he means that God bestows uncreated grace, that is, Godself, but not that God indirectly gives some parts of Godself to the creature by giving created finite realities. In this regard, God’s self-communication is given not only as gift, but also as “the necessary condition which makes possible human acceptance of the gift.” ⁹⁸ It is a “supernatural existential” in which we have a transcendental, though unthematic, orientation toward God’s offer of self-communication, and in which we have potential obedience through which we receive God’s uncreated grace. ⁹⁹ Therefore, for Rahner, there is not any possibility of making an epistemological gap “between God’s self-communicating, gratuitous, self-bestowing activity, and the reception of grace by the justified.” ¹⁰⁰ We can experience Godself outwardly communicated through the incarnation of the Logos in the grace of the Holy Spirit, who is also inwardly expressed through the Logos in the Spirit within the Trinity.

However, for Rahner, a serious problem arises from an ontological tension inherent in his rule of identity. Epistemologically, we have a transcendental possibility of receiving Godself through the offer of God’s threefold self-communication. On the contrary, ontologically, as the economic Logos, or the human nature of the economic Logos goes beyond the divine unity in plurality as the exteriorization of the immanent Logos and thus of God the Father, we could not be given Godself as the same much as the immanent Logos ontologically symbolizes God the Father. Instead, we could merely receive something of Godself.

This ontological tension and its incompatibility with an epistemological possibility lead Rahner to be hesitant to fully confirm that the incarnation of the Logos and the descent of the Holy Spirit are the totally whole reality of God. Though he claims that God communicates Godself through them, Rahner regards them merely as “absolute proximity.” As he puts it,

Hence when we reach the point of absolute proximity of the “coming” of God, the covenant, in which God really communicates himself radically and bindingly to his partner … ¹⁰¹

… [T]he inner, mutually related moments of the one self-communication, through which God (the Father) communicates himself to the world unto absolute proximity. ¹⁰²

Standing in opposition to such an obsolete concept of mystery, Rahner makes an attempt to identify “the primordial concept of mystery” on the ground that God remains as the incomprehensible mystery even in visio beatifica. ¹⁰⁴ In this regard, his own notion of mystery is what can be ontologically encountered in the original transcendental experience. This is the reason why he regards mystery not only as “the incomprehensible and ineffable mystery,” but also as “the holy mystery.” ¹⁰⁵ Therefore he concludes a section of his explication on the identity of the economic and the immanent Trinity, by putting his rule of identity in a balance with the incomprehensible mystery of God:

It is only through this doctrine [the Christian doctrine of the Trinity] that we can take with radical seriousness and maintain without qualifications the simple statement which is at once so very incomprehensible and so very self-evident, namely that God himself as the abiding and holy mystery, as the incomprehensible ground of man’s transcendent existence is not only the God of infinite distance, but also wants to be the God of absolute closeness in a true self-communication. … Here lies the real meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity. ¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

As has been discussed previously, Barth’s position of mutual correspondence, despite its determination to hold fast to the sameness and unity in content between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity, unavoidably implies the ontological independence or priority of the immanent Trinity, which, in turn, inevitably evokes an epistemological tension. Thus, in order to resolve the tension, Barth makes a further distinction between God’s primary objectivity and God’s secondary objectivity, and then finally resorts to a concept of mystery as ignoramus. And Rahner’s rule of identity strongly affirms that God whom we meet in our transcendental experience is Godself, because the economic Logos is the immanent Logos and the Holy Spirit in history is the Spirit within God. Nonetheless, due to its inherent ontological tension, he makes a further distinction between the immanent Logos as “the inward symbol” and the economic Logos as “the outward symbol” in an ontological sense, and regards divine self-communication as “absolute proximity.” This ontological tension is finally resolved in his location of the incomprehensible mystery of God in the foreground of his entire theology.

In this way, this article has critically analyzed Barth’s mutual correspondence and Rahner’s identity in terms of ontology and epistemology. As has been shown, ontology and epistemology are indispensable elements in each position, but nonetheless each position exposes certain tensions: ontological or epistemological. At the same time, this article has shown that a concept of mystery, though not univocally, has been used to resolve these tensions. These critical analyses provide a helpful insight on a matrix of ontology, epistemology, and a concept of mystery in our discussions on the relation between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity in order to advance the recent renaissance of trinitarian theology further. Such an insight, in turn, could provide a theological significance in our understanding of the relation between the triune God and the world, and also a pastoral significance in our conviction of God’s work of salvation for us. But these significances would be examined in a separate article. ¹⁰⁷