Abstract
Thomas Pröpper’s (1941–2015) systematic theology, that was deemed particularly innovative especially in the German-speaking Catholic realm but thus far has garnered hardly any international attention, poses the question of whether a reflection of the is and ought of freedom yields any returns for the question of God and moreover for ethics. 1 A theological way of thinking should be established that helps with understanding faith whilst also offering philosophical justification. 2 For eminently theological reasons, Pröpper pursues a theology of freedom because God’s self-revelation as love can be adequately inferred through concepts of freedom. 3 Pröpper’s theological approach of a question of the contemporary philosophy of subject and freedom also involves the inclusion of authority-critical thought. 4 According to Pröpper’s own information, Hermann Krings’s freedom thinking in particular alongside his transcendental philosophy, 5 tracing back to Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, is applicable to Pröpper’s own approach. 6 Consequently, for Pröpper a theological argument can be given only from man (ex parte hominis). For such an argument to be convincing, it must fulfil satisfy two criteria: it must be able to exist in the application of one’s own reason (“im Gebrauch der eigenen Vernunft”) and in the execution of freedom (“im Vollzug der Freiheit”). 7
1. Freedom as an Autochthonous Issue of Theology
If (Catholic) theology manages to overcome its tendential reservations towards contemporary freedom thought, from which no principal danger to Christian thinking stems, 8 then according to Pröpper it is at its core issue. 9 Pröpper himself assumes a positive stance on freedom thinking and conceives a theology of freedom that can also be understood as a “theology of love,” since only in (absolute) love does freedom find what it anticipates: unconditional acceptance. In this way, the event of the revelation of Jesus is also portrayed as an event of freedom that liberates and encourages love. 10 Pröpper indicates that this also implies an obligation for theology to make the unconditional respect for freedom the focus of theology and ethics. 11 For a theology with this focus, it will be impossible to avoid criticizing forms of thinking and actions that implicitly or explicitly ignore the “free I as a principal.”
If freedom from a contemporary perspective is interpreted as autonomy (a more precise analysis of autonomy follows in section 2), Pröpper postulates that freedom can be considered the transcendental reason for man’s responsiveness to God’s revelation. 12 The inherent relation between the concept of freedom and unconditional acceptance makes the option of a self-revealing God intellectually and existentially relevant for man. The fact that God’s mercy—that is, the unconditional acceptance of man—is completely free has rarely been contested within the history of theology. However, the conundrum lies in how mercy can be both unconditionally given yet also necessary for man. How can a gift simultaneously be able to be given freely despite the recipient being reliant on the offering? Pröpper believes this is the root of the problem along with the extent of human freedom, since they themselves cannot attain this by any other means, but instead can only receive this as a gift. 13 Love is only love if it is offered freely and accepted freely. 14 This well-known dialectic of freedom and necessity in love serves as an initial clue for understanding that the Christian revelation-paradox does not necessarily constitute an aporia into nothingness.
2. The Concept of Freedom in Pröpper’s Theological Anthropology
Anthropology begins with the Kantian question “What is man?” This question is not meant to be ceremonious and self-indulgent; it is a question that emerges from humans’ needs, their responsibility, and the dependence on the (absolute) Other. 15 Pröpper proposes that the person rises above the given and confronts it critically. Distance from oneself and from the world raises awareness of the possibility that everything could be completely different. This presents man with choices. 16 In choosing and rejecting, identity develops. According to Pröpper, if one could not determine him or herself in a temporal process of self-development, then he or she would not be free. The capacity for self-determination, Pröpper suggests at the beginning of his Theologischen Anthropologie, is “the … index of freedom,” meaning the emergence of an identity in the space of history by choosing freedom, through which it becomes more and more itself. 17
2.1 Formally Unconditional Freedom
According to Pröpper, the unconditional does not come into our thinking by adding up finite things. 18 According to Pröpper, Kant suggests that only in the unconditionally conditional does reason reach its goal. 19 Unconditionality can be related to freedom because, Pröpper emphasizes, if freedom explains itself only through itself, the uncircumventable reason that one was looking for is found in it. 20
Pröpper defines the relationship between freedom and unconditionality more precisely through the concept of the formally unconditional freedom central to his oeuvre. This means the person’s ability to distance him- or herself. 21 In freedom, a person can relate to everything and everyone, even to the “conditions and consequences” of his or her own actions. 22 Thinking can relate to everything thoughtfully and critically. 23 To this extent, freedom is formally absolutely free. Thus, it is freedom itself that brings the dimension of the unconditional into thinking. 24 Pröpper describes reasoning in this context as “free reason” and means by this its notorious ability to “transcend … the entire realm of the unconditional and the finite.” 25
Pröpper also emphasizes the unconditionality in freedom for decidedly theological reasons, since only on this understanding can humanity’s communicability with God’s unconditionality and His revelation be assumed. 26 How else should adequate communication between God and humanity ever exist, Pröpper asks, if something does not exist within humans that God can relate to? 27 This does not, however, imply that God is a part of human freedom. Rather, the unconditional circumstance of human freedom is established as a tertium comparationis to the completely different unconditionality of God. Theologically speaking, however, this tertium is of the highest importance, since it is only in this way that God’s revelation, as love chosen for humanity unconditionally, can be recognized as the human urgently emerging. 28
In this theological view, unconditionality is not something that is announced to man heteronomously. The revelation of God’s unconditional love and the determination for humanity’s freedom thus goes unproven, Pröpper continues. 29 Because God’s actions are not deducible by reason, 30 it does not remain without a reference point, relating to the concept of formally unconditional freedom. This makes the encounter with God human in the first place, because following blindly is then out of the question. 31 If there were no connection to the concept of God in the free thought of humanity, then the word of God, Pröpper stipulates, would be unthinkable; an empty shell, whose discourse would hold no worth and fail to move anyone. 32
2.2 Substantively Conditional Freedom
Another concept central to Pröpper’s analysis of freedom is, in contrast to the formally unconditional, the concept of substantively conditional freedom. The formal capacity for freedom still of course represents freedom, even according to the substantive conditionality of freedom that human freedom can only generally exist as a substantive conditionality of freedom in order to be capable of distance from a formal perspective. 33 Human’s actual experience of freedom is obviously conditioned by intersubjectivity and history. 34 Although this is the case and humans are predisposed in many ways—sometimes more burdened, sometimes more fortunate—in concrete freedom, individuals can behave reflectively and critically to anything and anyone, even if one often overestimates how much freedom lies in one’s own decisions. 35 Distance creates this substantively conditional freedom, as defined above, in the eye-opening moment when the everyday world is interrupted and life is questioned. The substantively affected freedom then catalyzes the transcendence towards reflecting on oneself, on others, and on the world. Pröpper is therefore not removed from reality and has never spoken of a solitary “simply unconditional freedom of man.” The formally unconditional freedom is a component in occurrences of freedom. Pröpper thus emphasizes that conditional and unconditional freedom can coexist. 36
3. On the Context of the Analysis of Freedom: The Conceivability of God
If one wants to create an even more explicit dialogue between the God question and Pröpper’s freedom thinking, the “unfathomableness of human freedom” he describes becomes relevant. 37 Since freedom itself is not posited and since cannot create what it longs for, it appears dependent (abhängig) and unfathomable (abgründig). 38 The person thus seems to become a question that cannot be answered. 39 This marks the double meaning in Pröpper’s freedom: on the one hand he stresses the finiteness of freedom, yet on the other hand he points to the movement of the unconditional question transcending this finiteness as an indication of the unconditionality of freedom. 40 Pröpper believes that through this, however, God does not suddenly and unexpectedly find a way into thinking. God does not appear plainly and conveniently as an opposition to immanence, contingency, and formally unconditional but substantively conditional freedom. Pröpper does not want to give proof of God, but rather contribute to the conceivability of God. 41 Just because something exists in thought and develops in one way and not another due to particular factors, and always developing the same way under this set of factors, does not mean that thought and existence necessarily correspond. It is here that Pröpper clearly differs from Karl Rahner, whose work he on the whole greatly appreciated. If Rahner’s freedom refers to God in a transcendental sense, then Pröpper’s concept of formally unconditional freedom is decidedly referential of history. 42 The quality of unconditionality in freedom itself therefore offers no hope; however, there exists a sort of hope for hope, insofar as it is conceivable that the unconditionality of this freedom can experience meaning. It is not guaranteed but is conceivable, which is significant. According to Pröpper, even if the analysis of freedom only provides proof of plausibility for the God-hypothesis, it becomes important in situations where man does not understand his existence as a coincidence but as an absurdity. 43
4. On the Context of the Analysis of Freedom: Ethical Consequences
Pröpper believes that the freedom of the person existis, as seen, between the unconditional and the conditional. As such, it is neither free from illusion nor corruptibility. 44 This polarity remains, according to Pröpper, 45 if it should not merely constitute self-enforcing libertinism. 46 Furthermore, commandments and duties cannot simply be externally dictated. 47 Were this the case—Pröpper criticizes in particular Christian obedience with its inclination towards disregarding uncircumventable freedom— 48 extrinsicism would be prompted: “I do not speak of some completely unconditional freedom beyond good and evil, but rather of a freedom that man knows he is obliged to in his actions; that is, he has seized his responsibility for the contentual knowledge of the moral commandments and has also discovered in himself the obligation argument of moral ought.” 49
There is a great deal of potential in acknowledging freedom as a central theme of theology, Pröpper stipulates, as discussed above in the extrinsic obedience problem. Freedom-focused theology, then, appears responsible for the respect of freedom and is particularly sensitive towards those whose freedom is not respected or even recognized. 50 With the following ethical principle, Pröpper emphasizes the ethical format of his analysis of freedom: “Every freedom carries the shared responsibility for the shaping of a world, through whose relations the approval of all men finds expression and the is-ought of freedom is encouraged.” 51 For Pröpper, making freedom possible consequently becomes a test case of behavior. 52 According to him, anything that takes part in the realization of freedom can only be described as humane. 53 Freedom can therefore never be satisfied with the death and annihilation of other freedom since the demise of other freedom also means the demise of meaning. 54 In this way, the other freedom appears as an adequate form of freedom. To this extent, the recognition of freedom seems to be doubled and necessary for the success of freedoms that encounter each other. 55 According to Pröpper, such respect for human freedom develops into ethical judgements. 56
5. Critical Reading of Pröpper’s Analysis of Freedom
On the one hand, Pröpper’s theological case for a freedom-theoretical relecture of Christian theology can indeed attract attention as its own approach, 57 but it has also been the subject of criticism from very different schools of thought that shall be mentioned here in the conclusion in abbreviated form to serve as a basis for further critical thinking. A comprehensive critique of Pröpper’s approach would have to be carried out in its own piece.
The most detailed critique of Pröpper’s approach can be found within Catholic reviews, which has to do with Pröpper’s Catholic background and not with him taking issue with important core Catholic beliefs. His greatest critic is Hansjürgen Verweyen. He emphasizes the mutual transcendental-logical line of thought but criticizes Pröpper’s equation of human freedom with the capacity of the unconditional. 58 Furthermore, he refutes the connection between moral ought and the conception of God that in Pröpper’s work results from the need for unconditional acceptance and solidarity, as already seen. 59 One such connection already seems problematic because of the notorious notion that human freedom is doomed to fail due to the unconditional acceptance of other freedom. In any case, the problems of freedom are more obvious than its successes, Verweyen holds. Even Pröpper’s recourse to the moment of the unconditional in every experience of contingency has sparked criticism. In this regard, the danger of mistaking God for a logical construct of reason is indicated. 60
Protestant theology too has expressed criticism of Pröpper’s freedom thinking. In particular, deeming the formally unconditional freedom a requirement for theological and ethical discourse must have been interpreted as provoking the passivity-principle (mere passive) of freedom. 61 Yet segregation does not stereotypically occur within the theological interpretation of freedom between Protestant and Catholic schools of thought. 62 In this way, Kahl Rahner and Wolfhart Pannenberg’s ideas are closer than Rahner and Pröpper as far as the positive referentiality of freedom to God is concerned, as the latter originates from a clearly formal relation. 63 Furthermore, with Emil Brunner there is a “Protestant Pröpper,” insofar as he also subjects autonomous man to a positive theological relecture. 64 Incidentally, Pröpper has even initiated a dialogue with Eberhard Jüngel on the exploration of the ecumenical-theological potential of the analysis of freedom. At the same time, Jüngel’s Protestant beliefs fuel his criticisms of Pröpper, as formally unconditional freedom allows man to appear primarily as an agent. In the confrontation with unconditional requirements, Jüngel argues, there is scarcely any room for the biblical scope of the passivity of the person, who also must not create from his own freedom what a relationship between God and humanity ensures. According to Jüngel, with whom Pröpper agrees, it absolutely cannot be originated from a possessive relationship with freedom. For Pröpper, the person has a formally and substantively formatted freedom. Theologically, however, it would depend on understanding freedom as mercy which can only come from God (sola gratia). A liberated freedom, as one can understand the formally unconditional freedom to be, lies at the end, and not before the event of justification, Jüngel continues. 65
Overall, Pröpper’s freedom thinking provokes not only the established discourse on God’s sovereignty, but also a postmodern skepticism of freedom that it discusses as an illusion. In this context, Pröpper’s theological freedom thinking—that highlights the potentialities of freedom and attests to its formal conditionality as reflected in a contemporary freedom-pessimism that deems the radius of freedom low—is indeed less en vogue. 66 However, even in this external meaning, the critical relevance of Pröpper’s approach can be seen. In any case, within theology the relevance consists in his approach in having precisely named, productively contextualized, and robustly applied potentialities of autonomy. Latent theologically mitigated freedom finds a theological counter-program in Pröpper’s innovative approach.
Footnotes
Author biography
1
T. Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft. Konturen einer theologischen Hermeneutik (Frieburg i. Br.: Herder, 2001), 64 and G. Essen “Transzendentales Denken und Letztbegründung. Annäherungen an Karl Rahner,” in H. Klaucke (ed.), 100 Jahre Karl Rahner post et secundum (Koln: Karl-Rahner-Akademie, 2004), 11–28 (13).
2
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 129.
3
T. Pröpper, Erlösungsglaube und Freiheitsgeschichte. Eine Skizze zur Soteriologie (MünchenKösel, 31991), 277. Cf. M. Knapp, Die Vernunft des Glaubens. Eine Einführung in die Fundamentaltheologie (Frieburg i. Br.: Herder, 2009), 264.
4
F. Bruckmann,
5
G. Essen, Die Freiheit Jesu. Der neuchalkedonische Enhypostasiebegriff im Horizont neuzeitlicher Subjekt- und Personphilosophie (Regensburg: Pustet, 2001), 177.
6
Pröpper, Erlösungsglaube, 182–83.
7
T. Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I (Frieburg i. Br.: Herder, 2011), 587.
8
S. Goertz, “Konkrete Freiheit. Ein philosophisch-theologischer Umriss,” in A. Autiero, S. Goertz, and M. Striet (eds.), Endliche Autonomie. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf ein theologisch-ethisches Programm (Münster: Lit, 2004), 75–102 (94).
9
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 66; cf. W. Kasper, Theologie und Kirche (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1987), 150; J. B. Metz, Zur Theologie der Welt (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1968), 16–18; U. Ruh, “Der Freiheit eine Gasse. Zu Thomas Pröppers Theologischer Anthropologie,” HerrKorr 66: 2 (2012), 94–97 (95).
10
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 125.
11
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 495.
12
M. Bongardt, Die Fraglichkeit der Offenbarung. Ernst Cassirers Philosophie als Orientierung im Dialog der Religionen (Regensburg: Pustet, 2000), 34–35.
13
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 151.
14
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 491: “Jede Erfahrung von Liebe macht es doch sonnenklar: dass in ihr das Notwendigste gerade das Freieste ist und jederzeit bleibt. Nur was aus unverfügbarer Freiheit begegnet, kann die Freiheit, die wir selbst sind, erfüllen. Dass Liebe, wo immer sie sich wahrhaft ereignet, trotz des Verlangens nach ihr freies Geschenk ist, stand damit fest.”
15
In this context, Pröpper refers to Friedrich Nietzsche, Ernst Bloch, and Gabriel Marcel. All three portray the restlessness of man differently; however, they share the observation that persons are as unrecognizable in the here and now as in everything the immanent future of the world has to offer; cf. Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 12.
16
Ibid. I, 34–35.
17
Ibid. I, 11.
18
Ibid. I, 394.
19
Ibid. I, 395.
20
M. Bongardt, Der Widerstand der Freiheit. Eine transzendentaldialogische Aneignung der Angstanalysen Kierkegaards (Frankfurt a.M.: Knecht, 1995), 96, and Pröpper, Erlösungsglaube, 139.
21
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 501.
22
J.-H. Tück, “Der Abgrund der Freiheit. Zum theodramatischen Konflikt zwischen endlicher und unendlicher Freiheit,” in M. Striet and J.-H. Tück (eds.), Die Kunst Gottes verstehen. Hans Urs von Balthasars theologische Provokationen (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 2005), 82–116 (91–92).
23
Pröpper, Erlösungsglaube, 184: “Sie wird bewusst als das schlechthin ursprüngliche und vom Menschsein unabtrennbare Vermögen [verstanden], zu jeder Gegebenheit und Bestimmtheit, zu den Systemen der Notwendigkeit und noch der Vorfindlichkeit des eigenen Daseins sich verhalten, d. h. sich distanzieren, reflektieren und affirmieren (oder negieren) zu können.”
24
Here, the anti-monistic element of his freedom thinking appears. Namely, anywhere a formal unconditionality is assumed, it must not be denied that man has been created, but man can then be considered free and not as a mere epiphenomenon of the cause; cf. Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 611.
25
Ibid. I, 396.
26
Ibid. I, 398: “Ohne den Rekurs auf ein Unbedingtes, das im Menschen selbst vorausgesetzt werden darf, wäre weder der Gottesgedanke in autonom-vernünftiger Einsicht bestimmbar noch die jeden Menschen unbedingt angehende Bedeutung der Selbstoffenbarung Gottes begründbar vertretbar.”
27
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 16.
28
Ibid. I, 16.
29
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie II, 942.
30
Ibid. I, 586.
31
Ibid., 500.
32
Ibid. I, 601–602.
33
Ibid. I, 500–501.
34
Ibid. I, 511 and Pröpper, Erlösungsglaube, 189.
35
M. Bongardt, “Gottes Liebe als Vorzeichen einer christlichen Existenz. Aspekte der Erfahrung und Bezeugung der Gnade,” in Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie II, 1437–89 (1463).
36
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 512.
37
M. E. Brinkmann, “Was hat Heil mit Freiheit und Freiheit mit Heil zu tun? Eine kritische Würdigung der Soteriologie Thomas Pröppers,” Bijdragen, tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie 59 (1998): 41–57 (46).
38
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 59.
39
Ibid. I, 19.
40
Ibid. I, 53; Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 28, and T. Pröpper, “Freiheit als philosophisches Prinzip der Dogmatik. Systematische Reflexion im Anschluss an Walter Kaspers Konzeption der Dogmatik,” in E. Schockenhoff and P. Walter (eds.), Dogma und Glaube. Bausteine für eine theologische Erkenntnislehre (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1993), 165–92 (191).
41
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 398.
42
M. Wirth, “Unhintergehbare Freiheit. Thomas Pröppers kritischer Beitrag zur Ethik des Gehorsams,” ThPh 93 (2018): 563--578.
43
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 398 and Wirth, Absurdität, 542--543.
44
E. Kaufner-Marx, Freiheit zwischen Autonomie und Ohnmacht. Eine Untersuchung der theologischen Anthropologien Wolfhart Pannenbergs und Thomas Pröppers (Würzburg: Echter, 2007), 376.
45
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 66 and M. Bongardt, “Verlorene Freiheit? Von Gottes und der Menschen Handeln in einer unübersehbaren Welt,” in M. Böhnke et al. (eds.), Freiheit Gottes und des Menschen (Regensburg: Pustet, 2006), 336–57 (344).
46
T. Rendtorff, “Emanzipation und christliche Freiheit,” CGG 18 (1982): 149–79 (170) and T. Rendtorff, Ethik (Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 32011), 206.
47
H. Krings, System und Freiheit. Gesammelte Aufsätze (Freiburg i. Br.: Alber Karl, 1980), 103–104 and Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie, [vol.1]44.
48
Pröpper, “Freiheit als philosophisches Prinzip,” 187; Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 126. See also M. Wirth, Unhintergehbare Freiheit.
49
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie II, [vol.2] 721 and Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 15.
50
Pröpper, Erlösungsglaube, 147.
51
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie, 712.
52
P. Platzbecker, Radikale Autonomie vor Gott denken. Transzendentalphilosophische Glaubensverantwortung in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Hansjürgen Verweyen und Thomas Pröpper (Regensburg: Pustet, 2003), 103.
53
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 15.
54
H. Verweyen, “Glaubensverantwortung heute. Zu den ‘Anfragen’ von Thomas Pröpper,” ThQ 174 (1994): 288–303 (296). See also J. Herdt, “Rain on the Just and the Unjust: The Ethical Implications of Indiscriminate Divine Love,” Studies in Christian Ethics 22 (2009): 34–47 (34–36).
55
Pröpper, Evangelium und freie Vernunft, 29.
56
Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie II, [vol.2] 742–43.
57
H. Verweyen, “Was ist Freiheit? Fragen an Thomas Pröpper,” ThPh 88 (2013): 510–35 (510–11) and Wirth, Absurdität, 536.
58
Verweyen, “Was ist Freiheit,” 510–11.
59
Ibid., 526–28.
60
R. Miggelbrink, Ekstatische Gottesliebe im tätigen Weltbezug. Der Beitrag Karl Rahners zur zeitgenössischen Gotteslehre (Altenberge Tyrolia Telos, 1989), 217–23, and R. Miggelbrink, “Latens Deitas. Das Gottesdenken in der Theologie Karl Rahners,” in R. Siebenrock (ed.), Karl Rahner in der Diskussion (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2001), 99–129, 403–405.
61
Wirth, Absurdität, 545.
62
In particular, claiming Protestant disrespect of freedom is a prejudice that Jüngel responds to with the remark that it was in fact the reformation that prompted contemporary autonomy, see E. Jüngel, Indikative der Gnade—Imperative der Freiheit. Theologische Erörterungen IV (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 303, and Wirth, Distanz des Gehorsams, 317; and also M. Hofheinz, “A Good Reason to Celebrate? The Anniversary of the Reformation in 2017,” Theology Today 74 (2017): 275–88 (287).
63
Wirth, Absurdität, 543.
64
Ibid., 545.
65
E. Jüngel, Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens (Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 42005), 153–69, 202–206. Additionally, Pröpper, Theologische Anthropologie I, 258 and Wirth, Absurdität, 545--546; Bongardt, Die Fraglichkeit der Offenbarung, 34 as well as Knapp, Die Vernunft des Glaubens, 140.
66
Bongardt, “Verlorene Freiheit,” 335.