Abstract
The recent protest in Hong Kong since summer 2019 makes political forgiveness an urgent public issue facing the Christian churches. Through a contextual and multidisciplinary dialogue with Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), this study argues for a realistic understanding that political forgiveness is possible as well as desirable, which should be based on a dialectical view of human nature, rather than a naïve and optimistic view of human compassion. This realistic understanding of political forgiveness is grounded on Niebuhr’s thought and relevance to the Hong Kong context.
Introduction
The Hong Kong government’s attempt to introduce an extradition bill sparked off a massive resistant movement since the summer of 2019. On the one hand, the protesters insisted on the appeal “five demands, not one less” which included “amnesty for arrested protesters.” On the other hand, some protesters asked for not only the dissolution or reform of the police force, but also the prosecution of police officers who allegedly used reckless and indiscriminate tactics against the protesters. A tricky question is, If the arrested protesters can be forgiven, why not the violent police officers? In this context, political forgiveness becomes an important issue of public concern. 1
Among the foremost modern Christian theologians, Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) is particularly famous for his view that forgiveness is relevant in conflicts of opinions on ethical and sociopolitical issues. “No virtuous act is quite virtuous from the standpoint of our friend or foe as it is from our standpoint. Therefore, we must be saved by the final form of love which is forgiveness.” 2 However, studies about Niebuhr and political forgiveness remain very few. The most relevant contribution by far is made by Nigel Biggar. 3 I have discussed the related topics of forgiveness and reconciliation with a multidisciplinary as well as Chinese Christian perspective without significant reference to Niebuhr and the present situation of Hong Kong. 4 The present study will take Biggar’s study as a starting point, and adopt a multidisciplinary approach to engage into a dialogue with Niebuhr on the problem of political forgiveness with reference to the Hong Kong context.
This study argues that Niebuhr is very positive on the possibility of political forgiveness, and may vindicate political forgiveness on a dialectical understanding of human nature, which takes human selfishness seriously rather than naïvely assuming human empathy as the sole source of forgiveness. In other words, for political forgiveness, compassion from the individual concerned is desirable but not absolutely required. This realistic approach to forgiveness in the legal or political spheres is compatible with Christian faith and relevant to the Hong Kong context.
Biggar on Niebuhr
According to Biggar, Niebuhr’s position on forgiveness went through a subtle yet significant shift of emphasis. In Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932), Niebuhr emphasized the realistic distinction between the two “realms”—the realm of gospel and the realm of political life. This distinction sounds similar to Martin Luther’s (1483–1546) theory of two kingdoms, but actually deviates from the position of Luther, who “did not envisage the public expression of Christian love in its most distinctive form as patient forbearance in the face of injury.”
5
Following Luther, Niebuhr also understands that love is unselfish as well as disinterested, and thus very difficult to be practiced in the political sphere; but for Niebuhr, the major difficulty is constituted by the human tendency of restricting this to the interpersonal sphere or socially proximate groups rather than human sinfulness, which is stressed by Luther. As Biggar summarizes for Niebuhr, Altruistic impulses can transcend egoistic ones more effectively in relation to near neighbours than to distant ones, since it is easier for human creatures to develop sympathy for those with whom they can more readily identify. Consequently, love has greater scope in interpersonal relations than in social ones, and in social relations between proximate groups than in those between remote ones. A further consequence is that social relations are ordered less by love than by justice.
6
… genuine forgiveness of enemies requires the contrite recognition of one’s own sinfulness and the acceptance of mutual responsibility for the sin of the accused, and this is the achievement only on rare individuals and is beyond the capacities of collective man. Furthermore, forgiveness of the enemy should not be made to take the place of action for justice, including punishment. So, while forgiveness can qualify punishment, “in the absolute sense” it is impossible.
8
Victim: forgiveness-as-compassion; Victim: condemnatory expression of resentment via communicative punishment; Wrongdoer: repentance; Victim: forgiveness-as-absolution; Mutual reconciliation.
11
Given the distinction between “forgiveness as compassion” and “forgiveness as absolution,” as well as the “repentance” between them, this ideal process should not contradict justice. Biggar claims that, according to this understanding, political forgiveness “can be more realistic than Niebuhr supposed.”
12
Niebuhr’s “Rejoinder”
In Niebuhr’s essay “Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism” published in the early 1950s, he suggests that in order to address the relationship between love and law, especially how love is the fulfilment of law, it is necessary to examine the concept of law.
13
Niebuhr finds that “the distinction between law and love is less absolute and more dialectical than conceived in either Catholic or Reformation thought.”
14
He further suggests that “there is a dialectical relation between love and law even as there is between love beyond law and love as law.”
15
This idea of “love as law” implies that love can be expressed in legal terms, and due to the dialectical relation between love and law, the legal expressions of love should be dynamic rather than static. As Niebuhr concludes, All law, whether historical, positive, scriptural, or rational, is more tentative and less independent in its authority than orthodox Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, supposes, even as it is more necessary than liberal Protestantism assumes. The final dyke against relativism is to be found, not in these alleged fixities, but in the law of love itself. This is the only final law, and every other law is an expression of the law of love in minimal or in proximate terms or in terms appropriate to given historical occasions.
16
In the same essay, Niebuhr discussed forgiveness at length. He rejects the view of “modern liberalism, including Christian liberalism,” which “tends to a sentimental version of forgiveness in which mercy has also completely triumphed over justice in such a way that responsibility of sin is denied.” 17 Niebuhr admits that “forgiveness seems to be purely in the realm of grace,” but he counters that it “comes partially into the category of love as law” because “it is also presented as an obligation” in the sense that “our forgiveness of our brethren is primarily a grateful response to God’s forgiveness.” 18 He affirms that “the commandment to love the neighbor as the self must finally culminate in the individual experience,” and “it is also a matter of grace because no sense of obligation can provide the imagination and forbearance by which this is accomplished.” 19 He further suggests that “the intimacy of the relation has of course a basis in nature” and he tends to identify this basis in the sexual or marriage union. 20 However, Niebuhr clearly refutes to confine Christian love to the realm of personal relations or individual experience. “The effort to confine agape to the love of personal relations and to replace all the structures and artifices of justice outside that realm makes Christian love irrelevant to the problems of man’s common life.” 21 He claims that “human actions can, to a degree, corrupt even the highest structure and they can also partially redeem the worst structure.” 22 This may imply that it is possible to make Christian love relevant to the public life without replacing the political structure, which is redeemable.
Considering all these together, Niebuhr argues that forgiveness as the final form of love has its natural basis in interpersonal relations, but this forgiveness should not be confined to the interpersonal realm. Through human effort, it is possible to make the political or legal structures in a given historical occasion more proximate and appropriate expressions of the law of love, which may include forgiveness. If he had the chance to respond to Biggar, Niebuhr might affirm the possibility of forgiveness in the political sphere, and even challenge whether Biggar’s proposal is “realistic” enough. As the issue raised by Biggar is the “political possibility of forgiveness,” this political possibility should belong to the realm of law, which, according to Niebuhr, has two characteristics: (a) It states our obligations to our neighbours in minimal and usually in negative terms. “Thou shalt not kill.” “Thou shalt not steal.” (b) It states our obligations to our neighbours in terms which presuppose the fact of sin and self-interest and the complexity of claims and counterclaims which are arbitrated by some “rule of reason” rather than by the ultimate scruples of the law of love.
23
As we are going to see, this question is addressed more directly by Confucianism and some academic studies of altruism than by Niebuhr.
Political Forgiveness in Confucian Perspective
In modern Chinese, “forgiveness” is usually translated into “kuan shu” (寬恕) or “rao shu” (饒恕), and the shared word shu is a key concept in Confucianism. As we will see, Confucianism may consider political forgiveness in no less than three different ways.
In The Analects (Lun Yu論語), the concept of shu is associated with the “Silver Rule” or “Negative Golden Rule” that “What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.” 24 The word shu, which may be translated as “reciprocity,” “altruism,” or “other regarding,” refers to “putting oneself in the other’s place.” 25 With this virtue of shu as “empathetic understanding of others,” 26 one may understand why the others had conflicts with oneself, and whether there is any ground for forgiveness and reconciliation. If one desires to be forgiven or “not to be un-forgiven,” one has to be forgiving or refrain from unforgiving others. In this way, the virtue of shu, which is supposed to be shared by everybody, appears to support the concept of “forgiveness as compassion” proposed by Biggar.
Apart from the Silver rule and the virtue of shu, which may support the possibility of political forgiveness, Confucianism also registers strong reservations regarding political forgiveness. “Someone said, ‘What do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?’ The Master said, ‘With what then will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness’.”
27
Confucius’ emphasis on justice or righteousness seems to rule out the possibility of political forgiveness. But it is interesting to note that the Chinese character translated as “justice” here is zhi (直), which literally means “straight” or “upright,” and appears in another part of The Analects: The Duke of She informed Confucius, saying, “Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father have [sic] stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact.” Confucius said, “Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.”
28
In addition to these two views, Confucianism also offers a third view which considers the matter from the perspective of governmentality or statecraft. The Book of Rites (Li Ji 禮記) reads, The Master said: “When kindness is returned for kindness, the people are stimulated (to be kind). When injury is returned for injury, the people are warned (to refrain from wrong-doing)” … The Master said, “Under heaven there is, only a man (here and there) who loves what is proper to humanity without some personal object in the matter, or who hates what is contrary to humanity without being apprehensive (of some evil). Therefore, the superior man reasons about the path to be trodden from the standpoint of himself, and lays down his laws from the (capabilities of the) people.”
29
One may perhaps query if Confucianism remains too naïve for its assumption concerning the ruler’s kindness as a personal virtue. However, if political forgiveness is a matter of governmentality as Confucianism suggests, one may agree with Confucianism to the extent that the ruler’s kindness (or lack of it) does not really matter. During the 1970s, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) was formed in order to clear up the extensive and perpetual problem of corruption in Hong Kong. Many police officers were prosecuted and the police force reacted strongly and even violently, including physical assault at the office of ICAC. In 1977, the Hong Kong government decided to grant amnesty to the police force and stipulate that, excepting the few cases already investigated, police officers would not be prosecuted for the corruption committed before January 1, 1977. This “political forgiveness” was based mainly on the government’s political consideration, rather than the “repentance” of the offenders or the government officials’ kindness or compassion towards the offenders. This is an example of “forgiveness as absolution” without requiring “forgiveness as compassion.”
Political Forgiveness in Multidisciplinary Perspective
Forgiveness is one of the key issues in the multidisciplinary studies of altruism. Some biologists observe that a certain degree of empathy, compassion, or tendency to prevent causing pain to other animals can be found in human beings as well as some other kinds of primates. 30 This kind of explanation of altruistic behavior in terms of empathy is more prominent in psychological studies of altruism. 31 Samuel P. Oliner’s study of intergroup reconciliation further affirms that empathy, which is the cognitive and emotional reaction to the other’s pain or danger, plays an important role in the process of intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation. 32 This emphasis on human empathy or compassion is further strengthened by recent studies of the human brain, or neuroscience. For example, Donald W. Pfaff suggests that due to our “altruistic brain,” “we are naturally good.” 33 Mary E. Clark also argues that the way the environment and human experience shaped the brain in the history of human evolution makes possible the emergence of peaceful processes for healing and adaptive social change. 34 In this road to peace, one may not only rediscover “the biological necessity for dialogue,” 35 but also the possibility and importance of “forgiveness.” 36 These studies may provide some sort of academic underpinning to Biggar’s emphasis on “forgiveness as compassion” as the starting point for the process of forgiveness and reconciliation.
Other than the studies of empathy altruism, some biologists explain altruistic behavior among animals with certain genetic affinities or blood relationship in terms of kin altruism. As some studies of primates show, some species of primates can kiss and make up after a fight, at least if their interests are bound up by kinship, shared goals, or common enemies, and the human forgiveness instinct is activated under similar circumstances. 37 This kind of forgiveness is reminiscent of Biggar’s explanation of Niebuhr’s reservations on political forgiveness that interpersonal love or forgiveness may take place among friends or relatives, but not in the public or political sphere. However, many studies indicate that the scope of empathy is expandable, and this may imply that the scope of forgiveness is also expandable. 38 Furthermore, this expanding circle of empathy may start with the nurturance we feel toward our children as the innermost kernel. 39 Based on studies of kin altruism, political forgiveness is theoretically possible, though practically difficult, and its natural basis lies at the parent–child relationship rather than the sexual or marital union as Niebuhr suggested.
Apart from empathy altruism and kin altruism, some biologists propose the concept of reciprocal altruism in order to explain altruistic behavior among animals of different species or people without any blood relationship. 40 Some social scientists also attempt to study reciprocal altruism, especially through conducting some prisoner’s dilemma experiments which are based on game theory. 41 In some computer-simulated tournaments derived from the prisoner’s dilemma experiments, it is found that “Generous Tit for Tat” as a strategy is more effective than “Tit for Tat” in building a perpetual and stable cooperative relationship. 42 These experiments indicate that in the building of reciprocal relationship, a certain element of “forgiveness” should be included. Based on these studies, David Sloan Wilson proposes to understand forgiveness in terms of complex adaptation in human evolution. 43 He affirms that while retaliation is absolutely essential for adaptation, conditional forgiveness is also required for human groups to function as adaptive units. 44 For example, in some hunter-gatherer societies, both the custom of retaliation and ceremony of forgiveness were developed in order to maintain and enhance cooperation within society. Similarly, as a complex adaptation system, in addition to its teaching about turning the other cheek, Christianity also developed different sets of instructions for in-group and out-group relationships. 45
In the perspective of reciprocal altruism, the “forgiveness” generated from the evolutionary process is basically a strategy of cooperation for the survival of the related groups or species. It does not require empathy or compassion towards the offenders or enemies. As Steven Pinker puts it, The Old Testament tells us to love our neighbours, the New Testament to love our enemies. The moral rationale seems to be: Love your neighbours and enemies; that way you won’t kill them. But frankly, I don’t love my neighbours, to say nothing of my enemies. Better, then, is the following deal: Don’t kill your neighbours or enemies, even if you don’t love them.
46
Concluding Remarks
Based on the discussion above, perhaps one may find that political forgiveness is affirmed by both Confucianism and multidisciplinary studies of altruism. For them, it is possible to extend forgiveness, which is supposed to be applicable primarily to interpersonal relationships, especially among family members, and to the public domain. While Confucianism tends to take political forgiveness as part of statecraft, evolutionary studies may take it as a strategy for the survival of the species or the whole group. For reciprocal altruism particularly, political forgiveness is not necessarily to be derived from human love or compassion. Instead, it can be based on the instinct of struggle for survival, which can help humankind to learn how to organize human society in a way that includes political forgiveness. These understandings of political forgiveness are much more “realistic” than the understanding proposed by Biggar.
Of course, one may query if these apparently “secular” understandings of political forgiveness are “Christian” at all. Historically they are not directly derived from any Christian doctrine, but it does not mean that they are incompatible with Christian faith. One may recall the title of Niebuhr’s The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, which is an allusion to Luke 16:1–8. It is noteworthy that this biblical text involves a sort of “forgiveness”—waiving some others’ debts with an assumption associated with reciprocal altruism. The parable concerns a dishonest steward who waived partially the debts of his master’s debtors for the steward’s own benefit, with the expectation that some debtors might “reciprocate” him with some “deferred benefits.” Interestingly, the steward “forgave” more than one debtor. This might assume a rather “dialectical” view of human nature that optimistically some people may reciprocate, but realistically not every one of them will do so. In spite of his dishonesty, this steward was praised for his astuteness by his master. The parable ends with the famous quote “The Children of this world are, in their generation, wiser than the Children of Light,” cited in Niebuhr’s book. 47 In comparison with Biggar’s understanding of political forgiveness as well as of Niebuhr’s position, perhaps Niebuhr might be much more open to a thoroughly “secular” or “realistic” approach to political forgiveness. This approach does not only assume dialectically both human selfishness as well as the human altruistic tendency, but also echoes Niebuhr’s famous vindication of democracy with a dialectical view of human nature that “Man’s [sic] capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s [sic] inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.” 48
According to this understanding of political forgiveness, a politically motivated forgiveness is humanly possible and even desirable to a certain extent, for it is based on a realistic understanding of human nature and can contribute to the reconciliation or building of harmonious relations to a certain extent. Paradoxically, since political forgiveness can be motivated as well as seasoned by political consideration, its achievement or importance is also rather limited because it may be granted without any “forgiveness as compassion” from the “forgiver” or repentance from the offender. It may help the conflicting parties stop killing each other, without enhancing a loving relationship between them. However, precisely because of these limitations, the Christian churches may see how they may contribute to the political process of forgiveness and reconciliation. In addition to the Christian message of universal love, the churches may develop and cultivate a culture of confession, repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Through its preaching, communal worship, and social service, the Christian churches may help people to be more sensitive to their own sins or mistakes, their needs of forgiving as well as being forgiven, and thus the possibility as well as necessity of mutual forgiveness.
For the situation of Hong Kong, based on the studies outlined above, it is possible to look for political forgiveness from the government, but it may be too naïve to put one’s hope solely on the compassion of the rulers from Hong Kong or Beijing. It may be necessary to let the rulers understand that some sorts of political forgiveness for most, if not all, of the protestors as well as the police officers concerned may be for the best interest of society as well as the government. For the protesters, hope for some sorts of political forgiveness for both sides will be more realistic and evenhanded than the expectation of political forgiveness for the protestors alone. In order to achieve political forgiveness, it may be necessary and more realistic to exercise political pressure on the government through continuous resistance or struggle, instead of begging for the rulers’ compassion, which may not function in their political decisions.
Footnotes
1
For a detailed explanation of political forgiveness and study of these cases, see: The Healing of Nations: The Promise and Limits of Political Forgiveness (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
2
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), 63.
3
Nigel Biggar, “Reinhold Niebuhr and the Political Possibility of Forgiveness,” in Reinhold Niebuhr and Contemporary Politics, ed. Richard Harries and Stephen Platten (Oxford: Oxford University, 2010), 141–53.
4
Pan-chiu Lai, “Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Peace-Building: A Sino-Christian Perspective,” in The Role of Religion in Peacebuilding: Crossing the Boundaries of Prejudice and Distrust, ed. Pauline Kollontai, Sue Yore, and Sebastian Kim (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2019), 35–51. The discussion below will make use of some of the materials presented in this essay.
5
Biggar, “Reinhold Niebuhr,” 142.
6
Ibid., 143.
7
Ibid., 144.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 146.
10
Ibid., 147–50.
11
Ibid., 150.
12
Ibid., 153.
13
Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (London: Faber & Faber, 1954 [1953]), 140. The essay was originally published in The Journal of Religious Thought 9:2 (Spring–Summer 1952): 95–111.
14
Niebuhr, Christian Realism, 162.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid., 163–64.
17
Ibid., 157.
18
Ibid., 156.
19
Ibid., 159.
20
Ibid., 159–61.
21
Ibid., 158.
22
Ibid., 158–59.
23
Ibid., 161.
24
25
Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011), 194–200.
26
Chenyang Li, The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony (London: Routledge, 2014), 139.
27
The Analects 14.34; see: https://ctext.org/analects/xian-wen (retrieved January 4, 2020).
29
The Book of Rites 32.11, 13; see: https://ctext.org/liji/biao-ji (retrieved January 4, 2020).
30
Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York: Three Rivers, 2009).
31
C. Daniel Batson, Altruism in Humans (Oxford: Oxford University, 2011).
32
Samuel P. Oliner, Altruism, Intergroup Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation, with the assistance of Piotr Olaf Zylicz (St. Paul, MN: Paragon, 2008), 13–14, 142–50.
33
Donald W. Pfaff, The Altruistic Brain: How We Are Naturally Good (Oxford: Oxford University, 2015).
34
Mary E. Clark, In Search of Human Nature (London: Routledge, 2002), 339–72.
35
Ibid., 365–67.
36
Ibid., 339.
37
Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin, 2011), 541; see further: M. E. McCullough, Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008).
38
Pinker, The Better Angels, 541, 580–92.
39
Ibid., 175–77, 580, 648–50.
40
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gints, A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University, 2011).
41
Alexander J. Field, Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioural Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004).
42
Martin A. Nowak, with Roger Highfield, Super Cooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed (New York: Free Press, 2011), 21–49.
43
David Sloan Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002), 189–218.
44
Ibid., 194.
45
Ibid., 204–15.
46
Pinker, The Better Angels, 591.
47
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defenders (London: Nisbet, 1945), ii.
48
Ibid., vi.
