Cities and counties are overlapping jurisdictions in most US states. Virginia cities, however, are independent of counties, with separate tax bases and residents. This paper examines whether the Virginia system creates a horizontal relationship resembling that among cities in other states. It uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns against competitive median voter benchmarks. The results show that cities and counties in metropolitan areas function like horizontal rivals in the Virginia system, in contrast with the vertical relationship imposed by the overlapping jurisdiction structure in other states.
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