An Evaluation of the Layering and Legacy of Area-based Regeneration Initiatives in England: The Case of Wolverhampton

Introduction

In England, area-based initiatives (ABIs) represent strategic national government policy interventions in locations requiring regeneration. In conjunction with their designation, time-limited funding is allocated on top of mainstream public-sector expenditure. ABIs can fall within local authority areas (LGAs), coincide with local council boundaries or cross local authority jurisdictions. They have predominantly been designated within deindustrialising urban areas and have formed a key pillar of urban policy over the past 40 years (Lawless, 2006). During this period, ABIs have attracted strong criticism, not least for their limited success in transforming national patterns of deprivation (Imrie and Raco, 2003; Robson, 1999). Explanations have included that the scale of ABI funding is too small to offset the structural inequalities created by uneven patterns of economic development (Chatterton and Bradley, 2000; Edwards, 1997; Oatley, 2000). From this perspective, ABIs could be considered a policy measure to ‘moderate’ rather than drastically transform the worst instances of deprivation (Batty et al., 2010, p.10). The prevailing criticism of ABIs, however, risks prematurely downplaying variation in their spatial and temporal achievements. Furthermore, the broad-brush treatment of ABIs can overlook alternative insights, including important institutional and governance perspectives (Cochrane, 1999). With the onset of the international economic crisis and a period of national financial austerity, it is a timely point to evaluate the impact of past ABIs.

In undertaking such a review, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the design of ABIs nationally and their implementation locally. Nationally, ABIs have evolved from Urban Development Corporations (UDCs, 1981–98, 2003-), to City Challenge partnerships (CCs, 1992–98), to the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB, 1994–2007), to the most recent, New Deal for Communities programme (NDC, 1998–2011). Other ABIs have occurred during this policy sequence, including action zones (Painter and Clarence, 2001), although they have been smaller in scale and fall outside the breadth of this paper. Within this timeline, ABIs have varied in funding, length, area size, eligibility and desired governance arrangement. The conceptual underpinnings of individual ABIs have been critically investigated, with authors questioning whether partnership working or community-led regeneration represents the panacea that government policy suggests (Dinham, 2005; Edwards, 1997; Wallace, 2007). At a local scale, ABI programmes have been examined individually (Davoudi, 1995) and as part of broader comparative research (Batty et al., 2010; Coaffee and Deas, 2008). Research methods have included questionnaires to interpret whether households have been involved in and benefited from ABIs (Lawless, 2006; Rhodes et al., 2005) and interviews with stakeholders inside and outside partnerships to determine who was involved and why, reasons for outcomes and future improvements (Davoudi, 1995; Wallace, 2007). There is also evidence of reviews feeding back into national ABI design (DETR, 2000a; DTLR, 2002; JRF, 1999; Rhodes et al., 2007). Evidence of policy learning must, however, be examined within a wider context of significant transformation in ABI policy formulation. Reasons include changes in national political party and/or ministerial control and national reinterpretation of the scale and nature of urban problems (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Florio and Edwards, 2001). Commentators have thus highlighted how national ABIs have gone ‘full circle’ in terms of whether an economic or social focus dominated, whether local authorities were integrally involved and whether ABI funding was fragmented or unified (Robson, 1999; Wilks-Heeg, 1996).

In recognition that the national narrative on ABIs is infused with evidence of institutional learning, as well as changing priorities, there remains significant uncertainty about the implementation and effectiveness of ABIs within specific LGAs (Coaffee, 2004; Coulson, 2005; Florio and Edwards, 2001). In 2003, the House of Commons Select Committee on the ‘Effectiveness of Government Regeneration Initiatives’ concluded that

We recommend that some places be selected for evaluation of outcomes taken over the 30 and more years of proactive urban policy, with a view to determining more closely the appropriateness of different categories of scheme for different types of place (House of Commons, 2003, paragraph 23).

Through longitudinal research, the local interpretation and actual implementation of specific ABIs can be examined and ABIs can be compared and contrasted in terms of their relative impact and/or effectiveness. National narratives about the evolution of ABIs can also be differentiated from local experiences, in ways that avoid assuming that the most recent initiative must be the most effective. Longitudinal research can further help in identifying broader legacies associated with a succession of ABIs. Potential examples include local authorities institutionalising different ways of operating, such as new forms of community engagement and/or partnership working, where ABIs have spurred new creative approaches. Where identifiable patterns are absent and urban governance appears disjointed and disconnected, then understanding why is equally important in terms of future policy developments. Conclusions must be drawn carefully for reasons including the influence of key individuals, the prevailing economic context facing specific ABIs and the impact of parallel policy initiatives.

The section that follows acknowledges that, whilst ABIs provide additional funding on top of main stream allocations, the extent to which new styles of governance have emerged remains uncertain because of the potential for resistance to change and because of the complex way in which different ABI formulations have been layered over time. The second half of the paper focuses on the City of Wolverhampton within the West Midlands urban conurbation. Wolverhampton represents a ‘shrinking city’ (Mace et al., 2007) which has experienced ABIs through the Black Country UDC, Wolverhampton CC, SRB funding and a NDC programme. After briefly introducing these programmes and their achievements, attention focuses on local experiences of and attitudes towards their layering and legacy. The research identifies stronger support for CC as compared with NDC for reasons including the level of local authority involvement. Limitations with CC are identified including the extent to which CC addressed area deprivation and the ease with which lessons learnt were transferred. Reflecting more broadly across the time-period under evaluation, the results highlight growing tension in terms of neighbourhood management and frustration towards the ability of ABIs to address strategic city-wide priorities. Somewhat contradictorily, the Wolverhampton case reveals how local authorities remain integral to the effective delivery of ABIs, yet potentially also slow to embrace alternative forms of urban governance. The paper therefore builds on research acknowledging anxiety towards the layering of urban policy where there is limited change in levels of local authority openness and inclusion (Coaffee, 2004). Conclusions are drawn with reference to emerging policy frameworks from the Coalition government (2010– ).

Conceptualising the Legacy and Layering of ABIs

The period stemming from the mid 1960s is associated with the rise of urban policy in England. As the extent of deindustrialisation and inner-city problems intensified during the 1970s, so did the need for more interventionist forms of urban policy. Various ABIs have been introduced in the period since to target areas of deprivation. Table 1 introduces four key ABIs: UDCs, CC, SRB and NDC. What is particularly notable is that ABIs have changed significantly in response to national priorities, but also the lessons learnt from past initiatives. Thus, as they have evolved, changes have been made to strengthen area outcomes including support for holistic forms of regeneration, lead-in times, exit strategies and community empowerment (DETR, 2000a; DTLR, 2002; JRF, 1999; Rhodes et al., 2007). Despite policy reformulations and adjustments, area-based regeneration initiatives have had limited success in fundamentally altering the spatial pattern of urban deprivation (Imrie and Raco, 2003; Robson, 1999). Recent government policy has therefore given greater support to building a stronger sustainable community ‘legacy’ where area change is occurring (DCLG, 2009). Rather than a forward-looking objective, ‘legacy’ is more commonly used to highlight how society has inherited a negative legacy, such as a legacy of overspending or industrial urbanisation (DCLG, 2008). It remains premature to conclude that a key legacy of past ABIs is scepticism about their future achievement, without carefully considering the broad range of potential legacies. In terms of area-based regeneration, attention often focuses on the built environment as physical projects represent the most tangible reminder of past interventions (Searle, 2002). In contrast, less consideration has been given to other legacies, such as stronger community organisations, continuing community programmes or new forms of urban governance (Smith and Fox, 2007). Taussik and Smalley (1998) provide support indicating the need to look beyond the transformational impact of ABIs to broader and subtler forms of success, including a stronger sense of commitment, co-operation and partnership. In addition to new styles of collaboration between local authorities and outside interests, the potential exists for changing relations between local authorities and local residents. The latter might include a reinvigoration or a strengthening of democratic forms of accountability. Negative legacies remain possible including strengthened criticism about the effectiveness of urban policy, or growing frustration by local interests towards how ABI funding is utilised.

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Table 1.

Summary of key area-based initiatives in England, 1980–2011

	Urban Development Corporations (UDCs)	City Challenge (CC)	Single Regeneration Budget (SRB)	New Deal for Communities (NDC)
Years	1981–98, 2003-	1992-1998	1994-2007	1998-2011
Time span (years)	10	5	Up to 7	10
Number created	12	31	Over 1000	39
Thrust	Developer-led	Local-authority-led	Local authority-led, plus other partnership forms	Community-led
Principal focus	Urban property	Urban property and community focus	Urban and rural designated areas, plus local-authority-wide focus	Urban community
Governance summary	Local authorities (initially) sidelined	Bidding time frames limiting inclusiveness	Often strategically created partnerships to satisfy funding requirements	Local authorities (initially) sidelined

Compared with mainstream public-sector expenditure, ABIs are amenable to study because of their area focus, dedicated funding stream and inclusion of contemporary government ideas about societal responsibilities and the relationship between different actors and institutions. One aspect that remains uncertain is how local authorities interpret the role of ABIs. They could, for instance, be viewed as the product of a national government meddling in local affairs, including prevailing governance structures. Examples exist of local authorities resisting ABI designations, or of community groups applying for funding because of local authority reluctance (Harding et al., 2000; Henderson et al., 2007). These cases aside, commentary often presents a somewhat ‘pragmatic’ response by local authorities in terms of accessing available funding, for reasons including dependency on national redistribution (Cole and John, 2001; Quilley, 2002). What remains less well established is how a local authority that successfully obtains ABI funding then engages. Is it simply another funding stream secured, which might be very small in a well-populated local authority, or does ABI funding create the opportunity to approach challenging deprivation issues in new and innovative ways? If experimental governance approaches are required by funding structures and/or adopted by local authorities, then further questions remain about how experiences and lessons flow into future decision-making structures (Healey et al., 2002). Alternatively, to what extent have ABIs contributed to broader academic conceptualisations about the contemporary transition from government to governance-style decision-making (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Kearns and Paddison, 2000)?

Local–central government relations have been a long-term policy and academic focus (Wilson, 2003). Strong forms of municipal government during the 19th and early 20th centuries gave way to state paternalism in the post-World-War-I period, with sub-national government gradually becoming a stronger and more dependent delivery arm for national policy (Baston, 2000). Up until the 1990s, urban local authorities were the provider of a wide range of homogeneous services, with important decisions often reached behind closed doors (Gyford, 1985). As the national economy declined during the 1970s and public funds decreased, local authorities were criticised for being too large, inward-looking, bureaucratic, centrally dependent and lacking the competence to respond. In urban areas, local authorities tended to be Labour party controlled and were labelled antagonistic towards enterprise at a time when economic activity needed to be stimulated (Deakin and Edwards, 1993). UDCs, as one of the earliest ABIs, were thus imposed on selected LGAs to fast track a strategic national response. Exceptions of varying scales to this generalised picture existed, including councils who were identifying local assets that could play a role in reshaping their futures (Henderson et al., 2007; Harding et al., 2000; Imrie and Raco, 1999). By the 1990s, national urban policy had rediscovered the importance of local government, especially in terms of the softer, social side of regeneration (Robson et al., 1994), and was also embracing the free market by turning ABI funding into a competitive bidding process (Davoudi, 1995). Local authorities were in turn prompted to create (CC and SRB) partnerships that brought together local interests into more co-ordinated approaches.

Whether a new era of creative collaboration resulted has been critically reviewed, with commentators pointing to short time-frames, central government managerialism and uncertain assessment criteria as contradictory dimensions (Whitehead, 2003; Wilks-Heeg, 1996). Reports have also pointed to strategically selected partnership arrangements and to declining involvement over time as bidding priorities evolved into council-orientated patterns of implementation (Harding et al., 2000; Atkinson, 1999; Davoudi, 1995). Following sustained criticism that the most deprived communities were not benefiting from the competitive approach to ABIs and that resident engagement remained tokenistic, the newly elected Labour government (1997–2010) designed the NDC programme to target selected LGAs. With local communities to play a stronger role in decision-making, local councils were to be relatively less influential or dominating. NDC would also need to be integrated with and supported by a broader programme of local government modernisation. The Local Government Act 2000 placed a general onus on local authorities to meet the economic, environmental and social needs of their residents and to do so in a way that was more transparent and inclusive. Policy changes included the creation of local strategic partnerships (LSPs) to stimulate engagement with interests outside local authorities and stronger neighbourhood committees to help identify local needs and to encourage broader accountability (Dabinett et al., 2001; DETR, 1998). The extent to which LSPs built on previous partnership approaches and encouraged a new era of more holistic and inclusive approaches to area-based regeneration remains underexplored (Coaffee, 2004; Lawless, 2006).

For Kearns and Paddison (2000, p. 847) urban governance is “an attempt to manage and regulate difference and to be creative in urban areas which are themselves experiencing considerable change”. An outstanding question is therefore whether ABIs have provided additional funding streams around which local stakeholders could engage in new, more creative ways. Different perspectives can be drawn. One perspective suggests that, if different stakeholders acknowledge varying interpretations of future environments, then it can become a focus for interactive discussions, including action plans which pool individual resources to secure mutually acceptable outcomes (Evans and Jones, 2008; Healey, 1997). Healey (2004) further acknowledges that there often exists an artificial dualism between local government and creativity (Healey et al., 2002). Looking beyond, strong traditions of central government control and dependency (Carley, 2000; Wilson, 2003) and underbounded and underpowered cities (While et al., 2004) research points to the potential for local government innovation (Cole and John, 2001). From this perspective, there exists a significant breadth of local resources and opportunities that could be accessed if a council was willing to engage more outwardly (Rhodes, 1981), including with the local business sector (Bassett, 1999; Porter, 1995). Reshaping institutional approaches, however, takes time, especially where meaningful collaboration requires trust (Coaffee, 2004; Stewart, 2003), and trust between separate interests requires shared experience. The time-limited nature of ABIs may render them ‘here today, gone tomorrow’ and therefore insignificant. In contrast, the way that ABIs have been layered over time may therefore enhance their influence.

In contrast, a second perspective highlights the importance of historical conservatism and institutional resistance, such as past conflicts and tensions between stakeholders, which are unlikely to be easily resolved within new partnership structures (Cowell and Martin, 2003; Ward and Jonas, 2004). Recent research has thus directed attention to how and, in a relative sense, where decisions are reached. Jones and Evans (2006) employ the concepts of proximity and distance to help interpret contemporary processes of urban change. They indicate that placing decision-making processes beyond or being ‘positioned’ further away from a local government, but still being able to access government powers can be critical in the effective delivery of urban regeneration. For Cole and John (2001), independent partnerships provide a forum for resolving conflicts and building trust; however, they must be at arms length from traditional political processes. Indeed, underpinning the transition from government to governance is a desire to shift the locus of decision-making power further away from local authorities. Achieving the appropriate degree of distance remains difficult in a policy sense, with past commentary describing how UDCs were positioned too far from local government, in the sense that council services needed to be better integrated if more holistic outcomes were to be achieved (Deakin and Edwards, 1993). Other insights relating to ABIs point to the illusion of partnership working, perhaps to secure grant funding, or the potential for partnerships to appear to be operating at arms length from a local authority, but to remain controlled from within (Coaffee, 2004; Davoudi, 1995). Reasons include the existence of deprivation outside designated areas (Raco, 2003) and pressure to re-allocate mainstream funding to spread rather than focus scarce resources (Davoudi, 1995). For local councillors, relinquishing control to outside partnerships may be viewed as diminishing the strategic role they were democratically elected to undertake, plus also a threat to their and their political party’s re-election prospects. Council officers may equally resist shifting responsibilities outside a local authority where it is viewed as an attack on their own effectiveness, ideological position and potential career achievements. Reflecting on west Newcastle, Coaffee (2004) thus points to increasing levels of community frustration because of the reluctance of the local authority to release control during a succession of ABIs.

A third perspective questions whether the way in which ABIs have been layered over time encourages or detracts from new creative urban governance approaches. For example, rather than representing discrete periods, followed by short spells of review prior to the next initiative, ABIs have tended to be overlapping in time. Nationally, SRB had entered its fifth round before an evaluation of CC was complete (DETR, 2000a). Additional complexity comes from growth in the number of overlapping ABIs, including multiple SRB programmes, the broadening of lead agency under SRB and the expansion in initiatives that occurred during the early years of the Labour government (Carley, 2000; Painter and Clarence, 2001; Robson, 1999). Significant variation in policy formulations (see Table 1), may also encourage variation in local authority involvement, not just because of national government preferences, but also where particular initiatives are deemed less strategically important. Reports have, however, indicated that, through a sequence of ABIs, local authority skills have been developed in project bidding (including exaggeration; Wilks-Heeg, 1996) and financial monitoring (Florio and Edwards, 2001). In this sense, we might consider ABI competitions, including failed ABI bids, as building local capacity (Fordham et al., 1999; Oatley and Lambert, 1998). The DTLR (2002), for example, highlighted that one of the legacies of CC and SRB was an enhanced capacity to compete for European programmes and Lottery funding. Taussik and Smalley (1998) suggest that CC encouraged both small-area and city-wide thinking, which assisted in targeting SRB towards strategic needs. What remains more uncertain is the extent to which governance lessons, rather than simply bidding lessons, have been transferred between ABIs and whether lessons learnt have been adopted more broadly in urban governance approaches.

In summarising, whilst ABIs have directed additional resources into local authority areas, what remains uncertain is whether ABIs have provided funds around which new forms of creativity co-operation have emerged, the intensity of co-operation and the extent to which more traditional forms of urban decision-making continue to dominate. Of additional uncertainty is whether the lessons learnt from past initiatives have encouraged new governance styles to be adopted, or whether the complexities associated with the layering of ABIs are reflected in local forms of fragmentation and disconnection. To reach a better understanding of how these different influences interact requires detailed research within selected LGAs. The following section introduces Wolverhampton as an appropriate location to begin such research.

Wolverhampton

Wolverhampton is a LGA located in the north-west of the West Midlands urban area (WMUA). The WMUA, with a population of 2.6 million, centres on the regional centre of Birmingham (approximately 1 million) and extends outwards to include Solihull, Coventry and the Black Country sub-region (see Figure 1). The ‘Black Country’ describes a geographical area that has its origins at the start of the industrial revolution in the mid 18th century (Jones, 1974; Wood, 1976). As a term, it first appeared in written records from the mid 19th century (Skidmore, 2003). From a geological perspective, the Black Country reflects that part of the South Staffordshire coal seam which came within manual excavation depth of the earth’s surface. From an industrial perspective, the Black Country reflects a territory Blackened by the smog of industrial processes (such as iron production). Whilst historically fragmented into a series of towns and villages, through the mid to late 20th century local government boundaries were reformed and what were initially town councils merged into larger borough councils; also historical parts of the Black Country were joined onto neighbouring market towns (for example, Bilston was added to Wolverhampton). By 1974, the administrative area now known as the Black Country consisted of the four local authorities of Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton. Collectivly, the population of the four local authorities was approximately 1.1 million people in 2001.

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Figure 1.

The Black Country sub-region and area-based initiatives in or overlapping Wolverhampton.

Wolverhampton, as a traditional market town, benefited from its proximity to iron and steel production in the Black Country. During the 18th century, Wolverhampton began its transformation into an industrial town, initially in terms of lock production, but more recently during the early 20th century from the manufacturing of a diverse array of emerging technologies, with transport being a particular strength. As a LGA with traditions of large factory-based forms of employment, Wolverhampton council has tended to be Labour party controlled. From the 1970s onwards, Wolverhampton, like other parts of the Black Country, has experienced ongoing economic restructuring. In Wolverhampton’s case, this has resulted in the twin problems of deprivation and population loss. Nevin (1993, p.106) indicates that between 1981 and 1987 Wolverhampton lost more than 23 per cent of its manufacturing employment. Between 1991 and 2001, the borough’s population fell by 10 000 to 238 000. The continuation of problems during the 2000s was reflected in Wolverhampton’s decline from the 35th to 27th most deprived local authority in England between 2004 and 2007, according to the national index of multiple deprivation (IMD).

During this period, Wolverhampton did experience significant growth in public-sector employment (GHK, 2008; WMRO, 2010); however, deprivation remained concentrated and levels of prosperity in surrounding commuter-belt local authorities increased (adjoining South Staffordshire District Council rose from 265 to 269 according to the IMD over the same time-period). In addition to being a ‘shrinking city’ (Mace et al., 2007) with among the highest levels of unemployment in the West Midlands (WMRO, 2010), Wolverhampton has strategic importance as the north-western city within the WMUA, a status granted in 2000. Wolverhampton Council (WC) thus changed from being a metropolitan borough council (MBC) to a city council. As the only city in the Black Country, its regeneration remains critical in terms of the sub-region addressing a below regional and national average per capita output (WMRO, 2009). Because of its decline during recent decades, Wolverhampton has been eligible for national ABIs. In the period since 1987 the former industrial town has experienced regeneration funding through a UDC (Black Country Development Corporation, BCDC), Wolverhampton CC, four SRB programmes and a NDC programme (All Saints and Blakenhall Community Development, ABCD). Relevant ABIs with sub-local authority area boundaries can be seen in Figure 1. As a result of this sequence, Wolverhampton provides a relevant case study to investigate ABIs in terms of their layering and legacy.

To review Wolverhampton’s experience of ABIs, local stakeholders were formally interviewed using a semi-structured questionnaire. Whilst interviews broadly focused on Wolverhampton’s experience of industrial decline, area-based regeneration and local governance structures, they were also tailored to the specific background and experience of individual interviewees. Notable methodological limitations include securing access to key informants, time-limited interviews and reliance on people’s memories. Where interviewees were involved in multiple initiatives, these problems were compounded. Responses included interviewing widely, follow-up interviews and carefully synthesising commentary and written documentation into a coherent description. Drawing on desk-top research and snowballing between mid 2007 and late 2009, 46 people were interviewed who had either been involved in the management and operation of ABIs, or who in an occupational and/or representative capacity were engaged in shaping Wolverhampton’s future. Conservative government (1979–97) ABIs were examined first, prior to the most recent NDC initiative. Interviews were conducted with: local authority officers (n = 6), lead councillors (4), the LSP (1), regeneration professionals (5), business, property and economic development interests (14), education and training interests (4), community leaders (6), social and voluntary group interests (4), a local Member of Parliament (1) and the West Midlands government office (1). Council officers and councillors aside, 11 interviewees had some level of involvement with one ABI and six interviewees had connection to two or more. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, lasted one to two hours and were recorded for later transcription. Six interviewees declined to be interviewed and four were interviewed twice for reasons including time constraints. The analysis begins by briefly summarising recent ABIs in Wolverhampton.

A Review of Recent ABIs in Wolverhampton

An Assessment of the Layering and Legacy of ABIs within Wolverhampton

The most notable conclusion from Wolverhampton in terms of layering was the contrast that existed between CC and ABCD. Whereas Wolverhampton CC was reported to be one of the more successful programmes nationally, ABCD has been labelled as one of the less well performing NDCs (Marrs, 2010). Recognising widespread variation between NDC programmes (Batty et al., 2010; Coaffee and Deas, 2008), local factors have played a key role in shaping Wolverhampton’s experiences. Explanations for CC’s perceived effectiveness included the leadership provided by its Chairman (the then Leader of WC), CC’s CEO (a former WC economic development officer) and the then Chief Executive of WC. As a result of high-level council support, partnership officers indicated that: “we weren’t battling to get anything done, there was just a very co-operative environment”. The breadth of the 17-person board was also described positively (local authority (n = 4), local community (4), local economic interests (4), independents (4), plus the CEO). The Leader of the Council strongly supported positioning the board structure outside the local authority and involving the local community. Two community forums were established through which a chairperson plus two board representatives were selected. Additional support for CC came from its more inclusive and holistic approach, and the way it differed from BCDC. Whilst CC’s chairman, who was also a member of BCDC’s board for part of its duration, was adamant that CC had not learnt anything from BCDC, the advantages of operating at a distance from councillor scrutiny and infighting were acknowledged during interviewing, especially when the funding came from external sources. CC was reported to have occurred within a context of commitment and respect, with community representatives appreciative of public- and private-sector leaders for taking an interest in their community.

Further adding to the local contrast between CC and NDC, was the SRB programme. What was notable was the extent to which lead councillors were critical of SRB for its limited impact and even reported being informed by officers that it was not their responsibility. That SRB somewhat marginalised local councillors was further reflected in commentary from external voluntary-sector and employment-sector representatives involved in and frustrated by the programme. SRB was therefore largely viewed as a pot of money to deliver projects rather than necessarily strategic city-wide thinking—perhaps not surprising, given national recession and budgetary cuts during the early-to-mid 1990s and a reluctance to radically restructure public-sector services. Spreading SRB funding widely would help to ease the burden (and pace) of change. The complexity of the layering process also meant that CC was at the same time advancing a number of strategic city-wide projects. The local authority-wide focus of SRB nevertheless brought together selected local partners and helped to pave the way for a partnership structure orientated towards co-ordinating burgeoning national Labour government initiatives prior to the LSP’s formal launch in 2002.

The subsequent emergence of NDC nationally was, from the outset, contradictory: whilst it was designed to learn from CC (for example, time length, lead in time before money arrived), at the same time, it was community-led and significantly different. Although WC continued to be accountable financially, it did not have the same level of control it had over CC and SRB. From an early stage of ABCD, a key concern was the willingness of WC to engage. Various reasons were identified. First, the community-led nature of NDC was reinforced by the national government which instructed senior WC officers to step back in terms of their involvement. For some commentators, WC felt unjustifiably sidelined, and therefore stepped back too far, as if waiting for its anticipated collapse. Adding to this was the conclusion by lead councillors that NDC was simply the next round of politically driven, project-orientated funds. WC officers themselves pointed to a lack of logic in terms of which ABI designations Wolverhampton had obtained in the past, while broader commentary highlighted influences such as newly elected MPs, the need to shock Birmingham into a more pragmatic approach or a regional strategy of distributing funding towards (and thus away from) particular local authorities. Furthermore, because NDC was to be community focused, it also lacked broader strategic significance. Accordingly, the emphasis was towards local Labour councillor involvement rather than the leader or deputy leader providing direction. The limited involvement of lead councillors and officers from an early stage had implications for how the project evolved in its first few years, because it provided the context in which intra-community conflict could emerge and limitations in government policy could become apparent (i.e. assumptions about latent community leadership; Wallace, 2007). Whilst reports indicated that local authority engagement strengthened during the life of many NDCs (Batty et al., 2010), in Wolverhampton the level of council involvement remained a concern throughout, including after national scrutiny of the NDC programme was reported to have dwindled (see also Marrs, 2010).

Because the local authority stepped back from NDC, there was evidence of lessons from CC either not flowing into ABCD, or being adopted belatedly. Examples included a board structure that was dominated by community representatives (19 in total in 2006—resident representatives (9, including the chair), councillors (4), council officers (1), public sector (3, including PCT, Police, LSP), Chamber of Commerce (1), other (1)) (ABCD, 2006), an ineffective political-administrative structure (for example, decisions being overturned), the early absence of themed discussion groups (i.e. that might have enabled the upskilling of community representatives) and a diminished emphasis on linking local programmes to city-wide objectives. From the outset, structured guidelines for allocating grant funding were notably absent. Community groups would therefore come forward with project ideas and funds would be allocated without rigorous assessment. In addition to the local authority stepping back, the designated community was from an early point seeking to safeguarding ‘its’ money, which included constraining the size of the management team and limiting WC’s involvement. By the time an enlarged partnership structure did emerge, which included employees from the earlier CC team, tension followed the introduction of a more evidence-based approach to expenditure. Regeneration consultants also acknowledged the difficulty involved in encouraging the community to move beyond short-term gains to long-term strategic opportunities. Other early oversights included the absence of investment in physical security that would have helped to build a sense of positive change across the designated area and a sense of momentum. When ABCD did attempt to advance larger projects, there was the quick realisation that they were more dependent on WC than they had appreciated.

Following a difficult early period, ABCD, like other NDCs (Coaffee and Deas, 2008), saw the initial CEO dismissed and a new CEO employed. What was true in Wolverhampton, and common nationally, was that neither CC CEO became an NDC CEO. Interviewees argued that early NDCs partnerships attracted people interested in (bottom–up) community development, rather than broader, more network-minded CEOs. The difference is significant in terms of the ability and willingness of ABIs to engage with partners outside the regeneration area and to join funding streams. Whilst ABCD did establish links beyond the council to the Primary Care Trust (PCT), other local and sub-regional agencies indicated their frustration, including economic development interests, training providers and the local voluntary sector. Intense community infighting played its role in strengthening inward-looking mindsets, as did rigorous national monitoring programmes. NDC officers, for example, indicated the need to account for the impact on individual students living in the designated area where funds were directed towards external schools—the irony being the importance of school improvement in supporting the longer-term attractiveness of neighbourhoods (Mace et al., 2007). Similarly, the limited availability of mainstream funding and resources from other national government initiatives (such as Neighbourhood Renewal funding) acted to reinforce a sense of isolation and fragmentation. Although interviewees pointed to the withdrawal of funding streams during (and after) earlier ABIs, it appeared particularly prevalent in the case of ABCD and thus reinforced a sense of how WC, in addition to other agencies, stepped backwards. This has particular significance given that NDC was orientated towards using small amounts of funding to lever in more substantial investments (Batty et al., 2010), and the potential for continued out-migration in the absence of comprehensive change (Lawless, 2006).

Discussion and Conclusion

By 2010, urban LGAs in the UK had experienced 40 years of urban policy. This has resulted in a mosaic of local experiences and narratives (Batty et al., 2010; Coaffee and Deas, 2008; Cochrane, 1999), such that care is required in drawing conclusions from single case studies. Broad generalisations can nevertheless be made about how individual local authorities respond to local issues, including the extent to which new forms of urban governance are emerging (Coaffee, 2004; Wallace, 2007). Focusing on the City of Wolverhampton, this paper has reviewed 25 years of ABIs. Local legacies have been identified in relation to specific programmes, including employment-orientated land uses and neighbourhood facilities. Evidence of enduring physical legacies, however, provides only part of the narrative, as key opportunities have remained undeveloped and some investments have proved unsustainable. A programme’s recognised legacy can thus hide as much as it reveals, including the continuation of high levels of deprivation. Each ABI attracted criticism in terms of whether it represented the creative use of an additional funding stream. Partly this reflects national government policy formulations, such as bidding time-frames and the hasty inclusion of a mix of community- and/or property-orientated opportunities into designated areas. It also reflects a centralist approach rather than evidence of broader, more holistic, forms of local governance, and the early creation of an inclusive urban vision (see, for example, Vigar et al., 2005) towards which future funding streams might be aligned. Further criticism was directed at the governance of ABIs, with particular attention focusing on the extent to which regeneration partnerships operated beyond the influence and involvement of WC. BCDC was described as too private-sector driven; SRB was labelled as too in-house; and NDC was identified as too distant for reasons including community resistance to local government intervention and that WC took a significant backwards step. In contrast, CC was viewed relatively more favourably, despite also having limitations. Commentary pointed to charismatic leadership, a balanced board structure, the involvement of lead councillors and a commitment towards board autonomy at a high level within the council. The strength of community involvement and influence also increased over time, thus helping to alleviate the uncomfortable co-existence of partners reported in other CC programmes (for example, Davoudi, 1995). Such conclusions reinforce the difficulty of where to position ABIs in relative space, the complex layering of significantly different ABI formulations over time and the continuing relevance of lessons drawn from earlier initiatives.

In comparing and contrasting individual initiatives, what was noticeable was the difference between CC and NDC within Wolverhampton, and the growing frustration towards ABIs for failing to meet the city’s regeneration needs. Thus, whilst CC empowered WC in terms of both strategic developments and community regeneration, the fragmentation of initiatives and responsibilities during the past decade (see Coulson, 2005; Florio and Edwards, 2001; Goodwin, 2004) resulted in WC demonstrating varying levels of commitment to individual ABIs and a growing sense of frustration towards ABIs generally. The potential for urban policy to overlook the regeneration needs of urban areas beyond the core English cities has been identified elsewhere (House of Commons, 2003). Because of pressure from the national Labour government to stand back from NDC, and because the initiative was deemed less able to respond to the city’s regeneration priorities, WC stepped backwards and lessons did not flow easily between initiatives. The absence of early attention to key projects and to longer-term community structures was therefore apparent. Wolverhampton thus differs from research in other NDC locations where the “inability of local authorities to ‘let go’” has been identified (Coaffee, 2004, p. 455; Wallace, 2007). As symbolised by the WDC’s early boundaries, Wolverhampton’s economic future was closely aligned with the city centre and a northward corridor extending past Wolverhampton Science Park to regional and national motorways and motorway junction opportunities beyond the historical Black Country. ABCD was thus initially disconnected from the city’s pragmatic view of where property development was likely to occur. Attempts by the local authority to kick-start a market-driven property development approach, however, failed to materialise (Henderson, 2011). Reasons included Wolverhampton’s inability to break free of the image of industrial decline that engulfs the Black Country by obtaining city status and a perceived lack of support for development from within the local planning authority (see also Express and Star, 2011).

Looking across the time-period under review for particular legacies, what was noticeable was that CC and SRB did bring different local interests together, especially in terms of the public sector, and this fed into a partnership that was created ahead of the top–down requirement for LSPs. Through neighbourhood renewal funding, new neighbourhood forums were introduced. Whilst collectively this suggests a strengthening of local governance, especially as it also brought the local voluntary and business sector into a formal partnership arrangement, the extent to which new more collaborative governance approaches have emerged within Wolverhampton, as well as in other local authorities (Harding et al., 2000; Davies, 2002), must be subject to on-going critical review. Two key concerns in Wolverhampton were the degree of openness within partnership structures, as reflected in the somewhat frustrated involvement of the voluntary and business sector, and the tense relationship between new top–down neighbourhood structures and community networks, including those stemming out of past ABIs. As reported elsewhere, the strength of top–down national government approaches, as well as local forms of ‘institutional inertia’ and/or ‘historical conservatism’, can constrain the degree of movement from government to more collaborative forms of local governance (Cowell and Martin, 2003; Stewart, 2003; Wallace, 2007). A gap may therefore exist between the rhetoric of partnership working and the reality as experienced by different partners. The relevance of this conclusion also extends beyond local residents disenfranchised by city-wide strategies (see, for example, Coaffee, 2004; Coaffee and Deas, 2008) to other local stakeholders sitting outside the public sector who are interested in city-wide futures. In this sense, continuing to investigate centralised forms of urban policy, local governance structures and the interrelationship between the two remains an important research agenda.

By way of conclusion, local authorities are key players in the delivery of ABIs and the transfer of lessons learnt; yet, somewhat contradictorily, the intensity of new open forms of governance can be resisted and particular ABI formulations may not only limit from above, but may also discourage active local authority involvement. Achieving a stronger level of integration between national interpretations of urban requirements and inclusive local understandings of what is required locally remains an inherent policy challenge. Into this context, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government, since taking office in May 2010, has advocated a stronger ‘localism’ agenda and delivered substantial budget cuts. Whilst policy precision will continue to emerge, including the extent to which policy changes are driven by ideology and/or budgetary responsibility, what is noticeable is the removal of the regional tier of government within England, including RDAs, and a rescaling of emphasis towards local government—local business-sector relations at a sub-regional level (HM Government, 2010). Somewhat confusingly, localism looks set to manifest at the community, local authority and sub-regional levels, with complex interrelationships within and between these scales, such as between bottom–up community structures, city-wide neighbourhood structures and councillor-orientated forms of democracy, as identified in this paper, and between local authorities and sub-regional local enterprise partnerships (LEPs). Support for a Black Country LEP will require WC, along with the other Black Country boroughs, to strengthen relations with the local business sector (including to advance their own cause) and to reconfirm their commitment to the Black Country (Black Country LEP, 2010). In WC’s case, this will require local business relations to move beyond the piecemeal connections encouraged by recent ABIs and the LSP. Doing so will involve challenging long-held understandings of business motives, overbureaucratic processes and the perception that civically minded business leaders are in decline, perhaps because of the international ownership of manufacturing companies or the concentration of business leaders in Birmingham as the regional centre.

Outstanding questions about emerging governance structures, include the degree of local authority involvement (for example, councillors and council officers), the selection (or election) of representatives from a fragmented business sector, the level of participation of other parties, including the voluntary sector, the community sector and the remnants of the public sector, and above all the locus of decision-making within relative space. Further uncertainties relate to the distribution of scarce national government resources (for example, the competitively allocated Regional Growth Fund) and the ability of the Black Country LEP to prioritise sub-regional business and property development opportunities across local authority boundaries. Despite the rhetoric of localism, state selectivity is at the core of emerging governance structures. Up-scaling from the Wolverhampton example, a key challenge will be to strengthen emerging Black Country future visions (BCC, 2005), including ensuring that recent planning exercises incorporate business viewpoints and the creation of shorter-term implementation plans (for example, locating the coalition government’s recently announced Black Country Enterprise Zone). Future bids can then be aligned with collaboratively determined frameworks, rather than simply chasing national government funds through local interpretations of national policy objectives. Without a coherent and inclusive Black Country platform, there remains the potential for disengagement and fragmentation, including contradictory forms of local authority regeneration and/or disconnection from local needs (such as education and skills budgets). An additional future variable will be the willingness of the coalition government after dramatically reducing public expenditure to adopt future ABIs to moderate the worse instances of area-based deprivation, perhaps following social protest. Given historical ‘full circle’ swings in ABI governance structures and focus, uncertainties remain about future policy formulations and the role and responsibilities of local authorities. Inevitably, the timing and availability of the next layers of national government policy will play a key role in shaping local governance arrangements, including the intensity of commitment to more locally creative and collaborative decision-making structures in Wolverhampton, the Black Country and other areas of spatial governance.