Abstract
Over recent decades, population diversity in the Western world has strongly increased. Cities in particular have over time become more diverse and multicultural. They face the complex challenge of maintaining and strengthening social cohesion among their diverse population, with its plural identities, lifestyles and behaviour. However, in Europe, the current (national) debates on integration, with their monocultural visions and strong emphasis on the risks stemming from ethnic and religious diversity, hamper fostering social cohesion at the level of the city and impede identity-building strategies of groups and individuals. Focusing on the Netherlands as a case study and using the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam as examples, this article shows that social cohesion policy would benefit from framing the integration debate differently. Research, performed in these cities, serves as a basis for alternative and more fruitful interpretations of diversity, identity and integration.
1. Introduction
In Europe, rates of migration have been increasing at great speed since the mid 1990s, with notable flows from developing countries to developed regions (Kazepov, 2005; OECD, 2007) and with varying diversification effects in different countries (ERICarts, 2008). The influx of immigrants has transformed the ways in which demographic, social and cultural diversity occur in particular in urban settings. In cities, diversity, with its costs and benefits, occurs in proximity: costs in terms of (cultural and racial) conflicts, division and fragmentation; benefits in terms of (cross-cultural) informal exchanges of knowledge, fostering processes of innovation and creativity.
Cities face the complex challenge of maintaining and improving social cohesion among their, often highly diverse, populations (see Niessen, 2000). The diversity debate addresses particular groups of migrants (new immigrants, refugees/asylum-seekers) and national minorities (Roma) as sources of cultural diversity. According to the United Nations (2004), managing cultural diversity and respecting cultural identities are central challenges of our time for at least two reasons.
First, as individuals and groups have increasingly become situated within multiple identity contexts, they have multiple points of reference. It is not always clear to what extent they feel connected with their place of residence. Some even argue that emotional social-spatial ties have become irrelevant (see Harvey, 1989; Giddens, 1990). This has important implications for questions of identity and cultural/language maintenance and (thus) also for fostering social cohesion at the city level.
Secondly, a climate of sincere openness towards various forms of diversity and identity is required, but this requirement is not always met. Prompted by the advancing European integration and by the strongly increased population diversity, in the past decade, in Europe the debate on culture, identity and territory has blazed up with great intensity. This debate is accompanied by tensions, doubts and fears that are disseminated and fuelled by the media (see Critcher, 2003; Hier, 2003; Bauman, 2004). Incidents of violence, both widely (terrorist attacks in the USA and EU) and locally (in neighbourhoods) have fuelled feelings of insecurity. Growing Islamophobia, increasing and various forms of racism and discrimination (especially based on visible differences) and socioeconomic marginalisation have a primary role in generating disaffection and alienation. Cultural differences have changed from an identity and diversity issue into a problem of internal security. New migrants, but also traditional minority groups, especially the Roma, the largest minority in Europe, face negative perceptions towards them (Castles, 2000; EUMC, 2006; European Commission, 2007; ERICarts, 2008). In many European countries, national populism has exerted an increasingly strong attraction.
This article shows that the present (national) debates on integration, embedded in increasingly vicious host–stranger relationships, tend to polarise and to evoke fear and feelings of insecurity. A monocultural vision and a strong emphasis on ethnic and religious diversity impede identity-building strategies of groups and individuals and hamper fostering social cohesion at the city level. It argues that social cohesion policy would benefit from framing the integration debate differently.
This brings us to the following leading question: how could alternative approaches to and interpretations of diversity and identity help to frame the national integration debate in a different way, thus benefiting the enhancement of social cohesion at the local level?
As will be shown, a broader and clearer definition of diversity and identity in the debates, as well as the binding force of local identity, could possibly give solace. To illustrate this point, a systematic review of the national policy debate on integration in the Netherlands has been performed. The Netherlands is an interesting case study, for it is often considered an exemplary case of a country where multiculturalism was abandoned in favour of politics that demand and enforce integration (Uitermark, 2010). This also seems to be reflected in a revolutionary change in the discourse on integration in 2000, when there was a shift from being mild and politically correct towards a situation in which migrants were told to assimilate quickly, while meeting stringent adaptation requirements. Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the two largest cities of the Netherlands, with the highest shares of migrants, will be used as examples. In addition to the review of the Dutch policy debate, this article connects to research on ethnic minorities in these two cities (van der Welle and Mamadouh, 2008; Entzinger and Dourleijn, 2008; van Bochove et al., 2009; Uitermark, 2010), in search of possible approaches to new framings of the wider integration debates.
In the following sections, first, the multidimensional character of diversity and identity will be elaborated, focusing in particular on their relation with social cohesion and place (section 2). Next, the Dutch national debate on integration will be addressed, including its underlying vision on culture, its approach towards diversity and its shortcomings as related to (fostering) social cohesion at the local level (section 3). Section 4 examines research on integration at the local level. In the final section, conclusions will be drawn and some alternative ways forward will be presented.
2. Multidimensional Diversity, Identity and Social Cohesion
To start with, it is important to reflect briefly on the concepts of diversity and identity—on their multidimensional character, their inter-relations and their relation to social cohesion and place.
2.1 Diversity and Identity: Multidimensional Concepts
In general, diversity concerns all aspects based on which people differ from each other, visibly (gender, age, ethnicity, etc.) or less visibly (particular needs, handicaps, sexual preferences, etc.). The literature distinguishes three sorts of (overlapping) classifications, based on characteristics of diversity that are primary or secondary, constant or variable and observable or unobservable (van Eyck van Heslinga and van der Raad, 2008). In somewhat more simple terms, Janssens and Steyaert (2001) distinguish between a ‘narrow’ definition of diversity that concentrates on specific aspects such as ethnicity and gender and a ‘wide’ definition that relates to all possible aspects: demographic differences (ethnicity, gender, age), psychological differences (values, convictions, knowledge), organisational differences (seniority, profession and hierarchical level) and so forth. Diversity thus potentially includes everybody and the notion opens up possibilities for a free articulation of identities (Lentin, 2008). Yet this requires emphasising the multidimensionality of diversity to start with and sincere openness towards various aspects of diversity. Instead, there is often a normative element involved, judging particular forms of diversity as ‘better’ or more desirable, than others.
Identity is an umbrella term used throughout the social sciences to describe an individual’s (changing) comprehension of himself or herself as a discrete, separate entity (‘self’ identity). The notion of social identity, as defined in sociology and political science, is defined as the way in which individuals label themselves and others as members of particular groups, expressing a multidimensional and multiscalar character. The constitution of a ‘group’ varies and so does the construction of a collective identity. For, identities might be based on all aspects of diversity and are thus multidimensional in character. Formulated in a different and more elaborate way, individuals identify themselves with different sectors (a community, a social class, sub-culture, ethnicity, religion, age, race, gender, sexuality and so forth), called ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw, 1989; Staunaes, 2005), as well as with different scales (nations, cities, neighbourhoods). Others might identify them externally (‘imposed’ identities) (see Barth, 1969; Hall, 1991).
In so-called trajectories of identity building, collectives create distinctions, establish hierarchies and negotiate and renegotiate rules of inclusion; identities are constructed through intersections of multiple dimensions (gender, ethnicity, race, age, sexuality and class). Social categories of identification and difference intertwine with individual processes of becoming (Staunaes, 2005). This dynamic process of identity building or identification unfolds in relation to economic, historical and political contexts. In this process, identity discourse and symbols are cast as mediators of structure and action (Cerulo, 1997; Ghorashi, 2003).
In a Dutch report, entitled ‘Identification with the Netherlands’ (WRR, 2007), the Dutch scientific council for government policy (WRR) distinguishes three types of identification. The first one is normative identification. This concerns the opportunities that one has in society to live in accordance with one’s own norms and values. The second one is functional identification, which comes about when people are primarily viewed as individuals with particular functional ties—for example as a member of a sports club, professional group or political party. The third and final one, emotional identification, relates to feelings of solidarity with others and place: it is about a sense of belonging.
Whereas the concepts of diversity and identity are thus multidimensional in character, they are framed by different contexts. That framing implies concentration on specific aspects of diversity, ordering them in a normative way, or limiting the trajectories of identity building by emphasising particular identities at the expense of others. To give an example, the Netherlands used to be a highly compartmentalised society, in which people were primarily identified in relation to their particular religious or political ideology (the so-called pillars). In more recent Dutch political and cultural discourses, one finds other distinctions, though. One that strongly comes to the fore is the distinction between the ‘autochthonous’ population and ‘foreigners’, relating the collective identity of these two ‘groups’ primarily to their (original) country of origin (Dukes, 2009).
After clarifying the concepts of diversity and identity, another important issue is how they are connected to social cohesion.
2.2 Diversity, Local Identity and Social Cohesion
Social cohesion is frequently seen as a prerequisite for the functioning of modern states and/or for internal security in multicultural societies (ERICarts, 2008). Urban researchers define social cohesion in different ways, but they all refer to the coherence of a social or political system—to the ties that people have with this system; to their involvement and solidarity with it and to a society that ‘hangs together,’ in which conflict between societal goals and groups and disruptive behaviour are minimal (Pahl, 1991; Kearns and Forrest, 2000; Novy et al., this issue).
As a policy concept, social cohesion can be qualified as a ‘quasi-concept’: a hybrid mental construction that politics proposes to detect possible consensuses on a reading of reality, and to forge them (Novy et al., this issue). To strengthen social cohesion, a variety of individuals and groups should be integrated into a wider social order. They are expected to adhere to common norms, values, aims, principles and codes of behaviour (Westin, 2005). A strong attachment to a particular place and the intertwining of people’s identities with specificities of places are presumed to contribute to stronger social cohesion.
Between 1999 and 2006 a major research programme on social cohesion was carried out by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). One of the main conclusions was that if one intends to strengthen the social cohesion of the Dutch society and the ties of particular ethnic groups with that society, one should concentrate on the maintaining of identity and self-respect of the groups concerned (Evenblij, 2007). This was an important insight, especially for governments of cities with a substantial population of foreign descent. 1 Yet, at the same time, for various reasons, meeting the pre-conditions for enhancing social cohesion is quite complicated in practice.
First, cohesion within a particular area (a neighbourhood, for example) seems to be served by homogeneity and consensus (sovereignty or having a say in one’s own circle), but social cohesion at one geographical scale might contrast with that at another: there is a tension between socially cohesive places and a cohesive society (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; van der Welle and Mamadouh, 2008; Moulaert, 2010). Individuals no longer operate solely in one delineated space, but, instead, are embedded in and related to multiple places and different scales. At what scale then should social cohesion be pursued? Or should more attention be paid to more dynamic views on scale and place? Individuals might be able to develop multiple identities simultaneously, and these do not have to conflict.
Secondly, enhancing the feeling of ‘us’ to improve social cohesion in a particular group might be at the expense of the qualities of the relations with other groups (‘them’), expressed by Robert Putnam respectively as bonding and bridging elements (see Putnam, 2000; Giddens, 1991; van der Welle and Mamadouh, 2008). Which ‘us’ should be enhanced?
Thirdly, and perhaps most important for this paper’s argument, social cohesion is not consensus but negotiated difference. Although Kearns and Forrest (2000) consider social cohesion as social harmony, conflicts that have their foundations in different interests, perspectives or ambitions play an important role in generating social cohesion. This is especially the case in the (larger) cities: the sites where civil integration is actively negotiated, where social groups encounter, experience, recognise and make sense of (cultural) difference. Their relationships and interactions are marked by prejudice, tolerance, empathy, hospitality and incivility—and sometimes all of these simultaneously (Nagel and Hopkins, 2010). Integration and social cohesion are thus also a living phenomenon, shaping the spaces of everyday life. How to manage this diversity and how to enable reciprocity between population categories are major challenges for urban policy-making.
Uitermark (2010) argues that integration politics is often conceived of in terms of national citizenship regimes. He refers to researchers who have shown how conceptions of nationhood find their way into institutions and structure the access and conditions of citizenship; and who have demonstrated that state institutions influence the extent to which minorities mobilise and through which identities they do so.
Emphasising the constraining element of these regimes, Novy et al. (this issue) argue that, politically, the challenge is to advance from an essentialist and exclusionary concept of national citizenship which creates ‘outsiders’ in the direction of a scale-sensitive and inhabitant-centred connotation of citizenship.
Ramadan (2007) points to the local level as the level where you can bind people, where trust can grow, in interactions between individuals and groups. In order to stimulate cohesion, local governments require the support of the national government, but these two levels do not necessarily coincide in terms of ideas about integration politics/policies. 2 Based on research in Amsterdam and Berlin, Vermeulen (2008), for example, points out the complications that the national integration rhetoric causes for local-level practices. National-level debates on integration may work as serious restrictions for local policy-makers.
To clarify this tension, in the following section the Dutch national debate on integration will be explored in more detail, focusing in particular on its vision of culture, its approach towards diversity and its possible shortcomings as related to (fostering) social cohesion at the local level.
3. Political and Public Debates on Integration
While public and political debates on integration in theory could apply to all characteristics of diversity, in the Netherlands over recent decades, they have concentrated primarily on cultural diversity and on the integration of immigrants. This issue is often directly related to a wider debate on social cohesion and inequality, especially at the level of the city.
There have been distinct stages in the debate on integration in the Netherlands: while it was still expected in the 1970s that the so-called guest workers, who had come to the Netherlands from the 1960s onwards, would go back to their countries of origin in the end, in the 1980s this ‘remigration’ idea was abandoned. The country was declared a ‘multicultural society’ and the integration of migrants was now permanently high on the political agenda. Multiculturalism unfolded in specific ways in different national societies, reflecting their specific circumstances, histories and social imperatives (Nagel and Hopkins, 2010).
In the Netherlands, in the 1980s, integration was not a big issue around which political oppositions formed. The major currents in Dutch politics had concensus on a pragmatic approach and the newly implemented ‘minorities policy’ was primarily a matter for administrators, although some debate developed around the question of whether minorities should be spatially dispersed or not (Musterd, 1984). The mainstream ‘minorities policy’ was intended to help ethnic minorities to integrate socially and economically into Dutch society, without shedding their cultural identities. It targeted in particular the four largest immigrant groups: Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese and Antilleans. According to Uitermark (2010), in this period the (now common) distinction within the Dutch population between (different generation) migrants (allochtonen) and natives (autochtonen) had already emerged. Dutch politicians had an eye for the arrears of migrants, but the tensions, insecurity and actual problems that their arrival in large numbers in particular urban neighbourhoods caused for the original, authochtonous residents fell on rather deaf ears. In a broader sense, there were growing feelings of insecurity in the Netherlands: traditional religious and socio-political stratifications were dissolving and individualisation was increasing. As a result of these processes, ‘clear’ collective identities gradually gave way to more uncertain, individual identities. Uitermark (2010) points to hostility towards the political establishment in this period, to the desire to criticise minority cultures and to the drive to make policies more stringent.
In 1991, Frits Bolkestein, the then leader of the right-wing Liberals, argued that Western civilisation was fundamentally different from—and vastly superior to—Islamic civilisation. This idea of ‘clashing cultures’ marked a new stage in the integration debate. Bolkestein strongly criticised the minorities policy, whose idea of collective and state-supported emancipation ran counter to his goal: creating a state in which economically independent citizens could prosper in safety. Although Bolkestein was severely criticised, all of his successors agreed that a generous welfare state exacerbated the problems of integration (Uitermark, 2010). This was reflected in the political approach towards integration. In the early 1990s, integration became increasingly looked at as the own, individual responsibility of migrants: the focus shifted from the group towards the individual. In most European countries, also in the Netherlands, ‘citizenship’ became the leading principle within the debates on integration. Initially, ‘active citizenship’ of people from ethnic minorities was considered sufficient: speaking the language and being actively involved in society. The new Dutch ‘integration policy’, replacing the former minorities policy, intended to improve the socioeconomic position of migrants, through employment, education and political participation (Sleegers, 2007).
In the late 1990s, however, political consensus began to crumble. In an epoch of ‘new realism’ (Prins, 2004), integration increasingly became a question of identity. This was the case in the Netherlands, but probably also in many other European countries. Demands on migrants were revised: they were now required to learn the language of their host country and to adopt its norms and values. A new sense of nationality was considered as the solution for ‘preserving’ the own (Western) society (see Scheffer, 2007). In view of the questions raised in various European countries, integration increasingly became an issue of national identity: what is ‘the Netherlands’, what is ‘France’ and ‘who are “we”’?
In the early 2000s, the public and political debate on the multicultural society, integration and national identity burst out with great intensity. In the Netherlands, the immediate cause was an essay written by the Dutch publicist Paul Scheffer in one of the leading Dutch newspapers, NRC Handelsblad. In this essay, he argued that there was an on-going process of underclass formation that had accelerated over the past decade: unemployment, poverty, dropping out of school and criminality were increasingly concentrating among minority groups (Scheffer, 2000: Uitermark, 2010). Next, the terrorist attacks in the US and the murder of the Dutch film director and columnist Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, by a young radical muslim of Moroccan descent, fuelled the debate on integration. These changes in attitude towards newcomers reflected changes in social and political contexts and were speeded up by world-wide events such as ‘9-11’ and the bombings in Madrid and London. Conflict on both global and local levels was reduced to a cultural clash (based on Huntington, 1994). A central question became whether ‘the’ Islam was a threat for the ‘own’ Western culture. Some argued that norms and values of the Islamic culture were possibly incompatible with those of Christianity. Debates on this topic were most open and explicit in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, but also rather lively in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Belgium. Defining a more explicit and strong national identity was seen as the solution for maintaining the ‘own’ society and as a means to make clear to migrants who ‘we’ are and to whom ‘they’ should adapt. Adaptation to ‘the’ national identity became the central point in integration policy. In the Netherlands, politician Pim Fortuyn, labelled a ‘far-right populist’ by his opponents and in the media, problematised cultural differences and argued that politics should pay attention to it. Many Dutch political parties embarked on this point of view and multiculturalism as a normative ideal was declared bankrupt; it was now seen as an ideology that undermined society’s ability to respond to the reprehensible ideas and practices of minorities (Uitermark, 2010). In various European countries, including the Netherlands, the alleged existence of a cultural incompatibility increasingly united the political left and right (Lentin, 2008). In terms of policy, integration was now considered to be a mutual obligation of migrants and society.
Meanwhile, the Dutch political landscape thoroughly changed: as of 14 October 2010, there is a right-wing minority government of VVD (The People’s party for Freedom and Democracy, the largest party) and CDA (Christian Democrats), supported by PVV (Party for Freedom). The latter party, led by Geert Wilders, combines economic liberalism with a conservative programme on immigration and culture. At the 2010 elections, the PVV more than doubled its seats in Parliament. The most recently published national policy document on integration, ‘Integration, binding, citizenship’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2011) continues the earlier policy, however, but advocates a more binding integration policy to prevent society from disintegrating. The individual is held responsible for their own integration in the Netherlands, to a much larger extent than before.
In short, the discourse on integration has changed significantly, both in terms of tone and meanings assigned. That change did not occur just in the Netherlands; clear equivalents can be found in other European countries as well (see for example, Ehrkamp, 2006; Riaño and Wastl-Walter, 2006; ERICarts, 2008). The new discourses emphasise the positive aspects of the ‘own’ culture and often assign negative meanings to other (especially non-western and in particular Muslim) cultures. Uitermark refers to this discourse as ‘culturalism’, organised around the idea that the world is divided into cultures and that our enlightened, liberal culture should be defended against the claims of minorities committed to illiberal religions and ideologies (Uitermark, 2010, p. 1).
This discourse, whose evolution had already started in the early 1990s, does not only serve to demarcate the boundaries of a ‘White’ nation, but also seeks to expand and restore a civil society.
The assigning of meaning in this discourse has various shortcomings, though, with regard to the framing and approach of diversity and identity, with serious impacts on, amongst others, fostering social cohesion at the local level.
3.1 Shortcomings in the Debates on Integration
Considering the Dutch discourse on integration, as it has developed from about 2000, first, the concepts of diversity and identity are narrowly and unidimensionally defined, often limited to ethnicity and religion. Many other aspects of diversity, like social-economic background, gender, lifestyle, age (intergenerational aspects), language and sexual orientation, remain underexposed in the debate. Besides, the emphasis is on identification with groups. Cultural and religious differences between (different ethnic) groups are often seen as the most decisive factor when trying to explain social problems. However, an exclusively cultural focus is insufficient for understanding the problems in marginalised areas (van Tubergen, 2005). Most of these problems have to be understood with other logics, such as ethno-racial discrimination and stigmatisation, and social inequality related to unemployment and flexibilisation of the labour market (Ramadan, 2008).
Secondly, in the Dutch debate cultural diversity is often approached negatively and hardly as an opportunity. Immigrants are depicted as problematic for cities as they would not integrate or not be willing to; would keep their identity; would contribute relatively strongly to criminal activities or would radicalise. In this debate, their positive contribution to the city, in terms of knowledge production and cultural exchange, hardly gets any attention.
Thirdly, there is limited reflection on patterns and power structures in Dutch society that possibly impede integration: the Dutch culture and the national identity, for example, are presented as homogeneous, static and well-defined, denying the existing diversity and inherent dynamics within Dutch culture (Sleegers, 2007; WRR, 2007).
Finally, the tone of the integration debate is set by stereotype constructions of difference. While refering to ‘we’ (the autochthonous population) and ‘they’ (the foreigners), differences as such are looked at as problematic. Ethnic groups are also often depicted as homogeneous, ignoring their mutual as well as internal differences. Similar stereotype constructions of difference, reproduced by the media, have serious consequences for the way in which ‘others’ are looked at (see Ehrkamp, 2002; Wetherell, 2007). Moreover, particular constructions can imprison a whole group for decades. Second- and even third-generation descendants of ‘guest workers’ are often still depicted as ‘the other’. Besides, freezing boundaries between cultures strongly influences processes of identity building and the ‘sense of belonging’ that these ‘others’ feel in a particular (host) society (Ghorashi, 2006). Often the ‘own’ identity in host societies is considered the norm and is not brought up for discussion. However, if one does not reflect on one’s own identity, the feeling of unity and of ‘us’ will be hard to realise. Raj Isar (2006) and Lentin (2008) point at the historical tendency of European nation-states to deny heterogeneity through the persistent production of an ‘imagined homogeneity’. Produced and reproduced discursive dichotomies in society thus hinder the unity in diversity, the development of identity and most certainly also the fostering of social cohesion. Besides, these dichotomies put key values in society, like solidarity and co-operation, under pressure and may contribute to the stigmatisation of particular neighbourhoods by outsiders (for example,‘les banlieues’ in France) and may ignite redlining practices by financial institutions or commercial disinvestments in these areas.
Efforts to bind people at the local level, to build trust between different individuals and groups, integrating them in a wider social order, with an open mind towards diversity and identity, does not seem to be supported by the national debates and discourses on integration. On the contrary, current debates and discourses appear to adopt a narrow and uni-dimensional interpretation of ‘diversity’, to present stereotype constructions of difference (‘we’, the authochtonous population, versus ‘them’ the foreigners) and to adopt stringent adaptation requirements.
A fundamental problem is the underlying vision of culture in the integration debate. Over recent decades, governments of EU member-states have followed different approaches in their policies, strategies and programmes towards minorities, immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. Basically, however, one can distinguish between two types of integration model on which their approaches have been based: a ‘diversity and empowerment’ model and a ‘cohesion or assimilation’ model (ERICarts, 2008).
The first—multiculturalist—model primarily aims at affirming diversity and dialogue in society, whereas the second model specifically pursues generating greater homogeneity in society. The question of whether societies should integrate their immigrants into one national lifestyle or rather embrace all the different cultures represented in society, is referred to as the ‘diversity versus cohesion antagonism’ (ERICarts, 2008).
As referred to before, the early 2000s have been marked by a turn against the multiculturalist models of integration. These models were considered to be unable to create conflict-free, multiethnic societies. In many EU member-states, they have been pushed aside to make way for monoculturalist models of assimilation (Essed, 2002; Entzinger, 2003; Joppke, 2004; Ghorashi, 2006; Alexander, 2007; Lentin, 2008; Nagel and Hopkins, 2010). According to Vermeulen (2008), the visions underlying the two types of model result in very different understandings of diversity: an integration model that is based on a multicultural vision has an eye for the positive aspects of diversity and pays attention to the structural inequality between groups, as well as to underlying patterns in the host society that cause and maintain them. It takes diversity as the point of departure, supports disadvantaged groups and leaves room for different identities. In a monocultural integration model, on the other hand, the ‘own’ culture and the national identity are the prevailing standard. Migrant groups and diversity are primarily constructed in terms of problems.
The national debate and discourse on integration and the vision of culture on which it is based, have far-reaching consequences for policy approaches, not only at the national, but also at the local level.
In the following section, attention will be paid to local integration practice and policy in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
4. Integration in Amsterdam and Rotterdam
4.1 Introduction to Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Amsterdam and Rotterdam are the largest and next-largest cities in the Netherlands. While superficially they may seem to be two modern cities, and both have experienced substantial migration from abroad, these cities are in fact quite different. Rotterdam’s history is strongly connected to its seaport and clearly has had and still has a strong ‘Fordist’ manufacturing profile, whereas Amsterdam has always had a much more varied economy due to affluence and the type of activities acquired in the 17th century, which laid the foundation for the current financial and advanced producer services industries and that created a stronger ‘post-Fordist’ service-sector profile. Burgers and Musterd (2002) showed that these specific urban histories have had major impacts on today’s functioning. A stronger reliance on manufacturing and port activities in Rotterdam implied a larger actual mismatch between the professional structure of the population (job supply) and the demand for jobs. This mismatch resulted in relatively high unemployment and many difficulties during economic restructuring. In Amsterdam, it was not a mismatch, but polarisation that resulted from economic restructuring. Unemployment levels were much lower than in Rotterdam; jobs were developing in the lower sections of the job distribution and in higher sections. In general, in economic and therefore also in social terms, Amsterdam currently has a much stronger position than Rotterdam with consequences for opportunities for minorities and with possible consequences for attitudes of other population categories towards diversity, identity and integration.
4.2 Integration as a Living Phenomenon
Integration and social cohesion are not only a matter of policy: they are also a living phenomenon, shaping the spaces of everyday life. Social groups in cities encounter, experience, recognise and make sense of (cultural) difference. Through social practices, they negotiate the terms of membership in society (Nagel and Hopkins, 2010). While shared space provides the opportunity for encounters between ‘strangers’, and thus an option for strengthening social cohesion at the local level, proximity does not equate with meaningful contact. Valentine (2008) even questions the idealisation of the city as a space of encounter, arguing that close proximity is often what generates or aggravates hostile viewpoints towards other groups.
In recent policy documents of Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011) and Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007), encounters are indeed addressed in terms of problems. Both cities struggle with an increasing coarsening of manners in public space. While Rotterdam emphasises the importance of respecting a ‘sense of standards’, Amsterdam advocates ‘courtesy’, in answer to a lack of respect and increasing discrimination practices. Valentine (2008) is critical, though, as ‘courtesy’ is not the same as having respect for difference. She therefore advocates an urban politics that addresses inequalities as well as diversity, and that recognises the need to fuse debates about prejudice and respect with questions of social-economic inequalities and power.
However, codes of behaviour in public space are merely some of the aspects that are addressed in the aforementioned publications. In recent years, many Dutch local politicians and policy-makers have embarked on the overarching key concept of (active) ‘urban citizenship’ as a possible fruitful way to pursue social cohesion, not hampered by the fact that its connotation is far from universal (Hurenkamp and Tonkens, 2008; van Bochove et al., 2009; Prins, 2010). This has also been the case in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The differences between the two cities in terms of economic position may explain the difference in the tone of the debates, which seems harsher in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam, but did not appear to impact the general (local) debates on integration and citizenship.
4.3 Citizenship: A Key Concept at the Local Level
Citizenship refers to the particular rights and duties of members of a legal community. Considering its present connotation, however, many other dimensions show up. In Rotterdam, from the late 2000s, the concept of ‘urban citizenship’ has figured prominently on the local agenda. A 2007 policy document (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007) presents ‘urban citizenship’ as an integral framework for all actions in the field of integration, participation and emancipation, during the 2006–10 Rotterdam programme agreement. Somewhat loosely defined, five dimensions are distinguished: reciprocity (rights and duties), identity (being a Rotterdam citizen), being proud of the city, participation and the earlier-mentioned ‘sense of standards’. While the elaboration of ‘urban citizenship’ in the policy document is actually rather poor, the municipality has made serious efforts to put the concept into practice, by creating direct connections between the local government and the Rotterdam residents (with a series of dialogues on urban citizenship), as well as by involving the local media, in order to give a voice to all the ‘urban citizens of Rotterdam’ (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008). Moreover, the local government has funded a research project at the Erasmus University, entitled ‘Verbindende Burgers’ (‘connecting citizens’), to generate knowledge on citizenship practices in Rotterdam and on the way in which they contribute to identification with the city. These practices are examined elaborately in terms of ‘type’, location and ways in which the local government could stimulate them (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2009).
While the concept is hardly linked to diversity and identity issues in Rotterdam, in Amsterdam it is: in a 2004 policy document (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004), citizenship figures prominently in the title: ‘Towards citizenship in Amsterdam: diversity and integration monitor 2004’. Its potential value for local diversity and identity policy is emphasised, but a closer look at the document reveals that the concept is more or less dragged in and is merely addressed as one ‘that requires further elaboration’. Moreover, how ‘citizenship’ and ‘integration and diversity’ relate to each other exactly is unclear: integration and diversity are presented as “important elements of citizenship” on one page (p. 7), but citizenship seems to be presented as an element of diversity and integration on another (p. 10). Moreover, the six ‘domains of citizenship’ that are distinguished (political participation, economic independence, constitutional state, social involvement, culture transfer and common decency) actually seem to be (former) domains of diversity and integration policy. Early 2011, the local government of Amsterdam started exploring the concept more elaborately, by organising two local conferences on citizenship with various stakeholders. In the resulting document, sent to the municipal council on 12 May 2011, the responsible Amsterdam Alderman asks for attention for a ‘special subject’: citizenship in Amsterdam. Yet although the concept is presented enthusiastically, its precise connotation remains somewhat vague. Citizenship is presented at the same time as a goal, a means and a vision of the future. As a goal, it should strengthen solidarity, fight the general coarsening of manners, stimulate participation and stimulate taking responsibility for oneself and for the city. This should be realised ‘by working on its building blocks’: participation, solidarity and courtesy, founded by the constitutional state, guaranteeing safety and law. Citizenship should ‘exceed and bridge’ the differences among the Amsterdam population, but the authors still seem to struggle with its realisation.
Summarising the foregoing, both the local governments of Rotterdam and (more recently) of Amsterdam have started exploring and improving (urban) citizenship. While there is an overlap in terms of dimensions of the concept, in Amsterdam, its precise connotation remains unclear. In Rotterdam, however, the concept is more ‘alive’ and far more elaborated, with the focus on urban citizenship practices.
Rotterdam in particular, pays attention to identification with the city. This is often depicted as an important pre-condition for feeling free and feeling responsible for the city. In an interview, the Dutch sociologist Gabriël van den Brink, professor at Tilburg University, states that attachment to a city is important for the development of urban citizenship. He even argues that it prevents ghettos from coming into existence and people from withdrawing from others (Kosmeijer, 2010). An important question is therefore to what extent people feel attached to their place of residence.
4.4 Identification Processes among Ethnic Minorities
Recently conducted scientific research on identification processes among ethnic groups in the Dutch cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam sheds some light on this issue. Two studies in Rotterdam were conducted: one was based on a survey among 650 Turkish-, Moroccan- and autochtonous-Dutch young people (Entzinger and Dourleijn, 2008); and one was based on interviews with members of the Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan middle class (225) and members of the autochtonous-Dutch middle class (100) (van Bochove et al., 2009). In both studies, in Rotterdam, the strongest feeling of solidarity turned out to be the one with the own ethnic group in the Netherlands. In terms of emotional identification, interestingly, young people from the ‘foreign’ middle class primarily felt themselves to be citizens of Rotterdam (‘Rotterdammers’) and secondly citizens of the Netherlands (a Dutchman or Dutchwoman). For autochthonous young people, on the other hand, in general the Dutch national identity outweighed the Rotterdam identity.
The research that was conducted in Amsterdam consisted of both a survey and 50 interviews among young people in Amsterdam (aged 18–30 years) of Dutch, Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese descent (van der Welle and Mamadouh, 2008). In this research also, the strongest feeling of solidarity was the one with the own ethnic group in the Netherlands. In addition, many among these young people chose to present themselves primarily as citizens of Amsterdam (‘Amsterdammers’), 3 as this identification could be combined easily with an ethnic identity. Moreover, for some, emphasising the local identity was used as a strategy to push clashing identities into the background.
While the topic of local identity requires far more intensive exploration, based on these results, one could argue that place does matter for the ethnic groups examined; their local identity is expressed in a much stronger way than their Dutch national identity. Moreover, and even more importantly, van der Welle and Mamadouh (2008) established that local identity has the potential to connect people with each other. This is quite a fruitful point of departure for politicians and policy-makers aiming at improving social cohesion at the local level.
5. Conclusions
The question raised in the introduction was: how could alternative approaches to and interpretations of diversity and identity help to frame the national integration debate in a different way, thus benefiting the enhancement of social cohesion at the local level? Based on the arguments developed in this article, some important conclusions can be drawn.
Considering the multidimensionality of diversity and identity, in theory, the city population could be approached in a variety of ways. However, as this paper has shown, in practice these options are actually far more limited, due to the wider (national) political and policy frameworks within which city governments formulate and implement their policy: their underlying models of integration have become increasingly monoculturalist, with serious implications for the way in which ‘diversity’ is approached. Additionally, the national debates and discourses on integration tend to have a one-sided focus on cultural or religious diversity, constructing identities of groups accordingly, often not taking the variety of identities of the members of these ‘groups’ into account. This does not do justice to the multiple identities of groups and individuals and might impede their identification strategies.
Considering the content, the tone and the meanings dominating these national debates and discourses, stereotype constructions of difference, disseminated by the media and constantly repeated in society, are enforced instead of being neutralised. They have a major impact on the ways in which ‘others’ are looked upon and on their ‘sense of belonging’: particular (negative) connotations in the wider debate on integration fuel (negative) images of particular groups and might thus impact connotations of these groups at the local level. Moreover, this national integration rhetoric, preaching discriminative integration, might hinder local discourses and local policy options as related to integration and thus be counter-productive for local politicians and policy-makers.
Actively influencing the tone of the integration debate and the ways in which meanings are assigned would be an important key to improvement. To make space for broader definitions of diversity and identity, their meaning should be clarified. Participants in (political and public) debates, governments in particular, could contribute by being more accurate in their communication policy by utilising more precise group designations instead of container concepts like ‘foreigners’. Assumptions underlying stereotype constructions of difference should be made explicit: why would a third-generation individual of Turkish descent still be depicted as the ‘other’, for example? This also implies a critical reflection on the own alleged homogeneous society and on processes that maintain different forms of inequality: why does the earlier-mentioned individual of Turkish descent still find himself in a disadvantaged position, for example?
The multidimensionality of diversity and the range of identities that people have should be explicitly emphasised in the debate on integration. This would offer far more connections to policy than the present narrow definition of diversity. Moreover, diversity should not merely be approached in a negative way or in terms of a ‘deficit’, but its power and added value for society should be emphasised instead and should be taken as the point of departure. Group and individual identities require more attention: research on ethnic minorities points to the potential of the ‘local identity’, of ‘attachment to place’ for connecting people and for bridging differences in identity. This is a promising approach for local politicians and policy-makers.
In recent years, both Rotterdam and Amsterdam have embarked on a mission to explore the concept of (urban) citizenship. Interestingly, its connotation is not primarily political, but has most in common with the cultural perspective towards the concept of social cohesion (see Novy et al., this issue). Like social cohesion, urban citizenhip can be qualified as a ‘quasi-concept’. As opposed to Dutch national integration rhetoric, this alternative policy conceptualisation has a strong advantage, for ‘urban citizenship’ is inclusive, embracing all citizens at the local level, and is devoid of a negative connotation. While it seems valuable as a discursive tool to frame integration policy at the local level, as a policy tool, it requires more elaboration, in terms of precise connotation and (measurable) dimensions. Its potential value comes to the fore most clearly in Rotterdam, where the policy focus on ‘local identity’ and ‘identification with the city’ strongly connects to feelings of attachment to the city that are present among its population. Moreover, the emphasis on urban citizenship practices expresses the fact that it is a living phenomenon and emphasises the viability of collective action, in order to strengthen cohesion. Finally, the explicit connection with the local media offers the opportunity to make urban citizenship even more ‘alive’ and shared by both the local government and the urban citizens. These local media, in turn, can disseminate their voices and their local connotations widely, counteracting national integration rhetoric.
Footnotes
Notes
Funding Statement
This research was supported by the European Commission, 7th Framework Programme grant SOCIAL POLIS ‘Social Platform on Cities and Social Cohesion’ (grant number 217157).