Multilevel Governance and Social Cohesion: Bringing Back Conflict in Citizenship Practices

Abstract

This paper revisits the relevance of conflict in governance and citizenship practices in cities. Europe national urban policies were readjusted in terms of economic policies and state expenditures in the 1980s and then again and more severely after the 2008 financial and economic crisis. Policy discourses in urban policy have emphasised the beneficial consequences of social and political consensus in helping cities to restructure economically as part of ‘good governance’. At the same time, the paradigm of citizenship understood as a system of social and political inclusion based on economic redistribution and political participation has been substituted by one that has the objective to ensure social cohesion in societies. This substitution renounces the objectives concerning social justice, fails to face the tensions of increasing social inequalities and misses the contribution of social innovation and citizens’ practices that incorporate counter-hegemonic ideals as equally important to an effective multilevel governance. A bottom-link approach is suggested as a synthesis of the tension between top–down policies and bottom–up practices.

1. Introduction

European national urban policies were readjusted in terms of economic policies and state expenditures in the 1980s and then again and more severely after the 2008 financial and economic crisis. This happened in a context in which European cities have become more diverse, not only because of the large numbers of foreign workers in them (Dukes and Musterd, this issue), but also through a more segmented division of labour, in which previous consensually organised interests now showed a fragmentation of identities and social interests. The basic identification of labour markets with nation-states no longer holds in global labour markets: individuals and groups have to search for a new sense of belonging different from national labour market participation. Moreover, in the political sphere, political rights have become unequal with numerous denizens sharing urban spaces with citizens.

All this challenges the notion of social citizenship based on national contracts and redistributive policies. The search is for mechanisms to overcome the ensuing crisis of democratic participation. In this scenario, national and regional governments and international organisations have established a double objective: to construct ‘good governance’ and to pursue ‘social cohesion’ in cities.

Promoting social cohesion runs in tandem with the changes in governance and the implementation of neo-liberal policies stressing competitiveness. Policies aiming for social cohesion in each country are informed not only by their political, economic and cultural traditions, but also—and sometimes mainly—by international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD and European Union. These institutions recommended a new approach to urban growth and policy-making to overcome problems of

social exclusion and loss of social cohesion that follow the creation of socially segregated zones of poor people, often immigrants and within minorities in cities (OECD, 2006, pp. 144–145).

In 2001, the European Commission published the White Paper and the Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion.¹ The White Paper contained recommendations to pursue ‘democratic governance’ reinforcing the role of civil society and of sub-national organisations in policy implementation. In the Second Report, the Commission drew attention to the increase in poverty and social exclusion in cities and the need to implement social inclusion policies, such as creating new employment opportunities. The document also recommended strengthening the role of regional and local authorities and of those on the ground, along with developing partnerships.

The transformation of discourses in national policies often resembled recipes in which decentralised governance through partnerships among all population sectors is part of the social cohesion in combination with competitiveness. Yet

even while accepting competition as the context of urban development it is a denial of lines of conflict and exercise of power. As prescription it evades the role that the national state must play in assuring economic well-being of individuals and the mitigating of competitiveness (Fainstein, 2001, p. 888).

Governance institutions and mechanisms have greatly changed in many policy fields with a variety of outcomes. The questions addressed here are: to what extent do governance and social cohesion—as used by policy-makers in their hegemonic discourses—conflict with citizens’ rights; what are the consequences of substituting policies based on citizenship principles (social justice, identity and political participation) for policies for ‘social cohesion’; and how does the contribution of socially creative strategies make a difference for participatory democratic action and for social justice? We see in the consolidation of complex governance arrangements the substitution of citizenship ideals and policies by social cohesion objectives. This substitution means the relegation of social justice as the prime objective of citizenship. In this substitution, we also observe a non-recognition of conflict in societies.

The academic urban literature has widely analysed the complex transformation in policy-making. Critical social scientists have unpacked the ‘concept’ of ‘good governance’ as a normative concept, defending its value as an analytical concept (Jessop, 2002). David Harvey was one of the first to point out that “the power to organize space derives from a whole complex of forces mobilized by diverse social agents” (Harvey, 1989, p. 4). Yet, governance—defined as a process of co-ordinating actors, social groups and institutions to reach collectively discussed objectives—raises the question of democratic legitimacy (Le Galès, 2002).

Governance not only refers to “any form of coordination of interdependent social relations”; it also involves “reflexive self-organisation of interdependent actors” (Jessop, 2002, ch. 6). Institutions and organised citizens engage in the restructuring of different policy fields in various ways, not only following a normative top–down interpretation of governance. Governance is more than a monolithic concept for the promotion of social cohesion in the sense of achieving social harmony (Novy et al., this issue). Governance also includes alternative mechanisms of negotiation between various groups and networks, potentially empowering local government (García, 2006; Gerometta et al., 2005; Leubolt et al., 2007). Governance equally embraces citizens who disagree with mainstream policy formulation and who present alternative creative strategies, such as innovation in governance through practices combining bottom–up initiatives with top–down policies, forming part of contemporary urban transformations. We propose the term ‘bottom-linked’ practices which combine social and institutional innovation (García et al., 2008).

With the neo-liberal turn, issues of social injustice and inequality have become less visible in political and policy discourses. Notions of social inequality

have given way to a new discourse of competitiveness, social cohesion and exclusion and social capital and a set of assumptions about how these relate to each other to determine urban outcomes (Harloe, 2001, p. 889).

As to conflict, the contemporary preoccupation with the maintenance of ‘social cohesion’ as a concern with moral and social order echoes the traditional view of social integration—meaning community and social control—and misses the point that social conflict and divisions are not necessarily destructive of social order. On the contrary

certain forms of argument and conflict constitute key elements of the process that bring people together in relationships (Harloe, 2001, p. 892).

We do not deny the importance of social cohesion as an overall and a multidimensional objective. However, our emphasis is on collective action performed by citizens in the pursuit of social justice. This is closer to the neo-Weberian (Le Galès, 2002) and political economy traditions (Fainstein, 2001; Harloe, 2001; Maloutas and Malouta, 2004;) that incorporate the inevitably conflictive character of urban social interests in their analysis (Mayer, 2003, 2009; Silver et al., 2010).

The following three sections provide, first a brief overview of governance dynamics with a focus on Europe and on multilevel governance. We include key scientific arguments that relate changing governance mechanisms to social cohesion aims. We point out contradictions in the processes of decentralisation while limiting citizens’ and localities’ participation in the design and implementation of policy. The following section discusses critically social cohesion in relation to social citizenship. Specifically, we consider policies that aim to overcome the deficits in access to housing and welfare services. We also look into the narrow treatment of social capital in urban renewal. In section 4, we incorporate the analysis of the proliferation of citizens’ practices as a key element of social innovation. We see social innovation as those social and organisational relations between individuals and groups that operate to empower citizens deprived of their most basic resources, social and political rights (Moulaert, 2000, pp. 71–73). We claim that citizens develop socially creative strategies and contribute to social cohesion policy when they bring back into the public sphere counter-hegemonic ideals, such as social justice. In their socially innovative practices, citizens can deal positively with tensions between top–down and bottom–up practices by situating them within a bottom-link multilevel governance approach.

2. Multilevel Governance, Competitiveness and Social Cohesion

Multilevel governance in Europe captures a series of changes in statehood resulting from the emergence of complex multilevel decision-making processes. Among supranational institutions, the European Union has played a regulative role creating opportunities for new governance arrangements at the local level, involving co-operation between market and civil society actors and developing co-ordination between multiple policy-making scales (Brenner, 2004; Giersig, 2008; Le Galès, 2002, 2005). The large number of EU regulations and financial programmes directed at cities is important not only for the financial support involved, but also for stimulus towards the constitution of networks and co-operation agreements (Rhodes, 1997; Keating, 1998).

Opening up government structures, promoting effective policy and encouraging co-operation between business communities and administrations have the main aim of supporting competitive environments. Parallel to its economic recommendations, the European Commission’s White Paper on governance promotes the virtues of ‘democratic governance’ in the EU including the principles of openness, participation, accountability and effectiveness with an emphasis on subsidiarity. Through its authoritative discourse and through implementing policy (European Regional and Cohesion Funds) in agreement with member-states (Wallace et al., 2010; Geddes and Bennington, 2001), the EU has contributed to the creation of a strong relationship between multilevel governance and competitiveness with emphasis on improving the competitive capacity of cities and regions.

The European Union has directly supported social cohesion in cities through community programmes such as the URBAN programme (1994–2006) (Le Galès, 2005). A clear example of indirectly promoting social cohesion is the emphasis on equality in employment opportunities in the European Employment Strategy (Basile, 2008; García et al. 2004).

Scientific debate has not only provided descriptions of the procedural characteristics of the multilevel governance model, but has also analysed the underlying objectives, the transformation of mechanisms of decision-making (Jessop, 2002; Le Galès, 2002; Brenner, 2004), as well as the consequences for the quality of democracy (Novy et al., this issue; Swyngedouw, 2005) and.the role of discourse (Leubolt et al., 2007; Pierre, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005).

Briefly, there are three main arguments. First, the structural changes in governance are part of a larger process of reshaping of the state that takes place globally, involving a diffusion of governmental functions into different spatial scales—sub-national and supranational. The multiscalar nation-states that result exhibit neo-liberal agendas supplanting Keynesian redistributive policies. The transformation towards complex, multilevel forms of statehood is no weakening of the state but its adaptation to the changing needs of capital (Brenner, 1999, 2004; and Le Galès, 2002). Market and state remain closely interlinked and interdependent (Jessop, 2002). Whereas under Keynesianism national strategies fostered industrial capitalist growth in the whole territory, in the post-Fordist era regional and local governments have started to develop their own growth strategies as recommended by supranational institutions. Local governments seek new sources of capital for investing in economic development and prioritise economic growth over economic redistribution. According to the economic capacity of each region, the competitiveness objective generates increasing territorial and social inequality as well as new forms of poverty. Furthermore, it promotes competition between cities and regions.

Secondly, a variety of modes of governance appear, according to the way in which tensions between economic competitiveness and social cohesion are addressed by local institutions and in the mechanisms through which significant and resourceful actors co-ordinate their actions. Whereas US cities have exhibited a ‘pro-growth’ model, in the EU urban governance modes are ‘managerialist’, ‘corporatist’ or ‘welfare-oriented’ (Pierre, 2005, p. 452), often in combination.

The peculiarities of urban governance in European cities are due to historical roots and to the commitment to a ‘European social model’ in contrast with other regions of the world. Looking into several specific cases—Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Edinburgh, Hamburg and Manchester—Harding (1997) concluded that competitive strategies in these cities have worked hand-in-hand with national responses to globalisation and that the differences between the way urban coalitions work are best understood by incorporating their respective national frameworks and ways of regulating rather than by extrapolating them from those national frameworks. Unitary state structures (Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK) are associated with the subordination of local policies to the priorities of state agencies (Harding, 1997, p. 308). In federal countries like Germany, city leaders have more autonomy and yet are no less bound by national regulations. In highly decentralised states (Spain, Italy), the strong role played by regional institutions creates a highly complex framework of governance mechanisms for the planning and implementation of urban regeneration projects (Salet and Gualini, 2007). What is common in European cities is that regeneration polices rely heavily upon formal planning and impose requirements and restrictions on investors, such as the provision of public amenities (Kantor and Savitch, 2002).

In European cities, economic development partnership is often led by local public administration actors who combine central government resources with local tax revenues and who engage private actors (Moulaert et al., 2003); not always without critical distance from sectors of the city administrations, more concerned with social cohesion than with urban competitiveness. Particularly interesting is the ‘virtuous’ triangle developed in the UK by the Blair administration between competitiveness and governance and social cohesion (Buck et al., 2005).

National regulatory structures (with the exception of financial markets) play a strong role in European cities (Le Galès, 2002, 2005; Kazepov, 2005). Cities are part of multilevel governance systems in which the local level can have different roles depending on the position of the local public authorities within the multiscalar governance system, the strategies of local actors and their articulation with national decision-making bodies. Given this multilevel frame, one key element is connectivity between different levels of power (Giersig, 2008, p. 53).

Another is finances. European cities are embedded in multilevel governance structures with different allocations of competences and resources. These differences can result in increased territorial disparities and this partially explains why some cities in Europe can practice a more ‘welfare oriented’ mode of governance or why certain cities have become powerful as centres of decision-making and play a remarkable role in the international markets (Giersig, 2008, p. 43; Le Galès, 2002, pp. 147–159). In northern and central Europe, municipalities assumed more responsibilities in the management of resources. In southern European countries, especially in Spain, decentralisation has not been accompanied by a redistribution of public resources from central to local administrations (García, 2006; Wollmann, 2009).² In spite of far-reaching political and administrative decentralisation in southern Europe, local institutions and citizens have limited opportunities to participate in the formulation of fiscal policies.

Finally, European cities have used public–private partnerships as solutions to shrinking public funding (Moulaert et al., 2003). The difference with the US is that these partnerships are often led by public institutions. Discourses favouring public–private partnership strategies have been politically justified by conservative government actors with reference to the inefficiency of hierarchical bureaucratic states and by left-wing governments fearing the autocratic character of the state and in favour of involving civil society in the design and implementation of policies. Beyond discourses, there is empirical evidence of local actors’ co-operation from public, private and voluntary sectors in local development strategies with a narrow economic growth objective. Local partnerships have also emerged as responses to social exclusion dynamics and as new forms of local social governance (Geddes and Benington, 2001). For example, in the provision of local welfare it is possible to observe changing arrangements in which the specific local socioeconomic and cultural conditions give rise to different combinations of formal and informal actors, public or not (Andreotti et al., this issue).

The third argument maintains that democratic deficit develops from the new governance environment. The formation of local coalitions involving public and private interest by-passes citizens’ participation despite local leaders’ boasts. These types of governance may be seen as hegemonic mobilisation plans, with clear winners and losers within cities (Moulaert et al., 2003). Not only are there limitations in achieving transparency and accountability in complex territorial governance (Swyngedouw, 2005; Beaumont and Nichols, 2008), but the strong emphasis on partnership and economic development has also created great difficulties for social inclusion of the vulnerable sectors of society at the local level. (Geddes and Bennington, 2001). Thus, territorial governance is not a guarantee of greater inclusiveness and is often used rhetorically to hide the increasing democratic deficits and the disempowerment of traditional bargaining actors. The erosion of the democratic character of the political sphere, especially through market forces that set the ‘rules of the game’, is a clear conditioning of new governance arrangements (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 1991).

In this section, we have summarised the arguments that have unpacked the concept of governance emphasising social and political complexities and challenges. We have stressed some of the peculiarities of urban governance in European cities and pointed out that in European urban societies the proliferation of socioeconomic, cultural and political identities challenges democratic policy (Moulaert, 2000, p. 13).

3. The Decline of Social Citizenship, Multilevel Policies and Community Responsibility for ‘Social Cohesion’

We return to the question: what are the consequences of substituting policies based on citizenship principles (social justice and political participation) for policies for ‘social cohesion’? We first look at how multilevel policies to foster social cohesion are giving more responsibility to localities and local communities while ignoring conflict, social inequalities and power relations in their formulations and policy implementation (for example, in the spheres of welfare and housing). Secondly, we point out different approaches to social cohesion and the use of social capital as an instrument of social inclusion in neighbourhood policy.

3.1 From National Citizenship to Multilevel Policies and Social Cohesion

Parallel to the changes in governance, which also refer to the political dimension of citizenship (we will come back to this in the next section), the emergence of the concept of social cohesion points to a transformation in the social dimension of citizenship as a system of social inclusion.

The principle of citizenship (in Marshall’s world) was based on a complex social structure defined mainly by social class. It was also linked to the nation-state as the boundary within which equality and social justice were promoted through redistributive policies among people considered as citizens regardless of region of residence. The national state was mainly responsible for ensuring this redistribution.

Originally, social citizenship understood as welfare redistribution, allowing inclusion in the standards of life for all the members of society, was articulated at a national scale. However, other levels of government were given an important role as local and regional agents of redistribution. Nowadays, issues that were formally mainly linked with the nation-state are shared by other agencies and institutions from the local to the supranational scale, and frequently at odds (what is promoted by the EU may contradict the desiderata at the local scale; for instance, in terms of migration and entitlements) (García, 2006).

The concept of social cohesion is articulated at different levels ranging from the nation-state to the neighbourhood. In contrast with the central role that the nation-state plays in the concept of citizenship as the main focus for redistribution, social cohesion explicitly reflects this multilevel character in the responsibility to implement redistributive policies according to the practices of multilevel governance. Regional and local government as well as businesses, community, non-profit organisations and even individuals themselves, are all involved in the objective of social cohesion. This shift from citizenship to social cohesion has been particularly salient in cities that have assumed a key role in guaranteeing social cohesion.

European cities, with increasing social inequalities and segregation, are affected by how the welfare states are changing (Musterd, 2006). One such way has been the rescaling of welfare policies, with reinforcement of the local dimension. This means a change of the current configuration of welfare systems towards a mix between central, regional and urban programmes. The effective action of enabling states that should guarantee equal access to social protection for every citizen has been blurred by this new way of proceeding in which other scales have a strong role in the design and implementation process of welfare policies. The restructuring of welfare policies led by national governments has encouraged local authorities to develop new governance instruments (local development agencies) in order to integrate many different actors (for example, for-profit and non-profit enterprises, banking foundations, mutual aid networks, social co-operatives and voluntary associations) into a multilevel framework.

The way in which civil society actors become stakeholders in governance dynamics varies across Europe and is not free of tensions (Sintomer et al., 2008). In some countries, contributions by civil society and market actors to policy implementation are regulated through strict and formal guidelines. This is the case with private providers and family-care drivers in Scandinavian countries (Pfau-Effinger et al., 2009). Contrary to this, in southern European countries, a social services market has developed spontaneously—for example, in domestic care services, provided by informally hired and poorly paid immigrants (Andreotti et al., this issue).

Research on welfare rescaling shows that social cohesion, considered as equal access to social rights, cannot be achieved without a public regulatory framework through which citizens’ social rights may be effectively guaranteed throughout society (Kazepov, 2008). Variations have been found in comparative analysis of social assistance in European cities between those local welfare systems in which social justice and solidarity principles are backed by central state support (Swedish, German and French cities) and those in which discretional decisions are taken at the local level depending on available financial resources (Italian, Spanish and Portuguese cities) (García, 2006, pp. 755–758). When the rescaling process is not accompanied by the common standards and financial resources provided by central states, local policies are more dependent on local fiscal policies and the discretionary power of local administrations.

Closely related to welfare is the privatisation and rescaling of housing systems. Researchers have observed a shift away from direct provision and policy direction of housing to a more fragmented and neo-liberal market-based model across Europe. In most EU countries, the state’s role in providing access to affordable housing has changed significantly since the 1960s. As in other policy fields, the provision of affordable housing has become constrained by a reduction of public finance to social housing subsidies (Ball, 2009). Moreover, an increasingly multilevel and multi-actor process has developed, involving different layers of government (national, regional and local) as well as private (profit and non-profit) actors. For example, in the provision of social housing, the sector has moved towards more contractual relationships between the commissioning authority and increasingly independent providers. The policy emphasis has shifted from redistribution to regulation and risk management (Eurofound, 2006). The privatisation of housing systems has negative impacts on people’s well-being and social cohesion within and between neighbourhoods. For example, the shift towards self-regulated housing mechanisms has fuelled social and ethnic segregation as well as racial and class conflicts in many European cities (Cameron et al., s.d.).

3.2 From Social Justice to Community Responsibility

As stated in the introduction, the objective of social cohesion has replaced social justice. This substitution weakens the character of citizenship as a process in which political tensions and conflicts are negotiated in societies. On the other hand, the social cohesion concept assumes that the community must have a role in achieving social cohesion through the concept of social capital. Accordingly, there have been different governance initiatives aiming at empowering communities and various approaches are listed in the governance literature concerning social cohesion (Novy et al., this issue).

The sociological roots of the concept of social cohesion tie in with the pernicious effects of modernity on organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1893/1964). The modern definition of social cohesion shows similarities with the definition of governance. Following Novy et al. (this issue), each can be defined as a problématique—as a range of questions and challenges posed by the political and methodological use of the concept. Both are frequently used in an international context, especially by important intergovernmental bodies such as the OECD, the Council of Europe and the European Union. Novy et al. (this issue) highlight the fact that social cohesion is a catchword—a quasi-concept—with multiple meanings covering a wide range of dimensions.

Solé et al. (2011) identify three dimensions in the concept of social cohesion: cultural, redistributive and relational. Concerning the first, social cohesion is the result of shared elements as values, norms or identity. The second dimension derives from redistribution and an open educational system. Finally, the relational dimension is the result of the promotion of social capital. However, concepts such as equality or social justice are replaced by an emphasis on belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition, legitimacy, governance, absence of conflict or co-responsibility.

Social justice and political participation have been abandoned as elements conferring legitimacy on government, but no substitute has been found. According to Novy et al. (this issue), the problématique can be summarised in the question of how social cohesion is possible in capitalism as a socioeconomic order based on class cleavages and constant transformation. The emphasis on social cohesion highlights the desire to maintain social peace in a context of a decline in redistributive policies, a failure to recognise diversity and the delegitimation of democratic mechanisms. Neo-liberalism and social cohesion stand in a contradictory and dialectical relation. On the one hand, certain features of modern capitalism are detrimental to social cohesion. On the other hand, a certain level of social cohesion is necessary for capitalism to exist as it provides social peace and legitimatisation.

In the introduction, we argued that, while social justice, citizenship and conflict have been demoted, social capital has gained prominence as a key element for social inclusion and cohesion. Theories on social capital have emerged to explain the role of social networks in generating social cohesion through empowering excluded populations and helping them to participate in economic growth as well as in political decision-making. In these cases, the concept of social capital has been used, ignoring the role of power and domination (Mayer, 2003). As Maloutas and Malouta noticed (2004, p. 449), the use of ambiguous notions such as social cohesion can be considered as an attempt at reconciling competition with social co-habitation without addressing increasing social inequalities. This is especially visible at the neighbourhood level when local public institutions seek measures to reinforce social capital in order to facilitate urban renewal, economic growth and the labour market insertion of excluded populations (Forrest and Kearns, 2001).

One of the strategies in urban renewal policies is to enhance the sense of belonging (‘community’). Local administrations try to create institutional mechanisms with programmes oriented to reinforce community relations. The assumption is that, through ‘participation’ in civic life, those involved will obtain resources of different kinds. These experiences have had various results. For example, the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal Action Plan, introduced in England in 2001 or the French Politique de Ville with the Contrats des Villes have not always resolved the strong disparities in life chances and consequent difficulties for social inclusion of many young populations in British and French large cities (Lagrange and Oberti, 2006, p. 161). However,

policy increasingly seeks to encourage such activities and solutions … This approach offers an attractive (and cheaper?) alternative for tackling social exclusion and regeneration and illustrates another set of linkages between social capital and social cohesion (Forrest and Kearns, 2001, p. 2139).

The appeal of the creation of cohesive social capital and the apparent equal access to economic progress and decision-making of a heterogeneous civil society is problematic. The use of the term ‘social capital’ in much of the literature focuses on the positive consequences of sociability and disconnects society from coercive power. It obviates the importance of citizens’ rights when institutions use political power to reshape policies that weaken those rights. By focusing on social capital as a non-monetary fount of resources, the strength of the community is put at the centre of the analysis and at the core of policy-makers’ policies without considering more costly economic solutions to social problems (Portes, 1998, p. 3). At the same time, such treatment of social capital, which highlights local community networks as channels for economic activity and social progress, ignores social conflicts for the redistribution of resources and the improvement of life chances of the deprived sectors of society. It also diverts attention from the strong historical role played by social movements in democratic progress and social trust and denies visibility to groups that propose counter-hegemonic objectives (Sommers, 2005, p. 5; Mayer, 2009).

One problem with these programmes lies in the assumption that neighbourhoods and communities not only play an important role in everyday life, but also can mobilise local relations (promoting ‘social capital’) in order to generate social inclusion. However, social exclusion dynamics have wider societal origins and operate independently of the neighbourhood programmes in question (Darcy, 2010; Lupton and Tunstall, 2008). A narrow understanding of social capital as a non-monetary resource cannot rule out more costly economic solutions.

Area-based development programmes, implemented in several cities in the European Union at the neighbourhood level, offer a contrasting example. These involve housing renewal and the provision of neighbourhood services. They combine these redistributive and relational measures—empowering civic life—with resulting benefits for urban renewal and economic growth. What distinguishes these types of ‘area-based approach’ is that they are supported by a city-wide socio-political movement and governance (Moulaert, 2000).

In this section, we have argued that European cities, with increasing social inequalities, are affected by how the welfare states are changing financially and in the rescaling of welfare policies. There is a relationship between changes in governance structures and dynamics and programmes that aim at improving social cohesion. However, there are important contradictions and circular explanations concerning social cohesion as an objective and as a method. The key contradiction is the abandonment of social justice as an objective and the neglect of social citizenship as the most valuable means of social inclusion. Also, top–down approaches tend to underestimate the importance of social mobilisation in urban policies such as neighbourhood renewal, while nevertheless including ‘participation’ as part of policy recommendation.

4. Political Citizenship, Deepening the Participative Debate and the Contribution of Socially Creative Strategies

Let us look again at the challenges to political citizenship and at the contribution of socially creative strategies. The nation-state definition of citizenship is challenged by cross-border identities and solidarities (cosmopolitan or transnational) (Issin and Turner, 2007; Sandercock, 1998). Cities are the sites where this manifests itself clearly: in the problem of access to citizenship for all inhabitants (Issin, 2002; Sassen, 2003). This goal has served as orientation for local governance and the deployment of opportunity structures for the social and political incorporation of migrants in European cities, albeit with different outcomes (Koopmans, 2004).

Urban and regional citizenship is emerging in the literature on governance. Local self-government is key in the production of substantive rights and place-specific obligations (Bauböck, 2003; Desforges et al., 2005). The problem of who belongs to the community, with its peripheries of exclusion, is a challenge. For instance, voting rights for migrants are now part of policy agendas especially in cities dealing with migration and with the social cohesion challenges this generates (Body-Gendrot and Martinello, 2000). Issues of redistribution interact with political citizenship. Who has the right to participate socially and politically?

While issues concerning the redistribution of resources have been blurred with new neo-liberal approaches to social cohesion, the concern with citizens’ participation in governance has achieved considerable attention. We mentioned in the introduction the role of international institutions in fuelling rhetoric on ‘participation’. Academics have been more critical, differentiating types of participation and analysing their positive and negative consequences (proliferation of NIMBY and xenophobic movements) using empirical research (Beaumont and Nicholls, 2008; Gbikpi and Grote, 2002).³

Two paradoxes characterise citizen participation as a key feature of urban governance. The first is that the power of the state is not necessarily diminished, despite the emerging plurality of actors engaged in governance. For example, in new public management the impact of accountability as a bureaucratic practice hinders the creative democratic initiatives of citizens. The second paradox is that the spread of participatory practices as an integral element of new modes of governance does not necessarily empower citizens (Blakeley, 2010, p. 130).

Regarding the second paradox, two complementary views exist in the current literature (Silver et al., 2010). One focuses on the procedural dimension of participatory democracy and puts the emphasis on the possibility of an ‘ideal speech situation’—the ‘Habermasian’ perspective (Silver et al., 2010, p. 454). The second holds that participation is only possible when there are critically conscious communities and when it is possible freely to define and develop those political identities that emerge in the margins of the public sphere (Mayer, 2003, 2009). In this case, the focus is on the conflictive nature of deliberation (and politics) and the emphasis is on power dynamics (Silver et al., 2010, pp. 454–455).

The first approach assumes that multiple actors can achieve rational consensus on certain issues through meaningful and egalitarian communication. It also stresses that institutional forms of traditional liberal democracy need innovative schemes to achieve a more coherent public sphere involving diverse citizens in policy decision-making. For instance, assessing a stronger role for civil society organisation, this perspective has been identified with ‘associational pluralism’ which stresses the importance of associations in encouraging grass-roots active participation in politics (Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Hirst, 2000; Smyth et al., 2004). By enhancing the public sphere with well-designed participatory institutions, fruitful communication and coherent consensus are possible provided that there is a relative balance between stakeholders (Beaumont and Nichols, 2008).

The second perspective does not necessarily exclude the assumptions of the previous one, but emphasises conflict of interests and is less comfortable with the strong emphasis on creating participatory devices to reach consensus. Radical democracy defenders are sceptical about the conditions of free speech created by governmental institutions and instead focus on the power dynamics in the process of deliberation in which political actors should be able to assert multiple identities in a conflictive polity (Fung, 2004; Melo and Baiocchi, 2006). This critical position assumes that, where there is consensus, there is also a silenced margin. Consensus may exist as “a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as stabilisation of power”, with the exclusion of dissent, as Mouffe (2000, p. 17) argues. Pluralistic democracy requires the acknowledgement and respect of conflict. This view goes beyond Habermas’ ‘deliberative democracy’. Some point out that

talk-centric democratic theory replaces voting-centric democratic theory while accountability replaces consent as conceptual core categories (Chambers, 2003; quoted in Gaventa, 2006, p. 18).

Mouffe’s (2000) proposition of an ‘agonistic’ model of democracy, however, sees political confrontation as part of the democratic process in which adversaries are treated as legitimate opponents.

We agree with Silver et al. (2010) in their conclusion of the review of the two theoretical positions (consensus-building vs conflict expression) in that they are complementary in the process of participation provided that democracy is guaranteed. We also agree that

participation is most democratic when it gives voice to everyone, includes and empowers the weak … and promotes redistribution and social justice (Silver et al., 2010, p. 473).

We go beyond their appreciation that “bottom–up mobilisation may coincide with and complement top–down initiatives” (Silver et al., 2010, p. 453) by applying the term bottom-linked as a method of combining channels of participation and producing social innovation. Yet bottom-linked practices require that institutions develop the capacity to deal with conflict, making room for dissent. In this sense, our proposition is closer to the ‘agonistic’ model of democracy defended by Mouffe.

4.1 Bottom-linked Socially Creative Strategies Working for Democratic Participation and Social Justice

A proliferation of civil society associations works to address social exclusion dynamics and develop socially creative strategies in coalition with other civil society actors. Different practices promoted by civil society offer new approaches to redistribution and participation. Examples are: the mutual aid co-operative; sustainable development initiatives; ethical banking and networks promoting the solidarity economy; and housing co-operatives aiming at social transformation. These initiatives are all oriented to reconnect citizenship with redistribution and participation.

Socially creative strategies promoted by some civil society groups, although path-dependent, can generate social innovation in governance (Gerometta et al., 2005; González and Healey, 2005; Moulaert et al., 2007; García et al., 2008). Civil society actors take various roles: they organise, (re)define problems, force transparency of institutional action and legitimate the incorporation of grass-roots movements. Paying attention to these roles puts a different slant on governance and social cohesion.

Multilevel analysis that takes into account interactions between civil society actors and welfare and governance regimes clarifies how in some cases civil society institutionalises its own actions in order to improve socially inclusive governance dynamics, while in other cases civil society tries to construct counter-hegemonic movements against the current consensus. As recent secondary research has shown (KATARSIS),⁴ multilevel governance can contribute to the sustainability of socially creative strategies (García et al., 2008). The term ‘bottom-linked’ helps to address these experiences. It allows seeing how social innovation arising from local citizens’ initiatives that deal with the satisfaction of material and non-material needs and that contributes to a better redistribution of resources can be combined with the actions of public administrations. The democratic calibre of governance dynamics is thereby enhanced.

The internal and external governance dynamics of civil society groups that pursue social justice involve the development of networks outside the neighbourhood or even the municipality. The capacity of civil-society initiatives to lobby and to achieve a certain degree of commitment from public administrations is a way to overcome social exclusion. Many of the agreements between civil society organisations and public administrations are achieved after a period of opposition and collective mobilisation, in many cases followed by a concrete negotiation (Vitale, 2007). Nevertheless, conflict does not always lead to these agreements, partly because institutions are not ready to accept the alternative views put forward by some civil society organisations.

Local governments, as well as international institutions, have paid insufficient attention in the past to the potential offered by grass-roots initiatives in terms of job creation, local development and social cohesion. This is only now beginning to be recognised by official urban policies, with the financial crisis. There is no consensual definition so far of what grass-roots initiatives mean and how to understand the role of urban social movements in governance dynamics (Mayer, 2003, 2009). New alliances for employment are being formed, bringing together community groups, market-oriented initiatives and local government agencies (Nyssens, 2006).

It is a limitation to restrict the scope of civil society initiatives to the local scale. Although it is easiest to identify how civil society organisations are tackling social exclusion at this scale, there are other second- and third-rank organisations representing the interests of civil society initiatives that operate at other geographical scales. Third-sector federations of associations working on social assistance, ethical banking and ecological movements are increasingly aware of the need to enter discussions with regional and national administrations. The question is whether the latter are interested in such discussion.

5. Conclusion

As many authors have pointed out, concepts such as governance, social cohesion and social capital have been used to explain the role of non-economic factors in economic development. Yet these concepts have been used in a diversity of meanings, often without definition. The hegemonic discourse on urban development has also used these concepts as relevant to reorganise social exclusion trajectories and to construct channels for the urban social inclusion of individuals and families, but these debates have served to alter the course of the discussion away from social justice and democratic participation. Policy discourses on governance and social cohesion often ignore power relations, territorial fragmentation and access to social rights. We argue that it is necessary to recapture conflict as well as multilevel and territorial governance analysis in assessing how cities are currently dealing with urban social cohesion.

Despite the optimistic views of the policy discourses on governance, the relationship between governance and social cohesion is neither direct nor automatic. Even though the discourse on ‘good governance’ is now global, its interpretation and implementation have brought different results, depending not only on the transformation of the relevant welfare regime but also on the role of local actors in this process. Depending on the country, we can find different processes of welfare rescaling with different consequences in terms of social cohesion. Moreover, this process of welfare rescaling is not homogeneous in terms of policy fields, given that local actors play a key role in the development of policies and that private actors may play a smaller or bigger role.

Urban governance can bring social cohesion when policy intervention goes beyond the idea of sharing spaces without conflict and takes into account social and cultural differences and acknowledges conflictive views on particular issues (Young, 1990). Citizens develop strategies to challenge policy initiatives or their absence. Often, the objective of citizens’ initiatives is not only to obtain material or immaterial resources for the excluded, but also to redefine norms and values at the root of exclusion. The claims for a redefinition of the notion of citizenship with counter-hegemonic views are clearly along these lines.

Seeing that these issues are not often considered in the literature on governance, this article has tried to look at the role of citizenship challenges, participatory governance and social innovation in fostering democracy. Here lie many new challenges for urban studies: new geographies of citizenship, in which cities could play a significant role; a growing interest in citizen participation; confrontations around the diverse conceptions of citizenship; the increasingly recognised role of civil society initiatives in the fight against social exclusion; the development of citizenship rights; the opening up of democratic spaces of participation and the innovations of institutions in dealing with political dissent.

Finally, considering what urban studies can offer to local practitioners dealing with these themes, it is necessary to bear in mind the lack of standardised empirical data on local initiatives (and grass-roots practices). Indeed, the impact of local creative strategies on democratic governance and social cohesion calls out for empirical analysis in terms of the quantity and quality of jobs created (when we look at social enterprises), civic commitments and citizens’ participation (analysing urban social movements), governing diversity and so on.

Footnotes

Notes

Funding Statement

This research was supported by the European Commission, 7th Framework Programme grant SOCIAL POLIS ‘Social Platform on Cities and Social Cohesion’ (grant number 217157).

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