Abstract
This paper focuses on a relatively overlooked aspect of social polarisation in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei: its gender implications. The transformation of these cities, from industrial to post-industrial cities, has been accompanied by a transition from Chinese patriarchal society to modern society. A dual gendered structure is emerging—a regime of labour intimacy (RLI) under state regulations and a technomuscular capitalism (TMC), presenting itself as a competitive labour market. Migrant workers are introduced to compensate for the loss of household labour, but the wage gap between them and their local counterparts may be controlled. The occupational segmentation and income disparity between men and women are improving because of the upgrade of women’s status. The model of bound RLIs and open TMCs emphasises a more contextually situated construction in which state migration policies and changing gender status play an intermediate role in the division of labour between work and home.
Introduction
Deindustrialisation, a noticeable change from manufacturing to the dramatic growth of financial and business services, is the major characteristic of a world city. The centralisation of production controls and producer services in urban areas has heralded new patterns of income distribution, social and spatial segregation per se and the broader conception of duality, as reflected in a shift of the occupational structure towards a mix of highly skilled and low-skilled jobs (Friedmann, 1986; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991; Sassen, 1991; Fainstein et al., 1992). However, the social polarisation hypothesis has evoked numerous debates, not only over its unpacked definitions and various ways of measurement, but also over its applicability and explanation for globalising cities beyond those in the global north (Hamnett, 1994, 1996; Baum, 1999; Hill and Kim, 2000; Fainstein, 2001; Robinson, 2002; McCann, 2004).
Simultaneously, world cities have witnessed a great transformation not only in employment but also in household structures. Social polarisation, a constructive ideological term, or in Hamnett’s words “an all-purpose general signifier of growing urban inequality and social division” (Hamnett, 2001, p. 167), has been commonly used to denounce different forms of social inequality, exploitation and oppression in the production sphere, but the dimension of reproduction—a dissolving household structure—is neglected. Further research into the effects of the state’s intervention and economic restructuring on gender inequality is still to be undertaken (McCall, 2001; Menahem and Elias, 2007).
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei have high-density populations that are mainly composed of ethnic Chinese. They are Asian world cities in the so-called developmental states, where the state plays a prominent role in their economic development (Hill and Kim, 2000; Tai, 2006). In recent decades, the three cities have experienced rapid industrialisation and subsequently have been transformed from industrial to post-industrial cities. Another common characteristic is the improving status of women, especially in economic and political participation. According to the 2004 Gender Empowerment Measurement (GEM), Singapore and Taiwan are ranked as 18th and 20th among 109 countries, better than Japan, China and South Korea. 1 Hong Kong, although not included in the list, demonstrates itself as a gender equality city as the Women’s Commission has been established since 2001.
A considerable range of studies on the change in labour market and income distribution in Asian world cities has been carried out and the significance of professionalisation in occupational structures has been widely recognised (Baum, 1997, 1999; Wang, 2003; Chiu and Lui, 2004a; Forrest et al., 2004; Tai, 2006, 2010). However, what is the landscape of social polarisation in these Asian world cities when the gender factor is considered? Drawing on a comparative study of the Asian Chinese cities—Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei—this paper examines the changing occupational and income structures and addresses gender dimensions in the transformation of household structures.
Putting Gender into the Social Polarisation Hypothesis
Under the label of ‘social polarisation’, much of the existing empirical literature focuses on spheres of production, mainly looking at the differentiation of employment structures resulting from economic restructuring. However, economic changes have undermined the organisation of labour in both the production and reproduction spheres. Sassen, an oft-quoted expert in the global city literature, has recognised that occupational differentiation brings about a new division between work and home. She puts it as follows The occupational structure of major growth industries characterised by the locational concentration of major growth sectors in global cities in combination with the polarised occupational structure of these sectors has created and contributed to growth of a high-income stratum and a low-income stratum of workers. It has done so directly through the organisation of work and occupational structure of major growth sectors. And it has done so indirectly through the jobs needed to service the new high-income workers, both at work and at home, as well as the needs of the expanded low-wage work force (Sassen, 1991, p. 13).
In global cities, occupational change and household restructuring go hand-in-hand. The reorganisation of work manifests itself in the stratification of women labourers, as Bruegel observes It is possible to see the increasing concentration of women in high-level jobs as having fuelled demand for labour-intensive services, which employ other women, often from migrant/ethnic minority communities in increasingly precious jobs (Bruegel, 1996, p. 1434).
In Europe, the concern for social inequality in the sphere of production has shifted to the sphere of reproduction, especially the impact of welfare states on income distribution, immigration and unemployment. The defining features of social polarisation are linked to the state’s strategic function as a regulator not only in facilitating the market but also in supporting the survival of the underclass. For example, Hamnett (1994, 1996) finds that occupational and educational change could support a world city towards professionalisation, but not necessarily with accompanying income polarisation. In other words, the increase in financial and producer services and their menial workers may not bring about income disparity. The expansion of the underclass can be regarded as a product of the crisis in the welfare state and its function in income distribution, controlling unemployment and regulating immigration (Bruegel, 1996; Burgers, 1996; Nørgaard, 2003).
Similarly, both professionalisation and polarisation have simultaneously emerged in Asian cities. Some comparative studies find a trend of professionalisation accompanying household income polarisation that is mediated through state interventions and the effects of migration. While adopting a similar open migration policy, Singapore, rather than Hong Kong, with a stable government attracts more global élites. In contrast, Taipei faces a brain drain resulting from offshoring and relocation to mainland China (Tai, 2006, 2010). Furthermore, some studies of Asian cities have noted the invisibility of immigrant female workers and their impacts on income distribution (Baum, 1997). Chiu and Lui (2004b) support the social polarisation thesis when migrant workers are included and considered in Hong Kong. In a case study of Singapore, Yeoh (2006) presents a labour market bifurcated by differential politics of inclusion and exclusion which lock transmigrants into two structurally determined sectors of society: one being contract workers recruited reluctantly as a marginalised and flexible labour force in the host households, the other being talented foreign persons enticed into the corporate and professional labour market. Global corporate and managerial labour is sustained by the intimacy of the private sphere where domestic work and motherhood are negotiated between unpaid corporate wives and foreign domestic workers (Weyland, 1997; Yeoh and Huang, 1999).
In contrast with the visibility of female migrant workers, unemployed men tend to remain in the shadows, but are dramatically increasing in number in major urban areas (Armstrong, 1999). Wilson (1987, 1996) finds the working-class Blacks in US industrial cities facing disappearing jobs in the manufacturing sector and having no chance to obtain service and sales jobs, which are disproportionately filled by women. Globalisation and recessions, combined with the changed status of the family, have made men especially vulnerable to unemployment, homelessness and depression (Farley, 1987; Coward, 1999). In the context of the collapse of the predominantly male employment in industry, some feminists have fastened their eyes on the salience of ‘a crisis of masculinity’, the declining status of men and its influences (Faludi, 1999; McDowell, 2001).
In rethinking the intersection of work and family, the work of Chang and Ling (2010) is critical in highlighting the significance of the gendered industrial structure. They constructed a concept of dual labour regimes: technomuscular capitalism (TMC) and the regime of labour intimacy (RLI). On the one hand, the TMC, associated with global finance, trade and telecommunications, is masked as universal Western capitalism, a form of masculinity, or as ‘deregulation’ and ‘privatisation’ which subsumes all local cultures under a global umbrella of aggressive market competition. On the other hand, the RLI is sexualised, racialised and class-based menial service work provided typically by female migrant workers who play a role in sustaining a stable poor workforce for the TMC. This, in turn, releases states from their sovereign duties over flexible production, enabling them to maintain their sexist policies, as well as supporting an ideology of transnational neo-liberalism.
Based on the gender division of labour, the model suggests an expansive understanding of the root cause of rising gender inequality in the global economy. However, it is normative and discursive, and had better be regarded as a hypothesis for analysing production/reproduction, or public/private spheres. To account for the gendering social polarisation theory, the model will be understood in the context of household restructuring through which it occurs, and is influenced by state interventions and institutional functions. In this sense, it suggests that, at the level of the model, it had better be interpreted differently because of the variety of historical, cultural, economic and political windows through which social polarisation is seen.
Methodology
To test the gendering social polarisation hypothesis, the basic question is how to define gender. In general, sex refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, attitudes, behaviours and attributes that a society considers appropriate for men and women. Rubin (1975, p. 165) used the phrase “sex/gender system” to describe “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is shaped by human, social intervention”. Some studies arose, out of a critique of sole sex-based research, for failing to account for actual experience at neglected points of intersection—various socially and culturally constructed categories contributing to systematic social inequality (Collins, 1986; McCall, 2001, 2005; Browne and Misra, 2003).
The primary goal of this paper is to expand research on the intersections between work and the household. It is necessary to consider the ‘sex/gender system’ embedded in the production and reproduction spheres. Gender inequality is initially understood as the disparity of occupation and income between men and women which begs the question as to what distinguishes the division of labour between men and women in different urban developmental trajectories. Institutional functions, specifically the state’s policies and the women’s empowering projects, are important in assessing the inequality of occupations and wages. The comparative characteristics of such designs help to create a form of complexity that can be examined via the sexual categories under the ‘sex/gendered system’.
The statistical information used for this study includes time-series data drawn primarily from government publications and secondary sources. The data on marriage, total fertility rate and crude divorce rate are collected from the websites of the Department of Statistics Singapore, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Hong Kong Women Statistics and Taipei City Statistical Yearbook. Moreover, the materials on occupation and income in Singapore and Hong Kong come mainly from the Laborsta Internet site, provided by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 2 Laborsta provides a useful database for over 80 countries from 1969 to 2008. In contrast, the data for Taipei come from the Taipei City Statistical Abstract, Taipei City Statistical Yearbook, Yearbook of Earnings and Productivity Statistics in Taiwan and Yearbook of Human Resources.
Household Restructuring, Migration and Labour Regimes
A Crisis for Household Production
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei are experiencing a household restructuring and population crisis. As shown in Table 1, there are similar trends in the late marriage age, declining fertility rate and growing divorce rate. In 2010, the median age at marriage for men was 30.0 years in Singapore, 31.2 in Hong Kong and 32.5 in Taipei, increasing from 28.1, 29.1 and 31.3 respectively in 1991. As for women, the median age at marriage was 27.7 years in Singapore, 28.7 in Hong Kong and 30.4 in Taipei, growing from 25.3, 26.2 and 27.9 respectively in 2000. As more men and women remain in the educational system for longer, in Taipei the median age at marriage for women even goes beyond 30 years, later than in Singapore and Hong Kong.
Median age at first marriage, total fertility rate and crude divorce rate in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei, 1990–2010
Data for 1991–99 are compiled based on the number of mean age at the first marriage.
Sources: Women and men in Hong Kong, key statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.hk/publication/stat_report/social_data/B11303032010AN10B0100.pdf); Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, analysis of the change in the total fertility rate (http://www.statistics.gov.hk/publication/feature_article/B70509FC2005XXXXB0100.pdf; Department of Statistics Singapore (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/catalogue.html#demo); Taipei City Statistical Yearbook (http://w2.dbas.taipei.gov.tw/NEWS_WEEKLY/abstract/04.htm).
Late marriage is a decisive factor in family formation, fertility and female labour force participation. In the same period, the total fertility rate has dramatically declined from 1.83 to 1.15 in Singapore and from 1.27 to 1.11 in Hong Kong; in Taipei, there has been a great effect of marriage postponement, with the fertility rate falling from 1.48 to only 0.90. According to the United Nations (2006), the total fertility rates in the cities have fallen to the lowest level in the world and have recorded below-replacement fertility. The amazing decline in fertility results from women becoming independent of traditional family obligations, leading to trends such as delayed marriage, increased singlehood and remaining childless to follow their careers (Friedmann et al., 1984; Jones et al., 2009).
Furthermore, the household structure has become more fragile because of the increase in the divorce rate. In Singapore, the crude divorce rate has jumped from 1.3 to 1.9; simultaneously in Hong Kong it has gone from 0.98 to 2.32 and in Taipei it has gone from 1.85 to 2.33. Chinese women were traditionally disciplined to tolerate an unhappy marriage. However, due to the growing acceptance of divorce and the rise of women’s consciousness, modern Chinese women choose to leave their marriage when they become financially independent of their husbands. The increase in the divorce rate has caused further disintegration in the family structure and composition, producing more isolated and single households.
Consequently women in Asian cities are in a dilemma over careers and families. The pressures of a job are incompatible with the demands of family life and motherhood (Sidney et al., 2010). The collapse of the household has brought a crisis to the reproduction system, which forces these developmental states to adopt social policies to save their lost household labour. One of the possible solutions is to introduce migrant workers.
Migration Policies and Bound RLIs
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei have been marked by a labour shortage, not only in industries but also in households. This has forced the states to introduce female domestic workers from less developed countries. To understand the characteristics of the RLIs, I probe deep into the migration policies, as well as their effects on wage distribution (see Table 2).
Employers’ requirements and working conditions for migrant domestic workers in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei
Sources: Yeoh and Chang (2001); Liu and Chang (2006).
Based on a ‘use-and-discard’ philosophy, the Singaporean state ensures that migrant workers are managed as a reserve army through a short-term work-permit system (Yeoh and Chang, 2001; Yeoh, 2006). Female domestic workers fall outside the protection of the Employment Act and become ‘family members’ supervised by the traditional Chinese patriarchy. On the other hand, there is evidence that domestic service workers are being sought by a growing number of middle-class families. For example, the threshold of household income for an employer should be more than S$30 000 per year, which is even lower than the 2008 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, S$54 693 (US$36 342). The state’s arrangement makes a female domestic worker an appendage of the Singaporean household, brought in by private contract, and made necessary only because the ‘family’ are no longer able to absorb what is traditionally unpaid work (Yeoh, 2006, p. 33).
As in Singapore, in Hong Kong the employment of a foreign domestic helper has become more affordable for middle-class families. The requirement for employers is that their assets should be worth more than HR$350 000, or their household income more than HR$15 000 per month (or HR$180 000 per year), which is also lower than the GDP per capita in 2008, HR$239 900 (US$30 783). However, the Hong Kong government uses the Employment Ordinance to ensure the sufficiency of households and to protect vulnerable domestic workers. A minimum wage system and standard employment contracts were introduced to regulate the relationship between migrant domestic workers and their employers. Furthermore, migrant domestic workers are allowed to engage labour unions to lobby for and address their issues on their behalf. The unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role in ensuring the working conditions and advocating the civil rights of migrant domestic workers (Cheng, 1996).
The Taiwanese government operates a tight migration policy based on a defintion of household need. The total number of domestic workers is decided by a quantitative quota system that comes under the scheme of ‘employment of foreign labour importation’. The eligibility of employers to hire a ‘social welfare foreign worker’ is through the demand evaluation system. Households with children under the age of 6 years or elderly members above the age of 75 years can qualify; households with more than three persons being cared for, and reaching the threshold of 16 points, are permitted one domestic helper. According to the Labour Standards Act, an employer has to provide the minimum wage and healthy security for a domestic worker. Under pressure from civil organisations, the government provides multiple social services and social programmes for migrant workers (Lan, 2008).
Given the different migration schemes, the numbers of female domestic workers are significantly higher in Singapore and Hong Kong than in Taipei. In 2009, the number of households in Singapore was 1 119 600 and the number of female domestic workers was estimated at 150 000 (Liu and Chang, 2006), making up about 18 per cent of the total female labour force. It is estimated that one in every seven households can hire one domestic worker. In Hong Kong, the number of households was 2 311 600, and that of foreign domestic helpers was 267 778, 3 constituting about 15.1 per cent of the total female labour force; thus one in every eight households can hire a foreign domestic helper. In Taipei, the number of households was 969 418, 4 and the number of migrant workers was 35 984. It implies that one in every 30 households has one migrant service worker. In Singapore and Hong Kong, where the entitlement to hire a domestic worker has been extended from high-income to middle-income families, more women are freed from their household duties and strive to occupy higher positions in professional and White-collar employment. Relatively, in Taipei, women are forced to make a choice between home and work because of the greater difficulty in employing labour to cover household duties.
The developmental states stipulate who is included within the protection of the labour laws. In Singapore, the wage gap between migrant domestic workers and their counterparts is decided by private contracts. The average wage of migrant domestic workers is only S$330 per month, the lowest in the three cities. In Hong Kong and Taipei, domestic workers share the same minimum wage guarantee offered to local workers. In Hong Kong, the monthly basic salary should not be lower than that of local workers in a similar industry, about HR$3320 (US$400). In Taipei, the earnings of migrant workers are assured by the minimum wage, about NT$15 864 (US$500). The experiences of the three Asian cities reflect that the gap between migrant workers and their counterparts is mediated by states’ intentions in maintaining household reproduction and controlling ‘the other’ within their territories.
Economic Restructuring and Open TMCs
In these Asian cities, there has been a rise in the female labour participatory rate which has been accompanied by a decrease in the male labour force (see Figure 1). Although the male labour participatory rates are still higher than the female, young women—especially those obtaining higher educational qualifications—are allowed to enter the formal labour market and compete with men.
Labour participatory rate by sex in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei.
The availability of female labour is dependent on the substitution effects of migrant domestic workers. In Hong Kong and Singapore, unpaid household workers are almost squeezed from their households, accounting for only 0.8 per cent and 0.9 per cent of the total female labour force respectively (see Table 3). In Taipei, the proportion of unpaid household workers to the female labour force is relatively high, at 4.6 per cent. Without the support of domestic workers, women in Taipei are forced to choose between their careers and family.
Female labour forces in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei, 2008 (percentages)
On the other hand, men are losing their advantages in what was a traditionally patriarchical society and are facing new challenges in the labour market. In contrast to Singapore, the male unemployment rates in Hong Kong and Taipei have grown higher than the female rates since the 1990s (see Figure 2). Men suffer from the decline in skilled manual employment and the downsizing of the manufacturing sector, trends that challenge the view that women always lose their jobs in economic recessions (Bruegel, 1979; Hegewisch, 2000).
Unemployment rate by sex in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei.
Furthermore, how men and women have performed in the major occupational categories varies (Tables 4 and 5). In Singapore, both men and women are witnessing a trend towards professionalisation. The rate of growth of women in high-level occupational categories, such as managers (133.4 per cent) and professionals (151.2 per cent), was much more rapid than that of men, whose growth rates stand at only 24.3 per cent and 137.0 per cent respectively. Following their growing possession of educational and professional credentials, women have gained access to managerial and professional roles formerly restricted to men.
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei: percentage of men in various occupational categories, 1994–2008
Note: The classification of occupation is based on ISCO-1968 for 1974–93 and ISCO-88 for 1994–2008.
Sources: The Singapore and Hong Kong data are from http://laborsta.ilo.org/default.html; the data for Taipei are from the Taipei City Statistical Yearbook.
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei: percentage of women in various occupational categories, 1994–2008
Note: The classification of occupation is based on ISCO-1968 for 1974–93 and ISCO-88 for 1994–2008.
Sources: The Singapore and Hong Kong data are from http://laborsta.ilo.org/default.html; the data for Taipei are from the Taipei City Statistical Yearbook.
In Hong Kong, there is an increase for both men and women in managerial roles, as well as professional roles, but a decline in clerks and production and related workers. The distribution of women among managers (48.6 per cent) has grown more rapidly than that of men (8.4 per cent), but among professionals, the growth rate is just 47.9 per cent, lower than that of the men, at 71.6 per cent. Further evidence of the difference between Hong Kong and Singapore is that the number of female service workers has grown (34.6 per cent). After 1997, the blurring of boundaries witnessed a significant number of ‘new arrivals’, especially the Chinese spouses of Hong Kong residents. Many such female immigrants had a relatively low level of education and filled low-paying unskilled jobs at the bottom of the economic hierarchy (Siu, 2008). Women confront a stratification of the labour force in relation to the increasing new Chinese immigrants and highly skilled workers.
In Taipei, men showed an increase among professionals (68.2 per cent), clerks (1.9 per cent) and service workers (15.6 per cent), but a decrease among managers (−15.5 per cent) and production and related workers (−31.4 per cent). In contrast, the occupational distribution of women has grown for managers and professionals (13.8 per cent) and technicians (47.1 per cent), but has decreased among clerks (−21.6 per cent), service workers (−12.8 per cent) and production and related workers (−58.0 per cent). As an exception in Asian cities, men in Taipei face a decline in highly skilled occupations related to the emigration of male managers to settle in China (Tai, 2005), accompanying an unexpected growth in low-paid workers.
Evidently these key Asian cities demonstrate the trend towards professionalisation that corresponds to the experiences of cities such as London, Sydney and Cape Town (Hamnett, 1994; Baum, 1997; Jacqueline and Crankshaw, 1999; Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). However, how the gender labour landscapes are emerging in the three cities varies. Professionalisation among both women and men has become evident in Singapore—that is, there has been an increase in highly skilled and a decline in low-skilled jobs. Hong Kong manifests a more stratified female labour market, with an expansion of highly skilled and low-skilled service workers. In contrast, Taipei offers a yet different trend in which men have seen a relative decline in their position as managers and a growth as service workers. One contrast between Hong Kong and Taipei should be remembered: the immigration of Chinese brides increases the number of female service workers in Hong Kong, and the outward migration of Taiwanese male managers results in the degradation of men’s position.
Income Disparity
One crucial aspect of the income distribution in the cities is that the gap between women and men is dwindling (see Figure 3). In the manufacturing industry, women can earn up to 91 per cent of men’s wages in Hong Kong, but only 85 per cent in Taiwan or 65 per cent in Singapore. In the financial industry, the wages of women in Hong Kong go beyond those of men, at about 127 per cent; in contrast, it is just 83 per cent in Taiwan and 68 per cent in Singapore. Further data from Hong Kong (Women’s Commission, 2009) show that women’s salaries are almost on a par with men’s in the category of manager, and even higher than men’s in the positions of technicians and associate professionals (p. 25). In addition, women can earn a higher income in the transport, storage and communications industries and obtain similar wages to men in finance, insurance, real estate and business services (p. 27). Although the wage gap between men and women has been maintained, the case of Hong Kong suggests that women may have the advantage in the advanced service economy. The growth of service-sector employment produces more sex-neutral occupations, in which skill and intelligence matter more than biological attributes, strength or energy. Women may have a level playing-field to compete with men in an open labour market.
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan: the percentage of women’s wages to those of men.
Concluding Remarks: Bound RLIs and Open TMCs
Since much research on social polarisation has emphasised the characteristics of professionalisation in Asian world cities, the gender dimension remains an important avenue for further research. Although there is no simple and straightforward way to respond to the changes in work and households, this paper attempts to shift the exclusive focus on the growing inequality between highly skilled professionals and low-wage migrant workers to a broader emphasis on the context of inequality brought on by migration policies and the gender division of labour.
To understand the issue, a model of the dual gendered labour regimes by Chang and Ling (2010) has been examined. The RLIs in developmental states present bound structures mediated by a state’s controls on migration. First, migration policies directly determine the number, income and welfare of migrant domestic workers, and their substitution effects for local household labourers. By contrast, the effect is not as significant in Taipei as in Singapore and Hong Kong, where women’s household positions are replaced by a huge number of domestic workers. Taipei has the lowest female participatory rate and faces the most serious reproduction crisis. Secondly, the wage gaps between migrant domestic workers and their counterparts are highly controlled and determined by states’ regulations. Migrant domestic workers in Singapore receive the lowest payment of the three cities, earning less than in Taipei and Hong Kong, where the governments endorse a minimum wage system and labour regulations to ensure they enjoy rights similar to those of local workers. At the other end of the spectrum, the TMCs in the three cities present a common characteristic of professionalisation. However, men and women develop towards professionalisation only in Singapore; in contrast, women face a stratification of the labour force in Hong Kong, and men have seen a drop in their relative positioning in the labour market in Taipei.
Although the comparatively disadvantaged status of women in occupation and income has not yet fundamentally changed (Ngo, 1997; Chang and England, 2011), the wage gap between men and women is decreasing. In the new advanced economies, more opportunities are open for women who possess a high level of skills and educational attainment when they are freed from the home. Especially in Hong Kong, the outstanding performance of women in industries such as finance and banking, in contrast to men’s performance in technology and manufacturing, will raise women’s income and diminish gender wage inequality.
The gendering social polarisation can remind us of some ignored points in Asian cities. First, the bound RLIs, a regime of intimacy, are regulated by the state’s migration policy. As an independent city-state, the Singaporean government can implement an effective policy to attract global talents and exclude undesired immigrants. In contrast, the governments of both Hong Kong and Taipei are facing transborder movements between their territories and mainland China. We can see different intimacy regimes being associated with specific considerations on migration policies, such as the state’s status, gender roles and other social forces. Secondly, the open TMC, a technomuscular capitalism, presents itself as a competitive labour market. In the advanced service economy, especially in Hong Kong and Taipei, men are losing their privileged status and suffering more from the downsizing of the manufacturing sector. The upgrade of women is visible, while the downgrade of men is largely ignored in Asian world cities, where racial discrimination is not as serious as in the cases of their Western counterparts (Farley, 1987; Wilson, 1987; Armstrong, 1999).
The findings suggest that the gendering division of labour in production and reproduction, employment and unemployment is an important consideration in exploring the gender issues in the social polarisation thesis. To understand the full picture of the division of labour between work and home it is necessary to examine the changing household structures and the gender division of labour in the interplay of state’s policies and women’s empowerment. The bound RLIs show the developmental states’ intentions in maintaining and supporting household reproduction by migration policies; the open TMCs illustrate how global capitalism has defeated the traditional Chinese patriarchy and taken possession of women’s labour to contribute to the new service economy. The revised model of bound RLIs and open TMCs may be the first point of entry for scholars who are interested in social polarisation and gender inequality in Asian cities and their successors in the process of globalisation.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Professor Ronan Paddison, without whose suggestions and editing this article could not have been finished.
Notes
Funding
This research was funded by the National Science Council, Taiwan (R.O.C.) in 2007.