The politics of sustainable development opposition: State legislative efforts to stop the United Nation’s Agenda 21 in the United States

Abstract

The Tea Party exploded on the US political scene with President Barack Obama’s election and scholarly research focuses on its role in national issues. However, Tea Party and property rights advocates, among others, also fiercely oppose sustainability city planning issues, recently having legislation introduced in 26 US states to stop such practices. They perceive planning as directly connected to the United Nation’s 1992 document, Agenda 21: the Rio Declaration on Development and Environment. The counter-narrative suggests the UN seeks to restrict individual property rights and American sovereignty. Meanwhile, Agenda 21-related planning is favourably considered and practiced worldwide. Through a mixed-methods approach using quantitative and case-based research, we track the opposition’s emergence through the introduction and sometimes adoption of state legislation. We draw conclusions and implications for research and practice using a theoretical framework routed in scholarship from planning, geography, political science, and communications/new media.

Keywords

Agenda 21 sustainability sustainable development policy diffusion policy mobilities

… The United Nations Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of environmental extremism, social engineering and global political control … This United Nations Agenda 21 plan of radical so-called ‘sustainable development’ views the American way of life of private property ownership, single family homes, private car ownership, individual travel choices and privately owned farms as destructive to the Environment…

Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Kansas:

That we recognize the destructive and insidious nature of United Nations

Agenda 21 and hereby expose to public policy makers the dangerous intent of the plan;

State of Kansas Approved House Resolution (2012)

For more than 20 years, the United Nations’ Agenda 21: The Rio Declaration on Development and Environment, a source document on sustainable development, was little known to US city planners. However, it recently became a rallying cry for Tea Party, property rights advocates and others, who succeeded in getting anti-Agenda 21 legislation introduced in half of the state legislatures. They argue it undermines American liberties to thwart planning meetings across the USA. This informal loose coalition of anti-Agenda 21 activists (the ‘no-21 coalition’ for brevity) promotes state legislation throughout the nation by developing a counter-narrative suggesting the UN seeks to restrict individual property rights and redistribute wealth from developed to developing nations in the name of questionable climate science (e.g. Americans Against Agenda 21, n.d.; American Policy Center, n.d.; John Birch Society, n.d.; Koire, 2011). Concerns about American sovereignty are not new, nor are assertions of a UN-led ‘one-world government’ domination, which undergird this narrative (Allen and Abraham, 1971; Foley, 2012; Postel, 2012), but what is new is the degree of legislative activism targeting city and regional sustainability planning efforts.

This paper seeks to understand this trend and legislative activity through examining the proposal and passage of bills aimed at stopping Agenda 21-oriented practices by individual states and their respective political subdivisions of cities, counties, regional agencies and special districts. The proposed bills take the form of binding legislation or non-binding resolutions, and use language similar to Kansas’ resolution cited above, the US Republican Party’s 2012 platform, and Alabama’s 2012 enacted binding legislation – the first bill enacted passing out of both chambers unanimously. With respect to the Alabama bill, there are no documented efforts to implement it and legislative staff did not provide rigorous analyses of its impact. However, its broad language makes its practical effect unclear. An Alabama advocate opposed to Agenda 21 claims one city recently stopped adoption of its comprehensive plan because of the legislation. Another interviewee speculated its future implementation through filed lawsuits rather than through state intervention.

The no-21 coalition loosely consists of several thousand individuals throughout the USA in a group called ‘Americans Against Agenda 21’, which self-identifies as ‘AgEnders’ and numerous others actively engaged but not part of this group. Activists affiliate with local Tea Party, property rights and liberty groups among others. The John Birch Society and American Policy Center promote opposition and the legislation. Activists suggest the counter-movement transcends political lines and cite the northern California-based group, Democrats Against Agenda 21 and affiliated Post-Sustainability Institute, who argue public planning processes purposely block genuine citizen input; unelected, regional bodies are unconstitutional; and, redevelopment and sustainability planning infringe upon on property rights.

Notably, former Fox News host Glenn Beck added his name to a dystopian futuristic novel with an afterword that instructs citizens on recognising and stopping Agenda 21 (Beck and Parke, 2012). The no-21 Coalition has widely circulated training materials, YouTube videos, and tool kits for purchase (e.g. http://store.americanpolicy.org/collections/action-kit-1; www.agenda21course.com; http://sustainablefreedomlab.org/store/#). Agenda 21 opponents counsel cities to ‘get out of ICLEI’ by cancelling their memberships to ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives), which assists cities with climate action planning. Some websites claim that upwards of 135 US cities have done so (e.g. Sustainable Liberty, n.d.; VirginaRight!, 2012). National and local planning and advocacy organisations quickly responded by offering targeted training and informational materials to their membership.

Given the no-21 coalition’s novelty, there has been little scholarly research on Agenda 21 opposition at the state or local level. Our analysis focuses on state legislation because of the potential policy and planning impact to a state and its political subdivisions, including local and regional government. Importantly, states nationwide have enacted climate-related and smart growth/sustainability policies, which affect local planning policies and activities (e.g. Barbour and Deakin, 2012; Chapin, 2012; DeGrove, 2005; Rabe, 2009). To this end, anti-Agenda 21 actors view the state as the key sovereign political unit for dismantling sustainability planning efforts, particularly as cities nationwide pursue climate action planning (Krause, 2012).

Our research design is framed within Tea Party/property rights scholarship; however, there is scant literature to date on Agenda 21 or Tea Party planning-related concerns (e.g. Marcuse, 2010; Throgmorton, 2013; Whittemore, 2013). To the extent empirical work exists, it draws from a small sample of localised cases (Filion, 2011; Hurley and Walker, 2004; Whittemore, 2013). To our knowledge, there is little published planning research drawing from in-depth interviews with Tea Party affiliates except for a recent study that examines regional planning in the San Francisco Bay Area, California and Atlanta, Georgia regions (Trapenberg Frick, 2014). Our research begins to address this gap though examining opposition at the state level, a core legislative unit within the US federalist system held dear to ‘constitutional loyalists’ and Tea Party affiliates (Foley, 2012). We also benefit from insights through interviews we conducted with Tea Party members among others.

Our research design takes inspiration from McCann and Ward’s (2013) call for a multidisciplinary approach and draws from the policy mobilities research as Tea Party/property rights activists are similarly sceptical about the circulation of planning policies. For greater insights on the quick spread of legislation, we look to Boushey’s work in political science on diffusion dynamics, which are ‘the processes underlying the stable, gradual diffusion of innovations over time and the sudden policy shocks precipitating positive feedback cycles and rapid policy mimicking across states’ (Boushey, 2010: 215–216). Finally, we draw on communications and new media scholarship to situate the role of internet technologies and social movement organising in this phenomenon.

After developing the theoretical context, we present our mixed-methods research approach to understand Agenda 21’s rapid ascendance on state legislative agendas nationwide. We then present a bill synopsis, summary statistics and regression analysis to reveal patterns and relationships between key sociodemographic and other variables in states where legislation has been introduced to prohibit Agenda 21. The purpose of the quantitative analysis is to test theoretical expectations about what state-level characteristics make some state legislatures more likely than others to introduce anti-Agenda 21 legislation. We use 2010 as our base year for the analysis because states were not subject to introducing such legislation until after the very recent rise of the general anti-Agenda 21 movement.

To ground our analysis, we then focus on a representative case, the state of Arizona as its population’s sociodemographic characteristics and key actors’ narratives and modes of participation parallel findings from the literature and our quantitative analysis. We conclude with policy implications for research and practice.

Theoretical context across diffuse streams

To frame our discussion, we connect three diffuse streams of scholarly literature in the areas of Tea Party/property rights positions, policy diffusion, communications/new media.

Tea Party and property rights ideals diffusion

Scholarly research on the Tea Party focuses on its explosive impact on national politics following President Barack Obama’s election. There is much deliberation over whether it will be a continuing political force; however, a recent Pew Research Center (2013) survey indicated Tea Party movement support by 42% of Republican/Republican-leaning voters and that Tea Party members compose 49% of the Republican voting electorate in government primaries (Pew Research Center, 2013: 4, 11). That said, labelling the numerous actors as part of a single unified movement is problematic because self-identified Tea Party participants state there are no declared leaders or organisations guiding the movement. However, major guiding forces or financial supporters often identified include FreedomWorks, previously led by former House majority leader, Congressman Dick Armey, the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute and Americans for Prosperity. The Koch brothers, David and Charles, are cited for funding the latter groups and other Tea Party efforts. Conservative Fox News Network plays a role challenging mainstream news and sustaining Tea Party narratives (Lo, 2012; Postel, 2012). That said, Abramowitz argues, ‘Any successful social movement requires both leadership and organisation and a grassroots army of sympathizers to respond to those leaders and organisations, and the Tea Party movement is no exception’ (2012: 192).

The current opposition is embedded in a history of conservative concerns and growing conservative movement focused on preservation of individual rights and reduction in government and taxation (Abramowitz, 2012; Postel, 2012; Rosenthal and Trost, 2012). Oft-cited Tea Party positions in the literature and popular press coverage follow suit and with attention to protecting a free market economy and personal property rights – hallmarks of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2007: 2), the tenets of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, and Medicare and Social Security benefits. Heightened opposition is exhibited toward the Obama administration’s healthcare legislation, ‘bailouts’ of financial institutions and climate change science. Much concern is expressed about immigration and US citizenship and with ‘the establishment’ and ‘the elite’, including long-time congressional members, President Obama and academic researchers.

Property rights concerns are not new to planning, often centering on NIMBY (not in my backyard) development projects, affordable housing, growth management, environmental and land use planning, and eminent domain issues (e.g. Chapin, 2012; Dear, 1992; Jacobs, 1998, 2010). However, the no-21 coalition directs its opposition at regional planning and associated unelected boards who are seen as unconstitutional; sustainability planning which is perceived as limiting property rights and other individual freedoms; and public engagement processes which are considered as staged to facilitate predetermined outcomes of selecting mobile sustainability-based policies that similarly appear nationwide.

Tea Party narratives frame the above concerns in various ways including:

Activists as ‘Citizen Patriots’ confronting threats posed by ‘big government’ (Ashbee, 2011).

Citizens recounting a ‘founders’ tale of the USA’ rooted in home ownership and citizenship and embedded with a sense of place, history, and memory of ‘the way things were’ that must be protected from external threats (Throgmorton, 2013).

Attacks on the middle class as it ‘… is being squeezed into the poorhouse by parasitic forces above and below them on the socioeconomic ladder’, which Berlet (2012) identifies as a conservative conception of producerism which distinguishes between legitimate producers of wealth – workers versus social aid recipients also sometimes referred to as ‘moochers’ (e.g. Skocpol and Williamson, 2011).

A sense of romanticism for a movement ‘composed of political neophytes “jolted in to action by economic distress”’ (Disch, 2012).

Regardless of the Tea Party’s durability as a social movement, researchers generally point to the enduring effect a movement may have beyond its tenure in impacting policy discussions, design and implementation (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005).

Policy diffusion

Spanning several fields, policy diffusion scholarship considers the spread of innovation from subnational to global scales. The policy mobilities and worlding literature focuses on power dynamics and larger forces in the diffusion of policies (González, 2011; Lee and Hwang, 2012). It challenges the prevailing implementation of neoliberalist pro-market-based interventions internationally and how we understand them (McCann, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2011, 2013; Peck, 2011a; Roy, 2011). Related research examines the rapid speed of transnational of ‘fast policy’ transfer and integration of ‘best practice’ models (e.g. Peck, 2002, 2011b; Peck and Theodore, 2010). Purcell cautions that unelected, appointed panels and non-profit organisations often are key figures, which in turn supplants governmental and citizen-based democratic participation in decision-making (2008: 27). Parallel work is found in the circulation of planning ideas and ‘how they land’ (Healey and Upton, 2010) including New Urbanist/Smart Growth design efforts and the major role that certain actors, such as consultants/renowned planners and architects play in knowledge transfer across locales (e.g. Khirfan and Jaffer, 2013; MacLeod, 2013).

These scholars argue the policy transfer research of political scientists and public policy view is devoid of rigorous analysis of power relations and larger forces of neoliberalism, and lacking in ethnographic approaches (McCann, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2011, 2013; Peck, 2011a). However, in the spirit of a multidisciplinary approach (McCann and Ward, 2013), the broader policy diffusion literature provides useful frames for examining the speed and scope of proposed legislation between US states. Karch views political innovations as ‘… virtually everything that is contested and contestable about politics’, ranging from ideas on ways to govern to interest group evolution (2007: 2). The speed at which innovations diffuse ranges from gradual, incremental buildup across states to ‘“policy outbreaks”– a process characterized by a positive feedback cycle leading to the extremely rapid adoption of policy innovation across states’ (Boushey, 2010: 5). Focusing events, such as a major disaster or media coverage, may trigger a ‘policy bandwagon’ of state imitation and mimicry (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2012: 142). National policy attention, federal grants and mandates influence state legislative agendas (Boushey, 2012; Karch, 2007). And the US federalist system allows for ‘venue shopping, a process where activists and interest groups strategically exploit the multiple venues of government to secure support for their legislative programs’. A controversial measure successfully adopted in one venue appears legitimate and inspires pursuit in another (Boushey, 2010: 145–146). Geographically diverse professional organisations and advocacy group networks facilitate venue cross-fertilisation (Boushey, 2012: 131–132). State legislatures swiftly adopt laws, such as term limits and property tax rate stabilisations (Martin, 2008), with ‘decision making driven by elevated attention, emotional reasoning, and policy imitation’ (Boushey, 2010: 24). The simpler the law, the more quickly its consideration spreads across states if it resonates with public sentiment (Boushey, 2010: 89).

The policy diffusion literature focuses on policy adoption; however, Karch argues for a broader process-oriented approach that examines policy introduction for understanding how ‘officials become aware of policy innovations, gather information about them, and amend them’ (2007: 26). Thus, in building from the agenda-setting literature (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 1995), a policy introduced in many states may be emblematic of larger issues worthy of study, including venue-shopping/inspiration, issue salience and actor communication and mobilisation networks.

Information and communication diffusion

Building on Boushey’s metaphor of policy outbreaks, information goes viral through the internet and scholarly research in political science, communications/new media and sociology examines the role of this information in social movements (e.g. Atkinson and Leon Berg, 2012; Bennett, 2012). In an analysis of Occupy in the US and related protests worldwide, Castells (2012) argues new social movement forms have emerged because of this rapid, interactive and pervasive flow of communication. Communication between individuals about their shared emotions and situations provides the fuel for potential new movements ‘inspiring the next one by networking images and messages in the internet’ (Castells, 2012: 221).

Bennett (2012) terms such mobilisations as Digital Networked Action. Grounded in Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005), Bennett and Segerberg (2012) consider public engagement, organisational form and relationships between actors in a digital era. They argue that the logic of collective action is no longer the primary mode of social movements, which traditionally are highly organised through formal groups with access to resources and official member participants. Rather, a new logic of connective action is emerging with blended constellations of actors engaging and impacting contentious political debates. Actors range from loosely connected, unaffiliated individuals to informal groups and highly structured groups including non-profit organisations and think tanks, also often referred to as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in agenda-setting/policy diffusion literature (e.g. Boushey, 2010; Kingdon, 1995).

The resultant activity takes many forms, which sociologists call repertoires of contention – the ways in which people participate in social movements, including traditional forms, such as protests, petitions and marches (e.g. Tarrow, 1993; Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004; Tilly, 2006). Digital strategies have emerged, including email campaigns, blogging and website and YouTube development. ‘One-click actions’ occur where online users transmit an email and sign a petition in tandem, reducing transaction costs (Earl and Kimport, 2011; Rainie and Wellman, 2012; Rolfe, 2005).

Chadwick (2013) similarly asserts that a newer hybrid system of political media communication has emerged where traditional media forms (TV, radio and cable) and digital media coevolve. For example, a traditional or cable news clip often is broadcasted widely through social media or embedded in a blog or email to reach a larger audience which can grow exponentially as viewers forward or repurpose the material. Chadwick (2013: 207) asserts that the result can lead to a major shift in power relations between political actors, which include mainstream media outlets, public/elected officials, formal and informal organisations, bloggers and activists among others.

Synthesising the literature

To frame our research design, we synthesise the above literature into four structuring points:

Tea Party/property rights conservatism and activism stem from deep concerns about the role of government and level of public expenditures, the economy and property rights, climate change science and environmental regulation among others. These concerns are exhibited in the four narratives of citizen patriots, Founder’s tale of the USA, the middle class under attack and citizens jolted into action. Tea Party affiliates constitute a large component of the Republican electorate.

Planning policies are highly mobile from one locale as they are replicated, altered and implemented throughout the globe. Certain actors, such as consultants and non-profit organisations, facilitate this diffusion and implementation. Scholarly research has called attention to the disparate, unequal impacts this ‘fast’ policy spread can have on local communities and power relations.

Policies can diffuse quickly, called ‘policy outbreaks’ in the form of state legislation as local and state actors imitate and potentially tailor legislation across venues. Bill introduction is a critical component for understanding venue-shopping/inspiration and customisation, issue salience and communication/mobilisation networks.

Internet-based communication facilitates connective action, a new social movement form, between activists and others for rapidly sharing and organising around contentious issues within and across geographies virtually and locally. As a result, a blended repertoire of contention mixing digital and traditional strategies of political engagement has emerged. These new technologies in combination with prior technologies (e.g. radio, TV) have resulted in a hybrid media that plays a key role in shifting power relations between key actors.

Research design

We used a mixed-methods approach to examine the four structuring points derived above from the literature through multiple vantage points. We undertook an exploratory quantitative comparative assessment of all 50 states constructing a national data base of state-level data gathered from a variety of sources, reflecting the year 2010 unless otherwise noted. We selected the year 2010 as our primary analytic time point because prior to 2010 the general anti-Agenda 21 movement had not gained momentum and only recently were states nationwide presented with the opportunity to introduce legislation after the movement’s rise into greater public consciousness. Variable selection was based on the Tea Party/property rights literature and narratives (Point #1) with the variables and respective data categorised as follows:¹

‘Citizen Patriots’ (role of government and political ideology): state expenditures on health, public welfare and highways; states with National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)-like environmental planning requirements; and, voting patterns in the 2010 congressional elections.

‘Founder’s Tale’ (as related primarily to homeownership and home value): homeownership; housing vacancy rates; percent change in house prices from 2007 to 2010; delinquent mortgage balance; and, foreclosure rates.

‘Middle Class Under Attack’ (economic conditions and other potential factors): income inequality;² unemployment; per capita GDP; and, employment for key sectors, change in urban and rural shares of population and housing stock; race; and, vehicle ownership.

We then used this data base to explore our theoretical expectations and examine potential differences between states that do or do not introduce anti-Agenda 21 legislation. Given that the legislative policy outbreak just began with some states having bills reintroduced or shifting from resolution to binding legislation as discussed below, our analysis follows Karch who argues that bill introduction is critical for better understanding policy diffusion because it signifies legislators’, advocacy groups’ and others’ attention to an issue (2007: 69) and venue-shopping, which in our case may lead to subsequent bill introduction in other states via connective action even if one or several fail initially (Points #3 and 4). According a John Birch Society-affiliated interviewee, even failed bills and associated legislative hearings have an important function as these ‘… serve the purpose of educating the people on the subject. They become a news piece’. Even bad press is good press he argues: ‘People do read between the lines that we reach out to. When they see an article that is left wing, they think there must be some validity’. A longer-term future analysis would be worthwhile that examines the full cycle of the legislative review by state and bill type (binding versus resolution) once the policy outbreak appears settled, and whose framework could build on our research design and findings.

For our bill introduction analysis, average values were calculated initially across states that introduced anti-Agenda 21 legislation and states that did not (Table 2). We then analysed the data in a logistic regression testing a variety of model specifications to assess which variables had the greatest explanatory power in predicting the introduction of anti-Agenda 21 legislation. Table 3 presents the results of a binary logistic regression, with an indicator of whether states introduced anti-Agenda 21 legislation as the dependent variable with each state only counted once, and the independent variables identified in the model specification process.

To provide a fuller assessment, we developed a synopsis of legislative activity across the USA and a qualitative case study exploring legislative efforts in Arizona, a representative case as later discussed. We carefully assessed content across interviews we conducted and document/internet-based material to triangulate sources with respect to prevailing narratives, motivations and modes of participation including connective action (Points #1 to 4). We then synthesised this information for the case description and findings drawing out key points of emphasis that were in line with the four structuring points from the literature and to complement the quantitative analysis. Evidence was gathered systematically through detailed review of key documents and online sources of public agencies, state legislatures, activists, non-profit organisations and others, including legislative hearings and testimonies, websites, blogs and social media platforms. For online material, we focused on prominent groups and actors’ communications, particularly related to their legislative efforts by following links between websites/other internet platforms and activists to tease out connections and relationships. We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews of 21 leading participants and observers of anti-Agenda 21 mobilisation in Arizona and the USA with high levels of legislative activity. The sample was designed to have an even distribution of those who support versus oppose sustainability planning across stakeholder categories: Tea Party/property rights affiliates (11), public agency staff (5), and activists and representatives of non-profit organisations supportive of sustainability planning (5). Interviews typically lasted from one to two hours.

Finally, although legislation has not been introduced in California, our interviews and document analysis revealed to our surprise that San Francisco Bay Area advocates feature prominently in the debates nationwide by means of social media/blog postings, in-person talks, training sessions and radio/television interviews; a key Bay Area activist played a leading role providing extensive legislative testimony in Arizona for example. Fellow advocates across the USA regularly highlight and link to their work; several non-California interview subjects mentioned them without prompting. Thus, we elected to draw from participant observation for two years in a regional planning process in the San Francisco Bay Area where strong anti-Agenda 21 sentiment continues. This allowed us to witness how the opposition organises and evolves and how the planning community responds in real-time.

Synopsis of oppositional legislation and patterns in state characteristics

This section provides a brief overview of Agenda 21 and synopsis of legislative activity throughout the USA. It then examines patterns in state characteristics relative to bill introduction.

Agenda 21 and oppositional legislative activity

Nearly 180 UN member states adopted the Agenda 21 declaration, which was presented at the 1992 Earth Summit/United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is a voluntary, non-binding 350-page declaration signed by Presidents George HW Bush and Bill Clinton. The document covers four main areas of sustainable development: social and economic dimensions; conservation and management of natural resources; involvement of major groups; and implementation. Although the declaration is non-binding, property rights and Tea Party-affiliated interviewees and others assert that legislation is needed because the US federal government offers grants to manipulate state and local governments into implementing Agenda 21 and enacted Agenda 21-based regulations to restrict private property rights. The rhetoric used suggests planners at all levels of government wear the ‘green mask’ of sustainability to shroud intent to similarly restrict private property rights and individual liberties (e.g. American Policy Center, n.d.; Koire, 2011)

Some activists recognise that environmental/sustainability practices were in place prior to 1992 including the National Environmental Protection Act, but they maintain that Agenda 21 is the UN, ‘globalists’ and ‘sustainablists’’ attempt to create a new world order to undo the US’ sovereignty and instituting socialism and communism to redistribute wealth. The UN’s US office responds that Agenda 21 does not usurp state sovereignty and is not a covert means to seek one world domination (United Nations Association of the United States of America, n.d.).

Some observers have named the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) as a behind-the-scenes supporter given its history of creating legislative templates in line with its mission of ‘expanding free markets, limited government, and individual liberty’ (ALEC, n.d.a). ALEC describes itself as ‘the state legislators’ think tank’ with membership of 2000 state legislators (ALEC, n.d.b) and openly works on anti-climate change and anti-UN initiatives; however, ALEC staff interviewed noted it has not posted model oppositional Agenda 21 legislation and thus does not have an official position.

From 2012 to early 2013, legislators in at least 26 states introduced anti-Agenda 21 legislation (Table 1 and Figure 1). All bills oppose or restrict Agenda 21 practices and object to any relationships with the UN and non-governmental organisations including ICLEI, which are often named and seen as key agents influencing sustainability policy diffusion across the USA. The notion of transfer agents echoes the policy mobilities literature, which finds that various actors are critical to facilitating diffusion of planning ideas (e.g. Khirfan and Jaffer, 2013; MacLeod, 2013).

Table 1.

Anti-Agenda 21 legislative history, January 2012 to November 15, 2013.

State	Bill number(s)	Bill or Resolution	Date introduced	Status as of 15 November 2013	Bill passed out of original Chamber
Alabama	SB 477	Bill	5 Apr. 2012	Passed	Yes
Arizona	SB 1507	Bill	31 Jan. 2012	Failed	Yes
Arizona	SB 1403	Bill	5 Feb. 2013	Failed	Yes
Florida	HM 1187	Resolution	1 Mar. 2013	Failed	N/A
Georgia	SR 730	Resolution	24 Jan. /2012	Failed	N/A
Indiana	HB 1021	Bill	7 Jan. 2013	In progress	No
Iowa	HR 124	Resolution	2 Mar. 2012	Failed	N/A
Iowa	HF 66	Bill	24 Jan. 2013	In progress	In progress
Kansas	HR 6032	Resolution	2 May 2012	Passed	N/A
Kansas	HB 2366	Bill	15 Feb. 2013	In progress	In progress
Kentucky	SB 80	Bill	5 Feb. 2013	Failed	Yes
Louisiana	HCR 89	Resolution	16 Apr. 2012	Failed	N/A
Maine	LD 220 (HP 181)	Bill	5 Feb. 2013	Failed	Yes
Michigan	HB 5785	Bill	17 Jul. 2012	Failed	No
Minnesota	HF 2558, SF 2117	Bill to Study	27 Feb. 2012	Failed	No
Minnesota	SF 325	Bill	7 Feb. 2013	In progress	In progress
Mississippi	HB 801	Bill	20 Feb. 2012	Failed	No
Missouri	HB 42, SB 265	Bill	4 Dec. 2012	Failed	Yes, but vetoed by Governor
Nebraska	LB 482	Bill	22 Jan. 2013	Failed	No
New Hampshire	HB 1634	Bill to Study	4 Jan. 2012	Failed	No
New Hampshire	SB 217	Bill	4 Jan. 2012	Failed	Yes
New Hampshire	HB 144	Bill	3 Jan. 2013	Failed	No
New Mexico	HM 96	Resolution	7 Mar. 2013	Failed	N/A
North Carolina	HJR 983	Resolution	16 May 2012	Failed	No
Oklahoma	SB 23, HB1412	Bill	17 Dec. 2012	Failed	Yes
Oklahoma	HJR 1072	Resolution	6 Feb. 2012	Failed	No
South Carolina	S 1254	Resolution	23 Feb. 2012	Failed	N/A
South Carolina	H 4818	Resolution	22 Feb. 2012	Failed	N/A
South Carolina	S 1251	Resolution	22 Feb. 2012	Failed	N/A
South Dakota	HCR 1008	Resolution	19 Feb. 2013	Passed	Yes
South Dakota	HB 1190	Bill	25 Jan. 2013	Failed	No
Tennessee	HJR 587	Resolution	19 Jan. 2012	Passed legislature; Governor did not sign but is not required to	Yes
Tennessee	SB 3407, HB 3571	Bill	26 Jan. 2012	Failed	No
Tennessee	HB 109, SB 1014	Bill	28 Jan. 2013	In progress	In progress
Texas	HCR 34	Resolution	30 Jan. 2013	Failed	No
Utah	SJR 11	Resolution	6 Feb. 2013	Passed	Yes
Virginia	HB 2081	Bill	9 Jan. 2013	Failed	No
Virginia	HB 2223	Bill	11 Jan. 2013	Failed	No
Virginia	HJ 654	Resolution	8 Jan. 2013	Failed	Yes
Washington	HB 1164	Bill	17 Jan. 2013	Failed	No
Washington	SB 5011	Bill	9 Jan. 2013	Failed	No

Figure 1.

Status of state legislation in relation to the percentage of votes for Republican candidates for US Congress House seats in the 2010 federal elections.

Some states had multiple bills introduced and included both binding legislation and resolutions. In total, 27 bills were introduced to prohibit Agenda 21 practices; two bills proposed the establishment of study committees to review Agenda 21 (Minnesota and New Hampshire); and 16 were non-binding resolutions. To date, Alabama is the only state to enact binding legislation. Missouri’s Governor Jeremiah Nixon, a Democrat, recently vetoed similar binding legislation noting difficulty with the bill’s implementation and the potential for lawsuits (Nixon, 2013). In this short period, four states passed resolutions: Kansas, South Dakota, Tennessee and Utah. Of these, all but Utah also had binding legislation introduced. In a major departure, Utah is the only state to endorse regional planning and collaborative processes, likely because of its experience with Envision Utah, a multiyear public/private planning process whereas most bills oppose such activities. The resolution notes that regional and local planning pre-dates Agenda 21 and supports ‘… locally directed regional planning efforts that are occurring in Utah and encourages other states to look to the Utah model of collaboration that protects local sovereignty and private property rights’ (State of Utah, SJR 11, 2013: 4).

To date, four bills are active and 31 failed. About one-third of the failed bills that were to be heard in both houses passed out of the house of origin – often with high votes in support and along party lines with Republican members in favour. While sustainability proponents interviewed interpret bill failure as success, they acknowledge the issue likely will resurface. Tea Party/property rights interviewees and others also see success in that the bills that have moved out of one chamber as promise for the future. Although non-binding resolutions do not have the force of law, activists consider passed resolutions as the foundation for subsequent binding legislation and as motivation to colleagues for replication nationwide. They hope the resolutions will cause a chilling effect³ whereby states, regional agencies and cities would be reticent to implement Agenda 21-like practices for fear of provoking future negative public debates and interactions.

Unpacking patterns in state characteristics

Table 2 presents a comparison of the average values of key variables among states that did or did not propose anti-Agenda 21 legislation, as well as the standard deviation for each group. Overall, we found that states proposing anti-Agenda 21 legislation spend more on public welfare and highways, have lower per capita real GDP, are more rural and have fewer zero-vehicle households. They are more conservative, as measured by the percentage of votes for Republicans for seats in the House in the 2010 federal elections, which was a watershed moment in which the Tea Party and other conservative candidates won seats. Interestingly, the unemployment rate and Gini coefficients were very similar across all groups of states before controlling for other factors in a logistic regression, and while changes in the House Price Index varied substantially across the USA (from −51% for Nevada to +13% for North Dakota), they did not vary as dramatically between states that had or had not proposed anti-Agenda 21 legislation. When comparing the states that did or did not propose anti-Agenda 21 legislation, the differences are not subject to a test of statistical significance, since they are based on data for the full population of 50 states. However, it is interesting to note that for all the variables above the averages are within a standard deviation of each other for at least one of the variables’ standard deviations. While the averages for each group of states show differences, there is also substantial variation within both groups of states, reflected in the magnitude of the standard deviations.

Table 2.

Average values of descriptive data for states with and without anti-Agenda 21 legislation proposed.

Summary of variables
Variable	Average, anti-A21 proposed	Std. deviation, anti-A21 proposed	Average, anti-A21 not proposed	Std. deviation,anti-A21 not proposed
Percent of state expenditure on public welfare	23.72%	3.78%	21.59%	4.10%
Percent of state expenditure on health	2.91%	1.25%	2.96%	1.23%
Percent of state expenditure on highways	6.73%	1.72%	6.66%	2.74%
Percent of states with NEPA-like environmental planning requirements	26.92%	44.36%	37.50%	48.41%
Unemployment rate	8.71%	2.02%	8.78%	2.03%
Per capita real GDP (2010, in 2005 dollars)	38,017	5036	44,263	9018
Gini coefficient	0.4525	0.0163	0.4502	0.0203
Percent of population in owner-occupied units	70.48%	2.89%	67.83%	5.20%
Percent of population in renter-occupied units	29.52%	2.89%	32.17%	5.20%
Percent of population, urban	70.42%	12.23%	77.01%	15.77%
Percent of population, rural	29.58%	12.23%	22.99%	15.77%
Percent white	77.25%	10.20%	76.19%	15.11%
Percent black	12.39%	10.70%	8.10%	7.28%
Percent Asian	2.27%	1.44%	5.21%	7.55%
Percent multiracial	2.43%	1.03%	3.74%	4.33%
Percent other race	5.65%	5.40%	6.74%	4.50%
Percent Hispanic/Latino	10.30%	11.07%	10.94%	8.39%
Percent of households, 0 vehicles	6.33%	0.87%	8.69%	4.71%
Percent of households, 1 vehicle	32.28%	2.91%	32.31%	2.57%
Percent of households, 2 vehicles	39.23%	1.27%	37.91%	2.60%
Percent of households, 3 vehicles	15.41%	1.68%	14.57%	2.64%
Percent of households, 4+ vehicles	6.75%	1.54%	6.53%	2.06%
Percent employment: agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting	0.18%	0.17%	0.18%	0.22%
Percent employment: construction	5.18%	1.00%	5.14%	1.32%
Percent employment: manufacturing	11.19%	3.27%	8.71%	3.72%
Percent employment: military personnel, 2009	1.17%	0.93%	1.36%	2.32%
Percent voting Republican for House in 2010 elections	56.64%	6.79%	48.90%	10.02%
Percent of mortgage balance delinquent 90+ days, 2010 Q4	5.09%	3.22%	5.83%	3.24%
Foreclosure rate	1.10%	0.39%	1.05%	0.50%
Percent change in FHFA House Price Index, 2007Q3 to 2010Q4	−15.69%	11.83%	−17.39%	12.96%

Note: All figures are for 2010 unless otherwise noted.

A logistic regression allows for controlling multiple factors simultaneously, in a more nuanced fashion than comparing summary statistics for the two groups of states. The results of the binary logistic regression analysis are shown in Table 3. Variables were tested for explanatory power and excluded from the model when shown to have low explanatory power or be insignificant. The most significant coefficients are those for the percentage of state expenditures on health and public welfare, the z-score of Gini coefficient, the percentage of households with zero vehicles, and the percentage of employment in the military, all of which are significant at the 5% level. Of these most significant variables, all had positive coefficients, except for zero-vehicle percentage. Percent of the population voting Republican in the 2010 election, and percent who are homeowners, are both positive and significant, but only at a 10% level. Two other variables came close to 10% significance, the foreclosure rate, and the presence of NEPA-like environmental regulations. Percentage of the workforce in manufacturing was insignificant. We discuss below the variables that were significant at least at the 10% level.

Table 3.

Results of binary logistic regression of proposal of anti-Agenda 21 legislation.

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Significance	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)
					Lower	Upper
Percent of state expenditures on health and public welfare	0.413	0.203	0.042	1.511	1.015	2.251
NEPA-like environmental planning requirements	2.181	1.425	0.126	8.858	0.542	144.713
Gini coefficient (z-score)	1.949	0.925	0.035	7.020	1.145	43.045
Percent of population in owner-occupied units	0.587	0.313	0.061	1.798	0.973	3.321
Percent of households, 0 vehicles	−1.265	0.504	0.012	0.282	0.105	0.758
Percent of employment, manufacturing	0.187	0.159	0.240	1.206	0.883	1.648
Percent of employment, military personnel (2009)	1.519	0.731	0.038	4.569	1.090	19.153
Percent voting Republican for House, 2010 elections	0.162	0.086	0.060	1.176	0.993	1.393
Foreclosure rate	4.347	2.707	0.108	77.280	0.383	15,584.472
Constant	−59.872	25.913	0.021	0.000

Notes: Nagelkirke R-Square: 0.753.

Classification: 90% correct.

While Gini coefficients are very similar across states that do or do not propose anti-Agenda 21 legislation, when controlling for the other variables in the regression income inequality becomes more significant. For every one unit increase in the z-score of a state’s Gini coefficient (corresponding to one standard deviation), the odds of anti-Agenda 21 legislation being proposed increase more than seven, controlling for other variables in the model.⁴ In addition, states with higher shares of military employment are more likely to propose such legislation. Every one percentage point increase in military employment increases the odds of such legislation being proposed by 4.6. Military presence is consistent with interviewees of Tea Party/property rights affiliates who had served in the military and often referenced the oath taken for protecting the US ‘against all enemies, foreign and domestic’ and view Agenda 21 as a threat.

In addition, for every one percentage point increase in the share of households with zero vehicles, the odds of anti-Agenda 21 legislation being proposed decrease by 72%, suggesting that states that are more automobile-dependent are more likely to propose anti-Agenda 21 legislation. With the GOP platform in support of anti-Agenda 21 legislation and numerous Tea Party groups in opposition, we also find as expected that for every percentage point increase in the share of votes for Republicans in the 2010 Elections for seats in the House, the odds of proposing anti-Agenda 21 legislation increases by 18%. This is consistent with Table 2’s descriptive statistics where states that proposed anti-Agenda 21 legislation had 7 percentage points more votes for Republicans on average than other states.

Given the focus on property rights, it is hypothesised that higher levels of home ownership would be correlated with higher probabilities of passing anti-Agenda 21 legislation. This relationship was consistent with these data, with a one percentage point increase in the share of the population in owner-occupied units increasing the odds of proposing anti-Agenda 21 legislation by 1.8. As Tea Party affiliates are very concerned with government expenditures on social services, we also examined the relationship of this factor to bill introduction. For every 1% increase in state expenditures on health and public welfare, the likelihood of introducing anti-Agenda 21 legislation increases 51%. A possible explanation is that observed, higher levels of expenditures on social services and particularly healthcare motivate political participation among Tea Party affiliates. This finding is consistent with interviewees who noted that their frustration with ‘Obamacare’, President Obama’s universal healthcare legislation, propelled them to activism.

A surprising variable was the percentage of population that was rural. States that introduced anti-Agenda 21 legislation do on average have a higher proportion of the population that is rural, as shown in Table 2; however when controlling for other factors, the explanatory power of rural population was not significant.

Overall, the quantitative results suggest evidence of the three of the four Tea Party narratives from the literature, as legislation is more likely to be introduced in states where citizens are reacting to big government as seen in states with higher public expenditures and environmental regulation (the ‘Citizen Patriots’ narrative), the ‘middle class is under attack’ from higher income inequalities, and fear their homeownership is at risk (‘Founder’s Tale’). The quantitative analysis does not lend itself to suggesting whether citizens were motivated to participate politically that had not previously. However, related interviewee data suggest new or more active engagement stemming from concerns about President Obama’s healthcare legislation and perceived threats to US sovereignty from Agenda 21.

Arizona: A phoenix out of the ashes

To provide a greater understanding of anti-Agenda 21 sentiment and organisation, we explore Arizona’s state legislative activities as its proposed bills were strikingly similar to others throughout the US. Arizona’s political, economic and sociodemographic characteristics and oppositional narratives parallel our literature review synthesis and quantitative findings: It is a conservative state with high homeownership, high vehicle ownership and hard hit by the Great Recession with high foreclosure rates and declining home prices as well as active Tea Party/property rights advocates. US citizenship issues have been a major focal point of legislative and media interest with major anti-immigration legislation passing recently.

Tea Party-affiliated Arizona Senator Judy Burgess amended binding anti-Agenda 21 language into an existing 2012 bill, which passed out of the Senate and then languished on the House floor because of concerns from the business and environmental communities. This language banned state, local governments and special districts from implementing Agenda 21’s ‘creed, doctrine, principles, or any tenet’ or other international laws. No state or local government or funding could be affiliated with NGOs as identified in the bill.

The following session Senator Burgess introduced an identical bill, thus keeping Agenda 21 on the state agenda and in public discussions. ‘Bad bills are like zombies. You kill them and they keep coming back again and again’, lamented an interviewee. A special hearing was held, with California anti-Agenda 21 activist and Tea Party leader Heather Gass as the opening speaker calling in for 30 minutes of testimony and discussion. Also in attendance were locally elected officials viewing the state action as critical to protecting their communities from sustainability planning and regulation recounting memories of a past era pre-Agenda 21. Intense debate ensued and the committee amended the bill to address business and resource agency concerns as discussed below. The Senate passed the bill with Republican members in favour. Those in support or opposition did much organising and advocacy online as well as in person, particularly through testifying at legislative hearings, thus blending together a mixed repertoire of contention between digital and traditional strategies. Senator Burgess testified in a legislative hearing:

The U.N. Agenda-21 program sounds wonderful on face value – sustainability, social justice, equity for the masses; however, the truth contained within this U.N. program depicts something sinister and dark. The plan calls for government to take control of all land use and not leave any of the decision making in the hands of private property owners.

It is assumed by the backers of Agenda-21 that people are not good stewards of their land and the government will do a better job if it is in control. Individual rights are to give way to the needs of the global community as determined by a global governing body – not by local elected representatives like our City Councils, Boards of Supervisors, and even State Legislators.

Furthermore, the contents of this U.N. program reveal that people should be rounded up off their own land and relocated to human settlements close to employment centers and transportation hubs.

A narrative of legislative support embodying Senator Burgess’ opening statements developed, with many advocates recounting anecdotes where environmental or other planning regulations and policies negatively affected family members and Arizona citizens. Conservative legislators, Tea Party/property rights affiliates and residents argued the United Nations seeks to usurp state and US sovereignty through Agenda 21, which is an insidious threat to all aspects of life: food, water, housing, private property rights, free enterprise, economic growth, freedom and liberty. Agents of the UN are non-profit organisations, particularly ICLEI, and regional ‘shadow’ governments whose unelected board members are unaccountable to the electorate. Through ‘cookie cutter’ plans and faux visioning sessions, these agents along with local government and planners force unsuspecting citizens out of the their homes, take away their cars and move them into high density walkable and bikeable neighbourhoods near mass transit such as in Europe and Asia. Also of concern is the perceived taking of private land under the premises of open space protections and creation of wildlife areas further restricting property rights.

The federal government’s provision of related grants manipulates state and local governments who feel they cannot turn down funds was mentioned as invidious. The Obama Administration’s Common Core initiative for a federally funded standardised state-level public school curriculum was singled out as an example of indoctrinating students in Agenda 21 philosophies. Overall, advocates argued this narrative was not conspiracy theory but conspiracy fact evident through the widespread replication of local sustainability-based plans and programmes. In this narrative’s representative quote, former Tea Party leader Wesley Harris draws initially from the US Declaration of Independence:

‘We hold these truths to be self-evident … Life, liberty and the pursuit of property.’ Private property is fundamental to our freedom; that was a compromise – happiness was a compromise because slaves were considered property at that time as you recall … Forced environmental statutes are Agenda 21 driven.

A counter-narrative to block the legislation developed with business and state resource agency representatives arguing the bill language could affect most state law and regulation because of Agenda 21’s expansive scope. Business interests warned that the uncertainty bred by anti-Agenda 21 legislation would create an inhospitable working environment and that sustainability principles they supported such as state sovereignty would be undermined. Democrat Senator Steve Farley argued against the proposed legislation at a hearing:

We have a bill in effect that sets up an anti-constitution. It’s as if we allow our constitution in reverse so that we can then adjust our laws by how little they comply with the Rio Declaration. It’s a complete backwards way of going about it … This substitutes itself for our state constitution … We have to take seriously that somebody is going to have to obey this law.

Environmentalists and others noted Agenda 21 is not a binding document and that Arizona independently established environmental protection laws and not under the United Nation’s influence. Thus, the narrative followed that opposition to Agenda 21 is based on ill-founded conspiracy theory and the legislative debates distract attention from other legislative matters. As the bill sponsor, Senator Burgess responded at a hearing suggesting state legislative policy diffusion in the US:

There are seven other states that have put on their tin foil hats and Arizona has been able to influence them and they are running the same legislation that the state of Arizona is running this year … and they asked for some of our talking points … So people are becoming aware of what is happening around them and in this nation, and they are stepping up and joining together with their elected officials and communities to stand strong to what is happening with them on another level other than business.

Other senators claimed legislative enactment sends a message that Arizona is sovereign and free of influence from the United Nations or NGOs and this bill compels evaluating all Agenda 21-like state laws. However, in response to business and resource agency concerns, the Senate amended the bill deleting language that any Agenda 21-related doctrine and tenet could not be followed. It inserted less restrictive language requiring public officials to support the US Constitution and state laws and to not recognise the UN or any of its declarations including Agenda 21. Public agencies could not affiliate with, ‘any group that espouses the usurping or overthrow of the Constitution of the United States’. Then, like the year prior, the bill stalled in the house, which according to interviewees was due to gubernatorial and house leadership opposition. Camps on both sides expect the bill’s reintroduction in 2014. Tea party/property rights affiliates and legislators currently are rallying for legislative support and will increase internet/social media communications to spur greater public education and engagement thereby fueling Bennett and Segerberg’s notion of connective action (2012). ‘Each time one of these bills come up, we get better at our social media and communications (and) we get more and more people aware’, commented a Tea Party affiliate. Reflecting on the saying, ‘A moth has wings of flame. An inchworm has no wings at all, but it gets there just the same’, he argued:

The inch worm has been pushing its way towards communism and socialism – a horse of the same color – and we have been asleep at the switch. With the internet, Tea party, 912 (liberty), veterans groups are starting to wake up and make other people awake and inform them about what is going on around them and that they need to get involved.

Thus, Agenda 21 will continue its state presence and observers nationwide will monitor the next bill’s fate. If passed, the bill will serve as a model and provide motivation to other advocates and state legislators. If it fails, others will learn and adapt bill language and advocacy strategies; this was the case in Alabama, which learned from Tennessee’s efforts and modified its language which occurs during policy diffusion/customisation and venue-shopping (Karch, 2007). Thus, the policy outbreak of anti-Agenda 21 could continue and evolve online through internet sources, traditional news and radio and when referenced at formal and informal group meetings or word of mouth. That said, sustainability and planning proponents also could mobilise during the ensuing outbreak drawing inspiration from failed bills as a bellwether for defeat.

Concluding thoughts

Chapin’s recent article on sustainability planning concludes with optimism about the future of sustainability planning and public participation (2012). However, based on our national analysis and the Arizona case, the planning field could have a bumpy road ahead. We draw on the four key points from our literature review to guide this assessment.

Consistent with Tea Party literature (Point #1), we found in our exploratory quantitative analysis that conservative states with higher shares of owner-occupied households, military jobs, higher income-inequality, and higher levels of public expenditures on social services, higher Republican voting fraction, and fewer zero-car households were more likely overall to have anti-Agenda 21 legislation introduced. We then examined Arizona’s overarching narratives of opposition, which compose a mosaic of the three of the four narratives previously identified in the Tea Party-related literature – from citizen patriots battling big government to producerism with the activists facing threats from above and below, to a ‘founders tale’ rooted in a sense of place, history and memory of the past. The fourth narrative regarding ‘political neophytes’ in action did not heavily factor into depictions of activists or legislators although state discussions appeared to draw out many citizens not previously involved in planning issues. The United Nations factored heavily in the Arizona case’s constructions of big government and in all state bills introduced. Thus, questioning government and planning’s role and scope was prominent in the narrative and bill language.

As a result, the narratives facilitated a contentious ‘us versus them’ environment with much identification and deliberation about the ‘Other’. This is consistent with current literature on the Tea Party (Berlet, 2012; Trost and Rosenthal, 2012) and other disciplines. ‘High ingroup solidarity’ often transpires and serves as a defence mechanism for reflections about the opposing side (Goffman, 1959: 209). This solidarity construction was revealed as interviewees on both sides often referenced the oppositions’ ‘loose facts’ and ‘fear mongering’.

Organised and passionate opposition is part and parcel of planning. Narratives related to property rights, smaller government, government distrust and scepticism, and reduced taxes have festered for decades. However, there are two new elements, particularly in the eyes of the participants and national observers. First, planning opposition has been at unparalleled levels as it is unusual for organised opposition to rise above an individual local or state level and become widespread as occurred through this state policy outbreak. Much opposition reflected in the bill language and our interviews relates to the no-21 coalition’s perception that they have been deceived by disingenuous visioning sessions, subversive guiding principles of sustainability, and purposeful imposition and mobility of these plans from city to city (Point #2). One conservative interviewee argued, ‘The towns may be different, but the plans are not’. This observation parallels the policy mobilities literature, which according to Temenos and McCann:

The strange familiarities of policies and the places they produce are not the result of happenstance. They are the works of numerous policy mobilizers, agents, institutions, and infrastructures who act to condition ideological fields of accepted knowledge and practice, to define certain policies as best practice models, to create connections among places, and to circulate models through those connections. (2013: 353–354)

Thus, the widespread policy outbreak of legislative introduction may indicate a longer-term situation whereby sustainability opposition becomes part of the state agenda with continued public discussion and media attention (Point #3). Some states see legislation introduced the following year as occurred in Arizona. The bills – even if they fail – inspire imitation and create momentum and learning opportunities, as evidenced by state venue-shopping proliferation across the USA and confirmed by our interviewees and document/online materials analysis. Adopted resolutions may invoke a chilling effect, dampening future activities such as curtailing city-based ICLEI memberships or sustainability planning.

Second, social media/internet communications facilitated policy diffusion and enabled digitally networked activism to flourish nationally (Point #4). Participants quickly and widely spread information, articulate counter-narratives, and send out rallying cries to generate participation and awareness. As many remarked, and consistent with Castells (2009, 2012), public agencies no longer control messaging through their websites and sympathetic mainstream channels. The more activists and others use digital communication, the more planning activities may become visible. Drawing from Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) logic of connective action for contemporary social movements, loosely connected participants and formal groups network online to share information and oppose practices. Sustainability supporters similarly organised by connecting organisations and individuals. Building from Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) theory, we argue the logic of connective action applies to participants on both sides of an issue whereby actors are loosely connected among themselves through internet-facilitated communications. Social movement literature typically focuses on progressive movements related to citizen claims for rights to the city. Our research adds to this literature by: (1) analysing the less-studied efforts of Tea Party/property affiliates to maintain current constitutional and other rights, (2) connecting this literature to the policy diffusion and mobilities scholarship, and (3) providing evidence of an evolving repertoire of contention that blends digital (online) and analog (in person) strategies. To magnify effect, digital tools used intermingle with traditional technologies (radio, cable TV, TV) in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). Through curating information for the web, activists can work at multiple scales, local to national, and assume additional roles of citizen journalist and educator.

Thus, planning and research communities would be well-advised to seek understanding this anti-policy diffusion and not dismiss it as undeserving of deliberation. Policy mobilities scholars similarly call for critical examination of sustainability efforts in the face of globalisation and neoliberalism, and with which anti-sustainability activists align even though they have divergent worldviews. A practitioner supportive of sustainability reflected that some good might result from recent contestations:

if it makes planners realize that they have to get true community engagement … The criticism is that planners push through something. They really have to walk it like they talk. People don’t want to show up at planning meetings. Maybe this whole issue has accelerated how we can do community engagement well and share best practices. It’s maybe about having more planners listen and be respectful to a diversity of opinions.

The above statement calls attention to limitations of consultative planning models, which are well covered in planning literature (e.g. Arnstein 1969; Hillier, 2002; Innes and Booher, 2004; Purcell, 2009a). Interviewees in both camps recounted with frustration that the opposition was dismissive, dogmatic and unwilling to engage in genuine dialogue. A way forward may be continued research and practice drawing from the political theory of agonism to reframe civic engagement where actors come to consider their opposition as legitimate adversaries rather than traditionally as enemies unworthy of engagement. In such moments, actors retain their core values and identities and may find common ground with others in a limited way or agree to disagree. Group consensus is not a goal, but compromise through bargaining and negotiations may occur (e.g. Gaffikin and Morrissey, 2011; Hillier, 2002; Mouffe, 2013; Purcell, 2009b). While challenging, the long-term objective is transitioning when feasible from highly antagonistic, counterproductive encounters to interactions of agonistic contestation and debate. Thus, our findings underscore the need for ongoing research attention to agonism’s potential for planning and sustainability debates. Consideration also is warranted of the interactive effects, difficulties and opportunities that come with an evolving hybrid media system in tandem with connective action and during agonistic shifts.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We benefited greatly from the insights from interviewees and three anonymous referees. We also appreciate the support and feedback of Michael Timberlake, Robert Cervero and Phyllis Orrick as well as data collection assistance by Andreanna Tzortzis. The authors alone are responsible for any errors or omissions.

Funding

This research was supported by the University of California Transportation Center, which is part of the University Transportation Centers Program of the US Department of Transportation and with support from the California Department of Transportation; and, the National Science Foundation (# IIS-0964412). Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the agencies.

Notes

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