Abstract
One of the most fundamental and fascinating topics of scholarly enquiries in Chinese urban and rural studies has been the issue of land development, given the extent to which it displays the conflicting interests among multi-scalar stakeholders (Lin and Ho, 2005; Xu and Yeh, 2005; Yeh and Wu, 1996). The complexity of land issues in China originates from the paradoxical nature of its socialist state. Under a top-down political structure of the land system, the state exerts an over-stringent land control target in the interest of national food security. At the same time, the high return brought about by land development provides strong incentives for various local stakeholders to circumvent national policies, resulting in discrepancies between intentions and actual outcomes. It has been pointed out that the key to understanding the complexities in land development lies in a systematic investigation of how the reforming socialist state is functioning in actuality (Lin and Ho, 2008).
Jianbo Ma takes up this challenge by writing this book, The Land Development Game in China. Ma has provided a vivid account of how the land system works in practice, and uncovers the behaviours of various public and private players. The word ‘game’ suggests his intention to capture the contested bargaining strategies outside the land system, particularly the ‘informal process’ through which the land is taken away from rural collectives at low cost for the purpose of urban development. Ma bases his analysis on the case of ‘Dragon County’. The coastal county in East China, as described, represents a classical Chinese region undergoing a great deal of informal land conversion. As argued by Ma, rather than being a failure with much local evasion, the current land system has worked reasonably well in promoting both land use efficiency and economic growth through top-down and bottom-up interactions among stakeholders (p. 29).
To support this argument, part I begins with a brief description of the land system, and then moves on to a detailed analysis of the critical players in the development game, including the national government, local government, villages, farmers, developers and the agents in charge of dispute settlement. The Chinese land conversion process is governed, officially, by a hierarchical top-down structure (p. 151). Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the national government is a unified and coherent entity. The national government in fact represents multiple sectors with their respective goals, leading to conflicted policies in the land conversion process. Particularly in the case of economic downturns, farmland protection often has to be compromised in favour of the need for growth. The situation is more complex at the local level. Local governments rely heavily on land conversion to generate revenue directly. In the meanwhile, they have to deal with land acquisition problems in a cautious way so as to ensure ‘social stability’. The village collectives, who are considered to be the owners of farmland, are restricted to exert only limited rights of ownership. The villagers in particular are excluded from the land market through compulsory land acquisition by the government. Yet, the elected village leaders usually have stronger incentives to side with township officials than to represent villagers (p. 230). As for the farmers, the compensation fee is the one last chance for them to generate wealth from farmland. They may adopt extreme strategies to resist governments in order to maximise their compensation from land acquisition or chaiqian. While a reform in 2005 was initiated to improve the level of compensation, equity remains an unsolved issue. Ma then introduces three kinds of developers in Dragon County: commercial real estate developers, entrepreneurs and land speculators. One thing these developers share in common is that their formal or informal connections with governments serve a critical role in reaping huge profits from land development. The last players identified are the mediators in the land development game, such as the courts, the Letters and Calls system, and the Supervision and Inspection system. As Ma suggests these systems are part of government institutions, and can not guarantee impartiality in coordinating the process.
Part II illustrates how the land development game functions in practice. The rigidity and inflexibility of central planning force local governments to resort to informal means of dealing with local demands for land. A major strategy adopted by local governments is to undertake the informal land conversion without approvals from above but not to go too far to be identified for this and reprimanded. Implied permission or even silence of local governments give rise to informal land trading between developers and farmers. Ma argues that such local informal land market is ‘rational’ in a sense because it is beneficial to all the players involved. Moreover, connections among players, guanxi, bring considerable flexibility and adequate efficiency for local land trading. Given the overall success of the informal land system, the national government has little choice but to ‘have one eye open and the other closed’ with local evasions. Their over-stringent targets imply the intention to leave room for accommodating local violations or simply reserve a margin of error.
Finally, the concluding chapters identify the common theme of sustainable development for China’s land system. As illustrated above, the current land system is identified as economically efficient in achieving farmland conservation and meeting local needs at the same time. However, Ma notices that this utilitarian approach values the total benefits more than distributive justice. To take this further, Ma explains that the informational asymmetry that exists both in the political system and the informal transaction has led to a series of economic and social problems, such as unnecessary waste of land resources, a growing gap between rich and poor, and increasing social disputes. In the end, Ma suggests that any resulting social instability calls for the need for further efforts for political reform by the national governments.
While there is a rising appeal for understanding the central planning under socialism, this book represents a major concrete step towards this aim, by providing one case study of the land development game in China and paying extra attention to the informal actions of local players. Unfortunately, the book did not involve adequate discussions of players at the provincial and municipal level. As an important tier between national and local level, the provincial and municipal activities are critical for the understanding of how national policies are circumvented from the local to the centre. Overall, the book is well illustrated and very readable. The chapters together provide us with insights into the on-the-ground realities of a sophisticated system and enrich our understanding of the centralised approach with Chinese characteristics. Readers who are interested in Chinese urban and rural studies may find interests in this book.