Making meaningful commitments: Accounting for variation in cities’ investments of staff and fiscal resources to sustainability

Abstract

Environmental sustainability is one of the great challenges of the 21st century. A number of explanations have been advanced for why some local governments make strong commitments to sustainability while others do not. Most of the extant empirical research, however, has relied on models that employ only one or just a few of these explanations. As a result, empirical analyses do not encompass a comprehensive set of variables that account for alternative explanations. This study begins to fill this lacuna by specifying an empirical model that examines six explanations for local commitment towards sustainability: local sustainability priorities, regional governance, climate protection networks, interest group support, local fiscal capacity, and characteristics of the local governing institution. Moreover, we use the designation of human and financial resources specifically for sustainability to operationalise commitment. This is a more substantive measure than has been used in previous studies. We accomplish this by utilising data from the Integrated City Sustainability Database. Our results indicate that local priorities, participation in regional governance, and membership in climate protection networks influence the likelihood of cities’ devotion of resources to sustainability. We discuss the implications of these findings for research and practice.

Keywords

governance policy adoption public administration resource commitment sustainability

Introduction

Achieving environmental sustainability is an effort to which cities are inextricably tied. Indeed, cities have been characterised as the key ‘battleground for sustainability’ (Clark, 2003). An estimated 54% of the global population (World Health Organization, 2014) and 84% of the US population (US Census Bureau, 2011) lives in urban areas, which are conservatively estimated as emitting between 30% and 40% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2007; Satterthwaite, 2008). Cities have authority over many decisions that have a direct impact on sustainability, including elements of land use, transportation, urban forestry, and waste management, making them an important unit of analysis for the study of sustainability policy (Bai, 2007; Coenen and Menkveld, 2003; Krause, 2011a; Portney, 2013).

Local governments have emerged as some of the leaders and innovators of sustainability policy (Rosenzweig et al., 2010). This is despite operating in an environment which theoretically disincentivises the pursuit of policy innovations by making it more advantageous to let others take policy risks and free-ride on the knowledge generated (Rose-Ackerman, 1980). The free-rider incentive for local governments is particularly strong for actions which yield non-exclusive benefits, such as sustainability policy (Brody et al., 2008; Olson, 1965).

The centrality of cities to achieving sustainability has attracted significant attention among researchers. Much of the literature on urban sustainability, however, has tended to focus on declarations of commitment by local officials or on local government practices that have been criticised as largely symbolic. The financial and the human resource capacities needed to implement sustainability policy and achieve stated commitments has received far less attention in the literature (Terman and Feiock, 2014). These resources can shape processes for building support for policy, and are essential for the consistency of their execution and their management performance, which are integral to policy success (Wang et al., 2014). Communities that have staff dedicated to sustainability issues tend to have broader and more expansive sustainability efforts in place (Homsy and Warner, 2015; Krause, 2012a). However, explanations for why they commit human resources and build the financial capacity for sustainability initiatives remains relatively understudied (Feiock et al., 2014; Portney, 2013). Understanding the drivers of resource commitment for sustainability is particularly salient because the authority for addressing environmental, economic and social issues within urban areas is largely held by local governments. The outcomes associated with different levels of resource commitment have important implications for how cities can advance their sustainability agendas, and is an important avenue for future research.

One significant limitation of the extant research is that it does not test a comprehensive set of theoretical explanations for the dedication of resources for sustainability. Instead, most studies rely on simple models that capture a few or sometimes just a single explanation. This study addresses these limitations by using a more substantive dependent variable and specifying an empirical model of institutional analysis that incorporates multiple theoretical explanations. Specifically, we draw from existing research that demonstrates the important effects of climate protection motivations and sustainability priorities (Krause, 2013), local revenue streams and fiscal capacity (Hawkins, 2011; Homsy and Warner, 2015; Krause, 2012b; Lubell et al., 2009a), local interest groups (Ramírez de la Cruz, 2009), the characteristics of local governing structures (Lubell et al., 2009b) and the role of regional governance and climate protection networks (Bae and Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013; Krause, 2011a) on sustainability efforts. To accomplish this we utilise the Integrated City Sustainability Database (ICSD) (Feiock et al., 2014). The ICSD contains the most comprehensive data available both in scope and in geographic coverage on local sustainability practices in the United States.

The following section describes the set of theoretical explanations relevant to cities’ resource commitment to sustainability. We then introduce the ICSD and describe the variables, method of analysis, and results. The paper closes with a discussion of the results.

Theoretical explanations

Our analysis of local commitment to sustainability expands the scope of analysis beyond the demographic and economic attributes of a community to include the interactions among institutional actors that generally help to define the situation and the outcomes associated with a policy decision (Ostrom, 1990). The focus on local government participants, their interactions, and the constraints they face when making decisions in a complex policy environment draws insights from the existing urban studies, public administration, and political science literature. Much of what we know about local public decision-making is based on theoretical perspectives such as regime theory, growth machine theory, and transaction cost and rational choice economics. Although much of the extant research has drawn from these theories to explain sustainability, at the core of much of this work is an analysis of institutions.

Using this overarching perspective, we test six explanations for why some local governments invest human and financial resources to promote sustainability goals: the nature of local sustainability priorities, involvement in regional sustainability governance, involvement in climate protection networks, interest group support, local fiscal capacity, and characteristics of the local governing institution.

Sustainability priorities

One of the factors that makes promoting sustainability particularly challenging is the multi-dimensional nature of the concept. Sustainability requires that the environmental, economic, and social practices of a community are balanced in a manner that can be maintained over the long-term (Portney, 2013). However, the quest towards balance does not necessarily mean that a community pursues all three dimensions with equal fervour. In some cases, a historically undervalued dimension of sustainability may require a disproportionate amount of attention to achieve balance. In others, the prioritisation of a particular dimension may reflect a favourable community or political bias rather than an attempt at achieving comprehensive sustainability. One sustainability-minded city may treat environmental protection and natural resource conservation as its primary sustainability objective, whereas another might prioritise economic growth, but try to do so in a way that does not undermine environmental goals. Yet for another, private investment and enhanced environmental protection may mean little if issues of social equity are not fully addressed. The variation in environmental conditions both between and within cities, past growth experiences, potential for future development, and the social issues that have plagued many cities over the last 50 years makes the challenge of reconciling these objectives more pronounced.

Empirical work, however, has generally neglected choices among different priorities for advancing sustainability. Some recent exceptions include Zeemering’s (2009) analysis of the perceptions of what sustainability means and the priorities that are most salient to local public officials. His findings suggest that some cities place a higher priority on planning and design, while environmental programmes and initiatives to advance equity are of lower importance. In cities he categorises as ‘traditional development cities’, private investment and engaging the business community in sustainability efforts is emphasised, as is providing more equitable opportunities for residents. In other research, the emphasis is placed on how a community prioritises a particular sustainability issue relative to others (Turcu, 2013). For example, Magee and Scerri (2012) present the Sustainability System Index (QSSI) as means through which a community can evaluate the extent to which its sustainability goals are complimentary or conflicting and the tradeoffs it must contend with. While informative, these studies are largely descriptive. A clearer understanding is needed of how the identification of sustainability issues and the prioritisation of goals feed into local policy decisions (Hickey and Innes, 2008: 131; Moldan and Dahl, 2007), including how a community’s priorities generate concrete benefits in the form of resource allocation and new agendas and programmes (Gahin et al., 2003; Holman, 2009).

The perception that pursuing one objective comes at the expense of the others may increase the costs of policy decisions by making it more risky for local officials to emphasise development rather than environmental conservation, or visa-versa. For example, there is often an expectation among policy makers that greater environmental protection in the form of open space preservation or heightened development restrictions will reduce the future growth potential in the community. Environmental protection and associated regulations that alter property rights may create an uncertain environment for investors and increase the costs of production (Feiock and Stream, 2001). In comparison, economic growth aimed at increasing employment and providing greater access to services may require public investments in social programmes and in land and infrastructure development that will come at the expense of environmental health. One approach cities have taken to reconcile perceived conflicts and tradeoffs between these policy domains is to promote a ‘green’ local economy (Portney, 2013), for example by encouraging ‘smart growth’ (Ramírez de la Cruz, 2009) and incentivising private investment to incorporate environmental protection measures into development (Hawkins and Wang, 2013).

Does the relative importance that a community places on these different sustainability dimensions influence the probability of it having dedicated financial resources or staff to the larger sustainability cause? Because economic development is a traditional area of emphasis for cities (Peterson, 1981), we hypothesise that the value placed on that objective will have little impact on sustainability investments. However, cities which place a greater priority on the less universally accepted local goals of environmental protection or social equity may be more likely to have invested in resources in sustainability (H₁).

Regional governance

It is commonly asserted that because municipal activities and their effects often spill over jurisdictional boundaries, local sustainability initiatives must be coordinated at a regional scale to be effective (Feiock and Coutts, 2013). Research on collaborative approaches to environmental management and resource conservation (Lubell et al., 2002), economic development (Hawkins and Feiock, 2011), and social equity through service delivery (LeRoux and Pandey, 2011) likewise demonstrate the importance of a regional approach to policy governance. In the broader study of sustainability, Zeemering’s (2012) analysis of local planning documents suggest that many of the leading US cities working on sustainability initiatives have established a myriad of horizontal relations with community organisations and regional actors in the development and implementation of strategies. Pitt (2010) finds that when a city is engaged in regional initiatives it increases the number of climate change mitigation policies that are adopted. Portney and Cuttler’s (2010) analysis suggests cities that are most active in implementing sustainability policies are also more likely to report the involvement of non-profit organisations in their work.

Although there are different schools of thought within the study of regional governance, most begin with the proposition that collaboration can produce benefits that would be very difficult to generate if a city acted alone. Cities, particularly in a metropolitan area, are often interdependent in that the decisions of one can shift the costs and benefits structure for other nearby jurisdictions. They also have the potential to engage in free-riding and opportunistic behaviour that can undermine collaborative efforts. Thus one of the challenges of regional governance is to develop institutional mechanisms that reduce the costs of monitoring and enforcing agreed upon solutions to regional problems, while enabling the joint benefits from coordinated action to be distributed among cities (Feiock, 2007). From the perspective of institutional analysis, the mechanisms that local actors establish through which to interact and collaborate represent the rules that guide behaviour and shape policy decisions.

Feiock (2013) identifies several institutional mechanisms relevant to regional governance, which may shape the decisions of area cities to commit resources to further region-wide sustainability goals. The first involves bilateral and self-organising exchange relationships among local governments. Interactions that tie the actions of multiple cities together in a functional area may help local officials identify policy responses to other regional problems, reduce information problems, and build enforcement structures to reduce the transaction costs of coordination. Through such mechanisms, local actors can negotiate agreements to address the effects of not only jurisdictional fragmentation, but also the policy fragmentation among cities that can undermine environmental, economic and social sustainability. At a general level, because horizontal relationships are developed and maintained over time, they improve communication and encourage meaningful interactions among public officials. This is critical given the fragmented nature of metropolitan areas that makes collective action for addressing sustainability issues difficult. The mutual dependencies that develop in collaborative relationships make pledges to commit resources more credible and more enduring.

Regional institutions are another collaboration mechanism identified by Feiock (2013). They take on a variety of forms including councils of government, metropolitan planning organisations, and regional partnerships. These types of mechanisms provide opportunities for cities to engage in joint problem solving and learn new policy approaches to address issues that cross jurisdictional borders. Over time this may minimise conflicting interests and generate greater consensus on sustainability goals and strategic public investments. Regional institutions provide venues for cities to interact and build networks and social capital, which can contribute to collective solutions to environmental, economic or social problems. Working collaboratively with regional institutions also provides a mechanism to enforce regional norms that support sustainability efforts. This is important in a non-coercive environment where the incentive to free-ride can undermine efforts to safeguard public goods (Krause, 2011a; Olson, 1965).

Social and interpersonal networks that are built through both types of mechanisms can reduce coordination costs and forge collective action to address policy issues that are not contained within jurisdictional borders. Feiock (2013) argues that both strong tie networks of bilateral exchange relationships among cities, and participation in weak tie associational networks through regional institutions, can increase the likelihood of greater collaboration in a variety of policy domains.

A series of articles on the governance of watersheds and regional environmental issues by Lubell and colleagues demonstrates the importance of these governance mechanisms in shaping local policy. The results of their studies suggest that when government and non-government organisations engage in regional governance it facilitates regularised interactions among partners and competing interests (Lubell, 2007). These interactions reduce uncertainty and risk in making policy decisions by increasing the availability of information (Lubell et al., 2002), and supporting policy implementation (Lubell and Lippert, 2011). Participation in regional governance also engenders trust that is essential for successful collective action in contexts where free riding undermines the individual contribution of resources for environmental protection (Lubell, 2007). Regional collaboration, regardless of the mechanism used to establish it, is hypothesised to facilitate collective action and increase the likelihood that cities will back their sustainability commitments with resource investments (H₂).

Climate protection networks

Implementing sustainability initiatives often requires specialised or technical information and skills. When information is imperfect and resources are limited, adopting and implementing policy in a trial-and-error fashion can be inefficient and costly. Hawkins and Wang (2012) describe a sustainability governance model that includes support networks of nongovernment organisations located primarily outside the local jurisdiction that encourage local policy change based on principles of sustainability. These networks can mitigate the transaction costs of sustainability by providing information on key policy issues and by helping to garner stakeholder support, which improves the prospect for successful policy implementation. Moreover, a network comprised of specialised organisations or technical experts can provide facts and knowledge for planning and decision making, as well as link professionals across municipalities who share similar goals and values and face similar challenges. Such support networks can help frame issues in ways that not only make policy relevant to local conditions, but also improve the capacity to manage policy changes (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Sharp et al., 2011).

ICLEI-Cities for Sustainability (formerly the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) and the US Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA) are the two most well-known sustainability and climate initiatives in the US. There are now over 1000 US municipalities that have signed the MCPA and approximately 500 have joined ICLEI, which sponsors the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign. Both efforts intend to assist and coordinate greenhouse gas mitigation efforts of local governments in order to enhance sustainability. Whereas the MCPA functions primarily as a platform for public commitment-making, ICLEI offers a more comprehensive set of benefits to its participants, including assistance with strategic plan development and software that enable localities to inventory, track, and mitigate GHG emissions (ICLEI, 2005, 2007). Upon joining ICLEI, cities pay a nominal membership fee and commit to following a prescribed planning process aimed at reducing emissions.

Empirical studies that examine the motivations behind local governments’ participation in these networks typically find that communities with greater levels of human capital − as measured by demographic statistics such as income, education, and environmental group activity − and local governments with a larger tax base, are significantly more likely to participate in climate protection networks (Krause, 2011a; Sharp et al., 2011; Zahran et al., 2008). From a policy innovation perspective, Krause (2011a) argues that local sustainability policies best reflect ‘incubated’ innovations which address long-standing, chronic issues and are adopted with the help of policy networks comprised of technical experts. In a later study measuring the treatment effect of network participation, Krause (2012b) finds that membership in ICLEI has a small but significant positive impact on the number of GHG reducing activities cities implement. Sharp et al. (2011) find that the length of cities’ ICLEI membership is positively associated with progress in implementing greenhouse gas reductions activities and Daley et al. (2013) later find that ICLEI membership is associated with more ambitious sustainability programmes, measured as an additive index of community wide sustainability initiatives. Similarly, we expect membership in sustainability networks, particularly ICLEI, to be associated with an increased likelihood that cities have dedicated staff and financial resources specifically to advance sustainability goals (H₃).

Interest group support

Reconciling the various objectives of sustainability can be difficult because of the sometimes intense competition and conflict over the distribution of policy costs and benefits that play out in many political arenas. An interest group model of local politics underlies much of the research taking this perspective. Previous research has shown that competing interests around sustainability issues often take the form of localised slow-growth organisations and pro-growth interests seeking to maximise economic development opportunities (Feiock et al., 2008; Hawkins, 2011; Lubell et al., 2005; Ramírez de la Cruz, 2009).

Drawing from a political market perspective, local interests are conceptualised here as business and chambers of commerce organisations that favour growth and land development, environmental groups that are apt to promote environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources, and neighbourhood organisations which tend to promote policies that generally protect perceived quality of life and maintain or increase home values.

The growth machine concept provides one theoretical underpinning for the activity of pro-development interests in local policy settings. The growth machine literature argues that pro-growth interests in the form of real estate developers and business groups are generally well organised and able to influence the adoption of policies that align with their preferences for development and economic growth (Logan and Molotch, 1988; Molotch, 1976). Although traditionally seen as in conflict, the general concept of sustainability and the interests of pro-growth organisations do not necessarily pull in opposite directions, and, indeed, business interests have been shown to be particularly active in shaping a commitment to sustainability at the local level (Hawkins and Wang, 2013; Lubell et al., 2005).

Environmental organisations express a general preference to maintain community character and push for policies that take a long-term perspective on resource use and environmental protection. Collaboration and participation in local planning processes by environmental interests have been shown to be a critical part of the successful development and implementation of comprehensive city plans (Brody, 2003). They have also been found to play an important role in shaping sustainability efforts (Lubell et al., 2009a), as well as more specific related policy initiatives − such as land use policy (Hawkins, 2011; Lubell et al., 2009b) and climate mitigation strategies (Krause, 2011b; Sharp et al., 2011) − that impact long term environmental health, economic growth, and equity within communities.

Support from local residents can also be critical to the development of sustainability policy. Local governments, to varying degrees, use civic engagement mechanisms that involve local residents in the planning and implementation of sustainability initiatives (Hawkins and Wang, 2012). It is argued that through their involvement, participants are often convinced of the value of sustainability, which in turn helps maintain support from elected and agency officials and improves the success of implementation (Conroy and Berke, 2004; Portney, 2005; Portney and Berry, 2010). Moreover, citizens can offer valuable information about local communities and their needs regarding sustainable development, leading to more inclusive and relevant environmental, economic and social objectives (Brody, 2003). Wang et al. (2014) find, for example, that civic engagement has a positive influence on local financial capacity. They suggest that greater support from residents convinces government officials to engage more actively in sustainability, which leads to more support in the budgeting process and ultimately financial capacity for sustainability. We hypothesise that active support from any of these interest groups will increase the likelihood of municipal resource commitment to sustainability. However, it is less clear, a priori, what the relative impact of support or opposition coming from these various groups will have on cities’ relevant resource decisions (H₄).

Fiscal capacity

Sustainability policies and projects often require large investments, the benefits of which may not accrue for many years, making stable and consistent revenue streams particularly important for policy success. This, plus the knowledge that sustainability initiatives must compete with other local programmes for limited resources, makes resource-backed commitments to sustainability more likely from cities that have a history and an expectation of strong and stable revenues.

Previous research shows that sustainability policies are significantly more likely to be adopted in cities with better fiscal health (Homsy and Warner, 2015; Krause 2012a; Lubell et al., 2009a; Sharp et al., 2011; Zahran et al., 2008). Krause (2011a, 2012a), for example, finds that higher levels of per-capita general revenue enable cities to sign the Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement, as well as actually implement greenhouse gas reducing activities. Other research points to the difficulty cities have in advancing sustainability when they are faced with financial constraints. For example, although financially strapped cities are more likely to join ICLEI’s climate protection programme, they also experience implementation delays (Sharp et al., 2011).

A secure financial base able to support policy change and implementation is essential for governmental policy innovations, including those associated with sustainability. Cities’ own source revenue − or the money that they generate through locally applied and collected taxes, fees, and rates − is a common indicator of local fiscal health. Compared to intergovernmental transfers, own source revenue typically has fewer strings attached to its use and its receipt over time may be more predictable and consistent. We hypothesise that cities with higher levels of own source revenue are more likely to invest in both the human and financial capacities that are explicitly intended to support sustainability (H₅).

Governing institutions

A considerable amount of urban policy and public administration research utilises institutional analysis to explain how selective incentive associated with formal political governing structures influence policy choice (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001). Form of government, specifically whether the local executive is an appointed manager or an elected mayor, is the most studied institution at the municipal level. Governing institutions are salient to sustainability because they shape the incentives relevant to local officials, which can motivate or dissuade leaders from pursuing particular policies. Sustainability necessitates a long-term outlook as well as up-front financial investments in both soft infrastructure, such as professional staff or specialised departments, and hard infrastructure in the form of capital projects and technological improvements (Wang et al., 2014).

The council-manager form of government places the locus of administrative decision-making with a professionally trained manager and provides the executive with some insulation from local special interests and pressure groups. Compared to a mayor-council governing system, this structure enables city managers to take a longer-term perspective on public resource investments (Lubell et al., 2005; Wood, 2006) and gives them incentive to promote citywide, as opposed to special or neighbourhood-based, interests (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001; Hawkins and Feiock, 2011). This appears critical for comprehensive sustainability efforts since they require achieving balance among environmental, economic and social initiatives, some of which may be unpopular with certain segments of a community. Moreover, through their professional networks, managers are able to share information and diffuse best practices which can minimise information and other transaction costs, particularly for new and innovative policies.

In comparison, elected executives in mayor-council governments tend to emphasise short-term interests and target benefits to narrower constituencies who are able to exert political influence. The greater exposure of elected officials to constituents often results in public policies and investments that yield more immediate and visible payoffs (Clingermayer, 1990). Resultant policy actions, thus, may not be consistent with the long-term time horizon that sustainability is oriented towards. Moreover, the technical expertise that is often required to design, implement and manage complex sustainability policy may be downplayed in favour of popular responsiveness under this form of government (Feiock and Kim, 2001).

Recent studies that empirically test the influence of form of government on local sustainability efforts largely confirm these theories. For example, Wang et al. (2012) find a relatively strong and positive relationship between local managerial capacity and sustainability activities. Bae and Feiock (2013) find that council-manager forms of government increase the likelihood of sustainability initiatives that emphasise energy efficiency in governmental operations, while mayor-council governments are more likely to direct sustainability efforts towards neighbourhood and business interests in the broader community. Drawing from the extant research, we hypothesise that because council-manager governmental institutions better support long-term and city-wide perspectives, cities with that form of government are more likely to invest human and financial resources for sustainability (H₆).

Data and variable descriptions

To test these explanations we utilise data from the Integrated City Sustainability Database (ICSD) developed by Feiock et al. (2014). The ICSD harmonises and combines data from seven nationwide surveys on sustainability, all of which were independently administered to US cities over a period of 18 months between 2010 and 2011. Response rates for the seven individual surveys range from 25% to 77%. Together over 2500 cities − including more than 90% of cities with populations larger than 50,000 − responded to at least one of the ICSD component surveys, resulting in the single most comprehensive database on local sustainability policy in the United States (Feiock et al., 2014). A detailed description of the component survey’s content, administration, and harmonisation can be found in the article by Feiock et al. (2014). Because rural and smaller cities are less likely to adopt sustainability policies (Lubell et al., 2009a), we limit the analysis in this study to only cities that had a population of at least 50,000 in the 2000 US Census.

Research on sustainability has called for a greater emphasis on understanding the strategies used by local governments for implementing and managing change (Wang et al., 2012). Whereas previous empirical research on municipal sustainability has focused on commitment-making (Krause 2011a; Zahran et al., 2008) and the implementation of specific actions (Bae and Feiock, 2013; Sharp et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012), this study examines cities’ decisions to allocate the resources necessary to pursue long-term sustainability. Both tangible or hard capacity (e.g. financial, physical and technological infrastructure) and intangible or soft capacity (e.g. managerial expertise and staff support) are considered critical for policy implementation (Horton et al., 2003). Reflecting this, our primary dependent variable, ‘resource commitment to sustainability’ has two dimensions: (1) the dedication of financial resources measured as whether a city has established a budget specifically for sustainability; and (2) the dedication of human resources by cities measured by whether it has a dedicated staff for sustainability. We operationalise full ‘resource commitment’ as whether cities have established both types of capacity towards sustainability. This is a more substantive variable than has been used in past research. The final sample size for each dependent variable varies minimally between staff (539) and budget (537), and only decreases to 524 for resource commitment.

The independent variables listed in Table 1 operationalise and allow the testing of the previously described theoretical explanations for local governments’ commitment of resources to sustainability. Community characteristics are used as control variables in this model, enabling us to more precisely test the theories in question. Cities’ population, population density, racial make-up, education, air quality, and climate − operationalised by the number of heating and cooling days − control for relevant contextual features. Independent variables come both from the ICSD and from external, archival sources. Table 1 describes their measurement, source, and summary statistics.

Table 1.

Variable descriptions and data source.

Dependent variables	Description and source	Mean (std. dev)	Min/max
Resource commitment	Dichotomous variable indicating whether a city has both dedicated staffing and a budget for sustainability. Source: ICSD.	0.34 (0.47)	0.00 1.00
Staff	Dichotomous variable indicating whether a city has dedicated staffing for sustainability. Source: ICSD.	0.56 (0.50)	0.00 1.00
Budget	Dichotomous variable indicating whether a city has a dedicated budget for sustainability. Source: ICSD.	0.32 (0.46)	0.00 1.00
Independent variables
Local government priorities
Environment	The extent of priority that cities give to the environment on a 3 point Likert scale where 1 indicates ‘not a priority’, 2 indicates ‘priority’ and 3 indicates ‘high priority’. Source: ICSD.	2.53 (0.56)	1.00 3.00
Social equity	The extent of priority that cities give to social equity on a 3 point Likert scale where 1 indicates ‘not a priority’, 2 indicates ‘priority’ and 3 indicates ‘high priority’. Source: ICSD.	1.90 (0.46)	1.00 3.00
Regional governance
County collaboration	Dichotomous variable indicating whether cities work with their county governments on sustainability issues. Source: ICSD.	0.42 (0.49)	0.00 1.00
Regional collaboration	Dichotomous variable indicating whether cities work with regional organisations on sustainability issues. Source: ICSD.	0.59 (0.49)	0.00 1.00
Neighbouring cities	Dichotomous variable indicating whether cities work with neighbouring cities on sustainability issues. Source: ICSD.	0.39 (0.49)	0.00 1.00
Climate protection networks
ICLEI	A dichotomous variable indicating whether cities were members of ICLEI’s Climate Protection programme in 2010. Source: ICLEI Cities for Sustainability.	0.34 (0.47)	0.00 1.00
US MCPA	A dichotomous variable indicating whether a city’s mayor had ever signed on to the Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement. Source: US Conference of Mayors.	0.54 (0.50)	0.00 1.00
Interests group support
Chamber of commerce	The level of support cities receive for sustainability from local chambers of commerce, on a 1 to 3 Likert scale. Source: ICSD.	2.58 (0.59)	1.00 3.00
Environmental groups	The level of support cities receive for sustainability from local environmental groups, on a 1 to 3 Likert scale. Source: ICSD.	0.77 (0.50)	1.00 3.00
Neighbourhood groups	The level of support cities receive for sustainability from neighbourhood groups, on a 1 to 3 Likert scale. Source: ICSD.	2.70 (0.48)	1.00 3.00
Fiscal capacity
Own source revenue	Cities’ per-capita own source revenue in 2007 in $1000s. Source: US Economic Census.	635.93 (468.40)	84.47 6234.2
Governing institutions
Form of government	A dichotomous variable indicating whether cities have a mayor-council form of government. Source: ICMA and ICSD.	0.36 (0.48)	0.00 1.00
Community characteristics
Population	Cities’ 2010 population in thousands. Source: US Census of Population and Housing.	180.79 (433.36)	29.89^a 8175.1
Race	% of cities population that is non-Hispanic white. Source: US Census of Population and Housing.	54.75 (22.26)	0.80 95.40
Education	% of residents over the age of 25 with at least a Bachelor degree. Source: US Census of Population and Housing.	30.37 (13.49)	4.70 79.30
Cooling degree days	The average number of annual cooling degree days from 1970 to 2000 for the NOAA climate division in which each city is located (base temperature, 65 degrees F). Source: NOAA.	770.98 (533.85)	2.41 2353.8
Air quality index	The proportion of days in 2009 that the air quality index (AQI) indicated healthy or moderate air for the county each city is located in. Source: EPA Air Quality Index Report.	0.96 (0.08)	0.64 1.00
Density	Cities’ 2010 population density, in hundreds of people per square mile. Source: US Census of Population and Housing.	41.26 (37.77)	1.71 518.10

Note: ^aGoleta, CA lost over 45% of its population between 2000 and 2010.

The seven surveys contained in the ICSD utilise slightly different samples and all have different response rates. As such, the numbers of observations in the ICSD vary by variable, depending on which and how many surveys asked about them. Only a minority of the cities that responded to any one survey responded to all seven of them. Thus, most cities have missing data for at least a few variables in the ICSD. Although the number of observations associated with most individual variables remains large, the problems caused by missing data increase with the development of multivariate empirical models. The number of observations in a model may decrease rapidly as cities are dropped for missing one or more variable. As such, when statistically appropriate, the ICSD employs an imputation technique to fill in missing data (see Feiock et al., 2014 for a detailed methodological explanation).¹ In the current study, we use ICSD data with imputation for the independent variables. The dependent variables of financial and/or human resource commitment come directly from the surveys and observations missing these values are dropped rather than imputed. Three separate logistic regressions are specified to predict the likelihood that city governments have dedicated a budget, staff, or both, to pursue local sustainability objectives.

Results

Of the cities in our sample, 34% have a dedicated budget for sustainability and 56% have dedicated staffing; 31% have both in place. The results of the logistic regressions, which assess the factors that influence each of these resource allocation decisions, are presented in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 present the estimates predicting the likelihood that the cities in our sample have a dedicated budget and staff for sustainability, respectively. Model 3 utilises the umbrella dependent variable ‘resource commitment for sustainability’ and presents the likelihood that cities have both a sustainability budget and staff in place. For ease of interpretation Table 3 presents the marginal effects associated with each independent variable. The results indicate that local priorities, regional governance, and membership in climate protection networks influence the likelihood of cities’ dedication of resources to sustainability.

Table 2.

Logistic regression results indicating cities’ resource commitment to sustainability.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Budget	Staff	Full resource commitment
Environmental	−0.026	0.320*	−0.030
priority	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)
Social priorityⁱⁱ	0.504^**	0.650^***	0.580^**
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
County	0.358	0.265	0.448*
collaboration	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Regional	0.221	0.451^**	0.258
collaboration	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Neighbouring	0.157	0.283	0.151
city collaboration	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
ICLEI	1.050^***	1.135^***	0.949^***
Member	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.24)
US MCPA	0.246	0.424*	0.458*
Member	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.25)
Chamber	0.104	0.268	0.157
support	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Environmental group	−0.193	−0.250	−0.315
support	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Neighbourhood group	0.338	0.043	0.452*
Support	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Per-capita own	0.000	0.000	0.000
source revenue	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mayor-council	0.127	−0.161	0.138
government	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Population	0.001^**	0.004^***	0.001
(1000s)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% white	−0.002	0.001	−0.009
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Bachelors	0.022^**	0.023^**	0.027^***
plus	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cooling degree	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
days	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Air quality	2.200	0.287	2.395
indicator	(1.54)	(1.38)	(1.63)
Density	0.007^**	0.004	0.007^**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	−6.342^***	−4.575^***	−6.877^***
	(1.83)	(1.69)	(1.96)
N	539	537	524
chi2	121.136	160.377	132.280

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

p < .1, ^**p < .05, ^***p < .01.

Table 3.

Marginal effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Budget	Staff	Full resource commitment
Environmental	−0.005	0.074*	−0.006
priority	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social priority	0.106^**	0.151^***	0.113^**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
County	0.076	0.061	0.089*
collaboration	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Regional	0.046	0.105^**	0.050
collaboration	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Neighbouring	0.033	0.065	0.030
city collaboration	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ICLEI	0.232^***	0.245^***	0.196^***
Member	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
US MCPA	0.052	0.099*	0.088*
Member	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Chamber	0.022	0.062	0.031
support	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Environmental group	−0.041	−0.058	−0.061
support	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Neighbourhood group	0.071	0.010	0.088*
support	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Per-capita own	0.000	0.000	0.000
source revenue	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mayor-council	0.027	−0.038	0.027
government	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Population	0.000*	0.001^***	0.000
(1000s)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% white	−0.000	0.000	−0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% bachelors	0.005^**	0.005^**	0.005^***
plus	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cooling degree	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
days	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Air quality	0.464	0.066	0.466
indicator	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Density	0.001^**	0.001	0.001^**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	539	537	524
chi2	121.136	160.377	132.280

Notes: Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses.

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

p < .1, ^**p < .05, ^***p < .01.

All else being equal, cities that describe environmental protection as being a high priority goal to their local governments are more likely to have committed resources in the form of staff to advance sustainability. In comparison, the prioritisation of social equity as a predictor of sustainability resources is consistently positive and significant across the three dependent variables. Economy is the third pillar of sustainability, however, its prioritisation was excluded from the model because there was virtually no variation in its value across observations; nearly every city described it as being a ‘high priority’. Substantively, the results in Table 3 indicate that, all else equal, for each additional unit of prioritisation a city gives to social equity, it is 10% more likely to have a dedicated sustainability budget. In other words, cities that describe social equity as a ‘priority’ or a ‘high priority’ are 10% and 20% more likely to have a budget for sustainability than otherwise similar cities for which social equity is ‘not a priority’. The effect of social equity on a city having sustainability staff is slightly larger; a one unit increase translates into a 15% increase in the likelihood of dedicated staff.

The results also indicate that participation in regional governance on sustainability issues increases the probability that cities have dedicated their own staff towards this goal. When a city engages with regional institutions, such as metropolitan planning organisations, it is 10% more likely to dedicate staff for sustainability. Collaborating with county governments increases the probability of full resource commitment. Because cities often work closely with county government on a wide range of policy issues, having a staff and a budget dedicated for sustainability may further mitigate the transaction costs of altering or modify various combinations of institutional arrangements and policy initiatives across jurisdictions. Collaboration with neighbouring cities on sustainability, however, has no significant impact on the likelihood that cities have dedicated a budget, a staff or both types of resources.

Cities’ membership in the climate protection organisation ICLEI Cities for Climate Protection significantly increases the likelihood that they have dedicated resources to advance sustainability efforts. These findings are robust to all three variations of the dependent variable and increase the likelihood of each by between 20% and 25%. The results also suggest that when a city is a signatory of the MCPA it is more likely to dedicate staff and both staff and a budget for sustainability purposes, but the substantive and statistical effect of this variable is relatively small compared to ICLEI membership. All else equal, cities that have signed the Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement are 9% more likely to dedicate staff and 8% more likely to have a full resource commitment than non-signatories. Both regional governance and membership in a climate protection network represent opportunities for cities to improve their capacity for undertaking sustainability activities, via increased communication, technical assistance and policy learning.

The theory of interest group influence receives minimal support from these models: only support from neighbourhood groups has a significant effect on full resource commitment. Local fiscal capacity, as measured by cities’ per capita own-source revenue, and cities’ form of government are not shown to impact the likelihood of resource commitment. The control variables in the model show little significance, with only education being consistently significant across the dependent variable variations. Larger and more densely populated cities are also more likely to dedicate some resource types.

Looking across the models, there is some difference in the factors that influence cities’ dedication of a sustainability staff from those that influence the dedication of a sustainability budget. Specifically, the provision of a sustainability staff is positively influenced by environmental issues being a priority, collaboration with regional institutions, and US MCPA membership. None of these factors influence the likelihood that a city has a sustainability budget.

Discussion of findings

‘Resource commitment’ has both human and monetary dimensions. Both are necessary to enable local governments to translate ideas and goals into implemented policy. Of the explanations tested, local priorities, regional governance, and participation in a climate protection network, receive the strongest empirical support in accounting for variation among cities in resource commitments to sustainability. Table 4 summarises the hypothesised and observed relationship between the six explanations and the budget, staff and full resource commitment for sustainability.

Table 4.

Hypothesised and observed effects.

Hypothesis	Independent variables	Observed effect
Hypothesis	Independent variables	Budget	Staff	Full resource
H₁: Sustainability priorities (+)	Environmental priority	(−)	(+)	(−)
H₁: Sustainability priorities (+)	Social priority	(+)	(+)	(+)
H₂: Regional collaboration (+)	County collaboration	(+)	(+)	(+)
	Regional collaboration	(+)	(+)	(+)
	Neighbouring cities	(+)	(+)	(+)
H₃: Climate protection networks (+)	ICLEA Climate Protection programme	(+)	(+)	(+)
H₃: Climate protection networks (+)	US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement	(+)	(+)	(+)
H₄: Interest group support (+)	Chamber of commerce	(+)	(+)	(+)
	Environmental groups	(−)	(−)	(−)
	Neighbourhood groups	(+)	(+)	(+)
H₅: Fiscal capacity (+)	Own source revenue	(+)	(+)	(+)
H₆: Governing institutions (-)	Mayor-council form of government	(+)	(−)	(+)

Note: Signs in bold are statistically significant coefficients.

With regards to Hypothesis 1, the results suggest that when sustainability is considered an environmental priority it affects the provision of human resources that likely manage resource conservation planning and policy development. However, managing short and long term programmatic initiatives that focus on wealth creation and the distribution of resources, and which may include a wide range of organisations and businesses, necessitates adequate local staff and a budget. While the environmental dimension of sustainability may remain a salient feature of local policy, the complexities involved with advancing the social dimension of sustainability appears to lead to greater commitment in the form of human and financial resources.

Depending on the variation of the dependent variable, working with county governments and regional institutions likewise has a positive effect on resource commitment, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. There is a wide range of activities that local governments can implement that produce relatively localised benefits, such as improvements to government facilities that reduce energy consumption or changes in land use policy to encourage the protection of open spaces. Collaboration with their county government or a regional organisation can provide cities with the incentive to pursue investments in sustainability that are likely to produce more widely distributed benefits. When cities work closely with county or regional governments it can also signal a shared commitment to sustainability and reduce free riding that could otherwise hinder relevant investment. Indeed, some argue that for sustainability activities at the local level to have their greatest impact, cities must engage in collective action and overcome barriers to the design and implementation of joint policy that produces region-wide benefits (Feiock and Coutts, 2013; Zahran et al., 2008). As a result, cities may be more willing to engage in collective action through greater commitment of their own resources.

Our findings related to Hypothesis 3 that tests the impact of network membership contradict some previous studies, which suggest that even though cities have joined ICLEI, they do not meaningfully change their local policies, programmes and practices (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Portney, 2009). As part of its ‘5-milestone process’ to help cities reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, ICLEI recommends that funding mechanisms and staff responsibility be assigned as part of developing a local action plan (Milestone 3). Our findings suggest that cities are indeed more likely to devote resources to sustainability when they are members of ICLEI. There is of course the possibility of reverse causality; having these resources in place enables a local government to participate in climate protection networks. Nonetheless, it is difficult to develop new programmes locally that are generated from participating in ICLEI when there is a lack of consistent funding and staff responsible for implementation and monitoring.

Our analysis uses city data from 2010, when ICLEI membership was at its peak. However, by 2012, ICLEI had become a target for political opposition by interest groups advocating small government and anti-United Nations sentiments. ICLEI’s origins as an outgrowth of the United Nations’ sustainable development document, Agenda 21, made it a particular target. As a response to political pressure, its membership among US cities, particularly those in more conservative states, began to decline notably (Krause et al., 2014). Although the implications of this reversal are not examined in this study, it is possible that once cities withdraw from ICLEI they will lose the observed ‘boost’ in their likelihood of resource commitment. Alternatively, there may be a residual effect from ICLEI membership which moderates the impact of withdrawal. Other networks − such as the Urban Sustainability Directors’ Network − may also expand to assume its space. An assessment of the implications of ICLEI withdrawal on local sustainability policy is an important area of future research.

Hypothesis 4 provides mixed results. The absence of a significant effect from environmental organisation’s support on resource commitment is surprising given the findings from previous research (Ramírez de la Cruz, 2009). While some of the most vocal opposition to sustainability comes from the private sector, such as chambers of commerce (Portney and Cuttler, 2010), more recently other types of organised interests, such as the Tea Party, have also taken aim at sustainability initiatives (Whittemore, 2013). However, our results suggest that the levels of support or opposition expressed by chambers of commerce do not yield a significant impact on governmental resource allocation decisions for sustainability.

The results do suggest, however, that cities are moderately more likely to devote staff and a budget to sustainability policy development and programme implementation when neighbourhood organisations are more supportive. This result is particularly important in light of the two distinct strategies used for building support for sustainability presented by Portney (2005). One type of strategy centres on assembling community support while the other emphasises a top down approach of acquiring technical expertise from professionals. The former strategy involves engaging and receiving ‘buy in’ from residents, which subsequently reduces the risks faced by elected officials when making policy decisions. Research points to the wide range of mechanisms used by cities to solicit input from residents on sustainability policy (Hawkins and Wang, 2012), and how this engagement increases the financial capacity needed for undertaking sustainability initiatives (Wang et al., 2014). The results do not provide statistical support for either the fiscal capacity variable (H₅) or the governing institutions variable (H₆).

The literature we draw upon to guide our empirical analysis was chosen because it aligns with an institutional perspective in explaining local actions. There are of course other strands in the literature on local government policy that may be useful in explaining resource commitment, including studies related to the practices of budgeting and financing government operations (Rubin, 2010; Wang et al., 2014), and research on policy diffusion (Shipan and Volden, 2008). From a methodological perspective, this study does not account for multi-level governance, in particular the role of state rules and policy actions that impact local decisions (Homsy and Warner, 2015; Krause, 2011a; Volden et al., 2008). We expand on the limitations of this study and the opportunities for future research in the concluding section.

Conclusion

Advocates for expansion in financial and human resource support for local sustainability argue that its benefits can improve cities’ economic competitiveness, reduce social inequalities, and mitigate environmental impacts from growth and development. Although it can take a substantial amount of time for local sustainability efforts to produce these results in a tangible manner, some municipal governments are heavily invested in sustainability and have actively developed and implemented relevant initiatives. What explains these actions and cities’ overall resource commitment to sustainability?

Previous research applies a variety of theoretical perspectives in efforts to answer these questions. The results of these studies have undoubtedly contributed to the general base of knowledge on local sustainability, but the theoretical scope and empirical assessments provided by this literature have been inhibited and constrained by the limited availability of relevant data. In this study we take the initial steps to mitigate the problems caused by the limited availability of city level data by utilising the Integrated City Sustainability Database (ICSD) (Feiock et al., 2014). The ICSD combines the results of seven independent surveys to generate the largest database of local sustainability activities available in the United States. We operationalise a new, substantively meaningful set of dependent variables and a more complete set of theoretical explanations, and test these theories using a larger number of observations, thus making a unique contribution to the explanatory research on local sustainability.

Local decisions on dedicating public resources to advance sustainability are shaped in an action arena where individuals interact through regional governance and climate protection networks. Our findings specifically point to membership in ICLEI in influencing cities’ commitment of human and financial resources. Moreover, the results demonstrate how local officials select actions provided by the options they face, for example the need to address social inequities as a priority, and because of the exogenous impacts of local interests, in particular neighbourhood organisations. Our findings simultaneously downplay the role played by cities’ fiscal health and form of government.

The impact that the commitment of human and financial resources have on city government sustainability activities or programmes is beyond the scope of this research to specify. However, the dedication of budgets and staff for sustainability represent important substantive actions and demonstrate cities are taking the issue seriously. Identifying the factors that influence resource commitment through this study represents an important additional step in clarifying theoretical explanations for sustainability. Additional analysis that includes specific budget outlays and a more precise measure of staffing dedicated to sustainability efforts would be a logical next step in understanding resource commitment.

Future research on this topic should consider a multi-level governance perspective that focuses on the important role states play in shaping local policy actions, particularly because of their activity in developing climate action plans (see Wheeler, 2008). Multi-level analysis could provide new insights into the relationship between the resources committed at the local level and state institutional structures or legislative policy measures. This is especially important given the ascension of anti-Agenda 21 onto the agendas of state legislatures (see Frick et al., 2014). Alternatively, some states such as California have been aggressive in promoting climate protection initiatives that are likely to impact how local governments pursue environmental protection (Kwon et al., 2014). A multi-level governance approach is also applicable in the analysis of federal initiatives that incentivise sustainability planning and implementation, such as the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant programme. There are also opportunities, pending the availability of data, to examine how a city’s history with sustainability-related practices shapes resource commitment. A longitudinal analysis could provide new evidence of these relationships. A qualitative analysis of a small sample of cities might also provide insights into how the success or failure of past initiatives has influenced resource commitment. Both approaches could incorporate the literature on policy diffusion and policy learning, which have been applied as theoretical perspectives in the study of local decision making.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

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