Competitive sub-metropolitan regionalism: Local government collaboration and advocacy in northern Melbourne,Australia

Abstract

Chinese

In contrast with attention to city-regions as motors of the global economy, alternative perspectives indicate the rising complexity of metropolitan forms. The coherency of city-regions, their management and the intensity of political benefits from outwardly radiating opportunities can therefore be considered problematic. Symbolic of this complexity is the emergence of sub-metropolitan regions, or sub-regions within city-regions, that seek to better position themselves within global economic flows and public-sector funding allocations. Careful assessment is necessary as place-based factors, including multi-level government structures and prevailing inter-government relations, shape resulting regional governance formations. In the Australian context, the significance of the state government level and a dearth of commentary on local government advocacy are highlighted. Within expansive Melbourne, regional wedge-based forms of collaboration involving local councils are identified, some having historical equivalents and overlapping regional governance structures. Specific attention is directed towards northern Melbourne where seven local councils forged a regional collaborative approach in the early 2010s after reflecting upon local and regional experiences and the achievements of other metropolitan and Victorian regions. A ratcheting upwards of advocacy endeavours is identified as symbolised by government delegations, advocacy documents, connections between regional governance structures and deliberation over how advocacy can be made more impactful. Future research priorities include comparative investigations to better document and conceptualise local and regional advocacy approaches and experiences, plus analysis of the counterstrategies designed by higher government levels to manage competing sub-metropolitan regions.

Keywords

advocacy city-regions governance local government multi-level governance regional collaboration

Introduction

Alongside recognition of city-regions as engines of the global economy and associated policy prescriptions (Scott, 2001, 2011), academic attention has been directed towards the complexity of emerging metropolitan forms (Brenner and Schmid, 2014). Capturing specific interest has been the existence of outer metropolitan regions (Jonas, 2011). Building on recognition of edge-cities (Garreau, 1991), significance has been directed towards ‘post-suburban’ (Phelps and Wood, 2011) or ‘in-between’ regions (Sieverts, 2003). Such regions incorporate metropolitan parts which are substantially disconnected from post-industrial centripetal commuting patterns. By recognising the existence of such regions and associated governance structures, criticism has been directed towards economic and political perspectives that place functional city-regions and outwardly radiating (or trickle out) benefits on a pedestal (Ward and Jonas, 2004). Likewise criticism has been directed towards ‘big’ or ‘dense’ metropolitan area perspectives (e.g. Glaeser, 2011) that gloss over the complexities of metropolitan management (Tomaney, 2012; Wheeler, 2009). Regions therefore exist within metropolitan areas – or sub-regions within city-regions – which actively compete with each other, navigate along different pathways and contest the post-industrial city-region imaginaries of higher levels of government (Addie, 2013; Young and Keil, 2014). Economic growth is not simply uneven between urban and regional areas, but also within metropolitan areas, thus leading disadvantaged or neglected sub-metropolitan parts to rally against both the over-concentration of opportunities within centralised nodes (e.g. employment, museums, hospitals, universities) and the frailties of transport systems (Henderson, 2015). Notions of regions competing, contesting and rallying do not simply infer the bending of global economic investment or the fostering of endogenous development, they also refer to lobbying or advocacy within the context of inter-government relations.

To conceptualise the inter-governmental politics associated with metropolitan areas, geographical sensitivity is necessary on two important fronts. First, embedded within cities are place-specific institutional arrangements characterised by government tiers, associated powers, inter-government relations and, typically, a complex underlayer of democratic electorates (Pierre, 2014). Such institutional inheritances not only shape local government responsibilities, resources and capacities, but also play a key role in determining the likely characteristics of constructed forms of regionalism (Brenner, 2004). Re-scaled local government endeavours are constructed upon formal territorial arrangements and the in-built or natural limitations thereof. As illustrated by the Australian federal system (e.g. Stilwell and Troy, 2000), where local government is dependent on higher levels of government for capital or project funding, local level advocacy can span into regional advocacy. Endogenous forms of place-based regional economic development can therefore be weakened (Beer, 2006; Tomaney, 2012). Second, care is required not to overlook the diversity of regional alliances that exist within metropolitan areas, as well as within more extensive city-regions (Addie, 2013; Myron, 2015; Young and Keil, 2014). In a sub-metropolitan sense, questions can be raised about the relationship between middle and outer city local government areas (LGAs) containing de-industrialising zones and spaces of rapid housing growth. Common LGA concerns can include employment-related anxieties within the context of centripetal forces. As city-centre-focused post-industrial economies grow stronger, shared interests between LGAs positioned along existing and potential radial transport lines can also be considered strengthened (Addie, 2013; Young and Keil, 2014). Urban governance research must therefore not overlook inter-local government regional ‘wedge-like’ alliances that extend outwards from the inner-city along different compass directions, or parts thereof. Such wedges have particular relevance in the case of ‘expansive’ Melbourne.¹

Metropolitan areas remain dynamic and urban experiences spatially uneven. Over time different policy responses may be adopted by higher levels of government in response to (sub-)metropolitan needs and/or electoral priorities. In addition to new agencies and investment programmes to deliver change, rhetoric-based governmentalities are deployed. Announced funding commitments to urban futures may therefore obscure the reality of competitive availability, spatial selectivity and dilution through dispersal, thus leaving the expectations of LGAs unfulfilled (Addie, 2013; Beer, 2006; Dodson, 2015; Myron, 2015). Disengagement by LGAs can, however, be problematic where vertical fiscal imbalances are substantial. Local government-based learning curves can nevertheless be anticipated through repetitive experiences, including strategic reflection on how local and regional advocacy approaches can be strengthened. After further elaborating the Australian, Victorian and Melbourne context, this paper investigates regional wedge-based inter-local government collaboration in northern Melbourne. In 2011, when the most recent iteration commenced, the region covered seven LGAs and a substantial 900,000 residents within metropolitan Melbourne (4.1 million residents), Victoria (5.5 million) and Australia (22.3 million) (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2016). Drawing on interviews and desktop research, rising levels of regional competition across Melbourne and Victoria are identified. Evidence includes: the re-emergence of local government collaboration in northern Melbourne, the first iteration in the post-1994/5 amalgamation era; regional advocacy documents; and dilemmas about how to better position the region at a state and federal level. Functional city-regions and the rising physical complexity of metropolitan forms must therefore be viewed from political perspectives, not least because of likely government attempts to maintain coherency and control, but also in view of the gradual ratcheting upwards of regional endeavours and advocacy pressures.

Sub-metropolitan regions and multi-level government in the Australian context

As the global population increases and urbanisation represents the dominant socio-spatial trend, new more complex metropolitan forms are emerging (Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Wheeler, 2009). In addition to mega-cities, the coalescence of cities and multi-nodal urban regions (Wheeler, 2009), traditional mono-centric industrial cities are facing intensifying challenges (Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Jonas, 2011). As well as de-industrialisation and associated urban regeneration requirements, where post-industrial city centre transitions are underway, opportunity-drawn population growth can exert enormous housing pressures. With brownfield development tending to offer partial solutions, greenfield development continues on the edge of cities, if not in more dispersed forms across extensive city-regions. As the city edge draws further from centralised post-industrial activity centres, important questions relate to employment generation, infrastructure provision and servicing (Jonas, 2011; Phelps, 2012). Such questions draw into consideration multi-level government structures, the capacities of individual tiers and the responses that are forthcoming, including spatially and temporally.

The structures of urban governance vary internationally (Pierre, 2014). Variation exists in whether formal tiers of government are present between the local and the national, the power embedded within relevant tiers, and how the geographies of government relate to the grounded built-up form. Whilst the potential for urban regions to extend across the territories of middle tier federated state structures has long been recognised (Gottmann, 1961), urban governance research commonly draws attention to the fragmentation of discrete metropolitan areas by LGA boundaries (Addie, 2013; Myron, 2015). Wheeler (2009: 867), for example, acknowledges a natural fragmentation whereby ‘local elected officials have little political incentive to collaborate regionally [or within metropolitan frames of reference], and tend to resist any loss of local power’. Looking beyond the local, regional governance structures can nevertheless be recognised, including local government collaboration at the metropolitan level, e.g. Metro Vancouver (2.5 million residents spanning 24 LGAs) (Sancton, 2005). Within the context of grounded situations, collaborative local government endeavours can be considered forthcoming where local leaders seize ‘moments of opportunity’ to promote the capacity of the ‘regional’ to benefit the ‘local’ (Newman, 2008) and from the alignment of multi-dimensional individually constructed rationales (Henderson, 2015). Downwardly introduced state spatial or scalar policies at a metropolitan, city-region and/or regional level are also acknowledged (Brenner, 2004), including city-scale LGA re-territorialisation, e.g. Auckland (1.6 million residents) (Mouat and Dodson, 2013). Leaving relatively small-scale metropolitan examples aside, as more populous, expansive and complex metropolitan forms emerge, metropolitan sub-regions require greater consideration (Henderson, 2015; Jonas, 2011). Of further importance is that such research does not simply point to the existence of sub-metropolitan regional forms, their catalysts and adopted actions, but also their evolution, achievements and responses drawn.

The urban impact of federated state (or provincial) governments must also be further probed because large metropolitan areas or city-regions, if not several, can be well contained within their boundaries. Depending on the relative significance of local government, plus state government political incumbents, the state level may respond to metropolitan needs in different ways. In the USA, Wheeler (2009) alludes to state level disengagement by highlighting the role that the US government must play in overcoming institutional inertia through incentives (e.g. goals, resources), especially if the management of mega-urban regions is to be improved. Differences exist with the Canadian situation where some middle tier provincial governments have adopted a top-down approach in re-territorialising local government (Addie, 2013; Sancton, 2005). As Sancton (2005) further indicates in relation to Ontario, the provincial government has demonstrated willingness to plan across a large urban region that extends beyond Greater Toronto (i.e. the Golden Horseshoe).

Australia shares similarities with Canada because of the strength of the state level, particularly in relation to the local government sector. Rather than local government structures emerging in bottom-up ways in response to urban needs, Australia’s colonial administrations played a dominant role in constructing LGAs during the 19th century. Local government is now commonly described as a relatively weak (legislative) ‘creature’ of state and territory governments (Dodson, 2015; Sansom, 2009; Stilwell and Troy, 2000). When the six colonial governments signed the Australian Constitution in 1901 selected responsibilities shifted upwards, notably foreign relations, defence, immigration and trade, while urban, housing and regional development responsibilities were retained, along with health, education, police and utilities (excl. telephone). No mention was made of local government. Notable changes since 1901 include the nationalisation of income tax collection during and after the Second World War. A situation of vertical fiscal imbalances therefore pervades the Australian federal system, as reflected in re-occurring state-federal level tensions (e.g. regional development policy, Kelly et al., 2009). Whilst local council responsibilities have broadened beyond their early focus on roads, rubbish and rates towards meeting community needs more generally, the breadth of extension, associated costs and the overall viability of the sector draws state government attention (Sansom, 2009). In the mid-1990s, Victoria led the nation in adopting a policy of LGA amalgamation (Connoley, 2007). Under the Kennett (Liberal/National Party) Coalition state government (1992–1999) the number of councils in Victoria fell from 210 to 78; 31 falling within metropolitan Melbourne (statistical division). Following a period of Labor party control (1999–2010) and a single term Coalition government (2010–2014), the incumbent Labor party (2014–) re-confirmed the State Government’s overriding power by introducing a manifesto pledge of capping annual council rate increases.

In view of Australian state government responsibilities, metropolitan primacy (e.g. 75% residing in Melbourne (ABS, 2016)) and the proximity of the state level to voters, incumbent politicians must at the very least give consideration to metropolitan issues. During the second half of the 20th century, Melbourne experienced industrial decentralisation, automobile-orientated suburban expansion and dispersed shopping centre development. From the early 1970s the city’s industrial economy started to wane as tariff protection barriers were lowered. City centre deterioration eventually saw the Victorian government respond through entrepreneurial flagship projects during the 1980s and 1990s (Hodge, 2005; John et al., 2013; Shaw, 2013). Evidence of a city-centre-focused post-industrial transformation is symbolised by Melbourne’s repeated designation of the ‘world’s most liveable city’ (Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2016). It is further reflected in: population growth (1450 per week 2005–2015, (ABS, 2016)); urban fringe land release – the principle delivery mechanism of affordable housing; a radial transportation system under pressure; and, predictions that Melbourne will reach 8 million by 2051 (Victorian Government, 2014).

Notwithstanding the (re-)emergence of metropolitan strategic planning by the Victorian state government from the early 2000s, the market-led approach that helped refashion the city centre continues to be influential. A substantive gap therefore exists between metropolitan plans espousing a multi-nodal, compact city comprised of sustainable (20 minute) communities and structured forms of implementation (Dodson, 2015; Gleeson et al., 2012; Spiller, 2014). Greenfield development therefore continues apace on the outskirts of Melbourne, but also on the edge of proximate regional centres as part of enlarged city-region imaginaries (e.g. Geelong, Bendigo, Ballarat) (Victorian Government, 2014). Melbourne’s complexity as a spatial entity therefore continues to increase through ongoing de-industrialising processes in middle and outer areas, expansion of the built-up form and long distance commuting. Despite incremental efforts to strengthen radial connections into the city centre-based post-industrial economy (e.g. new rail services, road widening projects), community anxieties about employment prospects, travel barriers, service deficiencies and living costs remain strong in middle and outer areas (Dodson, 2015; Essential Economics, 2013; Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (VAGO), 2013). Inevitably where state governments fail to met community needs, pressure is exerted on LGAs. An important question therefore is how municipalities respond within the context of inter-government relations.

One implication of Australian local government being labelled ‘weak and fragmented, save for a few quirks’ (e.g. Brisbane City Council (CC), Dodson, 2015: 32) is that metropolitan research perspectives tend to be state and federal focused. In doing so aspirational governance structures and policy options are promulgated, including metropolitan tiers of governance and aligned federal incentives (Dodson, 2015; Gleeson, et al., 2012; Spiller, 2014). A second implication is that when political institutions are reviewed and interest group lobbying is acknowledged, little if any attention is given to local government or local government networks (e.g. Singleton et al., 2013; Warhurst, 2014). Yet not only have metropolitan LGAs become larger in size,² more sophisticated and confident, but enlarged regional configurations can be identified, some with historical roots (Sansom, 2009). During the early 1970s, the then Labor federal government (1972–1975) supported the creation of voluntary regional organisation of councils (ROCs) and incentivised collaboration through federal grants. While the policy proved short-lived and contentious from an inter-government perspective, some collaborative arrangements that were formed in this period continue to exist (e.g. Western Sydney ROC) (Kelly et al., 2009).

In Melbourne, regional wedge-like structures also continued during the 1980s in Melbourne’s industrial west and north (Howe, 1995; Stanley et al., 1986). A North West Melbourne ROC (NWMROC) evolved into the Northern Regional Commission (NRC) and, like the Western Melbourne ROC, lasted through until council amalgamations. Since the mid-1990s various bottom-up and top-down regional wedge-like configurations have emerged in northern Melbourne (NM). In the sections that follow, these regional configurations are documented. Of particular interest is the most recent phase (2011–), which has involved seven LGAs³ engaging in a joint regional advocacy approach. To provide depth and evaluative insights, the remainder of this paper draws on material from a larger interview-based research inquiry into local and regional advocacy in Melbourne and Geelong. Between February 2015 and March 2017, 30 people were interviewed, including current or former board members, elected representatives and upper level executive officers from a mix of councils, business-led organisations and regional bodies. Interviews typically lasted one hour and were recorded for transcription and analysed according to theme (time period, policy/project, geographical area, advocacy approaches, key relationships). Two interviews involved more than one person, four interviewees were interviewed twice, several interviews were longer in duration and follow-up emails were used for clarification purposes. Confidential illustrative commentary is used to reinforce key conclusions.

Northern Melbourne: Regional iterations, advocacy approaches and prevailing dilemmas

Regional configurations prior to local government amalgamation

In the early 1990s, ‘prior to the 1994/5 [local government] amalgamations, there were nine metropolitan VROCs (voluntary regional organisation of councils, not necessarily dating from the 1970s) and at least as many in the rural and provincial areas … All were disband following council amalgamation’ (Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV), 1997: 8). The NRC was one such metropolitan VROC (Spiller Gibbins Swan, 1994). Core LGAs that spanned both the NWMROC and the NRC were Coburg (incorporated into Moreland), Broadmeadows (Hume), Bulla (Hume) and Gisborne (Macedon Ranges) (O’Connor and Rapson, 1993; Stanley et al., 1986) (see Figure 1). For periods, other LGAs were involved including Brunswick (Moreland), Keilor (Brimbank), Northcote (Darebin) and Preston (Darebin). Both configurations were unincorporated associations, included metropolitan and non-metropolitan LGAs, and represented loosely formed groups that engaged in discussion, profiling (O’Connor and Rapson, 1993), strategy development (Stanley et al., 1986) and advocacy work. Interviewees identified the following interests: manufacturing, Melbourne airport, roads, health services and business attraction, with advocacy primarily directed towards the state level. Little in the way of structured support or formal institutional recognition existed at a state level, because of the ‘potential to threaten the power of the state’ or state political control (Howe, 1995: 193). The most substantial achievement was reported to have occurred during the 1980s when a Labor alignment existed at the federal (1983–1996) and state level (1982–1992), and the then Australian prime minister was seated in Coburg (i.e. Bob Hawke (1983–1991)). At this point federal government investment in Melbourne Western Ring Road (M80) (constructed 1989–1997) was realised, having first been identified in the 1969 Melbourne Transport Plan. NRC was but one advocate. Through state and federal advocacy partial successes were acknowledged, including ‘… pilot funds for something, which had a small chance of ever becoming a major project (NMLGA Former CEO, 2016). That support was nevertheless obtained ‘… sort of stimulated everyone else to want to get a region’ (NMLGA Former CEO, 2016). Ironic therefore by the early 1990, the ‘geographically stretched’ NRC had lost what energy it previously had:

… there was no real sense of region, regional development, or even advocacy much … It was still called the Northern Regional Commission … gee it was low key, driven mostly by the CEOs, who would have a small agenda, it had one or two executive staff. It was very ineffective. It just hobbled along. And hard for it to stretch from inner north like Northcote … It stretched all the way out to Broadie (Broadmeadows, as well as beyond) where they were doing greenfield subdivision at Craigieburn. (NMLGA Former CEO2, 2016)

Figure 1.

Metropolitan Melbourne including local councils, an approximation of the built-up form and Regional Development Australia (RDA) committee areas.

In parallel with the NRC, other ‘northern’ inter-council forums existed including a Northern Melbourne Transport Group purportedly drawing together the CEOs of Coburg, Broadmeadows, Preston, Northcote, Whittlesea, Heidelberg (post amalgamation part of Banyule) and Diamond Valley (Nillumbik). The Group existed until the early 1990s when it expanded into a Melbourne-wide Metropolitan Transport Group. A business-led organisation termed the Northern Industry Education and Training Link (NIETL) also emerged from the mid-1980s. NIETL originated from the Preston area following a conversation about the need for skilled labour within the manufacturing sector between a local businessperson and an officer from Preston Technical and Further Education College (TAFE). From the outset NIETL encouraged business networking and shared learning. As individual and sectoral membership expanded, so did NIETL’s geographical coverage (e.g. Kodak (based in Coburg, 1965–2004), Ford Automobile Company (based in Broadmeadows, 1959–2016)). In summary, historical regional governance structures therefore pre-date more recent iterations in northern Melbourne.

Northern Melbourne regional configurations during the 1990s and 2000s

In 1994 the then (Keating) Labor federal government (1991–1996) indicated its support for voluntary regional governance structures. Termed ‘Regional Economic Development Organisations’ (REDOs, aka RDOs), like ROCs, they existed as a federal policy construct for a brief time period prior to being discontinued by an incoming (Howard) Coalition federal government (1996–2007) (Kelly et al., 2009). In Victoria, the emergence of REDOs coincided with LGA amalgamations, the disbanding of ROCs (MAV, 1997) and a period of commissioner control of the new larger councils.⁴ A Northern Melbourne REDO (NMREDO) was established in 1995 under the banner of Melbourne’s Northern Economic Wedge. Rather than the NMREDO superseding the NRC, given the amalgamation process underway a substantial disjuncture in regional governance occurred. By 1996, NMREDO was governed by a board constituted by nine financially contributing LGAs (Banyule City Council, 1996), plus representatives from industry and education. Early momentum was encouraged by the prospect of operational budgets (e.g. officer support, strategy development) and competitively available regional development funds. For Badenhorst (2009: 83) the entity proved ‘largely ineffectual’ for reasons including internal management issues and its diversity of interests. Interviewees also acknowledged ‘over-stretching’, as illustrated by Banyule’s decision to exit because of the degree of focus on the northward bound Hume Highway (Banyule City Coucil, 1996). Further loss of raison d’être followed the 1996 federal election and the incoming Coalition government’s announced cessation of funding.

Other regional governance structures also existed during the 1990s. Alongside REDOs the Labor government introduced Area Consultative Committees (ACCs) to address supply-side labour market issues (Kelly et al., 2009). ACC continued through the subsequent Coalition government, lasting until 2009 when they were abolished nationally by a Labor federal government (2007–2013). Following the removal of an inner-city ACC in the late 1990s, Melbourne was structured into four LGA-based wedges: eastern, northern, southern and western; with the northern region ACC including: Banyule, Darebin, Hume, Moreland, Nillumbik, Whittlesea and Yarra (see Figure 1). Relevant statistics for the NMACC area are presented in Table 1. In addition to advising on initiatives and pilots, and being the eyes and ears of government at a regional level, ACCs were tasked with developing networks (e.g. businesses, unions, education providers), compiling knowledge and identifying solutions. There was no mandate to involve local governments (Kelly et al., 2009). With the loss of federal government support for REDOs, the NMACC’s inability to address supply side problems alone resulted in a broader regional development approach, notably this included collaboration with an organisation called NORTH Link.

Table 1.

Key statistics for local government areas within NMACC and NMRDA 1983–2031.

	Illustrative unemployment levels (%) in pre-amalgamation council areas (Sept 1992)^a	Estimated 1993 population^b	2011 population^d (annual growth rate 1993–2011)	Forecasted population 2031^e (annual growth rate 2011–2031)	LGA unemployment level (%) in 2011 (and 2016)^f	Unemployment %, highest level by small area, 2011 (2016)^f
Banyule	–	116,300	122,983 (0.3%)	145,036 (0.9%)	3.5 (3.7)	Heidelberg West 9.8 (10.0)
Darebin	17.8 (Northcote), 18.5 (Preston)	127,800	142,942 (0.7%)	191,938 (1.7%)	5.5 (6.2)	Reservoir East 7.7 (8.2)
Hume	19.3 (Broadmeadows), 9.6 (Bulla)	106,500	174,290 (3.5%)	293,895 (3.4%)	8.9 (9.3)	Broadmeadows 23.1 (23.4)
Moreland	22.9 (Brunswick), 17.9 (Coburg)	143,200	154,247 (0.4%)	216,299 (2.0%)	5.6 (6.5)	Fawkner 8.4 (8.6)
Nillumbik	–	56,600	62,716 (0.6%)	67,600 (0.4%)	1.8 (2.1)	Kinglake 4.2 (4.2)
Whittlesea	14.6 (Whittlesea)	101,400	160,800 (3.3%)	313,959 (4.8%)	5.0 (6.3)	Thomastown 8.9 (10.5)
Yarra	–	63,550	78,903 (1.3%)	122,022 (2.7%)	5.3 (5.8)	Collingwood 10.2 (10.9)
Total[% of Metropolitan Melbourne]		715,350 [22.4%]	896,881 (1.4%) [21.8%]	1,350,749 (2.5%)[22.8%]	5.5 (6.2)
Metropolitan Melbourne		3,189,200^c	4,108,837 (1.8%)	5,931,007 (2.2%)	4.9 (5.9)	Campbellfield-Coolaroo (Hume) 24.1 (21.2)

Source: ^a O’Connor and Rapson (1993); ^b Office of Local Government (1995); ^c Australian Bureau of Statistics (1993); ^d Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016); ^e Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (2016); ^f Department of Employment (2017). Also note that the average labour force size per small area in the NMRDA area (total 60) was 9940 people.

NORTH Link was formed after NIETL and the flagging NREDO fell under the same private-sector chairperson and were merged in 1997. Following the appointment of a Director, the NORTH Link term was introduced. Rather than assuming regional continuity between NREDO and NORTH Link, a substantial transformation must be inferred, particularly from a local government perspective. In contrast with the overstretching identified above, the then chairperson reflecting on early NORTH Link participants indicated a much more constrained geography:

Hume and Whittlesea were the main ones, Darebin as well, but Moreland came in a bit later, and Yarra came in a bit later again, Banyule later again (the latter two joining after 2009 (Banyule City Coucil, 2010)) … and we expect that Nillumbik will come in (2017–) and also Mitchell.

From the outset NORTH Link integrated industrialists concerned for business competitiveness, LGAs anxious about de-industrialisation and unemployment, and educational institutions interested in linking training courses to economic activity. Such sectoral interests noted, NORTH Link is predominately a business-led organisation which has links to local governments via annual subscriptions (A$15,000 in 2016) and boardroom membership participation by local economic development officers. On a project by project basis, non-paying local government members have in the past engaged in regional partnership working with NORTH Link. As described by the abovementioned chairperson: NORTH Link provided the means for ‘… getting those councils working together as a region rather than being too territorial, too parochial about their own patch, and that has been a big step’. Helping to achieve the latter was NORTH Link’s expansion from the needs of existing businesses (e.g. delivering federal level business leadership programmes, such as Enterprise Connect) to considering regional economic dynamics and futures, and associated forms of advocacy. Based on similar geographical and regional development interests a close collaboration was forged with the NMACC during the 2000s, including shared board membership.

In 1999 the Victorian State Government fell under Labor control, helped by disgruntled non-metropolitan (or rural and regional) voters concerned about a Melbourne-centric approach. Funding programmes followed (e.g. Regional Infrastructure Development Fund, Provincial Victoria Growth Fund), and in forthcoming years were aligned with non-metropolitan regional structures and associated forms of regional planning. A stronger commitment towards regional approaches therefore existed, though left local and regional interests in Melbourne feeling overlooked. What followed in the northern Melbourne region was an attempt to evidence regional conditions and opportunities. Joint NORTH Link and NMACC publications emerged promoting an integrated economy that linked inner-city professionals with outer area industrial activity (National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR), 2003) and identifying the constraints and opportunities that existed within the commercial office sector (NORTH Link/NIETL and NMACC, 2007). For NMACC’s executive officer, the regional ‘evidence-based’ approach was innovative within a Melbourne context as: ‘… no one was approaching it in that way previously’. NMACC and NORTH Link also engaged in other forms of advocacy, including holding at least annual meetings with federal and state members of parliament to release reports and to advocate for selected and/or opportunistic projects: ‘We find that approach works much better than going to the media, making a hoo-ha, putting people offside’ (NM Regional Organisation, 2015). Successes included helping to secure the decentralised site for Melbourne’s future wholesale food markets during the mid-2000s by promoting the logic of a north rather than a west Melbourne location to state parliamentarians.

In terms of regional level achievements, critical perspectives were forthcoming where interviewees detected an over-emphasis towards regional description rather than structured forms of regional advocacy, and because regional documentation often depended upon government financial support. Regional level contact between LGAs was curtailed by inward looking mentalities such that no formal regional group existed to align with or support NMACC or NORTH Link. On an individual basis, there were reports of council economic development documents referencing regional publications, councillors occasionally attending NORTH Link business networking events or awards and collaboration between neighbouring council areas (e.g. joint support by Whittlesea and Hume for the food manufacturing industry through the Plenty Food Group). Formal connections between NORTH Link and the work of local economic development officers (i.e. inward investment promotion, business associations, retail precincts, business incubation, apprenticeship schemes) were considered limited:

… there was almost no sense of regional … the councils had dropped back out of the regional picture a bit … I never got the sense that the work being done by those information providing organisations linked to the work of my economic development staff … some of the direct action by groups of councils was more effective than that [regional] stuff. So around about that time, a little earlier, Yarra, Moreland and Darebin formed an apprenticeship training company. (NMLGA Former CEO2, 2016)

To summarise, notwithstanding early post-LGA amalgamation support for regional inter-local government endeavours (MAV, 1997), the decade of the 2000s is notable for the absence of regional collaboration in northern Melbourne. Local interests and internal dynamics within what were larger LGAs tended to dominate. Other regional governance structures existed, though their impact drew mixed commentary.

Northern Melbourne regional governance during the 2010s

In 2009, shortly after removing ACCs, the federal Labor government introduced area-based Regional Development Australia (RDA) committees as an alternative conduit with the sub-state level. A cooperative arrangement was forged with the Victorian State Government, out of which emerged a NMRDA based on NMACC boundaries⁵ (Figure 1). Like ACCs, RDAs committees were governed by a multi-sector board and did not include representatives from each incorporated LGA. In NMRDA’s case, two local government interests were appointed, the NMACC’s executive director was re-employed and the abovementioned evidence-based approach continued (NMRDA and NORTH Link, 2012; NMRDA et al., 2014). What helped to strengthen broader council interest in NMRDA activities was the availability of the RDA (project-based grant) Fund following the 2010 national election. Alignment with emerging regional strategic plans was therefore essential, though grant access was frustrated by nationally competitive bidding rounds and metropolitan/non-metropolitan eligibility politics. Ironically, if RDAs were designed to encourage regional collaboration, competitively available RDA funds contradictorily stimulated regional tensions. Round 2 of the RDA Fund required NMRDA to prioritise a small number of projects, which: ‘become a [local government] bun fight, but we put them up [to the federal tier], but in the end it wasn’t worth having the fight because nothing got funded’ (NM Regional Organisation2, 2015). For the NMRDA committee’s executive officer, RDA funds were ‘just one avenue that the region can get support through … we just see that a lot of the other strategic things that we do actually add a lot more benefit anyway’. Further project-based successes were identified as emerging from the NMRDA/NORTH Link approach of meeting with local parliamentarians, including helping to secure additional investment in the Northern Hospital in Epping (Whittlesea) and in an Agro-bio research centre at La Trobe University (Darebin). Other potential benefits were considered forthcoming from aligning regional industrial strengths with national growth strategies, including meeting Asia’s food requirements (NMRDA et al., 2014).

Although policy alignment helps strengthen advocacy, it does not guarantee the political will to invest, especially on a scale that might otherwise be considered necessary. By the early 2010s there was an emerging realisation that northern Melbourne’s seven LGAs needed to be speak with a ‘united voice’ (Hume City Council, 2011). In 2011 councillor approval was obtained to create an unincorporated Northern Metropolitan Mayors and CEOs Group (NMMCG) that would ‘advocate, provide support and … jointly achieve greater productivity and quality of life for those that live and work in the north’ (Hume City Council, 2011). Agreed priorities included: influencing metropolitan, land-use and green wedge planning; delivering transportation improvements; influencing economic development opportunities; health and regional recreational space advocacy; and, promoting education and learning. That the NMMCG emerged was described by LGA CEOs as reflecting a plethora of influences rather than a ‘big bang’ moment. Underpinning the regional re-awakening was the realisation that northern Melbourne was failing to attract the necessary public-sector investment, particularly given economic conditions and the rate of population growth (see Table 1). In addition to constrained forms of investment under neo-liberalism, there was a sense that Melbourne’s north was missing out relative to other Melbourne regions and to the nearby Geelong (G21) region (Henderson, forthcoming). A key dimension was the predominance of safe Labor voting electorates within northern Melbourne, such that informing local parliamentarians about local and regional needs would not necessarily be fruitful on its own:

They (the LGAs) started to realise I think that there were issues out this way, and unless we started speaking together, and … if you look at the last couple of elections, it has been quite stark, where there are marginal seats that is where the funding goes these days. It is not as based on need as you think it should be … When you think about it, what huge project has the state or federal government launched in north Melbourne in the last 20 years. (NMLGA councillor, 2015)

The key catalyst was that the ‘north’ wasn’t on any one’s radar and everyone could see that … My recollection for it was that the ‘west’ had been very successful as a regional group of councils, and the G21 had been very successful … The ‘south east’ has always had a lot of funding, government interest, because a lot of the swinging seats are in the ‘south east’, the marginal seats … And we just felt that we needed to get our act together. It was based on economic development and jobs rather than anything else. (NMLGA CEO, 2016)

Other factors contributing to the NMMCG’s emergence included past and present regional configurations, a sense that governments preferred to talk to regions, emerging opportunities at the federal level (Australian Government, 2011; Dodson, 2015), the leadership of particular CEOs (e.g. the CEO of Moreland) and a period of more active La Trobe University involvement. During one regional ‘moment of opportunity’ (Newman, 2008), university leaders promoted a new regional legal entity. Critical voices were forthcoming from the NMRDA, NORTH Link and local councillors about the need for a third regional organisation, its role and its funding. Subsequently, NMRDA and NORTH Link proposed a low cost arrangement involving monthly CEO meetings, CEO and mayor meetings every other month, and their own administrative support. This was considered more ‘palatable [to the councillors] because there was minimal cost for local government in that structure … [and post-adoption was] working really well … it meant that the CEOs started to look at regional issues, rather than simply local government issues’ (NM Regional Organisation, 2015). This return to regional local government collaboration, some 15 years after LGA amalgamation and the end of the NRC, was also presented as being constructed upon different logics and with variable levels of commitment. For some local government interests it was about the limits of local advocacy and the need to achieve local benefits on the back of collaborative endeavours (e.g. level crossing removal), plus the greater credibility and accessibility to key decision-makers that acting regionally provided. For others it was that ‘boundaries are much less visible’ based on the movement patterns of residents and workers. Investment in a regional hospital would provide benefits across local government borders, the proviso being that transportation improvements were achieved.

That regional endeavours emerged with variable levels of commitment is further evidenced by the abovementioned ‘bunfight’. A sense of being regional and divided can also be seen in the dynamics that played out during and after a series of northern Melbourne delegations to Canberra. In September 2011 council chambers also provided support for joint NMMCG delegations to Canberra to talk to ministers ahead of the 2012/2013 federal budget. Three formal delegations followed. The first involved five councillors and six CEOs or council directors, plus representatives from NORTH Link (2) and the NMRDA. As RDAs fed into national level regional monitoring, interviewees acknowledged that they did not in themselves strengthen connections to parliamentarians. An advocacy company with Labor party connections was therefore employed to arrange meetings and to prepare collective documentation. Despite the regional platform an early emphasis towards local level project advocacy was acknowledged (e.g. distributing local advocacy materials, side meetings). Given finite federal resources and ministerial promotion of regional coordination, the need for tighter NMMCG collaboration became self-evident:

So I think the first time we went to Canberra each council had about two projects each which they were wanting to be funded. And it became pretty obvious from meeting with the ministers at Canberra at the time that the ministers wanted to know what our regional infrastructure projects were … So that meant once we got that sort of feedback, the CEOs and Mayors realised that we needed to do some work in understanding what were the regional infrastructure projects that would benefit all of them, and that would have a reasonable chance of being funded at a state and federal level if they were all agreed that they were the regional priorities. (NM Regional Organisation3, 2015)

The shift towards closer collaboration is reflected in the creation of a joint strategy on the (public service, economic and community) benefits of investment in advanced (or national) broadband networks (i.e. the NBN) (Banyule et al., 2012). Support for the strategy was also provided by NMRDA and NORTH Link, thereby providing further evidence of a tripartite relationship. Limits to regional collaboration beyond advocacy nevertheless remained: ‘… shared services was one where we spent a lot of time on, didn’t get very far, it then morphed into the economic development of the region on the basis that we felt we were getting left behind’ (NMLGA CEO, 2016). The most significant endeavour came when the NMMCG used NORTH Link to commission research into infrastructure shortfalls and opportunities. The geographical focus was a region to Melbourne’s north that now included Mitchell as a metropolitan growth corridor council (Victorian Government, 2014). ‘Northern Horizons’ was the resulting publication (NORTH Link et al., 2014). The 522 page document comprehensively audited regional infrastructure (transport, social, utilities, environmental and economic infrastructure according to whether they were excellent, good, unsatisfactory, poor), drew comparisons with other sub-Melbourne regions to show under-investment and identified regional (hard and soft infrastructure) priorities separated into short (before 2021, 20 priority areas), medium (2022–2033, 14 priority areas) and long term timeframes (after 2033, 3 priority areas). Positive accolades were forthcoming from higher levels of government:

… the state government Metropolitan Planning Authority (MPA) when they met the northern region CEOs, the CEOs just said here are our priorities, here is our report, and the MPA basically said terrific. (NM Regional Organisation, 2015)

The second change that I noticed at a federal level was that they were really relieved and happy to talk to local government that had formed into cohesive units … the first time in living memory according to some federal politicians where a group of councils has been able to come up to Canberra and say these are the regional priorities. Where all councils agree that this project which is in Darebin is the priority of all for the good of the region. (NMLGA CEO, 2016)

Within what was a short time period, interviewees acknowledged a stronger sense of regionalism, albeit with caveats (e.g. by the third delegation the councils were ‘completely unified and they were all as one’ (NM Regional Organisation3, 2015)). What also helped to avoid an exercise of local priority aggregation was the role played by independent experts in consulting with all participant LGAs and identifying projects with regional benefits:

The process genuinely identified priorities for the region based on needs analysis on a regional basis, and a whole cost benefit process. It was only towards the end when some local governments, particularly the politicians were saying: ‘I can’t really go back to my community and say a pitch like this hasn’t got anything for Moreland in it’… But up to that point I would say it was a genuine and very thorough process, almost ignoring local government boundaries. (NMLGA CEO, 2016)

An objective regional document with a political consciousness can further be seen in its apolitical stance towards metropolitan planning priorities. A strategy of policy alignment with above rather than a confrontational approach from below was therefore adopted. The premise being that: ‘If it is government policy it would be crazy for us to do a report which ignored that’ (NM Regional Organisation, 2015). Yet by doing so, internal tensions between group members over the proposed pathway of a longstanding freeway connection, the North-East Link, were activated. Northern Horizon’s was also strongly framed by anticipated population growth. An appendicised letter by Yarra critically denounced the document for assuming the construction of a contentious East–West toll road link project (immediately north of the city centre), and for lacking urgency on climate change (e.g. critical infrastructure, priority setting). Shortly thereafter Yarra left the NMMCG and NORTH Link because of the group’s diverse interests and the council’s decision to strengthen relations with an established inner-city group of municipalities (i.e. Maribyrnong, Melbourne, Port Phillip, Stonnington and Yarra). Other signs of underlying instability can also be identified, including concern by some overlooked LGAs that whilst NMMCG was advocating regional priorities the government was cherry picking political wins (e.g. easy NBN roll-out locations). The absence of formal regional delegations to Canberra in the three years that followed the formal release of Northern Horizons is also significant. This less committed approach can be interpreted as reflecting the Labor party’s loss of federal control in 2013, a retreat from urban policy by the incoming (Abbott) Coalition government and internal regional dynamics.

Two particular questions that emerged following the release of Northern Horizons were how to translate the document into an advocacy campaign and whether northern Melbourne’s governance arrangements were sufficient to progress the case for investment. First, as a comprehensive evidence-based document with a political consciousness, Northern Horizons contained shortfalls because of its failure to clearly identify immediate regional advocacy priorities. This in part reflects the complexity of a populous and expansive multi-nodal region that lacks the radial coherency of an historic city-centre. It is therefore significant that when Northern Horizons was refreshed in (October) 2016, thus strengthening its alignment with the spatial imaginaries of the incumbent Labor state government in Victoria (2014–), the document was more forthwith in identifying three ‘impactful’ or ‘urgent’ regional priorities: North-East link (along ‘a route to be determined’ (North Link et al., 2016: 2)); an industrial park located adjacent to Melbourne’s new wholesale fruit, vegetable and flower market (opened September 2015); and, the accelerated roll out of NBN infrastructure. In a politically conscious way the document also gave ‘claps and applause … well “thank you state government” for doing whatever it might be’ (NMLGA CEO2, 2016). Evidence of an evolving advocacy approach is further reflected in associated press releases which actively promoted the region’s size and population growth (i.e. a 36.8% increase from 958,000 to 1.31 million between 2016 and 2031) relative to other parts of Australia, specifically Adelaide (i.e. 1.44 million by 2031) (NORTH Link, 2016). Emerging practices therefore include challenging simplified concepts of geopolitical space, both by fracturing the metropolitan area into sub-parts and by drawing nationwide regional comparisons.

Second, was the question of how regional governance structures could be altered to enhance regional advocacy. Deliberations were evident. On the one hand, NORTH Link interests suggested that the organisation’s credibility could be strengthened by having CEOs participate rather than economic development officers. An alternative proposition was that the northern Melbourne region needed a stronger figure head (or ‘go to person’) at the helm to attract greater attention and political interest. On the other hand, alternative perspectives can be identified which draw attention to the limits and instabilities of regional governance. Rather than more outspoken forms of advocacy, some NMRDA aligned interests supported a continuation of the current approach of regional actors presenting evidence, priorities and opportunities to northern Melbourne parliamentarians. Wariness was also acknowledged about strengthening regional voices and organisations in ways that were disconnected from councillors:

You had some natural competitors … the political arm of local government … says ‘who is bloody NORTH Link anyhow, and why are they in this’. They don’t say that directly but indirectly ‘I am the mayor, I am saying what is going on in this municipality, I don’t want an agenda group in there stirring things up, I have got enough trouble with the politics of the area’, the ratepayers association and whatever else. (NM Regional Organisation4, 2016)

At the same time, the strength of mayoral voices and the commitment of councillors can themselves be considered weakened by institutional structures, including legislatively decreed annually selected mayors (unless a council opts for a biennial alternative) and the often obscured party political affiliations and aspirations of councillors. Other signs of regional governance instability include LGA scrutiny of NORTH Link membership prior to rate-capping (Banyule City Council, 2015), but also afterwards, with Hume’s councillors deciding to fund specific community infrastructure priorities within the 2016/2017 budget rather than a continuation of the council’s NORTH Link membership (Hume City Council, 2016). Whilst LGA CEOs may have played an early role in persuading councillors about the virtues of establishing the NMMCG, their ability to be influential and outspoken remains bound. At the very least, under state legislation they represent councillor-appointed employees working on renewable contracts lasting up to five years.

The notion of natural competitors and instabilities also necessitates reflection upon the governance approach underpinning NMMCG. Inherit signs of informality include variable NMMCG titles within regional documents (e.g. ‘CEO and mayors’ rather than ‘mayors and CEOs’, ‘forum’ rather than ‘group’, ‘region’ rather than ‘metropolitan’). A review of the structure of NMMCG did occur during the mid-2010s. Complicating the decisiveness of this review was widespread change in regional LGA CEOs. Compared with 2011, two of the seven CEOs remained in post by the end of 2016. Accordingly there was a sense that momentum temporarily stalled on how to structure the regional grouping (e.g. organisational arrangements, the breadth of charter, budget coordination, dedicated personnel). Whereas one CEO felt that the creation of an incorporated organisation remained an unlikely proposition given the reluctance of councillors to relinquish control, other CEOs felt that a gradual ratcheting upwards of regional endeavours was nevertheless continuing. Northern Horizons, for example, was commissioned despite the absence of such a body, and the potential remained for one LGA to take the lead on a particular action and to be funded by the others. Additional evidence included advertising for a joint secretariat in late 2016, a planned delegation to Canberra in early 2017, a concerted effort to influence the 2017/2018 state government budget and new examples of inter-local government cooperation (e.g. regional procurement of road asphalting; Darebin, Moreland and Whittlesea jointly funding an A$11 million animal management centre). Of particular significance is the implied broadening beyond regional advocacy. Limits nevertheless continued to be acknowledged, such as a stronger emphasis towards regional procurement rather than shared back-office functions, for reasons including that greater savings could be made, and forthcoming regional inward investment materials that would likely incorporate specific LGA sections. Future interpretation of sub-metropolitan governance and resulting achievements within northern Melbourne therefore remains essential.

Conclusion

The re-emergence of a discrete northern Melbourne council group, some 15 years following LGA amalgamation and the NRC, draws additional attention to the spatial complexity of emerging metropolitan forms (Brenner and Schmid, 2014) and to the difficulty of creating coherent city-regions (Jonas, 2011; Ward and Jonas, 2004). Lying beneath contemporary city-region imaginaries of opportunities spreading outwards from post-industrial city nodes and beneficial forms of political stability are a plethora of local level concerns in middle to outer areas relating to the lack of employment, transport options, infrastructure and services. By implication, city-region imaginaries can therefore exist in conjunction with grounded realities of community protests, LGA action and regional collaborative endeavours. As a geographical construct, the NMMCG reinforces the need to recognise the diversity of regional governance structures that can occur within and between metropolitan areas. Rather than simply new post-suburban regional forms emerging on the urban outskirts (Phelps, 2012; Phelps and Wood, 2011), wedge-like regional structures can draw together middle and outer LGAs into collaborative entities. Beyond physical proximity, such configurations can be united by common transport corridors, employment dilemmas or regional infrastructure needs (Young and Keil, 2014). As Brenner (2004) further indicates, constructed geographical scales of action, including sub-metropolitan regions, must be considered dynamic entities. They are amenable to change as the metropolitan area itself evolves and as LGAs decide that community interests are best served through alternative actions. As post-industrial city centre dynamics radiate outwardly into inner-city suburbs and as the often dynamic built-up edge pushes further out, regional wedge configurations can become meaningfully over-stretched. Here, northern Melbourne illustrates how existing LGAs can exit and new LGAs with stronger commonalities can join a regional configuration.

New regional scales of action are not simply inserted between existing government tiers, they are also forged upon existing institutional structures (Brenner, 2004), including place-based local government arrangements and inter-government relationships. In the Australian context, similarities have been identified across time, including regional local government configurations that primarily function as advocacy bodies. A further similarity is limited government support for bottom-up local government structures. As noted elsewhere (Beer, 2006; Howe, 1995), Australian state governments can be reluctant to empower the local government sector and bottom-up local government structures for fear of losing centralised control. Although historical periods exist within which Labor federal governments have advanced local government collaboration, subsequent Coalition federal governments have tended to remove policy support as non-metropolitan country (including National Party interests) have exerted a stranglehold over the term ‘regional’ and regional funding (Beer, 2006; Kelly et al., 2009). Whilst RDA committees can be considered anomalies to this tendency, compared with earlier federal regional development structures they are distinguished by the absence of comprehensive local government representation. In the past, once spurred, regional bottom-up collaborations have shown that continuous action is possible (e.g. Western Sydney ROC). In contrast, northern Melbourne points to the existence of historical regional governance structures, and to the need for care in drawing linkages across time. The connections between NRC, NMREDO and NORTH Link were presented as less coherent than might otherwise be inferred. The contemporary co-existence of NMMCG, NORTH Link and the NMRDA committee also points to the complex geographical layering of distinctive regional governance structures, potentially with slightly varying spatialities. Careful precision is therefore necessary in documenting contemporary sub-metropolitan regional governance and institutional networking. Although cooperation between regional structures has been documented in northern Melbourne, natural tensions can exist within and between local and/or regional institutions. Examples include tensions over whose voice should be heard and how outspoken advocacy approaches should be.

Through a temporal lens it is also possibly to conclude, as LGA CEO interviewees acknowledged, that the current phase of local authority collaboration across Melbourne’s north is the most effective to date. Symbolically this is evidenced by ‘Northern Horizons’ which advanced the region beyond discussion, profiling and strategy development towards a comprehensive audit of regional underspend and infrastructure requirements. Collaborative frictions were nevertheless identified including diverging interests based on local versus metropolitan, current versus future, and inner versus outer Melbourne. Underpinning NMMCG and Northern Horizons were moments of reflection upon regional structures within and beyond Melbourne and their perceived successes. Sub-metropolitan regional competition and scrutiny has therefore been brought into attention. That regional competition is intensifying is evidenced by the gradual upwards ratcheting of advocacy, plus reflective dilemmas about how advocacy can be made more ‘impactful’. Of relevance here is ‘impactful’ beyond the limits imposed by safe electoral status and the infrequent occurrence of favourably aligned state-federal politics. With Australian local government considered weak within the Australian federal system, local and regional advocacy approaches have been neglected from a research perspective. Nevertheless as northern Melbourne exemplifies, regional organisations increasingly deploy advocacy practices that are commonly associated with promotional or sectoral interest groups (e.g. evidence-bases, contact with parliamentarians and ministerial staff, group delegations, hiring advocacy companies, media releases) (Singleton et al., 2013). More structured and comparative investigations of local and regional advocacy practices are therefore considered necessary.

Finally, LGA amalgamation in Victoria was associated with larger LGA units and a greater perceived capacity to act. A period of inward looking municipality followed in Melbourne. As urban pressures have intensified, and appreciation has grown as to the limits of acting locally, regional endeavours have strengthened. How strong regional groups can become remains an outstanding question particularly where local councillors are reluctant to relinquish power to the regional scale (Wheeler, 2009). Nevertheless, as the northern Melbourne situation indicates, region building processes are gradual and episodic, and can evolve in a variety of ways. A continuing sense of regional evolution therefore existed, despite the local institutional bedrock and actor dynamics within. At the state level, whilst the control-minded Australian state government tier can seek to reshape and restrain local government, how it responds to strengthening sub-metropolitan regional voices also requires greater attention. In terms of the relationality between territorial and constructed scales (Brenner, 2004), regional voices can be considered weakened by a lack of democratic mandate, but may also be less easy to silence. The crafting of counterstrategies by governments to manage sub-metropolitan regional interests must therefore be considered alongside the promotion of city-regions as economic engines with perceived political coherency.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the interviewees who provided their time and input into this research, the three referees for their critical comments on an earlier draft and the Urban Studies editors and administrative team for their support. Responsibility for any errors lies with the author.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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