From sustainable urbanism to climate urbanism

Introduction

Despite the reversal of climate change actions at the federal level in the USA, there remains an ongoing paradigm shift in urban planning focused on the development of ‘climate-friendly’ and ‘climate-resilient’ cities, which we argue is reframing the rhetoric of sustainable urbanism as the dominant policy narrative among the world’s major cities. We call this shift climate urbanism, and it can be characterised by new policies, programmes, and development initiatives aimed at (1) the active promotion of cities as viable and appropriate sites of climate mitigation and adaptation, and (2) the prioritisation of significant efforts to protect the physical and digital infrastructures of urban economies from the hazards associated with climate change. Indicative of a new stage in the evolving rhetoric of neoliberalism, climate urbanism represents a logical progression of sustainable urban development amidst global financial uncertainty and the looming threat of climate change. We draw attention to this shift because the policy implications and details of climate urbanism are just now being investigated and require a great deal of further scholarship. Even more significant and unexamined are the potential social justice concerns resulting from climate urbanism.

Climate urbanism hinges upon the recognition that cities are the primary engines of economic growth, and that growth is, and will be, affected by climate change. During the past decade, local action on climate change has become an increasing feature of the marketing and branding of cities to attract both investment and skilled labour, as entrenched modes of urban entrepreneurialism demand that cities actively work to promote and attract economic investment (Braiterman, 2011; Konijnendijk, 2010). Furthermore, there is increasing recognition that cities must be protected from climate hazards in order to ensure the reproduction of the global economic system. Cities are responsible for approximately 80% of gross world product, but the majority of ‘global cities’ are located in areas that are particularly susceptible to climate hazards such as rising sea levels, increased storm frequency, heat waves, flooding, and drought (Dobbs et al., 2011; Estrada et al., 2017; Sherbinin et al., 2007). Recent estimates suggest that the economic impacts of climate change on cities (e.g. sea level rise, health and water resources, emergency services, infrastructure rehabilitation, etc.) will range between 2.3% and 5.6% of their total GDP by the end of the century, with the ‘worst-off’ cities experiencing nearly 11% GDP loss (Estrada et al., 2017: 404). To address this, some have estimated that as much as US$90 trillion will be required for investment in climate-resilient infrastructure over the next 15 years (GCEC, 2016).

The result is that, for many cities, taking a solutions-oriented position toward climate change innovation offers a strategic opportunity that presents new pathways for investment, promotion, and regulation. As a recent report noted, investment in climate-resilient infrastructure is ‘the growth story of the future’ (GCEC, 2016). This narrative is common among the wealthy cities of the developed world, but has become equally so for cities in emerging economies. According to a World Bank IFC report, climate investment opportunities will be as much as US$23 trillion in emerging-market economies between now and 2030 (IFC, 2016). Indeed, the World Bank (the world’s largest provider of public finance to countries of the Global South) has stated that it will spend 28% of its investments directly on climate change projects and that future spending would either directly or indirectly consider global warming (Harvey, 2016).

Here, we elaborate on the idea of climate urbanism and its relationship to the emergence of a new urban climate economy (Floater et al., 2014; GCEC, 2016). We argue that its success depends on a carefully crafted policy orientation that (1) establishes cities and local governments as capable and credible institutions to address and govern climate change; (2) presents technological and material solutions to the severity of the climate crisis; (3) promotes new institutional frameworks and global investment assemblages that can finance these solutions; (4) provides a political narrative that simplifies the complex environmental and social challenges that accompany such projects and associated policies. Furthermore, we will discuss the evolution of climate urbanism as it relates to preceding ideas of sustainable urbanism, and suggest that, rather than contradicting the rhetoric of sustainable urbanism, climate urbanism rearticulates and reframes elements of sustainable urbanism in order to accomplish several goals. These include legitimising the social contradictions evident in ‘actually existing’ sustainable development (Krueger and Gibbs, 2007), reconciling economic challenges presented by the global financial crisis, creating new avenues and networks for urban infrastructure investment, and offering a political narrative to justify practices that preserve the existing economic order. While we expand upon these points in the following sections, we suggest that climate urbanism represents a distinct departure from sustainable urbanism in at least three ways:

To be clear, the authors of this paper agree that cities are appropriate sites for taking action on climate change, and we support many of these efforts. Climate action is urgent and necessary. However, in the current neoliberal context, the transition from policy rhetoric to climate action presents a potentially problematic landscape of inequality and injustice. This article serves as a debate piece for critically exploring the transition from sustainable urbanism to climate urbanism under these circumstances. In the following sections, we first introduce a brief history of sustainable urbanism and its transition to climate urbanism. We then identify the issues evident in the current transition to climate urbanism, and finally, we speculate about future outcomes in an era of mature climate urbanism.

Background: From sustainable urbanism to climate urbanism

Neoliberal growth strategies and the principles of sustainable urban development have evolved in tandem since at least the 1980s (Brand, 2007; Hodson and Marvin, 2017). City leaders found useful rhetoric in sustainable development platforms such as UN Agenda 21, and in documents by development agencies such as the World Bank, UNDP, the Asian Development Bank, and others (Hodson and Marvin, 2017). In borrowing this language, urban policymakers engaged in the coupling of neoliberal strategies and ecological concerns until these matured into a popular rhetoric of ‘sustainable urbanism’ – a broad term that we employ as a catch-all for the various sustainable policy initiatives that popularised the urban greening of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Throughout this period, cities began implementing ambitious programmes dedicated to ecological modernisation, density-oriented development, and smart urbanism in an attempt to present ‘win-win’ scenarios for the economy and the environment. This materialised in different ways, and there has been extensive scholarship exploring the ways cities have coupled sustainability measures to popular growth agendas (Kahn, 2010; Knuth, 2016; Krueger and Gibbs, 2007; Müller, 2013; While et al., 2004), as well as the various environmental justice and social justice consequences associated with these initiatives (Checker, 2011; Dooling, 2009; Tretter, 2013).

Toward the end of the 20th century, cities increasingly focused on the promotion of assets in the central city as a strategy to lure mobile capital and labour (Brand, 2007; McCann, 2013). The remaking of downtowns as centres of consumption and entertainment, the modernisation of central business district infrastructure, and the ‘revitalisation’ and densification of inner city neighbourhoods fell neatly in sync with many of the goals of United Nations Agenda 21 and the embrace of sustainable development principles by the Clinton administration in the USA. This also coincided with scholarly engagements of sustainable urbanism that emphasised the importance of density, mixed-use development, increased walkability, and efficiency in city planning (Wheeler and Beatley, 2007).

At the same time, works that portrayed the importance of developing an attractive, ‘vibrant’ central city for the purpose of attracting an emergent class of workers – the creative class – added support to municipalities who found overlapping themes of sustainability and livability in smart growth developments, increased transit options, and ‘authentic’ landscapes (Duany et al., 2004; Florida, 2005). In short, the connections between sustainable urbanism, central city redevelopment, and the ‘creative economy’ were emphasised, as proponents and critics alike noted the increased number of environmentally conscious knowledge workers seeking green, sustainable, and livable neighbourhoods (Florida, 2014, 2016; Kahn, 2010; Müller, 2013).

Throughout this period, the narrative of sustainable urbanism reinforced these trends. What is particularly important is that the ambiguous language of sustainability allowed its goals to be defined according to the priorities of policymakers, corporate elites, and city decision makers, resulting in multiple visions for urban sustainability (Williams, 2010). While et al. (2004: 551) address this issue through their discussion of the ‘sustainability fix’, when they suggest that the salience of environmental issues forced state and municipal actors to incorporate sustainability policies into planning goals. Early on, many cities saw the opportunity to use the sustainability fix to conflate economic development with sustainable urbanism, leading Krueger and Gibbs (2007: 103) to note that sustainability may no longer be an ‘obstacle to capitalist accumulation, but rather a constituent part of it’.

Since the 1990s, cities have applied the sustainability fix in three broad – and often overlapping – categories: (1) ecological modernisation of blue, green, and grey infrastructures; (2) a focus on smart growth and new urbanism strategies that emphasise density-oriented development, mixed use, sprawl reduction, public transportation, and environmental amenity creation; (3) technology-driven advancements in efficiency, smart systems, and digital infrastructures (often referred to as ‘smart urbanism’) (Kitchin, 2014; Levenda et al., 2015; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015). These three categories broadly cover the major planning trends that characterise the period of sustainable urbanism. Taken as a whole, they provided policymakers the means to transform complex environmental and social issues into legible outcomes while also facilitating greater municipal control (Brand, 2007; Rice, 2010; While et al., 2010). They also served the purpose of showcasing initiatives and projects that increase city marketability, improve efficiency, appeal to desirable industries, and provide amenities for labourers viewed as the greatest innovators and economic contributors. In this way, they represent the most noteworthy policy features of the sustainable urbanism period, which ushered in a seemingly promising ‘win-win’ narrative of environmental progress and economic growth for cities. ¹

However, in recent years, this narrative has been reframed as a result of increased actions toward carbon management (e.g. the creation of local greenhouse gas inventories and climate action plans), concerns over climate hazards (e.g. sea level rise, drought, storm intensity, etc.), apprehension about climate-related social conflicts (e.g. forced migration, conflict over resources, vulnerability, etc.), and ongoing economic uncertainty following the financial crisis (Busby, 2007; Estrada, 2017). Amidst a lack of climate action at the national level, these problems have forced a re-thinking of how environmental issues will be prioritised alongside urban global competitiveness and economic growth, and there is now increased scrutiny of the ways in which different modes of environmentally oriented development are counted as either cost or benefit (Bristow, 2010; Hodson and Marvin, 2017). Myriad local governments now have some form of local climate change policy or programme, and discussion of climate mitigation and adaptation is now the norm in many urban policy settings. Notably, policy priorities are being reoriented toward an ‘increasing focus on strategically important environmental resources and assets and the weakening of the commitment to comprehensive approaches and concerns with social justice and equity’ (Hodson and Marvin, 2017: 13). Rather than taking a holistic, ‘three pillars’ approach to sustainable development, we argue that climate urbanism focuses on two main goals: (1) the measurement and surveillance of carbon as a means to focus and justify new policies, and (2) the securitisation and promotion of vital industries, labour pools, institutions, and infrastructures. This, we will illustrate, allows a strategic reframing of the most successful initiatives of sustainable urbanism as securable assets crucial to the reproduction of economies, ecologies, and social structures. In the next section, we detail the characteristics of climate urbanism, and then discuss the political reframing of its narrative and the implications for national security and social equity.

Features of climate urbanism and the emergence of a new paradigm

We argue that there are two major features that serve as foundational to the logic of climate urbanism: carbon management and climate resilient infrastructure. This section describes these two features, while also acknowledging the increasing trend of policymakers and experts to appropriate the rhetoric of ‘climate friendliness’ and/or ‘climate resilience’ to accomplish their goals (Bristow, 2010; Meerow et al., 2016; Rice, 2010). These features are consistent with the trends of neoliberal urban governance that animated sustainable urbanism, yet they also offer unique aspects to climate urbanism that have assisted in making it a popular mode of urban economic development.

First, climate urbanism places critical importance on measuring and monitoring carbon and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) in cities to justify local climate policies and programmes (Bulkeley and Newell, 2015; Rice, 2014b). This is not to say that there were not measurable objects and indices during the sustainable urbanism era (for a review, see Huang et al., 2015). Indeed, assessing and measuring urban sustainability took many forms, including the identification of ecosystem services, quantification of energy and material flows, and the creation of multiple aggregated indices (Huang et al., 2015; Kennedy et al., 2007). However, these measurements were more diverse, complex, and contested than is characteristic of carbon management. Further, they were typically geared toward academics and planners, and were not legible or easily accessible. Carbon inventories, on the other hand, are easily understood by a general public increasingly concerned with the effects of climate change, making them an easily communicated policy goal that can be realised through carbon reduction strategies. As other scholars have noted, carbon and other GHGs provide clear, measurable objects for regulation and surveillance by urban governance while also serving as a single, publicly legible outcome (Rice, 2014a, 2014b; While et al., 2010).

The prioritisation of carbon (and GHGs more generally) under climate urbanism facilitates the re-territorialisation of climate governance toward the urban scale, and it also presents implications for further regulation within the city, allowing the extension of disciplinary action at the institutional, neighbourhood, or individual level (Rice, 2010). This allows cities to quantify their progress toward climate action plans and promote themselves as eco-pioneers at the vanguard of urban competitiveness. Additionally, the counting and marketing of emissions provides a clear mechanism for a governance of climate action to be measured at scales that range from corporate actor to citizen, the latter of whose consumer actions, housing choices, and lifestyle decisions can be reduced to an individual quantification of GHGs. Under climate urbanism, labels such as ‘climate friendly’ and ‘climate resilient’ are just as likely to be used to promote incentives or rewards as they are to be used to justify regulatory or disciplinary measures (Vale, 2014; While et al., 2010).

Second, we argue that climate urbanism is also predicated on the notion that cities act as the primary engines of economic growth, and that prioritising the infrastructural ‘resilience’ of their institutions and economies is necessary to the reproduction of the current economic order. A common narrative of climate urbanism is that the development of resilient infrastructure is deemed the most credible response to the challenges associated with climate change and that this endeavour requires significant financial investment. This narrative is evident in reports produced by development organisations and think tanks (see, for instance, Dobbs et al., 2011; Floater et al., 2014; GCEC, 2016; IFC, 2016) and academic works such as Costa et al., 2016; Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot, 2013; Labatt and White, 2011) which highlight the importance of securing financial investments for large infrastructure projects. These reports suggest that investment in climate-resilient infrastructure is urgent, growth-friendly, and provides a visible, material response to climate hazards. ² For example, an IFC publication titled Climate Investment Opportunities in Emerging Markets (2016) touts US$23 trillion in potential investment opportunities in regions having the greatest potential for new market development, and emphasises that the ‘IFC stands ready to support the private sector in its quest to invest more in industries that will improve the climate and yield healthy returns on investment’ (2016: iv). This narrative is reinforced in academic publications as well. ‘Infrastructure lies at the heart of economies’, notes Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot (2013: 773) and there is an urgent need to ‘invest in infrastructure that is both low-carbon and climate resilient’ (2013: 774).

In short, infrastructure development that integrates climate mitigation, adaptation, and resilience is increasingly seen as the most viable avenue for investment and economic development. These terms (mitigation, adaptation, and resilience) are used frequently throughout the academic and institutional literature. However, of these three terms, ‘resilience’ has become the dominant conceptual term used to promote climate-oriented development (Fainstein, 2015; Harris et al., 2017; Meerow et al., 2016). An important caveat is worth noting here: we do not suggest that climate resilience and climate urbanism are synonyms. Rather, the former is a rhetorical tool that facilitates the policy outcomes of the latter. Like sustainability, resilience is a contested and ‘fuzzy’ concept (Meerow and Stults, 2016). In the era of sustainable urbanism, ‘sustainable urban development’ provided a rhetorical framework that was strategically and selectively employed by policymakers; in the era of climate urbanism, ‘climate resilience’ provides a useful narrative that is subject to negotiation, contestation, and obfuscation. For instance, in a recent survey of local government practitioners, they were quick to laud the importance of social equity in resilience projects (Meerow and Stults, 2016); however, as several scholars note, there is little evidence that the practice of climate resilience prioritises social equity in these projects (Fainstein, 2015; Vale, 2014; Webber, 2017). Rather, projects become contested and negotiated as they materialise, resulting in ‘difficult choices and trade-offs’ between development organisations, local leaders, and community members (Harris et al., 2017). In such situations, the projects that materialise often disproportionately represent the development priorities of those already holding power (Fainstein, 2015; Vale, 2014).

Much like the ‘sustainability fix’ (While et al., 2004) employed during the period of sustainable urbanism, a ‘resilience fix’ is being employed in the era of climate urbanism. Flexible interpretations of ‘resilience’ allow a broad spectrum of initiatives that can serve as targets for investment and development (Meerow et al., 2016). In this way, any infrastructure initiative that potentially reduces the vulnerability of city services to the impacts of climate hazards can be used to (1) politically justify major budgetary commitments to such projects for a new era of global urban competitiveness, and (2) be employed rhetorically to engage potential investment partners and even create entirely new financial institutions and networks (Bristow, 2010; Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot, 2013). The enormous scale of infrastructure projects needed to mitigate and adapt to climate change requires a significant mobilisation of financial capital (Costa et al., 2016; Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot, 2013). With as much as US$90 trillion needed for infrastructure in the next 15 years, some have suggested that the world has entered a ‘new climate economy’ (GCEC, 2016).

The forms of carbon management and climate resilient infrastructures that underpin the logic of climate urbanism, together, are creating global investment assemblages that can promote and finance cities as sites of climate governance. As agencies such as the World Bank IFC declare that there ‘has never been a better time to invest in climate solutions’ (IFC, 2016: iv), research groups such as the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate employ pressing statements such as: ‘The challenge is urgent. The window for making the right choices is uncomfortably narrow …’ (GCEC, 2016: 2). As a result, we are witnessing the emergence of a global assemblage of interurban investment and consulting networks, policy institutions, and development agencies who are forcing a new development paradigm. Many of these organisations are focused on creating new sources and pathways for large-scale investments. On their website, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities leadership has noted that they are dedicated to creating ‘innovative sources of capital’ through the creation of ‘platforms, processes and partnerships that we believe may represent the dawn of a new generation of innovative finance for climate action’ (Rodin 2015). There are interurban networks and consulting groups such as C40 Cities, the Sustainable Cities Institute, ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN), and the Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-International (ISET); research oriented groups such as the Earth Institute Resilient Cities, World Resource Institute, FSI Smart Green Cities, and Climate Action Network; and investment oriented agencies such as 100 Resilient Cities, World Bank Resilient Cities Program, and the United Nations Green Climate Fund. Partners include corporate entities, universities, think tanks, NGOs, global financial institutions, and traditional development agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations.

While many of these organisations fund climate-focused projects in the developed North, they are outspokenly focused on cities in emerging and lesser-developed economies. Despite the number of these organisations, their partners, and their participating cities (C40 boasts more than 90 ‘megacities’, and in 2016 100 Resilient Cities finalised its list of 100), their rhetoric is not fragmented, but rather remarkably similar and can be distilled into four general aims. Nearly all of these organisations place a high priority on (1) investment in climate-oriented or climate-resilient infrastructure; (2) providing networks for the exchange of knowledge, expert advice, and solutions-oriented dialogue; (3) creating financial and logistical pathways for capital flows; and (4) promoting technological innovation and support. While these four aims are largely focused on the logistics of climate-oriented investment, the role of the tech sector and technological innovation is so significant that it warrants a separate discussion.

Just as the tech sector played a crucial role in reimagining and restructuring the city during sustainable urbanism, it will continue to do so during climate urbanism. The employment and site selection strategies of companies such as Alphabet, Amazon, Samsung, Apple, Microsoft, and others heavily influenced the creative city literature (Florida, 2013, 2016; Grodach, 2012) and continue to appear in academic commentary and media headlines (Parilla, 2017; Wakefield, 2017). Tech companies also broadly espoused a strong environmental ethos as part of their corporate philosophies (Murugesan and Gangadharan, 2012) and became partners in many of the key features of sustainable urbanism (i.e. ecological modernisation, smart growth, and of course, smart urbanism). The growing tech labour force, with its reputation for eco-conscious behaviour, has also become one of the most politically and economically influential demographics in the central city (Cortright, 2014; Florida, 2014, 2016). So much so, in fact, that their presence has played a role in heightened urban inequality and the formation of elite eco-districts in major cities (Gibbs et al., 2013; Long, 2016). As we transition to climate urbanism these processes are exacerbated, and the influence of the tech sector has gained heightened political, economic, and cultural prominence. In the era of sustainable urbanism, the tech sector was viewed as a partner; under climate urbanism, it is viewed as a panacea.

As many have noted, the high-tech, efficient, networked ‘smart city’ has become the central focus of discussions about addressing climate change, as cities are emerging as sites of experimentation for climate-focused ecological modernisation, energy efficiency, carbon control, and smart solutions (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015; Söderström et al., 2014; Viitanen and Kingston, 2014). Through the holistic integration of new technologies, the smart city has the potential to improve electricity generation, metering, transport, and administration; increase efficiency in transportation, water systems, emergency response services, and other city services; improve knowledge sharing and economic networks; and advance the monitoring and control of greenhouse gas emissions (Marvin et al., 2015). In many ways, the city’s rapid drive to implement technology into various facets of infrastructure is significant enough to signal the shift to climate urbanism, as it raises weighty questions about who will finance, develop, and administer these technologies and what sorts of public–private relationships will emerge within governance structures (Levenda et al., 2015; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015; Rice, 2014b). Overall, the new climate economy, the control of carbon, and the management of climate-induced ecological hazards introduce a host of challenges that will require new policy frameworks. These include questions of industry ownership and public privacy (Levenda et al., 2015), concerns over jurisdiction and urban citizenship (Rice, 2010), and disconcerting possibilities of securitisation, surveillance, and discipline (Oels, 2013).

As While et al. (2010: 76) have already suggested, the increasing pressures of carbon control are already introducing ‘a new set of values into state regulation’ that were ‘not possible under sustainable development’. Indeed, a new political narrative is emerging that simultaneously presents the urgent immediacy of action while reorienting discussions of social and environmental justice toward a global moral imperative. This is an important rhetorical step in legitimising policy actions, some of which are already beginning to materialise. We argue that these actions have significant implications for social justice. The following section discusses the social justice issues made evident under sustainable urbanism and outlines the way these are evolving in the era of climate urbanism.

Social justice and climate urbanism

Theorising the social justice implications of climate urbanism requires a brief review of the failures and contradictions of sustainable urbanism before speculating about future directions. This section acknowledges the critical social justice scholarship of sustainable urbanism, highlights the exacerbation of social injustices during the transition to climate urbanism, and speculates about the future of social justice and equity in the era of climate urbanism. As we argue, the promise of holistic sustainable urban development was rarely (if ever) realised in the era of sustainable urbanism, and while the rhetoric of climate resilience allows room for discussion of social equity, we suggest that development in the era of climate urbanism is proving to exacerbate – rather than diminish – issues of injustice.

Instead of providing an equitable ‘rising tide’ of economic opportunity, many features of sustainable urbanism resulted in widespread displacement of vulnerable communities and the segregation of the urban landscape. Examples include the revitalisation of waterways and green belts to simultaneously promote ecological amenities and remove homeless populations and minorities (Dooling, 2009; Dooling and Simon, 2012); the redevelopment of parks and brownfields as tourist spaces and amenities that displace working class, immigrant populations, and LGBTQ communities (Dooling and Simon, 2012; Patrick, 2014); and the promotion of smart growth, sustainable transit systems, and other ‘green’ services/amenities that displace working class and minority populations (Checker, 2011; Long, 2016; Rosol, 2013; Tretter, 2013). Terms such as ecological gentrification and environmental gentrification have been introduced to capture the increasing use of an environmental ethic as justification for development that resulted in the displacement or exclusion of marginal populations (Checker, 2011; Dooling, 2009; Quastel, 2009). The social contradictions during the period of sustainable urbanism were clear. Simply put, in neighbourhoods throughout the USA and Europe, ‘actually existing’ sustainable development frequently meant development that prioritised the housing and lifestyle amenities preferred by investors, skilled knowledge workers, and their associated industries over the basic needs of minority and working class populations (Heynen et al., 2006; Krueger and Gibbs, 2007).

Smart growth developments proved attractive to the moneyed members of the creative class while simultaneously providing proximity to the employers that were relocating downtown. Many of these developments were redevelopments, occurring as revitalisation strategies for working class and minority neighbourhoods. The subsequent gentrification in the central city led to a disproportionate number of poor households in the suburbs (Berube and Kneebone, 2013; Kneebone and Garr, 2010). The ‘suburbanisation of poverty’ has been an increasingly observable phenomenon in the USA, Europe, and elsewhere (Berube and Kneebone, 2013; Hochstenbach and Musterd, 2017). In this situation, lower income households are displaced from central city neighbourhoods and forced to relocate to more affordable housing in suburban or ‘satellite’ neighbourhoods (Berube and Kneebone, 2013; Hochstenbach and Musterd, 2017). As Cooke and Denton (2015) note, while poverty is indeed increasing in low-density suburbs, medium density older neighbourhoods are also experiencing a noticeable increase in poverty. The overall result has been an increasing segregation of city neighbourhoods along class and ethnic lines.

At the same time suburban and neglected neighbourhoods are witnessing increasing poverty, newly developed ‘eco-districts’ within central city downtowns are gaining popularity, touting a low-carbon, climate-resilient, and secure lifestyle with proximate access to amenities and employment. These districts are largely located in wealthy areas of cities and are marketed specifically to the affluent and educated (Grydehøj and Kelman, 2016; Holden et al., 2015). Indeed, the rising popularity of luxury eco-districts draws sharp contrast to the increased vulnerability experienced by poor neighbourhoods, and is indicative of rising segregation during the transition from sustainable urbanism to climate urbanism. In the era of sustainable urbanism, the ability to lessen your ecological footprint was a privileged position based upon education, income, and access to green infrastructure, amenities, and services. Under climate urbanism, this trend is likely to intensify. The ability to live a climate-resilient lifestyle is still a matter of income, education, and access, but now carries the security of living in insulated districts that are less susceptible to climate hazards. The implications for vulnerability should be apparent. Poorer areas tend to be home to ‘at risk’ populations, have decreased access to city services and amenities, and are often more susceptible to environmental hazards such as flooding, landslides, subsidence, etc. Numerous studies have demonstrated that poorer urban neighbourhoods – in both developed and lesser developed cities – are not only far more vulnerable to natural hazards, but also experience slower response times and lower efficacy of emergency services during environmental disasters (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Graif, 2016; Wamsler et al., 2013). In the era of climate urbanism, there will be even sharper distinctions between the districts of the climate resilient elite and the areas that are home to the climate vulnerable poor.

Again, it is important to reiterate that development in the period of sustainable urbanism relied upon the strategic employment of sustainability rhetoric to maintain political legitimacy. This allowed a de-coupling from the problematic issues of social injustice by elevating sustainability as a moral good that served the broader community and the planet (Checker, 2011). We suggest that a political rhetoric of climate urbanism is emerging that follows this same logic to an extreme, replacing the proactive rhetoric of sustainable development with a new, reactive moral imperative of survival that accelerates the social justice issues of the previous era and transforms them into policies and political agendas that may lead to an almost carceral level of security and segregation.

Securitisation and segregation under climate urbanism

The logic of climate urbanism emphasises the need to buttress against climate-induced environmental catastrophe, allowing the formation and prioritisation of entirely new narratives of equality, protection, and development. For example, environmental and social concerns that were focused at the neighbourhood scale in the period of sustainable urbanism are now revaluated at a planetary scale. The complex problems of biodiversity loss, pollution, agricultural production, etc. can be reduced to a singular object of control: greenhouse gases. The prioritisation of infrastructure projects is increasingly focused on preserving the reproductive capacity of economies and ecosystems. The complex – and rhetorically inclusive – social issues of sustainable urbanism are being overshadowed by an urgent narrative of climate urbanism that emphasises the preservation of the human race. The result is a moral imperative of climate politics with incredible de-politicising potential (Beck, 2010; Oels, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2013). As Beck (2010: 263) notes, in the name of climate change, ‘green politics has succeeded in de-politicizing political passions to the point of leaving citizens nothing but gloomy ascetism [sic], a terror of violating nature … everything happens as if green politics has frozen politics’. As the effects of climate change become more acute, the need for compromise and consensus may usurp political divisions.

Bolstered by urgency and the rhetorical simplicity of its goals, the narrative of climate urbanism reinforces the primacy of growth-oriented ideologies while preserving the reproduction of vital economic structures, institutions, and actors. Doing this introduces severe potential social consequences. As Beck (2010: 257) notes: ‘There is no longer any doubt that climate change globalizes and radicalizes social inequalities inside national contexts and on a global scale’. Under climate urbanism, the social problems that existed in the era of sustainable urbanism (i.e. social inequity, segregation, and marginalisation) are not addressed, but rather re-cast under a new moral imperative that trivialises their salience against the threat of planetary environmental collapse. This is already evident in the increasing use of a ‘climate apocalypse’ narrative (Oels, 2013), where the displacement and marginalisation of vulnerable populations are normalised as part of the new hazardous realities of a post-climate-change world.

Under climate urbanism, interventionism on behalf of distant (or even domestic) climate victims is not necessarily a priority. Instead, priorities are focused on the urgent task of securing vital infrastructures as well as capital systems of circulation and reproduction. As climate hazards increase and we move further toward the normalisation of climate urbanism, the rhetoric of resilience will reinforce political agendas of security through the mobilisation of public trust and safety concerns. As Vale (2014: 195) notes, climate resilience has ‘strong associations with security … the term carries with it an explicit and comforting sense of protection against future hazards’.

It is important to note that while we largely discuss the narrative of climate urbanism in this paper, this narrative has already resulted in actions with material consequences and will continue to do so. Concern over climate hazards and the need to secure economic growth trajectories has already led to defensive infrastructure projects, the creation of new investment networks and institutions, and dependency on the development/integration of ‘smart’ systems. In the neoliberal context, each of these facets is likely to intensify. With limited governmental resources and increased stress from climate hazards, it is likely that reliance on private/corporate actors will allow two urban populations to emerge: (1) the urban elite – who have the political influence and financial stability to insulate themselves from climate change, and (2) the urban and suburban poor – who will find themselves increasingly vulnerable. Access to emergency services, medical services, new technologies, and security will likely fall along economic fault lines. What is more, the logic of climate urbanism introduces a political narrative that prioritises the survival of economies, social institutions, and the basic ecosystem services of the planet above other concerns, leading to a moral imperative that acknowledges few alternatives when juxtaposed against the perceived end of humanity. The recent rise in populism and nationalism may also play a role in the increased segregation and securitisation of urban citizens, especially when the rising tide of climate refugees enters the equation. During the transition from sustainable urbanism to climate urbanism, surveillance and monitoring of carbon/GHGs has resulted in incentives and rewards to encourage citizens to internalise the logic of carbon reduction as a form of good citizenship (While et al., 2010). As climate urbanism matures, these could just as easily result in disciplinary or regulatory action of the individual (or groups). As While et al. (2010: 85–86) suggest, the ‘technologies of carbon measurement could facilitate an extension of state surveillance and control in keeping with the shift towards more authoritarian forms of governance’.

In the transition period from sustainable urbanism to climate urbanism, resilience is framed as an investment opportunity and a moral imperative to improve economic mobility for developing world cities and their citizens. In the later stages of climate urbanism, climate-focused infrastructure may take on a more defensive and urgent tone – one that is portrayed as the only credible alternative. In this scenario, the environment (under the guise of climate protection) would ostensibly be used as the chief justification for preserving, securing, and promoting the livelihoods of some cities and their citizens over others, leaving landscapes of inequality and violence in the name of security and safety.

Conclusion: Critical engagement with climate urbanism

We offer our discussion of the rise of climate urbanism as a lens through which to interrogate and substantiate the rhetoric of urban policymakers, development experts, and city leaders as they seek political capital and financial resources to mitigate the effects of climate change. There is no question that the threat of climate change is real. Because the need to pursue climate action is a pressing issue, we must acknowledge that the critical perspective offered in this article is not without its drawbacks. Indeed, the cities of the world need climate-focused infrastructure investment, may benefit greatly from greater technological integration, and certainly require significant funding to accomplish the tasks at hand. However, there is also little question that the development of climate urbanism – at least in the current neoliberal context – forebodes an unmistakable landscape of inequality and injustice.

As concerns over climate change continue to increase, the distinctions between sustainable urbanism and climate urbanism are sharpening. Whereas the narrative of sustainable urbanism was comprehensive and proactive, the narrative – and resulting policy action – of climate urbanism is selective and reactive. Whereas the financing of sustainable urbanism initiatives came in the form of soft investments and public–private partnerships, the financing of climate urbanism infrastructures stems from global assemblages of banks, policy institutions, and development agencies. Whereas access to a ‘sustainable lifestyle’ meant lessening one’s eco-footprint, access to a ‘climate-resilient lifestyle’ means the surveillance and management of GHGs, and the security of living in districts insulated from climate hazards. Whereas the social justice concerns of sustainable urbanism were focused on equity and access at the neighbourhood scale, the social justice concerns of climate urbanism are reiterated as issues of survival in the face of global catastrophe, allowing them to be reterritorialised to the urban, regional, and nation-state scale.

All of these issues should be considered within the context of a recent rise in nationalism and populism – particularly in developed countries of the Global North, whose anti-immigration and protectionist stance does not bode well for the estimated 1 billion climate refugees and migrants expected to be resettled or displaced. This resettlement may introduce a potential reordering of social hierarchies based upon access to employment, nutrition, healthcare, and education. Amidst an increasing securitisation within the city (in the name of public safety and economic preservation) and the selective buttressing of urban infrastructure, a defensive form of urbanisation begins to emerge. With this in mind, it is not difficult to imagine a future landscape of climate urbanism and its potential for environmentally justified segregation.

These are just a few of the issues we have outlined in this article. Further scholarship may articulate how a new development paradigm may respond to the threats of climate change while simultaneously recognising the need for social justice. What is emerging in the neoliberal context, however, is a climate-focused infrastructural development regime that will almost certainly exacerbate social inequalities and perpetuate environmental degradation. As the threats of environmental and economic crisis increasingly occupy the minds of city leaders and policymakers, it is important to remain circumspect as we transition from the era of sustainable urbanism into the new development paradigm of climate urbanism.