For the benefit of all? State-led gentrification in a contested city

Abstract

Chinese

Gentrification is not only an economic process based on individual desires and decisions and independent of political goals, but also a process led or assisted by governments with economic development and national goals. In this work, we study a state-led ethno-gentrification in Acre, a contested city in the north of Israel. Looking beyond the neoliberal terminology of regeneration, we argue that in contested cities gentrification is an economic development policy often intertwined with national-demographic goals. Yet, while economic and national motivations and policies may reinforce one another, they also produce tensions among policy makers, gentrifiers and local residents. ‘State-led ethno-gentrification’ presents the complexity of the relationship between neoliberalism and nationalism in a contested city. Interviews conducted in Acre with policy makers, Jewish newcomers involved in the gentrification process and Arab residents present a complex picture of goals, interests and concerns, as well as contradictions and tensions.

Keywords

contested cities displacement/gentrification Israel policy politics race/ethnicity nationalism

Contested cities, divided by ethno-nationalism and class, display patterns of discrimination, exclusion and power struggles between groups (Friedmann, 1996; Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000; Sassen, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Gentrification, traditionally described as a process led by individual decisions whose main motivation is economic (Hamnett, 1991; Smith, 1982, 2002), is likely to have different sources, motivations and implications in contested cities. Directed from ‘above’, gentrification can be a component of state policies. Economically motivated, state-led gentrification can be described as a policy designed to encourage growth and regeneration. Economic goals, however, are not the only or even the most important motivations. Looking beyond the neoliberal terminology of regeneration, revitalisation and renaissance (Slater, 2006), economic development policy and specifically gentrification in contemporary contested cities cannot be investigated without considering questions of ethnicity and ethnic politics.

State-led gentrification, regardless of its stated goals and intentions, can affect ethnic minorities in different ways. First, ethnic minorities are often over-represented in lower income groups and are vulnerable when state-led gentrification aimed at economic development causes, as a side effect, ethnic displacement without this being its stated intention (Arena, 2012; Goetz, 2013; Khare et al., 2015; Wyly and Hammel, 2004). Second, ethnic minorities can be targeted; state-led gentrification explained and justified by their stigmatisation. And, third, typical of settler colonial societies (Blatman-Thomas and Porter, 2018; Clarno, 2017; Shaw, 2012; Yacobi and Tzfadia, 2019), gentrification can be part of a wider state-led project of territorialisation and ethno-national domination. In the latter, nationalism, underscoring demographic engineering, and neoliberalism, associated with economic gentrification, converge. Neoliberalism enables states to both promote and conceal national control, society and market forces encouraged by the state and presents them as neutral ‘bottom-up’ processes (Clarno, 2017; Porter and Yiftachel, 2017; Tomiak, 2017; Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2015). But, while convergence of nationalism and neoliberalism is often the case, the tension between the two, demonstrated in policy debates and citizens’ resistance, also merits attention, as this paper demonstrates.

In this work we study gentrification processes in Acre, a city in Northern Israel, where Arab and Jewish citizens reside. We use the term state-led ethno-gentrification (the latter borrowed from Monterescu, 2013, 2015) to explain the settlement of Jewish citizens in the Old City, traditionally an Arab neighbourhood. State-led ethno-gentrification has a clear demographic purpose – Jewish presence and control – but also an economic goal of urban regeneration, promising to benefit all. Our qualitative field research, studying the relations between state, municipality and communities in a contested city, engages with particular but also wider theoretical questions. First, what is the role of ethno-national and economic considerations in state-led gentrification processes? Second, are there differences between policy making at local-municipal and state levels? Third, how do newcomers use economic and ethno-national arguments to describe their motivations and justify their presence? And, fourth, how does the promise of economic regeneration affect the perceptions and concerns of local residents towards gentrification?

Contested cities

Contemporary cities are perceived as culturally diverse, politically vibrant, promoting universal citizenship principles and a democratic arena for all inhabitants (Held, 1990; Katznelson, 1995; Walker and Barcham, 2010). Critical scholars, however, suggest that exploitation and structural stratification characterise contemporary cities (Friedmann, 1996; Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000; Sassen, 1998; Taylor, 2000) and that ethno-nationalism delineates power relations and boundaries. Scholars use terms such as polarised, divided or contested to describe contemporary cities where the very legitimacy of their political structures and their rules of decision-making and governance are challenged by ethnic groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power, or demand group-based autonomy or independence (Allegra et al., 2012; Bollens, 2018). In these cities, politicised multiculturalism constitutes a challenge to their ‘ethical settlement’ (Keith, 2005: 8), often encapsulating wider ethno-national conflicts (Boal, 1994).

Settler colonialism has left its mark on several contested cities, with particular forms of planning and urban policies. Focusing on the interaction between indigenous lives, colonial structures and urbanisation processes, researchers argue for profound displacement, erasure and often destruction on indigenous histories and geographies for the dominant ethno-national group (Porter and Yiftachel, 2017). Ethno-gentrification is another, more recent, process combining political and economic means and an engagement of ethnicity/nationalism and class. The fact that gentrification can involve market forces, ethno-national ideologies and state policies challenges mainstream descriptions of the ethno-national contested city and the neoliberal city as separate entities and contradictory analysis frames (Yacobi, 2016).

Minority populations can be excluded and marginalised when urban planning involves attempts for control of space on behalf of a dominant national group (Allegra et al., 2012; Bollens, 2018; Braier and Yacobi, 2017; Dumper, 2005; Gaffikin and Morrissey, 2011; Pullan, 2011). The advantage and control of a hegemonic ethno-national group over urban resources and space, described as ‘Urban-Ethnocracy’, appears to produce a contested space and social instability (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003). The dominance of an ethno-national force in shaping urban spaces led scholars in recent years to define new concepts such as ‘the urban frontier’ and the ‘suburban frontier’; ‘indigenous ghetto’ and ‘gray spacing’; ‘urbs nullius’, the ‘planning contact zone’ and ‘dynamic structuralism’ (Porter and Yiftachel, 2017) as well as ‘targeted towns’ or ‘shared towns’ in contrast to ‘mixed towns’ (Monterescu, 2015).

Gentrification: State-led

Definitions of gentrification have expanded over time and it is now understood to be a ‘process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital’ (Clark, 2005: 258). Accordingly, initial studies of neighbourhood change, driven by economic interests and individual choices (Hamnett, 1991; Ley, 1986; Smith, 1982), were replaced by studies that examined the role of states and described gentrification also as a political strategy in which the state is a primary agent (Lees et al., 2016).

Gentrification is often part of a neoliberal urban policy that relies on markets and economic incentives to achieve economic goals such as strengthening the local government’s tax base, generating growth and rehabilitating urban spaces (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Lees et al., 2008; Smith, 2002). To solve the problems of inner cities, suffering poverty and crime, municipalities and governments attempt to attract a ‘strong and creative middle-class’ to move into these areas (Bridge et al., 2012; Florida, 2005; Holgersen and Baeten, 2017; Lees and Ley, 2008; Roberts and Sykes, 2000). This urban growth and renewal is expected to ‘trickle down’ and improve the welfare of all residents (Holgersen and Baeten, 2017; Roberts and Sykes, 2000).

The displacement of indigenous and ethnic groups from the urban space by gentrification can be explained by different intersections of identity, class, space and home ownership, as well as state and municipal policies. A threefold typology explains the differences. First, ethnic minorities are often over-represented in lower income groups, likely to live in poor sections of the city that are potential gentrification sites and disproportionately vulnerable to displacement pressures (Goetz, 2013; Huse, 2018; Mele, 2013; Phillips et al., 2014; Smith, 1996). The intersection of class and ethnicity means that state-led gentrification aimed at economic development often causes, intentionally or not, ethnic displacement (Arena, 2012; Goetz, 2013; Khare et al., 2015; Mumm, 2017; Wyly and Hammel, 2004). The pressures of gentrification are strongest in ethnicised or racialised neighbourhoods that are located on the perimeter of redevelopment zones, making gentrification ‘a profit-driven racial and class reconfiguration of urban, working-class communities of color that have suffered from a history of disinvestment and abandonment’ (Phillips et al., 2014: 8). Chicago’s Plan for Transformation, part of the federal Hope VI plan, for example, aimed at revitalising public housing but led to what was described as ‘racial cleansing’ of neighbourhoods (Goetz, 2013; Khare et al., 2015; Wyly and Hammel, 2004).

Second, ethnic minorities of lower income groups are not only economically vulnerable to displacement but can also be politically devalued and stigmatised. Accordingly, the depiction of ethnic minority concentration as damaging the reputation of the area (Uitermark et al., 2007) can encourage and legitimise gentrification policy, sometimes described as ‘social mixing’ or diversity. In Singapore, for example, social mixing through its Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) was aimed at promoting racial integration and preventing ethnic enclaves (Shaw, 2012). In practice, whether intended or not, gentrification that seeks to diversify can result in the displacement of ethnic minorities because of rising real-estate values and new entrepreneurship driving out traditional businesses.

Finally, in settler colonial societies gentrification can be part of a wider state-led project of territorialisation and ethno-national domination (Blatman-Thomas and Porter, 2018; Clarno, 2017; Shaw, 2012; Yacobi and Tzfadia, 2019). Relations of ethnicity, power and space are set within a continuing legacy and logic of settler colonialism where the presence of ethnic minorities must be contained or pushed back. Gentrification, under these circumstances, is a more subtle form of ‘Demographic engineering’ (McGarry, 1998) where various incentives are provided for groups perceived to be loyal to move from central to peripheral areas designated by the state as strategic. Accordingly, in contested cities gentrification is not only about political-economic re-structuring but is also a spatial and racial project to re-imagine the city and its ethnic make-up (Blatman-Thomas and Porter, 2018; Grandinetti, 2019; Monterescu, 2013, 2015; Porter and Yiftachel, 2017; Shaw, 2012; Yacobi, 2016; Zaban, 2017).

The threefold typology of ethnic displacement by gentrification presented above is of ideal types that can combine in different settings. We use the term ethno-gentrification (Monterescu, 2013, 2015) in Acre to describe a state-led policy that includes the stigmatisation of an Arab neighbourhood as poor and crime-ridden with an ethno-national project of Jewish control. Accordingly, both national and economic logics and forces are employed for the displacement and replacement of the population.

Ethno-gentrification: Neoliberalism, nationalism and contradictions

In the contemporary age of globalisation and neoliberal hegemony, the capacity to execute projects of demographic engineering seems limited by global markets that, among other things, promote individualism and competition at the expense of national solidarity and commitment. Neoliberalism, however, does not necessarily undermine the power of states (or nationalism), as contemporary neoconservative politics demonstrate (Helleiner and Pickel, 2005; Pickel, 2003). States, in spite of globalisation, still preserve national identity, culture and borders (Barber, 1996; Robertson, 1994; Tomlinson, 1999) and are able to accommodate or adopt neoliberalism. The neoliberal state, argues Harvey (2005: 84), ‘needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive’ as increasing social alienation and atomisation must be balanced by cohesion that nationalism can provide. Neoliberalism intensification and its failure to provide welfare for all are now mobilising nationalism as a defence against the ‘people rage’ (Brown, 2018; Filc, 2006; Maskovsky and Bjork-James, 2020). Similarly, neoliberal policies claiming efficiency are presented as strengthening state and nation (Sclar, 2001).

Neoliberalism, by introducing market mechanisms, can encourage gentrification, expanding the real-estate value of ethnic neighbourhoods where residents are vulnerable to displacement pressures (Huse, 2018). Neoliberalism can also be instrumental for state-led ethno-gentrification where seemingly neutral market operations serve as a government tool for ethnic exclusion and territorial control (Blatman-Thomas and Porter, 2018; Clarno, 2017; Tomiak, 2017; Yacobi and Tzfadia, 2019), and privatised spaces protect class, ethnic and racial hierarchies (Harvey, 1989). Accordingly, the ethnic rationale of spatial control is supplemented by an economic rationale of re-structuring. The former encourages populations identified with the state to settle in designated areas in order to establish control, providing a combination of symbolic rewards and more traditional economic incentives for gentrifiers. The latter ‘sugarcoats’ the process, erasing the politics of winners and losers involved in the policies, and provides a complimentary view of the state (Smith, 2002).

While neoliberalism and nationalism both shape contemporary contested cities (Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2015), the tensions and contradictions between class and ethno-national forces should not be overlooked (Shtern and Yacobi, 2018) as they occupy state and municipal authorities, newcomers and veteran residents who struggle with different challenges of displacement and replacement. Urban authorities engage in place branding of neighbourhoods –‘authenticity’, ‘diversity’ or the ‘exotic’ mobilised as selling points (Huse, 2018; Zukin, 2008). Such ‘ethnic packaging’ (Huse, 2018) can be undermined if gentrification ends in the total replacement of original communities. Newcomers or gentrifiers identified with the dominant ethno-national group may describe themselves as pioneers but often also respond to economic incentives, using both national and economic logics to justify their presence. Finally, gentrification is likely to breed opposition from those threatened by it, as ‘pressures of gentrification are deeply enmeshed with broader inequalities of class, race and ethnicity and gender’ (Newman and Wyly, 2006: 51). Veteran residents, however, are torn between economic promises for urban renewal, vulnerability and commitment to defend their place. Consequently, while we study how state-led gentrification combines collective-ethno-national and individual-economic incentives and motivations, we want to move forward and examine also the tensions between the logics. First, policy makers and entrepreneurs, for different reasons, may prefer to downplay the national or economic logic. Second, and similarly, new settlers in contested cities have different goals and incentives in which national and economic logics can coincide but also conflict. And, third, veteran ethnic communities, potential victims of gentrification, may be also influenced by economic incentives and the promise of urban renewal.

Israel: Ethno-gentrification

Demographic engineering was part of the nation- and state-building projects in Israel. National ideology and the power of the state vis-à-vis society underscored processes of immigration absorption and population dispersal directed by state agencies. While pre-state Jewish settlement was in lands purchased by Zionist organisations, Jewish philanthropists or entrepreneurs, the war of 1948 established Jewish sovereignty and control over new territories; many of the Arab/Palestinian owners were deported or fled during the war and were prevented from returning. Population dispersal included the settlement of over 900,000 new Jewish immigrants, many of them from Muslim countries, at times forcefully, in the periphery areas where Jewish population was sparse and there were restrictions on Arabs who remained after the war (Tzfadia and Yiftachel, 2004; Yuval-Davis and Stasiulis, 1995).

Designed to ensure Jewish dominance and control, demographic engineering continued even in the neoliberal era that began in the 1980s, though by different means. Checking the alleged take-over of lands by Arabs and establishing national-Jewish control of space (Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2015) involved combined government and private-market-led initiatives. The new policies included incentives provided for Jewish entrepreneurs and individuals to build and buy houses in ‘community settlements’ in the north of Israel and the occupied territories (Alterman, 1999; Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2015; Yacobi and Tzfadia, 2019). In the 1990s, facing a large immigration from the former Soviet Union, planning authorisation procedures were shortened, with more incentives for entrepreneurs to build in new allocated lands and with subsidised rent for the newcomers (Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2015; Tzfadia and Yiftachel, 2004). Attempts to ‘disperse population’ to peripheral areas continued (Tzfadia and Yiftachel, 2004), with planning, land allocation and incentives to entrepreneurs described as a ‘space Judaisation’ project.

Demographic engineering in contested cities also involved government policies and private entrepreneurs, encouraging Jewish citizens to settle in Arab neighbourhoods. In those cities, compared with rural settlements, demographic engineering involved direct and everyday contacts between Jewish newcomers and Arab residents. Ethno-gentrification, as described below, is state-led and facilitates a loose coalition of state actors, state-owned public housing companies, local municipalities and Zionist NGOs, each with its own set of economic and national goals. It is carried out by Jewish settlers motivated by a combination of national ideologies, economic incentives and symbolic rewards, who debate their place and relation to local residents. And, finally, the process is met by local residents whom gentrification promises to benefit but threatens to uproot. Thus, what we describe as ‘state-led ethno-gentrification’ enjoys wide support but can also evoke concerns, resentment and resistance from its potential victims.

Methodology

Our study of Acre explores how different groups and actors perceive the process of state-led gentrification. The study included 34 interviews, 11 local Arab residents from the Old City neighbourhood of Acre, 11 newcomers and 12 policy makers (from Acre municipality). Interviews of 29 participants were by face-to-face meetings and five by phone. Interviews, lasting 30 to 90 minutes, were audiotaped and transcribed. The interviewees’ names, at their request, remain confidential. In addition, we also rely upon policy papers, state documents and documents of NGOs involved that provide more information.

The sampling strategy included combining quota sampling, to ensure sufficient representation from each group, and snowball sampling, to identify and reach influential people involved in the processes studied. At the city level, interviewees included the mayor, deputies and senior executives engaged in the development of the Old City; some among the newcomers’ association founders, CEO, managers, coordinators and students. Finally, at the residents’ level, Arab residents involved in community affairs. The material analysis process included three steps (thematic analysis), aimed at formulating the research information into concepts, central themes and dimensions (Clark et al., 2010).

The gentrification of Acre

Acre (Akko) is a Mediterranean coastal city in northern Israel. Of the city’s 48,303 residents, 68.2% are Jews, 28.8% Muslim Arab, 2.8% Christian Arab (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The Old City of Acre, where 5000–8000 Arab citizens live, is an historical neighbourhood surrounded by sea on its south-eastern, southern and western sides, and a wall on all sides. The historic area contains preserved structures: Ottoman walled towns with citadels, mosques, khans and baths from the medieval 11th-century Crusaders (Forman-Neeman, 2008). The majority of Acre’s Palestinian community escaped or were expelled during the war in 1948 (Abbasi, 2010). Arab land and property, as elsewhere, were seized by the state through the ‘Absentees Property Law’ (1950), some used later for public housing. The remaining Arab population concentrated at the Old City as protected tenants in public housing. From the end of 1949 Jews were also housed in the Old City, comprising 36% of all residents by 1952. Later, the Jewish population moved out of the Old City, which was considered a disadvantaged area of poverty and crime (Waterman, 1971), to new neighbourhoods or other towns. Emigration left the city with mostly a socio-economically lower-class population and created a peripheral and disadvantaged city. The declining number of Jewish residents and the growing poverty led to concerns among Jewish groups and organisations regarding the city’s identity and to efforts to increase Jewish presence in the city (Luz and Stadler, 2017; Ram and Aharon-Gutman, 2017).

The Old City, inhabited mostly by Arab residents, is at the centre of attempts to revive Acre because of its touristic and real estate potential. The ‘Old Acre Development Company’, founded by the Ministry of Tourism in 1967, encouraged investors and entrepreneurs to develop the area to attract both tourists and middle-class residents. Through these efforts new hotels, restaurants and galleries were opened, cultural events, including an annual theatre festival, began to take place, tourism increased and in 2001 the Old City was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site (Old Acre Development Company website, available at: http://www.akko.org.il/en/About-the-Old-Acre-Development-Company; Yavo Ayalon et al., 2018). Housing prices also rose, the municipality raised property taxes and public housing companies began to evict tenants – Arab citizens who were debtors – and put the houses up for sale, many of them bought by Jewish investors or entrepreneurs (Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1.

The Old City of Acre, Israel.

Figure 2.

Development of the Old City of Acre.

The entry of Jewish residents into a previously Arab neighbourhood was not only the result of economic-led gentrification but was also facilitated by national ideologies, state policies and NGOs. Established in 2002, as an organisation of young Israeli pioneers, Ayalim’s declared goal was to promote the settlement of Jewish young people in the northern and southern periphery in what was described as a revival of the Zionist pioneering ethos (Ayalim NGO website, available at: https://www.ayalim.org.il/en/). The government, through several bureaucracies, granted Ayalim a fixed amount of around 30 million IS every year for more allocations for different projects Ayalim operates, and provided lands leased at minimal prices (Government Resolutions Number 1041, 2013). Ayalim are also supported by philanthropists from Israel and around the world (such as ‘Keren Hayesovd’– UIA, Jewish Federations of Canada and Merage Foundations), as well as private donors, for another 7 million IS per year (Ayalim Finance reports, The Guidestar-Israel’s Non-Profit Organization (Web). Available at: https://www.guidestar.org.il/organization/580398352/documents). Ayalim established student villages where, in return for housing and scholarships, students volunteer in nearby communities. These efforts, according to Ayalim, combine national-demographic and economic-regeneration goals, as they establish a Jewish presence but also promote the physical and social development of the periphery.

Ayalim’s project in the Old City of Acre was encouraged and supported by the government and the local municipality, interested in increasing Jewish presence in the area. In 2007, Ayalim were given five buildings from the ‘old Acre Development Company’, to settle in Acre (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

An Ayalim building.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking in an event ‘Saluting Community Building in the Galilee’, described the settlers as ‘pioneers’ working for the benefit of state and society:

… These groups combine secular and religious members, all of them Zionists, all of them passionate about taking action. This is expressed through the spirit of volunteerism that is quite simply refreshing and provides a tremendous amount of hope … they contribute to society … I want to thank you all – you are truly the genuine pioneers of our time. You are building this country. (Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Acre, 18 December 2012, available at: https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/speechgalil181212)

Naftaly Bennet, a right-wing politician of the Jewish Home party, alluded to the main goal of the settlement project:

The city of Acre is becoming Arab … whole neighborhoods where Jews once lived are now inhabited mostly by Arabs … building after building, neighborhood after neighborhood … in the old city most of the signs are in Arabic, not in Hebrew … Acre should also be a Jewish home, in the full sense of the word. (Available at: http://www.akkonet.co.il/forums/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24827)

Politicians described the settlement of Acre as part of a larger project of demographic engineering, increasing Jewish presence in the periphery and in contested cities. ‘Nothing to be ashamed of’, stated one minister, referring to the ‘Judaisation’ project (available at: https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/222094). Another described the dangers of a dominant Arab presence in terms of increasing crime and violence, but more importantly of ‘creeping invasion’ and ‘stealing our land’ (available at: https://www.inn.co.il/Besheva/Article.aspx/7804/1).

The local municipality

Municipal officials and local politicians explained their support for Ayalim’s project in economic terms, highlighting their potential contribution to urban renewal for the benefit of all residents. The newcomers, described as a ‘strong’ population, they argue, replace a population dependent on public resources and their presence contributes to the renewal of the Old City, encouraging entrepreneurship, investments and tourism.

Our policy is not to bring in weak populations, we have enough of those as is … people who live in the old city today enjoy better conditions than before … there is better infrastructure, tourism is expanding … That is the municipal policy, to bring in a strong population that can contribute and take care of weaker populations. (Mayor of Acre)

These houses were closed, ready for demolition and those who bought them made out of them hotels and restaurants … this creates employment and brings tourism … we encourage this … this is our policy, bring in any strong populations. (Deputy Mayor of Acre)

The municipality perceived the arrival of Ayalim as a positive social force that can help transform the city. Officials described members of Ayalim as ‘salt of the earth’, because of their volunteering in informal education activities or in renovation efforts of the neighbourhood. City officials, unlike the government, downplay the national/ethnic significance of Ayalim’s presence in the Old City and describe their social and economic contribution. The goal, as one council member explained, is a ‘mixed city with a Jewish majority … I will do everything to bring Jewish people of high quality’ (interview). Ayalim provide a reservoir of a desired population:

Most young people left town and rejuvenation of the city was necessary … one idea was to bring in Ayalim … this would change Acre … we need once and for all to end poverty, crime, vandalism, drugs and the isolation of Arabs in the old city … an atmosphere of joint Arab and Jewish life … if Arabs would buy these properties it would not make this change … so if the old city is developing and there are also Jews living there, is that not something positive? (Advisor to the Mayor)

At the same time, policy makers at the municipal level were concerned that the ‘Judaisation’ efforts would backfire, undermine Jewish–Arab relations and transform the ‘authentic’ character of the city. Many of the interviewees mentioned the events of 2008, when Arab and Jewish citizens clashed in Yom Kippur, and raised concerns that clashes will undermine economic development and undermine efforts made.

living together in coexistence seem very natural to me … in a mixed city you cannot ignore the weaker populations … I believe both Jews and Arabs are happy in Acre, we live well together … ten years ago there were riots in Yom Kippur and afterwards they suffered economic losses and they drew the conclusion that coexistence is good for them as it is good for us. (Deputy Mayor of Acre)

The neoliberal logic behind urban renewal, it appears, contrasts with the national-demographic logic not only out of concerns over clashes that would tarnish the image of the city and make it less attractive but also because the presence of native residents has its own ‘market-value’ (Zukin, 2008). Municipal officials used the word ‘authentic’ several times to explain their concerns for the future of the Old City as a tourist attraction. The gentrification of Jaffa, they argued, was a negative example for a city that lost its uniqueness. Tourism, they believe, requires that Arab residents remain and maintain the area’s character. The national interest of a Jewish presence, therefore, was in tension with economic interests.

The old city must stay authentic with its current residents and a tourist scene will develop there … I can say that tourists come because the old city remained authentic with its original population. (Mayor of Acre)

Jaffa in my opinion is ruined because there is nothing there; all that is left is galleries and rich people from Tel-Aviv that resided there. There is nothing authentic in Jaffa … we don’t want this to happen here … if you take the authenticity out of Acre you are left with nothing. (VP of the city economic company)

Acre is a mixed city and should stay this way … the old city must remain authentic … guaranteeing the local population helps maintain authenticity and tourism. (Deputy Mayor)

The gap between state-level and municipal decision makers can be attributed not only to local economic interests but also to the representation of Arab residents in the municipality more ambivalent towards the presence of the newcomers. While they support the social role performed by the new settlers they reject the national ideology they carry, as the Arab Deputy Mayor explains:

The students are helping residents in the old city … but when I see the goals of Ayalim, I cannot identify with them and I do not cooperate with them … when you say settlement, why does it have a racial aspect of bringing Jewish people? Say you want to strengthen the city, improve quality of life … I am against the organization, not the students who do help Arab children … so why the talk about Judaization? I don’t understand. (Deputy Mayor)

Economic concerns, political interest in the Arab residents’ votes and the presence of Arab citizens in the municipality explain the attempts to present gentrification as beneficial for all. Unlike state-level politicians, local policy makers are cautious to use national statements and demographic goals and prefer economic explanations and the promise of urban renewal. However, city policies of encouraging the entry of new higher-status residents, even if avoiding ethnic language, cause population displacement. The increase in rental prices has driven out poor Arab residents in favour of affluent Jewish people.

New residents: Ayalim

Members of Ayalim describe themselves as taking part in a national mission, combining logics of particularistic demographic engineering, pioneering and security, alongside a more universal economic language akin to discussions of gentrification elsewhere. The Old City is described as an ‘empty space’, deserted or underdeveloped, justifying their presence:

These were deserted houses with nothing in them … I know there was nothing there because this was a ruin … no one really lived here so it became ours. (I, a student in Ayalim project)

Presence is about Jewish dominance but also about economic regeneration claimed to benefit all – city and Arab residents. A Jewish presence, they argue, would prevent the radicalisation of Arab society and promote integration and coexistence.

Ayalim’s goal is Zionist-Jewish presence … that the old city will not be exclusive Arab … there was a strong presence of radical elements of the outlawed Islamic movement … when you have a segregated area in a mixed city radicalism and hate grows … children don’t learn Hebrew … an [Arab] village in a mixed city … when Ayalim came in, it was the first time that Jews live here and the status quo was changed. (Ayalim Director Old Acre)

Others prefer to de-politicise the project and describe their presence not in terms of security and curbing radicalism but as something that promotes coexistence, downplaying demographic engineering or conflicts and highlighting the contribution of their presence to all residents:

[Jewish] presence is a first step towards coexistence … my personal goal is to create coexistence … acknowledge this is a mixed city and try and create better communication. (D, a student in Ayalim project)

I come here to help develop the city and I don’t think the attitude towards us should be hostile … we think coexistence is possible and this is what we are here to do. We are not engaged in politics, even if it seems political, we come here to serve the residents of the old city and Acre, that is our goal. (M, a student in Ayalim project)

The description of Acre as desolate and underdeveloped provides a sense of mission and justification. Settlement endows the settlers, young middle-class Jewish people, with symbolic rewards and turns the act of settlement into a heroic sacrifice.

Zionism is about being where people don’t want to be … people leave Acre … unemployment is high, there are not many jobs available, there is no cultural life … so it is difficult for people to stay … we come to places that others avoid. This is the place of Zionism. To empower the periphery. (Y, a student in Ayalim project)

People say that the old city is a place of crime, a dirty city … we changed the stereotype of a terrible and unsafe place … because until now nobody believed that Jews can live in the old city. (R, a student in Ayalim project)

Settlement is justified by national discourse claiming space, Zionism endows them with a pioneering status and a sense of mission. Arab residents, conversely, by their very presence, are part of the ‘problem’. Demographic arguments legitimise the project but at the same time threaten to disrupt it. Consequently, national-demographic arguments are softened by the promise that newcomers’ presence will benefit also local residents, echoing the logic of municipal politicians described above.

Arab citizens

For the local-native residents of the Old City, state-led gentrification evokes mixed reactions: welcomed economic development and improved infrastructure matched by rising property values and insecurity. Thus, while material benefits of gentrification are real, residents suspect the intentions of policy makers and potential displacement.

Old city is pretty now, no argument. The municipality is putting lots of efforts to make the city a tourist destination … it is great to see so many tourists … Business is good, we are making a living … But, they want us out, for more tourism … the municipality wants to make life difficult for those living in the old city … They raised city taxes and they evict those who cannot pay … they tell you your house is unsafe and when you leave they turn it into a hotel. (JN, local resident)

Class tensions also play a role in the perceptions of Arab residents and their rejection of gentrification. Often, they find themselves unable to compete with the newcomers, lacking economic resources and facing policies that favour Jewish newcomers. Housing becomes a scarce resource and the community’s future is threatened:

If I want to buy an apartment in my neighborhood and a Jewish person comes from the outside, pays almost a million shekels for the apartment, how can I pay that? … I heard there were tenders in Acre for apartments last month, no Arabs have won. Why? Because it is expensive. Only rich Jewish people buy. (Anonymous resident, Acre)

We still don’t know how to find Arab capital that would compete, I wish we would. A minority of residents would not sell to Jewish people because that would end Arab presence in the old city. The majority just want to improve their lives and would do what is best for them … we are happy with development, but does it have to come at the expense of veteran Arab residents? (Ala Halihal, local resident in Gilad, 2018)

Arab residents stress the political forces and ideologies that guide the seemingly natural economic consequences of demand and supply and describe a concentrated displacement effort. The presence of Ayalim, supported by government and by Jewish philanthropy, they argue, clearly demonstrates there is a policy behind the changes that implies their displacement.

Those who buy houses here, many Jewish people with money from donors in America, Canada and elsewhere … they buy to take control of the state … there is a deal to take Arabs out of old Acre … Ayalim come here because they want to bring in Jews and move out the Arabs … they want the old city to be about tourism and ancient ruins. (AH, local resident)

They humiliate people here, they don’t want them to buy the houses … We live in the old city for 72 years, my father was born here and my grandfather … the state does not want Arabs here, maybe some Arabs but not a majority. (HH, local resident)

The replacement of Arab residents by Jewish newcomers, according to Arabs, leaves them without alternatives and raises criticisms not only of the state and its policies but also of Arab residents who sell their houses.

If I want to sell my house, a rich Jewish person will offer me a large apartment in the city. That is how it works. So those who don’t have money and want to sell, and do not think of their roots – they sell. Those who have honor and want to stay – don’t sell. (Anonymous resident, Acre)

The Arab community of Acre organised to fight the gentrification of the Old City and demanded protection from evictions. Arab residents’ requests for building permits require special approval because the neighbourhood is an historic conservation area. While their requests are delayed and often rejected, permit applications for public projects are more easily approved, for example the renovation of the Ayalim Association’s building. Residents, in dire need of housing expansion, describe illegal construction (including renovating, expanding or adding a room in many cases, and even invasion of an empty building) as both a necessity and a form of political resistance. The bureaucratic difficulties of permits, perceived by residents as policy, lead over the years to extensive illegal construction that is estimated at more than 80% of the buildings in the neighbourhood.

So I built [a room] without permits and they fine me again and again … but where will my children sleep? … So we build, that is what you do. (HH, local resident)

Collectively, supported by human rights organisations, residents turned to the courts and appealed against turning an old building into a hotel, challenged tenders of privatised assets in the Old City and eviction notices for residents. Residents also brought their case to the media and to the attention of UNESCO. In 2013 they initiated a campaign called ‘Acre is not for Sale’, demonstrated against evictions, privatisation of assets, high city taxes and discrimination against Arab residents – all perceived to be part of state-led gentrification (Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Protest in 2014 against privatising the Old City assets.

Conclusion

Studies on state-led gentrification often emphasise the economic motivations behind the process, aimed at generating growth and rehabilitating urban spaces. To solve the problems of inner cities, suffering poverty and crime, municipalities and governments attempt to attract new middle- and upper-class residents to generate urban growth and renewal for the benefit of all. In practice, however, intentionally or not, gentrification can also involve the displacement of indigenous and ethnic groups from the urban space. Displacement, as we describe in this paper, can be the result of the intersection of ethnicity and low incomes, rendering minorities disproportionately vulnerable to displacement pressures. Alternatively, economic vulnerability is coupled with devaluation and stigmatisation, displacement targets minorities perceived to damage the reputation of neighbourhoods. Finally, as in the case of Acre studied here, gentrification is part of a wider state-led project of territorialisation and ethno-national domination.

In the study of Acre we use the term ethno-gentrification (Monterescu, 2013, 2015) to describe a state-led policy in a contested city of Jewish and Arab citizens. State-led gentrification is designed to encourage the settlement of Jews in the Old City where a Palestinian-Arab community resides. The gentrification policy combines the stigmatisation of an Arab neighbourhood as poor and crime-ridden with an economic discourse of urban renewal and an ethno-national project of Jewish control. Accordingly, economic incentives and national ideologies encourage Jewish citizens to settle in the Old City of Acre, designated as strategic. Economic and ethno-national logics often complement each other but also contain tensions and contradictions between policy makers at state and municipal levels, in the goals and perceptions of newcomers, and in the ambivalence towards gentrification among veteran residents.

State-level Jewish politicians do not hesitate to describe the settlement of Jews in demographic and national terms, Arab residents being ignored or securitised. Policy makers and bureaucrats at the municipal level, conversely, tend to downplay the national logic and stress the economic, presenting the settlement of young Jewish people as an essential part of urban renewal. For local politicians, Arab residents are valued not only because of their political power but also for their economic contribution. The presence of Arab residents is considered essential for urban renewal and the ‘authenticity’ of Acre marketed for tourists and entrepreneurs. Thus, while from the national-demographic logic Arab residents are a threat that needs to be contained and encourages gentrification, the economic logic assigns them an indispensable value that potentially limits gentrification.

The national-demographic rationale behind gentrification provides settlers with status and justifies the resources allocated by the state for such projects. But, these projects favouring one ethno-national group over another not only stand against democratic values but they also risk resentment and resistance of would-be victims of gentrification. Conversely, the economic rationale is presented in more neutral terms, presenting gentrification as urban renewal that benefits both veterans and newcomers. Jewish settlers describe themselves as idealists or pioneers who carry a ‘national mission’ deserving government support. While the national-demographic logic is powerful, like local-level policy makers they also employ the economic logic to de-politicise their presence. First, they describe the area as poor and desolate and the houses they purchased as ‘ruins’, to justify their presence. And, second, their presence is described as bringing urban renewal also for the benefit of Arab residents.

Finally, Arab residents’ reaction to gentrification exposes, first, the tension between the economic and national logics, and second, also their own dilemmas and concerns. Like elsewhere, the entry of an affluent and ethnically dominant population has the potential to bring with it improved public services and economic growth. Yet, the national-demographic logic, easily exposed and an inherent component of contested cities, implies marginalisation or displacement.

The study of a contested city in Israel suggests that national ideologies continue to be a major factor in spatial planning and control, but with relatively new economic tools and interests. State-led ethno-gentrification is a government policy combining national and market ideologies, supplanted by entrepreneurs who provide tools and justifications, but it is also ripe with contradictions and opposition. Gentrification both privatises and nationalises space, converging economic and national-demographic logics, providing a powerful tool for dominant ethnic groups in contested cities. Yet, notwithstanding the powerful convergence of the two logics, we argue that tensions and contradictions also exist. Thus, at the local level policy makers face the potential costs of gentrification, settlers debate whether to present themselves as Zionist pioneers or urban entrepreneurs and downplay the former in favour of the latter, and local residents reject the economic promise of urban renewal and attempt to resist ethno-gentrification perceived as a threat. Overall, the process of ethno-gentrification is torn between a nationalist logic that generates hierarchy and displacement and an economic neoliberal logic that attempts to downplay the political impact of gentrification.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Professor Haim Yacobi, Professor Marguérite Corporaal and the three reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Yael Shmaryahu-Yeshurun

Guy Ben-Porat

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