Exclusion Through Inclusion: Institutional Constraints on Women’s Political Empowerment in India and Bangladesh

Abstract

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This comparative case study uses qualitative data to explore and analyze the institutional obstacles that women in reserved seats face to their political empowerment in the Gram Panchayat in India and the Union Parishad in Bangladesh. The findings reveal that women in reserved seats in both countries confront some fundamental institutional barriers, such as a masculine model of politics, lack of political party support, as well as lack of power and resources. Indian women face serious problems—the inclusion of ex-officio members, the rotational system, bureaucratic dominance, and partisan elections—whereas Bangladeshi women suffer from the unequal distribution of reserved seats under a quota policy and lack of clarity in rules, power, and provisions. A lack of financial resources limits the effective participation of women members in the decision-making process in both countries. Further institutional reforms are vital to ensure women’s political empowerment through reserved seats in both countries.

Keywords

Asian Politics India Bangladesh Reserved Seats Local Councils Institutional Constraints Gender Mainstreaming Gender Inequality Women’s Empowerment Women in Politics Gender and Politics Gender Quotas Representation Affirmative Action Masculine Model of Politics

Women’s active participation in electoral politics is a genuine indicator of the effective advancement of democracy in any nation worldwide today. Women’s equal representation in political legislatures is vital to initiate political agendas, to promote women’s interests, and to legitimate democratic establishments (Dahlerup 2006, 3; P. Rai 2017, 58). To advance women’s interests, more than 130 countries have implemented affirmative actions or gender quotas, both at the national and local levels, with the aim of increasing the number of women in political legislatures (Hughes et al. 2019).¹ Gender quotas are mostly seen as equal opportunity techniques that put pressure on nominating organizations or on political parties, to recruit, select, or nominate increasing numbers of women for political positions (Dahlerup 2006, 5).

Quotas inaugurate a statutory effort to break the masculine model of politics, thereby enhancing the numbers of female politicians in legislatures. The masculine model of politics refers to a model of political life which is structured according to male norms and values, and even to male lifestyles (Shvedova 2005, 35). This masculine model of politics refers to “how patriarchy still operated in different ways and at various levels in the institutions of politics” (Zakar, Zakar, and Hamid 2018, 224). Quotas institute an “exogenous shock” to the mostly masculine model of political systems; they pose a warning against norms associating politics with male politicians (Baldez 2006, 104). Some believe, however, that quotas are not simply about enhancing women’s numbers in order to pose a threat to male legislators; rather, quotas—negatively or positively—can transform the quality of elected delegates and yield opportunities to press for group benefits in policy making and participation in politics (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012, 3). Thus, quotas may have both positive and negative effects on women’s increasing numbers in legislatures.

Although many countries have adopted gender quotas in their attempts to break the masculine model of politics, women legislators still do not have much influence on power and decision making in most societies around the world, particularly in developing countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU] 2018; Jahan 2017). This study considers why women politicians are still sidelined in power and decision-making positions in India and Bangladesh. It finds that women who enter political assemblies through gender quotas are more likely to suffer from institutional constraints such as the masculine model of politics, lack of political party support, and lack of power and resources. These institutional constraints are termed “exclusion through inclusion.” This is because, although gender quotas have included many women in political assemblies, institutional constraints still exclude them from effective participation in the decision-making process.

This study adds to previous research on gender quotas which has found that quota women are more likely to suffer from institutional constraints (Abou-Zeid 2006; Ghosh 2003; Jayal 2006; Kudva 2003). It has generally been found that institutional hindrances are ubiquitous dilemmas for quota women. However, Zetterberg (2008) has argued that institutional hindrances may not be ubiquitous or affect all women legislators equally because the majority of previous studies are based on single case studies (mainly in India). Thus, Zetterberg tested this hypothesis by comparing the institutional barriers that quota women and non-quota women face in their parliamentary affairs in two Mexican state legislatures—Zacatecas and Michoacán—and no general support was found for this claim (Zetterberg 2008). Inspired by Zetterberg, I argue here that it is not sufficient to use data from one in-country case study to generalize more broadly, and that what is required are a succession of comparative case studies to examine the claim that women who enter political assemblies are more likely to suffer from institutional constraints. To contribute in this direction, this study re-examines the institutional obstructions that women in reserved seats encounter with regard to their participation and empowerment in local councils in India and Bangladesh. I do so from a comparative perspective focusing on the lowest level of rural local government, in the Gram Panchayat in India and in the Union Parishad in Bangladesh. I inspect how institutional barriers restrict quota women from their effective participation in the political process. To investigate institutional barriers, this article employs a central research question: what kinds of institutional challenges do quota women face with regard to their political participation and empowerment in local councils in India and Bangladesh?

There are a number of reasons for choosing India and Bangladesh for this research. First, both are considered developing countries and their administrative legacies and evolution came from the British colonial system. Second, both have three tiers of rural/local government and both have implemented similar quota policies (reserved seats) to enhance women’s representation in local councils. Third, both countries are predominantly patriarchal societies and have similar cultures. Patriarchal cultures have often presented women as unfit for political activities and politics as being unsuitable for them. In short, the two countries are similar enough to make a valid comparison.

This study is significant for a number of reasons. First, at the time of writing and to my knowledge, this is the first qualitative comparative study that investigates institutional constraints on women’s political empowerment in India and Bangladesh. The majority of single case studies on institutional constraints have been carried out in India, so it is crucial to compare another country (in this case Bangladesh) with India to reject or reconfirm the hypothesis that quota women face institutional constraints about their performances in political legislatures. Second, the results can provide a new direction to the comparative literature on gender quotas in relation to women’s political empowerment, especially in developing countries. Most importantly, the findings can suggest solutions in assisting women to function more effectively in the political decision-making process. The major contribution of this study is that it applied a qualitative research strategy to compare women’s political empowerment through an institutional lens. This qualitative research has enabled a deep, rich, understanding of these women’s situations and lived experience. The main argument is that the masculine nature of political institutional design in India and Bangladesh does not, and cannot, promote women’s political empowerment, in this case through reserved seats in both countries. This study uses the terms “quota women” and “women members” throughout, which refer to women in reserved seats.

Women’s Political Empowerment

There are varying conceptualizations of empowerment with academics concentrating on resources, agency, and achievement in its definition (Sell and Minot 2018, 46). Resources are defined as control over physical, human, financial, and intellectual capitals (Kabeer 1994), whereas agency refers to the ability and freedom to induce personal preferences (Desai 2010; A. K. Sen 2009). Achievement is a combination of both resources and agency, and is associated with globally common fundamental activities, but it is also related to individual choice (Kabeer 1999). In respect to women, Geha (2019, 511) explains empowerment as “a process of authorizing greater power and authority to individuals or groups of people to permit them much control over their own lives and surroundings.” Women’s empowerment has been debated in terms of a process of gaining control (G. Sen 1997), power within the household (Mason and Smith 2003), involvement in politics (Norris and Inglehart 2001), and economic power and access to resources (Parveen 2008).

Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender (2002, 8) argue that control over resources does not spontaneously transform to empowerment but can be a “catalyst for empowerment.” Although “resources—economic, social, and political—are often critical in ensuring that women are empowered, they are not always sufficient. Without women’s individual or collective ability to recognize and utilize resources in their own interests, resources cannot bring about empowerment” (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender 2002, 9). However, Sell and Minot (2018, 47) argue that “access to, and control over, resources is a key idea within the empowerment discussion.” Sundström and others (2015, 4–7) argue that politics is the field for collective decision making, and that “participation” is another significant defining feature of women’s political empowerment. Lopez-Claros and Zahidi (2005, 4) argue that women’s political empowerment is the “equitable representation of women in decision-making structures and their voice in the formulation of policies affecting their societies.” Sundström and others (2015, 4) define women’s political empowerment as “a process of expanding the ability for women, leading to a better choice, agency, and participation in the societal decision-making process.” Therefore, women’s political empowerment refers to the expanding ability of women to participate in collective decision-making processes, especially their ability to choose capitals and to raise their voices to affect the decision-making process in order to provide resources (public goods and services) to their people (particularly women).

Institutional Obstacles to Women Legislators’ Performance

Historically, men have dominated and controlled the political sphere and this continues in the 21st century; men map the rules of the political game and often develop the principles for assessment of participant performance in politics (Ara and Northcote 2020; Shvedova 2005). Women have been, and continue to be, systematically marginalized and underrepresented in what is fundamentally a men’s political world (Ara 2019; Kjaer 2010; Putnam 1976). Feminist scholars (see, for example, Elshtain 1993; Enloe 2014; Lorber 1994) have identified that the positions of power, the state, and polities are masculine in nature. Men are associated with politics, foreign affairs, and leadership in many cultures, while women are associated with the private and personal spheres of life, particularly the domestic sphere of the family (Zamfirache 2010, 176). The durable nature of this masculine model of politics results in lower interest from, and participation of, women in politics (Duverger 1955; Karam and Lovenduski 2005). For example, in January 2020, only 24.5 percent of women occupied positions in national parliaments worldwide while the number of women in local government was not much higher (IPU 2020). Although women’s representation in elected local government bodies varies from region to region, the average number is 26 percent (UN Women 2019).

Political parties are also another vital instrument that determine women’s access to political power (Ara and Northcote 2020). Political parties maneuver the selection and nomination process of candidates, cooperate during the election campaigns, and continue to care for members after elections (Omondi 2016). Processes within political parties are often biased against women in that “male characteristics” are given priority in selecting candidates (Mlambo, Kapingura, and Meissner 2019). To maintain their control of the political agenda, male party leaders nominate politically inexperienced and powerless women (Baldez 2006; Dahlerup 2006). Lack of power and resources further limits women’s participation in political affairs (Jayal 2006). Quota women are unable to secure their interests to endure in political assemblies due to scarcity of financial resources (Dahlerup 2007, 2008). From this discussion, it appears that there are many institutional barriers to women’s participation at all levels of politics in the world today.

Quota Provisions in India and Bangladesh: A Comparative Perspective

India and Bangladesh adopted reserved seats for gender quotas in politics in the 1990s. The reserved seats quota policy guarantees a fixed number of seats for women in political assemblies or offices (Dahlerup 2007, 85–86). India adopted reserved seats for women only at the local levels, but Bangladesh introduced reserved seats for women at the national as well as the local levels (F. D. Chowdhury 2013; Panday 2010). In 1993, the Indian Parliament enacted the Constitutional Amendment Act of 73, which provided reserved seats for women for not less than 33 percent of the total seats, in the Panchayat, by direct election (Kondo 2008).^2,3 In comparison, over the past four decades, the Bangladesh government has undertaken different strategies to address gender inequality and to bring women into the sphere of decision making, particularly in the political arena. In 1997, the Local Government (Union Parishad) (Second Amendment) Act of 1997 was introduced which made a provision of direct elections for reserved seats for women for not less than 25 percent in the Union Parishad (Ara 2017).⁴

Variations on Quota Design in India and Bangladesh

The electoral systems of both countries have a constitutional legacy and are plurality-majority systems where adult franchisees (male and female) directly elect quota women. The term for election in both the Gram Panchayat and the Union Parishad is five years and representatives are elected as candidates on a first-past-the-post basis. Yet some basic differences are witnessed on gender quota dimensions in both councils. First, the Gram Panchayat does not have a fixed number of members but fluctuates from five to 30 members including a Pradhan (Chairperson) and Upa-Pradhan (Vice Chairperson), depending on the population of the district. However, the number of members in the Union Parishad are fixed and do not depend on the population size. The Union Parishad consists of one chairperson, nine general members, and three women members in reserved seats, totaling 13 persons, and there is no post for a vice chairperson. Although the formation of the executive bodies of both councils are different, these are representative in nature.

Second, the Gram Panchayat system is a party-political system and the members are elected as candidates from party lists. However, the Union Parishad does not have a party-political system for members in general seats and reserved seats (S. M. Rai et al. 2006, 229–32), but a party-political system has been applied since 2016 to nominate and elect the chairpersons. The argument behind this is that partisan elections should reduce corruption and ensure the accountability of the elected chairpersons. The political party confirms the nomination of the chairperson candidate. If anyone is not interested in standing for election as a chairperson with a party affiliation, he or she can compete in elections independently (Panday 2019). The party-political system election has direct negative consequences on quota women’s activities in the Gram Panchayat, whereas this system does not have a direct effect on quota women in the Union Parishad. This is discussed at length later.

Third, the Gram Panchayat in India has a provision of a one-third reservation for women among the positions of the chairpersons (S. M. Rai et al. 2006, 229–32). Conversely, a one-third reservation for women members is seen in different committees such as the standing committees and project distribution and implementation committees in the Union Parishad in Bangladesh (Panday 2013). A one-third reservation for chair positions for quota women in the Gram Panchayat has a significant effect on the type of public services being delivered (Priebe 2017, 500), while a one-third reservation of women in different committees in the Union Parishad has not had a substantial effect on public service delivery (Begum 2012). Fourth, there is system of ward rotation for the reserved seats for women in the Gram Panchayat in India (S. M. Rai et al. 2006). Although different states have applied different ways of implementing such a reservation, in effect, in most of the cases, it has been random (Pande and Ford 2011), which means that if you have Panchayat with nine villages and nine members, in three of these villages’ only women candidates can stand for election. In the next election, women will stand in three other villages (S. M. Rai et al. 2006). However, Bangladesh has secured certain territories for women with reserved seats and women can contest for election as much as they can (Panday 2013). Finally, the wards for the reserved seats for women are similar to constituencies of members in general seats in the Gram Panchayat, whereas quota women have constituencies that are three times bigger than the “general seats” in Bangladesh (Panday 2013; S. M. Rai et al. 2006, 229–32). The rotation system has brought many inexperienced women into the Gram Panchayat, while quota women in Bangladesh face difficulties in providing services to three times more numerous populations with limited resources.

Impacts of Quotas on Women in India and Bangladesh

The quota policy has brought some positive changes for women politicians in local government in India and Bangladesh. Reserved seats in India increased the number of women leaders (Bhavnani 2009; Pande and Ford 2011), enhanced women’s interests in providing public goods and services (Deininger et al. 2011; Priebe 2017), and focused on practical gender needs (Jayal 2006). In Bangladesh, reserved seats increased women’s numbers as candidates and voters in elections (Islam and Islam 2012; Panday 2013), facilitated women’s voices to offer better services to their constituents (Panday 2013), and yielded a qualitative change in women’s roles perception in the Union Parishad (N. Chowdhury 2002). However, although the implementation of reserved seats has produced some positive changes for women in local political spheres, scholars have found several institutional constraints which still debar women members from effective participation in local councils (Panday 2010; S. M. Rai et al. 2006). These are now discussed briefly.

Institutional Challenges Faced by Quota Women in India and Bangladesh

Despite some positive effects, scholars have identified some major institutional weaknesses of quota policy in both countries. In India, scholars have found that the mandate provision for reserved seats to rotate among various electorates has been a continual attempt to devalue women members’ efficiency and limit them from being persuasive in the Gram Panchayat (Buch 2013; Jayal 2006). The political parties do not nominate these women again to contest in elections in their same constituencies since these reserved seats become general seats due to de-reservation (Chathukulam and John 2001, 93–94). In a study into the potentials and pitfalls of increasing participation through decentralization, Bryld (2001, 162–63) found two powerful negative effects of this system. First, historically the question of accountability toward constituents remains unanswered. Because of the de-reservation pattern, elected representatives would be reluctant to fulfill the demands of the voters, as they know that they would not be re-elected in the next election. Second, the problem at the time was related to wasted “asset and investment.” Quota women took time to acquire and understand the rules and regulations of the Panchayat affairs, but this rotational system prevented them from applying their acquired experiences in the next election. Jayal (2006, 27) discovered that the relationship between state bureaucracy and new Panchayats in some states has been unclear and ambiguous. He found that bureaucratic officers were likely to dominate elected representatives due to their higher education, permanent jobs, and expertise in procedures and administrative experience. The elected male representatives did hesitate to talk to state bureaucrats; elected women members were usually more reluctant. The state bureaucrats take all of the decisions regarding Panchayats issues and the Panchayats only follow the directions of the bureaucracy regarding the worthy receivers for various schemes. The state bureaucrats even allocate the funds and resources. Some studies (Ban and Rao 2008; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004) have argued that, due to a partisan election policy, political parties have brought elderly, uneducated, and politically inexperienced women to the Gram Panchayat who represent the interests of powerful elites, local-level politicians, and men of societies. Some other scholars (Baviskar 2002; S. M. Rai et al. 2006) have found that, historically, perhaps the most mystifying aspect of Panchayat functioning, for women representatives, is that of financial resources, and many women confess to being very unconfident about financial matters. In the past, members of Panchayat in India received between Rs five and five (from US$0.066 to 0.66) as a “sitting allowance” for attending a meeting (S. M. Rai et al. 2006).

In Bangladesh, each Union Parishad is divided into nine seats, which are termed as “general seats.” Men and women have an equal opportunity to stand for election in these general seats. Furthermore, these nine wards are divided into three larger wards, which are known as “reserved seats.” Women can contest against women only in reserved seats. Even though there are no statutory obstructions to women standing for election in nine general wards, very few women contest due to socio-cultural and economic drawbacks and even fewer are elected to those seats.⁵ Therefore, in most cases, men contest against men for nine general seats and become members of the Union Parishad. Consequently, elected women members represent constituencies that are three times larger than those the male members do, and the proportion of male and female members stands at a 3:1 ratio (Begum 2012). Scholars have found that this unequal distribution of reserved seats quota policy could not ensure women members’ effective participation in the Union Parishad (Begum 2012; Panday 2013; Prodip 2015). Other studies have argued that lack of adequate resource distribution among the members in general seats and reserved seats limits women’s meaningful participation in the Union Parishad (see, for example, F. D. Chowdhury 2013 and Sogra 2008). Although women members represent bigger electorates than the male members represent, they obtain the same amount of remuneration as the male members (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004; Sogra 2008). Within this small amount, women members cannot maintain close relations with their larger constituencies (F. D. Chowdhury 2013). A group of scholars have observed that the Union Parishad’s guidelines do not provide any specific role, power, and authority to women members to address the problems and prospects of three-times lager electorates than those powers and responsibilities allocated to members elected to general seats (F. D. Chowdhury 2009; Khan and Ara 2006; Rahman and Khan 2018).

The above discussion gives the impression that, although India and Bangladesh adopted reserved seats to promote women in politics, their institutional quota designs are dissimilar enough. Additionally, while quota provisions have offered an avenue for women to enter into formal politics, the institutional design of quotas has further restricted them from participating in the decision-making process in local councils in India and Bangladesh. Therefore, this study aims to contribute to this knowledge of gender and politics from a comparative perspective.

Research Design and Methodology

A qualitative research strategy is adopted in this study. Qualitative research provides researchers well-grounded sources of rich data (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 2014, cited in Austin and Sutton 2014, 436). Research ethics (approval number HE18-165 was granted on July 1, 2018 by the Human Research Ethics Committee).

Selection of Respondents

Nadia district in West Bengal in India and Rajshahi district in Rajshahi division in Bangladesh were chosen as study areas. These two study areas have similar administrative evolution, the same cultures and languages, and, as such, are significant sites to research as these can represent the familiar features of India and Bangladesh. In total, 84 respondents were selected for this study. Three elected women members from the reserved seats of each Gram Panchayat and three Gram Panchayats from each of the two Panchayat Samiti⁶ of Nadia were approached for interviews: 18 elected women members in total. Similarly, three elected women members of each Union Parishad and three Union Parishads from each of the two Upazilas⁷ of Rajshahi district were chosen for interviews: again, a total of 18 elected women members. In total, there were 36 participants that were elected women members from Nadia and Rajshahi districts. As well, 48 key informant interviews were conducted to elicit the informants’ expert opinion regarding institutional constraints on women members’ activities in the Gram Panchayat and the Union Parishad.⁸ The sample sizes and study sites are presented in Table 1. More information on the respondents can be found in the Appendix.

Table 1.

Sample Size and Study Sites.^a

Types of respondents	Data collection method	Number of respondents	Study sites
Elected women members	Semi-structured interviews	18	Nadia, West Bengal, India
Elected women members	Semi-structured interviews	18	Rajshahi, Bangladesh
Elected male chairperson	Key informant interviews	5×2 = 10	Nadia, West Bengal, India and Rajshahi, Bangladesh
Elected female chairperson	Key informant interviews	5×2 = 10	Nadia, West Bengal, India and Rajshahi, Bangladesh
Elected male members	Key informant interviews	5×2 = 10	Nadia, West Bengal, India and Rajshahi, Bangladesh
Local women politicians	Key informant interviews	3×2 = 06	Nadia, West Bengal, India and Rajshahi, Bangladesh
Local government officers	Key informant interviews	2×2 = 04	Nadia, West Bengal, India and Rajshahi, Bangladesh
Officials of women’s organizations	Key informant interviews	2×2= 04	India and Bangladesh
Academics	Key informant interviews	2×2 = 04	India and Bangladesh

5 × 2 means each of five from Gram Panchayat and Union Parishad.

Data Collection and Analysis

Primary data were collected through semi-structured and in-depth, key informant interviews (see Appendix for details). Informed consent was taken from the respondents and pseudonyms were used to protect their privacy and anonymity. Interviews were conducted in the Bengali language in both countries and the 74 interviews were translated into English.⁹ Obtained answers of participants were coded in the same category, and then themes were constructed concerning the literature review and objective of this study. Data analysis was performed through conversation analysis (Damico, Oelschlaeger, and Simmons-Mackie 1999). Conversation analysis helps researchers to catch usual interplays between respondents as broadly as possible (Bloor and Wood 2006, 2).

Findings from the Field

The findings are presented in three broad categories: the masculine model of politics, lack of political party support, and lack of financial resources.

The Masculine Model of Politics

In India, this study identified three major structural deficiencies that prevented quota women from performing their jobs effectively. These are as follows: the inclusion of the ex-officio members, the rotational system, and the relationship between the Gram Panchayat and bureaucracy. All of these strengthen men’s power, roles, and domination of politics at the local level and can be linked therefore to the masculine model of politics. First, the most mystifying aspect of the masculine model of politics is the provision of including of the ex-officio members in the Gram Panchayat in West Bengal. Besides elected representatives, Panchayat Samiti members are also the ex-officio members of the Gram Panchayat. By default, the elected members of the Panchayat Samiti become members in the Gram Panchayat. These members are officially termed as “ex-officio members” (Bakshi 2011, 204). They are usually known as higher-level political leaders than the members of the Gram Panchayat are. In most cases, they hold the posts of secretary, vice-president, or president of All India Trinamool Congress in Block level. They have voting rights in all kinds of decisions taken by the Gram Panchayat, except selecting the Pradhan and Upa-Pradhan.¹⁰ Of the 16 interviewed, 13 women members said that Panchayat Samiti members nominated members (male and female) to be elected in elections in the Gram Panchayat. The ex-officio members have significant influence on the decision-making process, as they are upper-level politicians. They run the office on behalf of their parties. They disperse responsibilities among the elected representatives, distribute projects, and development funds and decide who would be the members of five Upa-Samiti.¹¹ The ex-officio members are mostly men and known as “Dada” (Big Brother), as noted by a woman member:

All elected members are entirely dependent on Dada, and he determines the roles and functions of the Gram Panchayat regardless of whatever is said in the Panchayat manual. Our Dada is the President of the All India Trinamool Congress in Block level. Nobody dares to challenge his supremacy. Women members do not hold any power to take independent decisions. (WMIND04)

Another woman member explained how she had been excluded from the Upa-Samiti over five years:

Several times, I have expressed my interest to the council meetings to be the Sanchalak (president) of Upa-Samitis. However, I did not get the position. Even I have not been a member of Upa-Samitis. Dada decided who would be the Sanchalak and member of Upa-Samiti. He not only determines the positions of committee but also decides each matter in the Gram Panchayat. (WMIND 05)

The academics interviewed agree that the inclusion of the ex-officio members has created leadership hierarchy in the Gram Panchayat. As higher-level political leaders than the Gram Panchayats’ elected members, they try to establish absolute control over each matter. An academic reported,

The present structure of Panchayat Raj Institutes (PRIs) reflects the leadership hierarchy in West Bengal. When Panchayat Samiti members come to the Gram Panchayat, they try to control all affairs. It is assumed that they have better relations with the higher-level politicians; thereby, they exercise much power than the members of the Gram Panchayat. Hence, women members face serious male domination and do not continue their natural functions. (ACIND02)

The second institutional deficiency identified is the rotational system. It is important to note that the practice of rotational system in West Bengal is quite different from other states of India. The state government of West Bengal applied reservation for two terms in 2013 and this means that reservations for women will be de-reserved after ten years. All elected women members said that they were elected as members for second terms due to the two terms reservation system.¹² However, these women members also reported that the two terms rotational system does not guarantee that a woman can secure nomination for a second term. A woman member explained how the rotational system expelled an experienced woman Pradhan from the Gram Panchayat:

The previous Gram Panchayat’s Pradhan of my nearest constituency is now running a small business. Due to caste reservation, she was elected as member and Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat in 2013. However, the political party did not consider her to run for 2018 election (WMIND02).

Women members further explained how they have secured their nominations and been elected as members for the second term, as reported by a woman member:

My husband was the elected member of the Gram Panchayat from 2008 to 2013. Due to seats reservation, he could not stand for elections in 2013. One day he came from outside and told me that “you would stand for election instead of me.” He has very good relationship with the party leaders. In this way, he managed my nomination for two consecutive terms. (WMIND03)

A number of interviewees reported that two terms reservation did not bring any significant changes to the Gram Panchayat. They assumed that when reservations are finished, political parties do not consider those women in general seats and give priority to males to stand for election. Thus, an experienced woman lost her position in politics and become an ordinary woman. One of the academics said,

Due to rotation, women who would serve Gram Panchayat for ten years would have lost their positions when it becomes general seats. Previous experience indicated that political parties never consider them as candidates in general seats. It is clearly gendered political discrimination. (ACIND01)

Another academic further explained why two terms reservation could not bring substantial changes for women:

The rotational system primarily established male dominance in the Gram Panchayat. It is observed that the majority of women members have secured nominations and become the members for their husbands. Their husbands managed nominations and campaigned for elections. These women members act as proxies for their husbands. (ACIND02)

The final (or third) structural deficiency found was the relationship between the Gram Panchayat and the Block Development Office (BDO) which is ambiguous to elected members of the Gram Panchayat. The Block Development Officer is the ex-officio of the Gram Panchayat in West Bengal. Thus, the BDO officer has much control and dominance over the Gram Panchayat. The BDO officer mainly decides and approves the final work plan and financial issues. Of the 16 women members interviewed, ten said that the BDO officer helps them in their roles and responsibilities rather than creating obstacles. But they could not explain how the BDO helps with their activities. Six women members reported that their BDO officer is not helpful. They said that the BDO directs the Gram Panchayat how to implement different programs, as explained by a woman member:

We send our annul plan to the BDO officer after identifying the problems of the Gram Panchayat. In most cases, our proposals were not considered as the BDO finally determined the annual work plan and disburses financial resources for the Gram Panchayat. (WMIND10)

A woman Pradhan (Chairperson) further explained,

We prioritize our work plan through the Ward Shava meeting. Each year we call two Ward Shava meetings. Male and female citizens attend meetings and raise their problems and needs. Based on their demands, we prioritize the major issues of our Gram Panchayat and make a work plan to send to the BDO. However, the BDO officer takes the final decision. We do not have any scope to say “no” to the BDO officer. (FCPIND01)

Interviewees also said that the BDO has much control over Gram Panchayat, believing that this is because the recent West Bengal government has centralized the power of local governance. For example, previously, Panchayat Samiti members were in charge of monitoring the Ward Shava of the Gram Panchayat. The government has vested this power to the BDO instead of Panchayat Samiti member. As members of the Gram Panchayat (male and female members) do not have much education, they do not understand the dominance of the BDO. One of the academics said,

The BDO can exercise much power on each matter in the Gram Panchayat. Predominantly, they look after the annual work plans and disburse financial matters. When the BDO finally approves the work plan, the members (Pradhan, Upa-Pradhan, male and female members) of the Gram Panchayat do not have any chance to raise any question against his/her decision. Apparently, it seems that quota women can place their demands in the meetings. The question is that: does Gram Panchayat consider their demands and issues? (ACIND01)

In Bangladesh, the most perplexing aspect for women members is the unequal distribution of reserved seats, as quota women represent three times bigger constituencies than the members in general seats. This unequal distribution of reserved seats quota policy has established an everlasting masculine model of politics in the Union Parishad. Of the 17 interviewed, 14 women members argued that they have raised their voice regularly in monthly as well as different committee meetings in attempts to secure the rights of poor people, and to promote women’s interests. However, only three women members in each Union Parishad are not enough to alter the decision in the meeting, while nine male members are mostly united for their interests. They further explained that the chairpersons do not want to give priority to women members as they need only seven votes to pass an issue in the meeting. Thus, the chairpersons convinced at least seven male members for passing agendas. A woman member explained how she was excluded from the decision-making process of project distribution and implementation committees:

Union Parishad has nine male members, while women members are only three. In connection with the chairperson, male members do not want to provide one-third development projects to women members. They always show excuses that women members are not capable enough to deal with project works. (WMBD01)

A male chairperson’s remark further supports these comments:

I need only seven votes to take a decision on any issue. As I can manage seven male members, I do not need to count women members at all. If I do not consider women members’ voices, they do not have any power to create problems in my work. I need to maintain good relations with male members to keep smooth functioning of the Union Parishad. Thus, women members are systematically excluded from the decision-making process. (MCPBD05)

Overall, this study found that the majority of quota women in India suffer from three structural difficulties: the inclusion of ex-officio members, the rotational system, and the relation between the state bureaucracy and the Gram Panchayat, which continue promoting the male nature of politics. In contrast, unequal distribution of reserved seats quota policy made quota women subordinate to male members in the Union Parishad in Bangladesh.

Lack of Political Party Support

This study finds that the partisan election policy has negative consequences on women member’s activities in the Gram Panchayat in India, which is not the case in Bangladesh.¹³ Of the 16 women members interviewed, twelve said that they did not have prior experience in politics before coming to the local councils. To fulfill the mandate of the constitution, party politicians brought them either directly or by their husbands to the Gram Panchayat and, thereby, tried to control them after successful elections. A woman member said,

As we came here through political parties, we usually listen to our party leaders. I observed that the majority of women members who are elected to the Gram Panchayat are politically inexperienced and uneducated. Political party leaders choose these women for controlling them easily. (WMIND09)

Another woman member explained why party leaders choose inexperienced women as candidates in elections:

The party politicians need to nominate 50 percent of women in elections to fill the requirement of the state government. Party leaders found it difficult to nominate experienced women for two reasons. First, it is tough to appoint a huge number of experienced women at the local level. Second, the majority of male members who lost their positions due to seat de-reservation, they managed party leaders for their wives to be nominated in elections. When they are elected to the Gram Panchayat, they do not have any option rather listening to their husbands and party leaders. In most cases, it is evident that women members argue for the interests of their husbands and party leaders. (WMIND10)

Interviews with the BDO officers revealed similar responses to her comments:

As we observe, the majority of women members are not politically sound. Even they fear to talk in meetings publicly. Predominantly, political leaders nominated these women for establishing absolute control over them. Women members follow their leaders’ direction and act as dolls. (GOIND01; GOIND02)

The finding here is that partisan elections have resulted in negative consequences for quota women in India, whereas Bangladeshi women do not experience any problems, as members (general and reserved seats) are not elected from party lists.

Lack of Power and Resources

As previously noted, lack of power and resources is another institutional barrier that quota women face in their work in political offices. In India, this study found that quota women could not perform their affairs effectively due to having limited resources. The elected representatives of the Gram Panchayat still receive a very low honorarium: Rs. 150 (about US$2) per month. Women members reported that they need to manage mobile costs and pocket money in order to come to the office regularly. It becomes hard to meet these expenses with a limited allowance, so dependence on their husbands becomes necessary, as reported by a woman member:

Although I have a bicycle to go to Panchayat, I often go to many places to provide services to people. I cannot ride bicycle all the time. Thus, I need to manage transportation costs. Besides, I have to manage mobile costs and pocket money. I do not have any option, rather depending on my husband. (WMIND10)

Women members further stated that poor people often come to them to ask for financial help for arranging social ceremonies, such as weddings for sons or daughters, sports, and worship. Without money, it is difficult to meet people’s demands as stated by another woman member:

I receive only Rs. 150 (about US$2) per month as a “sitting allowance” for attending a monthly meeting. Many people often come to me to provide a certain amount of money on many occasions including wedding, worship, and sports. People do not understand that we do not have much money. They assume that we receive a huge amount of money from the government. I often cannot donate a certain amount for social ceremonies. (WMIND06)

In Bangladesh, this study found that the majority of quota women could not perform their activities effectively due to a lack of enough power and resources. Of the 17 interviewed women members, eleven said that there is no difference in terms of prestige, position, power, and authority between members in general seats and quota women—although quota women represent a population that is three times higher. Male members often used this unequal status as a weapon for not offering an equal share of projects to women members. A woman member said, “Although women members represent three-times bigger constituencies than male members, the post, position, and honorarium are equal to one member in general seats. Therefore, male members do not respect us at all” (WMBD01).

These women further said that male members do not respect them, as they do not have any specific roles and functions. Women members do not know what to do after being elected as members. A woman member who has 15 years’ long political career in the Union Parishad talked in this regard:

The main question is: what is the business for quota women in the Union Parishad? There is no clear guidance regarding the roles and regulations of women members. What will they do here? Which work should they do? As they do not have specific jobs here, the majority of male members do not respect them. (WMBD07)

Lack of power also comes from the unclear provisions of the Union Parishad. For example, the local government Act of 2009 states that 33 percent of the post of chairpersons of project committees would be provided to women members in reserved seats. However, it does not provide any indication of how project committees would run, and development projects would be implemented. A woman member, who has 25 consecutive years of experience as a member, explained how they were barred from working in the project distribution and implementation committees:

The act states that one-third of the project’s chair must be provided to quota women. Union Parishad can usually do only one project once a year. We are twelve members, and each of them has the right to do the projects. Though the Union Parishad assigns a project to one woman member, the other two of them will also be deprived. From my long political career, I have observed that one member can do only one project within five years of tenure. (WMBD09)

It is also found that the inaccurate provision of standing committees further instigates women’s limited power to work in the Union Parishad. The Local Government Act of 2009 (Section 45) states that one-third of positions of chairs of standing committees would be reserved for women members. There is an intellectual gap in this provision. The Union Parishad has 13 standing committees where the committee of law and order is reserved for the chairperson. The remaining twelve committees would be chaired by elected members in general and reserved seats. If women members receive one-third of the positions of chairs as stated by the law, the number of standing committees would be four. However, there is also a provision that one member cannot be chair of more than one committee. Therefore, women members have become members of three committees.

This study finds another significant issue in Bangladesh is the unequal resource distribution among the members in general and reserved seats. Quota women receive the same amount of honorarium, 8,000 BDT (about US$95) per month, although they represent constituencies that are three times bigger than the members represent in the general seats. Eleven women members said that, although the honorarium of male and female members is equal, they could not fulfill the demands of the citizens of their bigger areas. “I deal with three time’s higher population than male members. Many people come to me for various reasons and ask for financial help. However, I could not help them” (WMBD16). Another woman member stated: “People invite me to attend various programs such as marriage, sports, and cultural ceremonies. Some people also come to me for treatment costs. I cannot manage [this] with a little amount of honorarium” (WMBD17).

It is evident that quota women in both countries face serious financial crises in their political activities. However, the causes of financial catastrophe are different in India than in Bangladesh. Moreover, quota women in Bangladesh are unable to function well due to having inaccurate provisions of different committees. This is not the case in India.

Discussion

This study re-examines the claims by Ghosh (2003), Jayal (2006), Kudva (2003), and Abou-Zeid (2006) that women who enter formal political structures through gender quotas are expected to suffer from institutional constraints concerning their effective participation and empowerment in the decision-making process. This study explores the experiences of institutional constraints of quota women in their performances at the lowest level of rural local government, in the Gram Panchayat in India and in the Union Parishad in Bangladesh. Enough support has been found for this claim; the results reconfirm that quota women are still facing institutional constraints on their political affairs in local councils in both countries.

The majority of quota women suffer from some major institutional constraints with regard to their political participation and empowerment in India and Bangladesh. This study has found that the following all have a negative associations with quota women in both countries: the masculine model of politics, lack of political party support, and lack of power and resources. However, causes within the three measures are significantly different from country to country. In India, the masculine model of politics is strongly fortified due to three distinct structural difficulties: the provision of including ex-officio members, the rotational system, and the relationship between the Gram Panchayat and bureaucracy. Inclusion of the ex-officio members has increased male domination as these members determine the nomination of members (male and female) and regulate the programs in the Gram Panchayat. They decide who would do what, how projects funds would be distributed, and how Upa-Samiti would work; thus, quota women have a very limited scope to contribute to the decision-making process. The rotation system creates barriers to quota women in the Gram Panchayat (Bryld 2001; Buch 2013; Chathukulam and John 2001; Jayal 2006), although the rotational system is applied for two terms in West Bengal. The rotational system provided spaces to quota women’s husbands to play significant roles in the Gram Panchayat. Furthermore, experienced women were not considered for elections, even though they had a chance to be nominated. The relationship between the BDO and Gram Panchayat is still unclear to quota women (Jayal 2006). As the BDO takes the final decision about the annual work plan and financial issues, quota women have very limited chance to work for their constituents.

In relation to Bangladesh, the masculine model of politics is strengthened due to the incidence of the unequal distribution of reserved seats quota policy, which has resulted in significant male domination over women members (Begum 2012; F. D. Chowdhury 2013; Panday 2013; Prodip 2015). Due to this unequal status, the majority of quota women are deprived of projects and unable to raise their voices in monthly meetings and different committees in order to offer services to local people and women. It is evident that, fearful of losing control over authority, the chairperson and male members do not want to give space to women members to talk in the decision-making process.

Lack of political support is another institutional constraint on women in India as partisan based elections mandate political parties to nominate women on reserved seats (Ban and Rao 2008; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). However, this is not evident in Bangladesh as elections of members (general seats and reserved seats) are not partisan in nature. Party leaders nominate inexperienced women to be elected to the Gram Panchayat for at least three reasons: the unavailability of a huge number of experienced women, or because they are influenced by the male politicians who lost their positions due to the rotational system, and/or to establish absolute control over quota women after successful elections. Therefore, these inexperienced women represent the interests of their party leaders or their husbands (male politicians).

Lack of power and resources is also a dominant institutional drawback that limits effective functions of quota women (Jayal 2006). The results indicate that the power and authority of members (general and reserved seats) are the same in the Gram Panchayat in India, whereas quota women in Bangladesh seriously suffer from lack of enough power and authority to address the problems and issues of their constituents. Quota women in Bangladesh do not have any particular power and responsibility to contend with the problems of constituencies that are three times bigger. Lack of power further comes from the unclear and faulty provisions of different committees where women have mandatory representation. Significantly, quota women in both countries face a serious scarcity of resources in their activities. Quota women in India receive too small an amount to meet citizens’ demands, whereas quota women in Bangladesh are unable to meet the demands of the three-times higher populations within the same honorarium that are offered to general seat members.

It is significant that the provision of including ex-officio members is a debilitating institutional norm that has created serious male supremacy over women members in the Gram Panchayat. Furthermore, a rotational system has reinforced male domination and proxies in India. In the case of Bangladesh, it should be asked why quota women need different policies regarding their roles, power, responsibilities, and financial resources, as their statuses are equal to general seats’ members. The explanation is that women members represent three-times bigger constituencies than the members do in general seats. It is therefore vital to provide different status, roles, power, and resources to women members in order for them to attend to their constituents’ problems. Another important issue is that the causes that lead to institutional constraints in India and Bangladesh are different. The explanation is that, although both countries have implemented the same strategy to promote more women in local politics, their institutional designs are different.

This study found much evidence to support the previous studies that quota women face institutional barriers in their legislative activities (Abou-Zeid 2006; Ghosh 2003; Jayal 2006; Kudva 2003). This study sought to re-examine the claim that quota women face institutional constraints and has identified three types of institutional barriers: the masculine model of politics, lack of political party support, and lack of power and resources that restricted quota women from performing their jobs effectively. It found that the provision of including ex-officio members in the Gram Panchayat is a new contribution to the literature on gender and politics. The presence of ex-officio members in decision-making processes has resulted in a severe form of masculine politics.

Conclusion

This study re-examined the claim that quota women face institutional constraints on their political participation and empowerment in local councils in India and Bangladesh. In other words, I investigated and analyzed how institutional norms and designs work as barriers to quota women’s performances in local councils in India and Bangladesh through a comparative perspective. By explaining three categories of institutional obstacles—the masculine model of politics, lack of political party support, and lack of power and resources—the results reconfirm that although India and Bangladesh set out gender quotas (reserved seats) to include more women in politics, institutional constraints further exclude quota women from their effective participation in the decision-making process to provide services to their citizens in general, and women in particular. The dissimilar institutional norms and policies in both countries are designed according to male standards and values to sustain male interests instead of expanding the ability of quota women to choose capitals and to raise their voices to effect decision-making process in order to provide resources (public goods and services) to their people (particularly women). As a result, women’s political empowerment through reserved seats in both countries remains questionable. Further institutional reforms are vital to ensure women’s political empowerment through breaking the politics of men’s standards and values in local councils in India and Bangladesh.

Footnotes

Appendix

Respondent Information.

Respondents’ Id	Category of respondents	Country	City	Name of local councils/organizations	Interview’s date
WMBD01	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Belpukuriya	16.11.2018
WMBD02	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Belpukuriya	11.11.2018
WMBD03	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Belpukuriya	13.11.2018
WMBD04	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Puthiya	02.01.2019
WMBD05	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Puthiya	03.01.2019
WMBD06	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Puthiya	05.02.2019
WMBD07	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Silmaria	04.11.2018
WMBD08	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Silmaria	01.11.2018
WMBD09	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Silmaria	29.10.2018
WMBD010	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Harian	24.10.2018
WMBD011	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Harian	25.10.2018
WMBD012	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Harian	05.08.2018
WMBD013	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Darshan Para	04.12.2018
WMBD014	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Darshan Para	05.02.2019
WMBD015	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Darshan Para	02.12.2018
WMBD016	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Hujuri Para	09.10.2018
WMBD017	Women Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Hujuri Para	10.10.2018
MMBD01	Male Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Belpukuriya	06.01.2019
MMBD02	Male Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Silmaria	18.11.2018
MMBD03	Male Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Harian	25.07.2018
MMBD04	Male Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Hujuri Para	14.10.2018
MMBD05	Male Member	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Darshan Para	10.10.2018
MCPBD01	Male Chairperson	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Belpukuriya	06.11.2018
MCPBD02	Male Chairperson	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Silmaria	25.11.2018
MCPBD03	Male Chairperson	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Harian	24.07.2018
MCPBD04	Male Chairperson	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Hujuri Para	13.10.2018
MCPBD05	Male Chairperson	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Darshan Para	10.10.2018
FCPBD01	Female Chairperson	Bangladesh	Bagerhat	Raripara	25.09.2018
FCPBD02	Female Chairperson	Bangladesh	Bagerhat	Fakirhat	23.09.2018
FCPBD03	Female Chairperson	Bangladesh	Bagerhat	Teligati	27.09.2018
FCPBD04	Female Chairperson	Bangladesh	Bagerhat	Shontoshpur	25.09.2018
LWPBD01	Local Women Politician	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Bangladesh Awami League	28.01.2019
LWPBD02	Local Women Politician	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Bangladesh Nationalist Party	05.02.2019
ACBD01	Academic	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	Department of Public Administration, Rajshahi University	24.11.2018
ACBD02	Academic	Bangladesh	Dhaka	Department of Public Administration, Dhaka University	10.01.2019
GOBD01	Deputy Director Local Government	Bangladesh	Rajshahi	District Level Office of Local Government, Rajshahi	03.01.2019
NGOBD01	Acting Executive Director	Bangladesh	Dhaka	Democracy Watch	11.09.2018
NGOBD02	Training Co-ordinator	Bangladesh	Dhaka	Democracy Watch	11.09.2018
WMIND01	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Tatla 1	12.12.2018
WMIND02	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Tatla 1	12.12.2018
WMIND03	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Tatla 2	15.12.2028
WMIND04	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Tatla 2	15.12.2028
WMIND05	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Tatla 2	15.12.2028
WMIND06	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Silinda 1	16.12.2018
WMIND07	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Silinda 1	16.12.2018
WMIND08	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Nokari	14.12.2018
WMIND09	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Nokari	14.12.2018
WMIND10	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Nokari	14.12.2018
WMIND11	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Baidyapur	20.12.2018
WMIND12	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Baidyapur	20.12.2018
WMIND13	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Baidyapur	20.12.2018
WMIND14	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Shyamnagar	18.12.2018
WMIND15	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Shyamnagar	18.12.2018
WMIND16	Women Member	India	Kalyani	Shyamnagar	18.12.2018
MMIND01	Male member	India	Kalyani	Tatla 2	14.12.2018
MMIND02	Male member	India	Kalyani	Silinda 1	17.12.2018
MMIND03	Male member	India	Kalyani	Nokari	17.12.2018
MMIND04	Male member	India	Kalyani	Baidyapur	13.12.2018
MMIND05	Male member	India	Kalyani	Tatla 1	13.12.2018
MCPIND01	Male Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Tatla 2	18.12.2018
MCPIND02	Male Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Silinda 1	22.1.2018
MCPIND03	Male Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Nokari	20.12.2018
MCPIND04	Male Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Baidyapur	20.12.2018
FCPIND01	Female Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Tatla 2	17.12.2018
FCPIND02	Female Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Silinda 1	17.12.2018
FCPIND03	Female Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Nokari	14.12.2018
FCPIND04	Female Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Baidyapur	20.12.2018
FCPIND05	Female Chairperson	India	Kalyani	Tatla 1	20.12.2018
LWPIND01	Local Women Politician	India	Kalyani	All India Trinamool Congress	13.12.2018
LWPIND02	Local Women Politician	India	Kalyani	All India Trinamool Congress	12.12.2018
ACIND01	Academic	India	Kalyani	B. R. Ambedkar Institute of Panchayats And Rural Development	19.12.2018
ACIND02	Academic	India	Kolkata	Department of Political Science, Rabindra Bharati University	08.10.2018
BDOIND01	Block Development Officer	India	Kalyani	Block Development Office, Chakdaha	14.12.2018
BDOIND02	Block Development Officer	India	Kalyani	Block Development Office, Ranaghat	20.12.2018

Notes

About the Author

Mahbub Alam Prodip is an Associate Professor in the Public Administration Department at the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh. He is currently pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in Peace Studies at the University of New England, Australia. His research interests are gender, politics and empowerment, gender and violence, political violence and good governance, and health and education of refugee children. His recent research entitled “Cultural Obstacles to Women’s Political Empowerment in India and Bangladesh: A Comparative Perspective,” has been published by the Asian Journal of Comparative Politics (January 2021).

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