The Biden Administration: An Opportunity to Affirm a Flexible and Adaptive American World Leadership

Abstract

Spanish

Chinese

The article develops a strategic framework to redefine American international leadership under the Biden administration. While the decline of the American-led order is not a new trend, it has been accelerated under the Trump administration, which focused on domestic policies and left the global stage in disarray. The challenges are many for the new president, and many pressures can already be felt. Biden’s administration is under high expectations to stabilize the international system and deal with the many issues that the world faces: economic recovery, COVID-19, climate change, cybersecurity, and relations with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, to name but a few. Yet, while the Biden presidency is—wrongly—understood as “U.S. back to normal,” the international stage has evolved. The article thus argues that restoring American world leadership means modifying that leadership and adapting it to the new reality. Building on management theories and the English School of international relations theories, the research presents a theoretical framework for reinventing and reconstructing a new form of leadership. It then applies the resulting strategic design to the Biden administration’s objectives and policies in the form of seven strategic recommendations. Ultimately, the article explains how the United States can remain world leader by acknowledging the current global situation and adopting a pragmatic vision of international affairs.

Keywords

United States President Biden World Leadership Modifying the American-led World Order Geopolitics Geoeconomics American Hegemony International Relations Biden Administration Pragmatic Vision Sino-American-Russian Rivalry Pandemic COVID-19

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the international order under the aegis of the United States has wavered; with COVID-19, this decline is confirmed. Instead of solidarity, mutual aid, and empathy, the COVID-19 crisis has marked the deep-rooted tendencies of mistrust of the other and identity-based withdrawal characterized by strong nationalism and tinged with populism. The mentalities of besieged citadels, which governed decision-making processes during the pandemic, confirm that tensions between great powers are currently structuring the international order. In a globalized world, great powers should be the ones providing leadership, organizing crisis response, and providing aid; yet since November 2019, they have behaved in the opposite way. Rather than provoking a surge of international solidarity, the pandemic has highlighted deep-rooted nationalist tendencies and identity retrenchments that have been sweeping the world over the past decade. Two examples are particularly illustrative. First, the “war for masks” that broke out in early 2020 was based on countries either jealously guarding their stockpile even though their neighbors had more urgent needs, or stealing masks between countries; and second, the development of a vaccine for COVID-19 is more similar to an arms race or the space race than anything else. In that sense, the symbolic name given to their vaccine by the Russians, Sputnik-V, is particularly illustrative. A critical lesson to be drawn from 2020–2021 is that the current crises surrounding the pandemic will strengthen, rather than ease, tensions between the major powers; it may even accelerate skirmishes, proxy wars, and ultimately lead to wars that do not bear their name.

Overall, there has been a tendency by the great powers to put international cooperation on the back burner by focusing more on crisis management at the national rather than the global level. The current crisis has only strengthened the Sino-American-Russian rivalry. Furthermore, although both Beijing and Washington aspire to global leadership, it seems unlikely that we will see an American retreat, or that the Chinese frontloading of solidarity would help strengthen other countries’ confidence.

Fallen Hopes

At the end of the Cold War, with Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) “end of history” thesis, democracy and free trade were understood to be the future, and the Western model would conquer the world. If the end of the Cold War was indeed characterized by a “unipolar moment” as defined by Charles Krauthammer (1990/1991), this period is well and truly over, and the COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced and accelerated worrying trends, thus rendering the liberal order in its present form obsolete and outdated.

First, democracies are retreating while authoritarian tendencies are resurfacing. In 2020, “the number of Free countries in the world reached its lowest level since the beginning of a 15-year period of global democratic decline, while the number of ‘Not Free’ countries reached its highest level” (Freedom House 2021). In this regard, Larry Diamond (2015) talks about a “democratic recession.” The fact that the liberal world order is in disarray, a tendency confirmed by the pandemic, opens the door to many competitive, mostly populist, ideologies and alternative cognitive frameworks. Moscow and Beijing have understood these tendencies, using the opportunity to wage information wars against democracies over the management of the health crisis while extolling the merits of authoritarian systems (Struye de Swielande and Orinx 2020, 53–58). Second, as the international economy is being hit hard by the economic and social consequences of the pandemic, the coming economic recession is likely to accelerate inward-looking economic models (isolationism, protectionism). This will likely reinforce doubts about the benefits of globalization, especially because many countries were only beginning to bounce back from the 2008 financial crisis. Third, the pandemic also supports an economic and political shift in the redistribution of power toward non-Western countries and a more polycentric world, with regional centers of power developing around the world. Fourth, multilateral institutions and organizations have either been conspicuously absent in this crisis (e.g., the United Nations [UN] Security Council) or heavily criticized (such as the World Health Organization). Finally, as already mentioned, the pandemic confirms a crisis of authority and leadership on the part of the major powers.

Thus, while Western powers dominated international relations in past centuries, the contemporary era is characterized by the return of great powers, competition. While it is not synonymous with war and does not exclude cooperation in areas of common interest, it is inherently more conflictual. First, the main competition takes place between the United States and competitors such as China and Russia. Second, discord between the major powers is also reflected at the regional level between regional powers, affecting the systemic level because of patron–client relations (e.g., China–Pakistan, United States–Israel) and the involvement of the former in regional dynamics and/or proxy wars. Third, if the military balance remains a significant issue (proxy wars, hybrid warfare, alliances), geoeconomics become equally critical. Fourth, the rivalry is also situated at the level of norms and values. Indeed, the rules upon which the international system is based are those established after the Second World War by the United States, through the UN and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among other things. These norms have never been, or are no longer, accepted not only by U.S. competitors such as Russia or China, but also by some countries within the European Union (EU; for example, Hungary) or even by the former Trump administration. International relations are increasingly “de-westernized.” Ideological and cultural differences can lead to conflictual approaches at the political, social, economic, security, and military levels. Although Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 22–49) theory of the clash of civilizations is open to criticism, we cannot ignore the fact that civilizations are in a fragile and precarious state of coexistence. American hegemony and the Western liberal order as they have been implemented for the past 30 years are doomed to fail when other countries defend different cultures and traditions. Following Badie’s (2016, 17) questioning, can we govern such a complex world in which people with different histories and cultures coexist?

This brief panorama of cleavages at the international level highlights the fact that the competition will take place on different chessboards (Nye 2011). The point undoubtedly raises concerns about the evolution of international stability. It has become much more difficult for Americans to defend the Pax Americana, and the COVID-19 pandemic is reinforcing, rather than easing, tensions between the major powers. Thus, from a centripetal tendency toward cooperation, we are moving toward a centrifugal force of equilibrium. New rules between the great powers are therefore needed.

The Need to Rethink the International System

The all-out promotion of democracy and human rights since the 1990s has been characterized by numerous failures: the Rwanda genocide; wars in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya; and the non-integration of Russia and China into the Western liberal order, to name but a few.

Confidence in this order has collapsed, leaving the world in systemic chaos and ushering in a leadership vacuum and a crisis of legitimacy against the organizing principles of the order. In short, we are entering a period of rupture with the international order. Two possibilities can be delineated in such a context. The first possible path is to maintain the current course, continuing the head-in-the-sand policy that has characterized the United States and, even more so, Europe for several years, as these two poles of power have avoided acknowledging and adapting to new geopolitical realities and changes in the balance of power. The second possibility is to recognize this period of rupture as an opportunity, inspired by Schumpeter’s (1962) process of creative destruction. This process consists in substituting an old dysfunctional model with a new, more efficient dynamic; it would make it possible to think and shape international relations from a balanced and realistic angle, as is increasingly acknowledged. Notwithstanding the Trump presidency, which caused many upheavals, a return to the status quo ante founded and dominated by the West is ultimately neither realistic nor desirable—nor actually feasible. As returning to the status quo ante is not and cannot be the goal, a more pragmatic order should be the objective. This order needs to be thought of according to Cardinal Richelieu’s indication that “the thing that must be defended and the force that must sustain it must be geometrically proportionate” (Kissinger 1994, 63). In other words, if the liberal democratic subsystem wishes to preserve its internal political model, it must have the necessary power to defend it, and minimize, or counteract, interference and destabilization from outside forces. This objective will be reached in two parallel processes leading to the establishment of two cohabiting models of inter-state relations inspired by the English School in international relations theory: an international society subsystem (characterized by shared values and norms) and an international system (bound by a common set of basic rules). The first model of international society requires maintaining a strong and united liberal democratic pole, tending toward the establishment of a subsystem based on the norms and values defended by liberal democratic countries (the United States, the countries of the EU, Australia, Japan, etc.). The aim is to promote the bond between democracies and like-minded states that adhere to the values and principles of the liberal order (such as democracy and human rights). Such a dynamic of inter-state relations must, however, be refocused on this subsystem only. The second model aims to redefine inter-state relations as a whole, based on a balanced international system that allows for the integration of all (including competitive visions of world order). However, this latest objective can only be achieved by refocusing on Westphalian organizational principles (sovereignty—legal equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state—and the authority of states over their political regime and territory). Normative and ethical issues cannot prevent discussion of major international issues with interlocutors who do not share the same values. As Christopher Layne (2020, 42) explains,

The U.S. would be better advised to take ideology out of the equation and conduct its relationship with China (and Russia) as a traditional great-power rivalry, in which diplomacy aims to manage competition through compromise, conciliation, and the search for common ground. Ideological contests, on the other hand, are zero-sum in nature. If your rival is evil, compromise—indeed, negotiation itself—becomes appeasement.

This return to inter-state relations based on realpolitik emancipates international politics from the moral and normative dilemmas that currently obstruct the management of global problems. Ultimately, the West “will have to learn new rules and play differently in the new world of checks and balances, where others have assets and policies that [the West] does not and cannot control” (Adams 2018). This pluralistic approach is characterized by respect for diversity and the abandonment by Western countries of the desire to expand and impose their norms and values, while continuing to defend and promote them internally.

What we defend here is not an “every man for himself” system in which all blows would be allowed. It is merely a matter of recognizing that (1) the West no longer dominates the world and the values it advocates are not unanimous, far from it; and (2) a disunited West is a weakened West that risks unbalancing power structures. Stabilizing the international order will be reached by returning to the fundamentals of realpolitik in a reflexive process of dialogical thinking, in which complementarities are sought without erasing contradictions (Morin 1982). As the world is “in essence a world of opposing interests and of conflicts among them” where “moral principles can never be fully realized” (Morgenthau 1993, 4–5), it is the “raison du système” that must prevail; that is, “the idea that it is worth (above all) making the system work” (Watson 1992, 14) before imagining a solidarity-based and normative logic of promoting liberal democratic values. Instead of considering diversity as a burden, it should be seen as an opportunity and possible contribution to change; to favor situational rather than dispositional behavior (Heider 1958). Many leaders make a “fundamental attribution error”—the “tendency to insufficiently take into account situational forces when interpreting the behaviors of others” (Brauer and Bourhis 2006, 610). Instead of labeling and stereotyping Russia and China, it is necessary to disregard who the other is and focus on specific situations without having preconceived ideas or prejudices, to negotiate and find common ground. This is the only way for great powers to move forward and find solutions in dossiers such as Syria, Iran, North Korea, or Ukraine. The current ideological approach blinds pragmatic thinking, thus impeding discussions and negotiations on a case-by-case basis. The great powers are thus hindering the possibility to find win–win solutions on the ground. Therefore, the current period of rupture is an opportunity to think differently and to avoid the great powers being labeled as “irresponsible” as Bull (1980, 437–47) did.

New Forms of Leadership

The model depicted above requires leadership. Indeed, notwithstanding the limits of historical analogies, history teaches us that international politics and leadership vacuums cannot cohabit. This means that reflections on any international structure call for a focus on leadership.

The U.S. vision of leadership must undergo a profound redefinition. The practical application of the international system—the second model—materializes in peer leadership, in which the other actors cede authority to the leader on a conditional basis “reserving the right to challenge, ignore or even remove the leader” (Empson 2019). The legitimacy of the leader is central as peer support is essential for the system to correctly function. The United States now has the opportunity to adopt the profile of initiator, role model, or mentor of a peer network with equal authority, power, and responsibility (Baker 2014). This involves guiding and facilitating a rapprochement of equals within a diverse group without explicitly behaving as a leader—a status that would not be granted or recognized by others anyway.

It ultimately translates into system leadership. Held by the most powerful state, today the United States, it requires “skills and capacities, that any organization can use to catalyze, enable and support the process of system-level change” (Dreier, Nabarro, and Nelson 2019, 4). This requires a global vision of the world, acknowledging that the world is multifaceted, interconnected, and constantly in motion (Edmunds, Measure, and Matsunaga 2017) to avoid any fundamental misallocation. System leadership requires trust, patience, empathy, consideration of the other’s point of view, communication, and a focus on common interests. To adopt the role of system leadership, the leader must remain above the fray. It needs to bring states together to discuss shared interests and goals, build trust to move forward, be accountable, be flexible, and agile.

In the international society subsystem, bringing together like-minded states, it is necessary to involve allies and partners in the setting-up and implementation of policies. To this end, the most appropriate form of leadership is collective leadership, which allows for “shared responsibility and decision-making . . . All members are involved in creating the vision and committing themselves to work towards achieving that vision” (O’Neill and Brinkerhoff 2017). Collective leadership is characterized by a multiplicity of perspectives, sharing responsibility, building upon the strengths of others. Eventually, it leads to increased effectiveness, accountability, shared responsibility, sustainability, and leveraging motivation. The powerful actors are those able to enroll, convince, and enlist others into the model. The United States has to make its allies and partners feel part of the strategic process.

From Strategic Design to Practical Application

Building on the theoretical framework outlined above, the second section focuses on the practical application of this model for the Biden administration. Since the economic crisis of 2008–2009, the United States has become aware of the “Lippmann Gap” that characterizes situations in which the engagements of a nation’s foreign policy exceed its power (Lippmann 1943, 7–8). The present situation faced by the United States is that of an overtly hegemonic ambition stemming from a will of expansion based on Manifest Destiny and exceptionalism. Paul Kennedy (1987) conceptualized this idea in his work under the term “imperial overstretch”; the situation results, as I have mentioned elsewhere, “in an exhaustion of resources and power energy, tolling the bell of its domination” (Struye de Swielande 2017, 6).

Furthermore, the world is evolving toward a multipolar system, which the United States, incapable of opposing it, would be well advised to take advantage of. If the United States remains for some time to come “the superpower,” we are slowly moving toward a more equal redistribution of power. The precarious economic situation, the presence of American forces in many theaters of operations, the skepticism of the American population toward the imperial inclinations of certain ideological currents, and so on, all motivate a more selective and managerial foreign policy. The difference between what is strategically important and what is peripheral can only be established with a policy well-calibrated to the national interest. The Biden administration has the opportunity to implement the strategic design presented in the previous point by prioritizing the following seven areas/principles: socio-economic sphere, selective engagement, smart and performative power, transformational leadership, empathy and accountability, pragmatism, and regional pivot and swing states.

It’s the Socio-economic, Stupid

If the United States wants to continue to play an important role on the international scene, it needs to be economically strong. Yet the challenges are immense. The American economy is still greatly handicapped by several structural problems. On top of them stands the recovery from COVID-19. But there are many other challenges. In March 2021, the public debt of the United States was around 28.1 trillion U.S. dollars (Odeo and Boyle 2021). In addition, America still suffers from some socio-economic deficiencies: fragmentation of society, social and racial discrimination, insecurity, a declining educational system (primary and secondary schooling), a looming student debt crisis, and an uneven medical system. Even with the implementation of Obamacare, millions of Americans remain without health insurance (Kendrick 2020). Sixty percent of federal revenues are dedicated to social security—such as the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, and Medicaid (see Struye de Swielande 2017)—as well as to interest on the national debt. It is the American society that is increasingly unequal with colossal fortunes on one end and low income coupled with employment insecurity on the other. In addition, an increasing number of infrastructures are becoming obsolete (Struye de Swielande 2017). This socio-economic fragility has been aggravated by the paralysis of American institutions, the polarization between Democrats and Republicans, and also within the two parties.

Domestically, economic resurgence can be achieved by reconstructing the pillars of economic power: education, infrastructures, new technologies (renewables, semiconductors, cryptocurrency, biotechnology, telecommunications, AI, quantum computers), foreign direct investments, market capitalization, research and development, patent deposits, and economic resilience. Moreover, as Beckley (2011, 67) pointed out and I have iterated before, “what really matters is the technological predominance, a notion understood as the faculty to produce and use relevant, militarily and commercially sustainable innovations. Indeed, it is important nowadays to control the cycle of technological innovation” (Struye de Swielande 2017, 7). These priorities can secure U.S. economic leadership in the long term.

At the international level, a classic hegemonic approach in geoeconomics will prove to be more fruitful and beneficial than Trump’s neomercantilist approach (Wigell 2016, 141–46). While the latter is characterized by a rather competitive/coercive approach, the maximization of economic power, and a national interest defined by economic interests and a zero-sum game, the former emphasizes a win–win approach, cooperative institutional arrangements, and mutual benefits, and guarantees, above all, the supply of public goods. A hegemonic approach will translate into agenda-setting in international organizations and institutions, participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, control of the value chain of new technologies, and economic diplomacy (reinforcing the means of the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, etc.). This approach does not exclude a more neomercantilist approach when necessary.

Selective Engagement

Since the Obama administration, the United States has adopted a less interventionist policy on the international scene. Under Obama, this policy translated into the concepts of nation-building at home and strategic patience; under Trump, it materialized into “America First” and “Make America Great Again.” It is unlikely that a Biden presidency would send large military contingents back to conflictual regions without any provocation or direct stake for the United States. Biden shares with Obama and Trump the idea of putting an end to endless wars with the withdrawal of soldiers from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Reducing the American military footprint in the world can prevent getting entangled in peripheral crises that would require boots on the ground at high cost and that would endanger the economic recovery. That being said, the White House must continue to have a military force capable of decisively influencing the international balance of power while it reassures regional allies and partners of its commitment.

The United States is confronted with the classic butter and gun dilemma and the only strategy that is adapted to this reality is one of selective engagement. Advocates of selective engagement

do start from the premise that U.S. resources are scarce: it is simply impossible to muster sufficient power and will to keep domestic and international peace worldwide, or to preserve the U.S. as the undisputed leader in a unipolar world. (Posen and Ross 1996–1997, 16)

Consequently, selective engagement (see also Art 1998; 79–113; MacDonald and Parent 2011, 7–44; Posen 2014; Posen and Ross 1996–1997, 5–53; Van Evera 1990, 1–51), as James Baker (2016, 2) points out, “recognizes that the U.S. has core interests in the world and must protect them. At the same time, it also acknowledge(s) the reality that (the American) power is limited.” Selective engagement “understand(s) and appreciate(s) the complexity of the real world—a world of hard choices and painful trade-offs”; furthermore, it “avoid(s) both the cynicism of ‘realism’ and the impracticality of ‘idealism’” (Baker 2016, 2). Selective engagement is characterized by the concentration of capacities where it really matters, where it has the biggest impact, where it is essential. This translates into practice by establishing priorities: balance of power, peace among major powers, containment or discriminate interventions in regional conflicts, ethnic conflicts, or humanitarian missions, the preservation of alliances, and the promotion of a divided Eurasia (Posen and Ross 1996–1997, 5–53). The United States needs thus to determine reasonable objectives and reassess them as conditions evolve.

Smart Power and Performative Power

Contrary to the Trump approach of limiting American power to economic and military coercion, Joe Biden will have to deploy the total range of American power capacities. The administration cannot hesitate to use military force if necessary, nor hesitate to resort to economic sanctions, but the incoming president will also need to make use of soft power. Since the arrival of President Trump at the White House, there has been a continuous deliberate effort to deconstruct international and regional institutions and international agreements (exiting the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, undermining the transatlantic relation, defending authoritarian regimes). The Biden administration has to restore the image of the United States, using public diplomacy, nation branding, and investing in international organizations, agencies, and treaties. To maintain a certain influence within international organizations, Washington will have to support initiatives even if they do not directly serve U.S. interests. This would make it easier for the United States to obtain the endorsement of states in other areas that are important to U.S. interests.

The State Department has to be reorganized, refunded, and remotivated after the Trump administration. The fact that China has more diplomatic posts around the world than the United States says a lot. As James Mattis once famously said, “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.” The same applies for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Ultimately, it is about transforming and mobilizing all available capacities. This will only be achieved through “the robustness and effectiveness of a country’s governing institutions to direct the changes needed to transform its potential capability into an actual capability that would determine the outcome of a struggle with other comparably positioned countries” (Tellis et al. 2000, 21). It is what Snider named power performance (see Tellis et al. 2000, 21): the state performance to use resources and actors, which implies ensuring elite and ideological cohesion, securing institutional stability, and avoiding social group fragmentation (ethnic and religious divisions).¹

Transformational Leadership and Commitment with Allies

Because of its relative decline, Washington—now more than ever—needs to rely on its allies. Disavowing partners and allies, as President Trump has done, had a heavy toll on American prestige, reputation, and reliability. Although alliances are never perfect, they are power multipliers. If leaving alliances or partnerships is easy, the cost of reentry or creation is high. If an American president only engages in lecturing allies without explaining the long-term objectives, or without defining a grand strategy so that allies feel part of the project, the United States loses its credibility and status and becomes a toxic leader, leading to resistance and defiance from followers. Furthermore, due to its incapacity to fulfill its role as leader under the Trump administration, the United States gave the opportunity to potential challengers to take the initiative.

Biden will have to shift the policy with allies from a transactional American leadership toward a more transformational one. On one hand, transactional leadership is a process of exchanges analogous to contractual relations in the economic field (Goethals, Sorenson, and Burns 2004, 1558). This leadership style relies on the dyad of rewards and punishments. Moreover, the leader sets the goals without necessarily including the followers, implying effective control by the dominant power over the means of punishment or reward. By contrast, transformational leadership encompasses the motivations and ideas of followers. Theoretically, the leader increases the welfare of all and fulfills a common goal through mutual stimulation and bandwagoning. It not only permits the leader to distribute the costs of leadership among its allies, it similarly propels the allies to the center of the international stage by empowering them with part of the responsibility for international stability, while giving them the means to achieve it: enablement (see Struye de Swielande 2017). To do so, the United States needs to be a reliable partner and uphold its commitments, its allies for their part need also to be less rhetorical about their commitment and stop free riding. In other words, they need to talk the talk and walk the walk. The resulting “burden shifting,” in Layne’s (2012) words, goes beyond burden and risk-sharing: It means “getting other states to do more for their security so the U.S. can do less.”

Empathy and Accountability

The great powers are moving “in the direction of comprehensive confrontation, where every aspect of the relationship—social, economic, diplomatic, military, political—is defined by intensifying rivalry” and “thus risk of miscalculation” (Hass 2018, 2). Great power relations are based on mistrust because of misperceptions and prejudices. A skill that reduces misperceptions is empathy. For White (1986, 58),

empathy means understanding others from the inside looking out, not merely from the outside looking in. Empathy requires us to get inside the skin (as far as this is possible) of the top policy- and decision-makers of actual or potential adversaries and then to imagine what the world would look like through their eyes, as they watch what we do, and through their ears, as they listen to what we say. Only then can we devise a truly effective strategy to change their image of us in such a way as to serve our best interests. Empathy means “being” our actual or potential enemy, at least long enough for analytical purposes. Empathy thus means understanding and studying the political and cultural history, traditions, elites, population, ideologies . . . of the other great powers. (See also Frei 1985, 586–98; Smith 2004, 335–39)

Empathy is a necessity if the United States wants to act as a leader and facilitate some cooperation with China and Russia.

In addition, succeeding presupposes the abandonment of double standards which are all too frequently present in U.S. foreign policy. As the comments of some world leaders attested after the January 2021 storming of the Capitol (see Associated Press 2021), if Washington does not accept to be held accountable, then holding others accountable will be an extremely onerous task. Leadership and accountability are, of course, two sides of the same coin. And “leaders who absolve themselves of any responsibility cannot effectively lead others—with leadership comes responsibility” (Struye de Swielande 2017, 9).

Bismarck and the Systemic Level

Instead of trying to continue to impose the liberal order, Western powers under the leadership of the United States should be more pragmatic with rivals. International relations are increasingly de-Westernized. Could we really have expected China and Russia to “simply hitch (their) wagon to this American-led order and be economically as well as politically transformed” (Heath and Mazarr 2018)?

This acknowledgment of the failure to integrate China and Russia in the liberal order needs to be addressed by the United States and taken into account to build a pragmatic international system together. First, to preserve some kind of leadership, the United States needs to adopt flexible policies to respond to some Chinese, Russian, or others’ demands. Furthermore, labeling these countries as deviant and stereotyping them is counterproductive:

Refusing to acknowledge reality will only generate more tension—and more risk, because failing to accommodate China (and Russia) will destabilize the rules-based order on which the world has come to rely. Instead of clinging to outdated assumptions and rigid ideas, the West should work with China (and Russia) to reform the existing global order in ways that benefit all. Otherwise, Western leaders’ worst fears will be realized. (Yu 2018)

But, as Heath and Mazarr (2018) explain, “the trick is to decide where compromise is acceptable for U.S. interests and to draw clear lines around principles where it is not.” The art of leadership is thus to adapt to the context of a given situation (there is no “one size fits all”).

It is subsequently preferable for the United States to follow the concept of primus inter pares rather than primus solus if it wants to achieve system leadership. This idea of first among equals, or peer leadership, is based on a European system developed by Chancellor Bismarck during the 19th century. This system is well illustrated through the image of the hub and spokes, where every partner of the United States (the hub) is attached to it through a bilateral relationship (the spokes). The strength of this model depends on the existing mistrust within the transversal relations among the great powers except the United States. The hub would be formed by the United States and the spokes would characterize the relationship between it and the great powers (Russia, India, China, etc.). Regardless of the disagreement or dispute between the superpower and the great powers, the hub-to-spoke relationship needs to be stronger than the spoke-to-spoke ones. This Bismarckian system requires a permanent and active implication of the United States. Indeed, a change in the relationship of two great powers would have consequences for the whole system. Finally, in such a system, all great powers tend to depend on the hub more than on each other. The basic requirements for such a system are proactivity, engagement, realpolitik instead of ideology spreading (i.e., spreading American values or reshaping other countries), flexibility, and, last but not least, adaptability—something that has been lacking, certainly concerning Russia, pushing the latter toward China. It should be a priority for the Biden administration to engage Russia on a pragmatic basis. This would have at least two advantages: (1) the Bismarck system could be realized by avoiding a strong partnership or potential alliance between Moscow and Beijing; and (2) the military doctrine of the Department of Defense would focus less on readiness for two major wars, which in any case is not feasible due to the economic situation.

Regional Pivot States and Swing States

If the United States wants to keep its predominant position in different regions—and thus safeguard its capacity to defend its interests there—it has to focus on a certain number of pivot states. The objective is to reduce direct engagements (no boots on the ground) and, just as Presidents Obama and Trump did, have a lighter footprint outside U.S. borders. Washington cannot afford to devote men, women, and resources to peripheral issues any more. The United States should head toward a network-centric approach in which allies and partners are expected to take more regional responsibilities and to assume costs and risks linked to their zone of influence. By giving more autonomy to trusted followers, Washington can put in practice a policy of selective engagement. In a certain way, Washington should reactivate the 1970s Guam/Nixon Doctrine by designating pivot states. Consequently, if the core national interests are not endangered, the priority is to contain and/or manage the situation by counting on the pivots (allies and partners) to fill the void.

In addition, the United States needs to go beyond core allies and trusted partners to develop relationships with so-called swing states, by recognizing their national interests, fears, and concerns. Swing states, which sit on the fence in terms of foreign policy alignment, have uncertain foreign policies, the orientation of which will weigh in favor of or against the leader, shifting the balance pro- or contra- the United States at the systemic as well as on the regional levels. Today’s most important swing states are India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, and Turkey.² Each of these states holds a strategic position either regionally, functionally, or both, and could prove a decisive asset to reinforce the guiding principles upon which the United States has founded its leadership. On the contrary, if they were to free ride or align to another great power, the already-declining American leadership and the international structure upon which it is based could be in danger of eroding further, and may possibly fragment (Vandamme and Struye de Swielande 2015). The key to Washington remaining the global leader lies in bringing the major swing states into the American sphere of influence. Although “they desire changes to the international order, they do not seek to scrap it” (Fontaine and Kliman 2013, 99). Rather, they defend the establishment of new modes of governance and aim at forging new power relationships (Khanna 2012). Such demands for change take the form of requests for reforming the UN Security Council, widely recognized to be reflective of the post–Second World War order and in need of reform, in a similar way as for institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank. The resulting balance between China and the United States may well be decided by the orientation that the swing states take.

Conclusion

The aforementioned seven principles could renew the lease of the United States as the leader of the international system. This new-found form of American primacy, although less dominant, would be more pragmatic and acceptable to others. Hence, it would safeguard stability while satisfying the status of emerging powers. Consequently, Washington should integrate strategic patience and maintain a form of discipline in its way of wielding power. Should it fail in this endeavor, the risk of absolute decline would become a reality, as would hegemonic war.

The evolution of the world shows that the post–Cold War period was ultimately a mere parenthesis in the traditional rivalry between great powers. Unchallenged for more than 25 years, the United States is today being challenged in its status as the number one player in the system. The challenge affects all areas, economic, political, ideological, cultural, and military, including the American national scene. We can thus apply to the present period the quote from Gramsci who wrote, “The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: it is now the time of monsters.” It is therefore clear that the international system needs to be rethought. This would require that the great powers

look first to their shared interests and accept a pluralist norm of tolerance towards their differences . . . The balance will depend on whether the great powers focus on raison de système, and the need to respond to shared fates, or on raison d’état, and the pursuit of their own interests, obsessions, and advantages. (Cui and Buzan 2016, 207)

In the end, Raymond Aron (1981, 289–90) was right when he said that “the choice in politics is not between good and evil, but between the preferable and the detestable.”

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

AcknowledgmentsThis article develops and substantially extends a few small excerpts I previously published in my 2017 article titled “Obama’s Legacy and the Way Forward.” Global Affairs 3 (4–5): 325–36. doi:10.1080/23340460.2017.1377627.

ORCID iD

Tanguy Struye de Swielande

1

The extent to which national potential can be realized reflects the organizational, industrial, and technological proficiency of a society. However, national potential is ultimately determined by the degree to which a society’s political system allows its state to concentrate and apply national skills and resources quickly (, 20).

2

This list is not exhaustive and only identifies what we qualify as the major swing states—thus excluding the minor ones, such as Pakistan, Ukraine, Egypt, Algeria, Argentina, Nigeria, and Vietnam. For further references, see .

About the Author

Tanguy Struye de Swielande, PhD, is professor of international relations at Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. He is the founder of the Genesys Network and the director of the Center for the Study of Crisis and International Conflicts. He is also a research fellow at the Egmont Institute and a guest lecturer at the Belgian Royal Military Academy. His research focuses on U.S. foreign policy, U.S.–China relations, Indo-Pacific, power, geopolitics, and geoeconomics.

References

Adams

Gordon

. 2018. “A New World Is Dawning, and the US Will No Longer Lead It.” The Conversation, June. https://theconversation.com/a-new-world-is-dawning-and-the-us-will-no-longer-lead-it-98362 (accessed April 12, 2021).

Aron

Raymond

. 1981. Le Spectateur Engagé [The Engaged Spectator or The Commited Spectator]. Paris: Julliard.

Art

Robert J.

1998. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” International Security 23 (3): 79–113. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/446939 (accessed April 12, 2021).

Associated Press. 2021. “World Reaction to the Storming of the US Capitol.” U.S. News, January 7. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-01-07/world-reaction-to-the-storming-of-the-us-capitol (accessed April 12, 2021).

Badie

Bertrand

. 2016. “Introduction.” In Qui gouverne le monde ?, edited by Badie

Bertrand

Vidal

Dominique

, 17. L’état du monde 2018. Paris: La Découverte.

Baker

James A.

III.

2016. “‘Selective Engagement’ Offers Best Hope for U.S. Foreign Policy.” III. Opening Remarks. Washington, DC: Senate Foreign Relations Committee. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051216_Baker_Testimony.pdf (accessed April 12, 2021).

Baker

Mila

. 2014. Peer-to-peer Leadership: Why the Network Is the Leader. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.

Beckley

Michael

. 2011. “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” International Security 36 (3): 41–78. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/461859 (accessed April 12, 2021).

Brauer

Markus

Bourhis

Richard Y.

2006. “Social Power.” European Journal of Social Psychology 36 (4): 601–16. doi:10.1002/ejsp.355.

10.

Bull

Hedley

. 1980. “The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order.” International Journal 35 (3): 437–47. doi:10.1177/002070208003500302.

11.

Cui

Shunji

Buzan

Barry

. 2016. “Great Power Management in International Society.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9 (2): 181–210. doi:10.1093/cjip/pow005.

12.

Diamond

Larry

. 2015. “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession.” Journal of Democracy 26 (1): 1141–55.

13.

Dreier

Lisa

Nabarro

David

Nelson

Jane

. 2019. “Systems Leadership for Sustainable Development: Strategies for Achieving Systemic Change.” Harvard Kennedy School, Corporate Responsibility Initiative 48:1–46. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/publications/fwp/crisept2019 (accessed April 12, 2021).

14.

Edmunds

Kimberly

Measure

Equal

Matsunaga

Mike

. 2017. “What Are the Characteristics of Effective Systems Leaders?” Harder+Company Community Research. https://medium.com/equal-measure-ideas/what-are-the-characteristics-of-effective-systems-leaders-981b3fb35bd9 (accessed April 12, 2021).

15.

Empson

Laura

. 2019. “How to Lead Your Fellow Rainmakers: Collectively, Dynamically- and Very Carefully.” Harvard Business Review 114–23. https://hbr.org/2019/03/how-to-lead-your-fellow-rainmakers (accessed April 12, 2021).

16.

Fontaine

Richard

Kliman

Daniel M.

2013. “International Order and Global Swing States.” The Washington Quarterly 36 (1): 93–109.

17.

Freedom House. 2021. “Freedom in the World: Democracy under Siege.” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege (accessed April 12, 2021).

18.

Freeman

Chas W., Jr.

1997. Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

19.

Frei

Daniel

. 1985. “Empathy in Conflict Management.” International Journal 40 (4): 586–98. doi:10.1177/002070208504000402.

20.

Fukuyama

Francis

. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.

21.

Goethals

George R.

Sorenson

Georgia

Burns

James MacGregor

. 2004. Encyclopedia of Leadership. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

22.

Hass

Ryan

. 2018. “Principles for Managing U.S.-China Competition.” Policy Brief Brookings, August 8. https://www.brookings.edu/research/principles-for-managing-u-s-china-competition/ (accessed April 26, 2021).

23.

Heath

Timothy R.

Mazarr

Michael J.

2018. “Without Reform and Cooperation with China, the International System Cannot Hold.” The National Interest, June 20. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/without-reform-cooperation-china-the-international-system-26350 (accessed April 12, 2021).

24.

Heider

Fritz

. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: John Wiley.

25.

Huntington

Samuel P.

1993. “‘The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22–49. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations (accessed April 12, 2021).

26.

Kendrick

Kristen

. 2020. “Despite ACA Coverage Gains, Millions Still Suffer ‘Catastrophic’ Health Care Costs.” NPR, November. https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/11/12/934146128/despite-aca-coverage-gains-millions-still-suffer-catastrophic-health-care-costs#:~:text=Despite%20the%20gains%20in%20insurance,plague%20many%20Americans%2C%20researchers%20found.&text=The%20study%20found%20an%20overall,not%20among%20the%20privately%20insured (accessed April 12, 2021).

27.

Kennedy

Paul

. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York. Vintage Books.

28.

Khanna

Parag

. 2012. “Surge of the ‘Second World.’” The National Interest 119: 62–69. https://nationalinterest.org/article/surge-the-second-world-6806 (accessed April 12, 2021).

29.

Kissinger

Henry

. 1994. Diplomatie [Diplomacy]. Paris: Fayard.

30.

Krauthammer

Charles

. 1990/1991. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs 70 (1): 23–33. https://www-jstor-org.web.bisu.edu.cn/stable/20044692 (accessed April 12, 2021).

31.

Layne

Christopher

. 2012. “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing.” The National Interest, January 27. https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405 (accessed April 12, 2021).

32.

Layne

Christopher

. 2020. “Coming Storms: The Return of Great-power War.” Foreign Affairs 99 (6): 42–48. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/coming-storms (accessed April 12, 2021).

33.

Lippmann

Walter

. 1943. U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little Brown.

34.

MacDonald

Paul K.

Parent

Joseph M.

2011. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment.” International Security 35 (4): 7–44. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00034.

35.

Morgenthau

Hans J.

1993. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 6th ed. New York: McGraw Hill.

36.

Morin

Edgar

. 1982. Science Avec Conscience [Science with Conscience]. Paris: Fayard.

37.

Nye

Joseph S.

2011. The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs.

38.

Odeo

Kimberly

Boyle

Michael

. 2021. “US National Debt by Year Compared to GDP and Major Events.” The Balance, March. https://www.thebalance.com/national-debt-by-year-compared-to-gdp-and-major-events-3306287 (accessed April 12, 2021).

39.

O’Neill

Cassandra

Brinkerhoff

Monica

. 2017. Five Elements of Collective Leadership for Early Childhood Professionals. Washington, DC: Redleaf Press, A division of Think Small.

40.

Posen

Barry R.

2014. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

41.

Posen

Barry R.

Ross

Andrew L.

1996–1997. “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy.” International Security 21 (3): 5–53. doi:10.1162/isec.21.3.5.

42.

Schumpeter

Joseph A.

1962. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

43.

Smith

M. Brewster

. 2004. “Realistic Empathy: A Key to Sensible International Relations.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 10 (4): 335–39. doi:10.1207/s15327949pac1004_3.

44.

Sweijs

Tim

Oosterveld

William

Knowles

Emily

Schellekens

Menno

. 2014. Why Are Pivot States So Pivotal? The Role of Pivot States in Regional and Global Security. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

45.

Struye de Swielande

Tanguy

. 2017. “Obama’s Legacy and the Way Forward.” Global Affairs 3 (4–5): 325–36. doi:10.1080/23340460.2017.1377627.

46.

Struye de Swielande

Tanguy

Orinx

Kimberly

. 2020. “China’s Cyber Strategy: A Wake-up Call for the West.” In China: Systemic Rival, Economic Competitor, and Negotiating Partner?, edited by Sanders

Luk

51–70. Brussels: Royal Higher Institute for Defence.

47.

Tellis

Ashley J.

Bially

Janice

Layne

Christopher

McPherson

Melissa

. 2000. Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

48.

Vandamme

Dorothée

Swielande

Tanguy Struye de

. 2015. “Global Swing States: Which Leadership Will They Follow?” In Power in the 21st Century: Determinants and Contours, edited by Struye de Swielande

Tanguy

Vandamme

Dorothée

33–51. Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses universitaires de Louvain.

49.

Van Evera

Stephen

. 1990. “Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn’t: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 13 (2): 1–51. doi:10.1080/01402399008437408.

50.

Watson

Adam

. 1992. Evolution of International Societies. London: Routledge.

51.

White

Ralph K.

1986. “Empathy as an Intelligence Tool.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1 (1): 57–75. doi:10.1080/08850608608434999.

52.

Wigell

Mikael

. 2016. “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geoeconomic Strategies: Neo-imperialism, Neo-mercantilism, Hegemony, and Liberal Institutionalism.” Asia Europe Journal 14 (2): 135–51. doi:10.1007/s10308-015-0442-x.

53.

P. H.

2018. “China Won’t Wait.” Project Syndicate, May. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-and-west-reform-international-order-by-p-h-yu-2018-05?barrier=accesspaylog (accessed April 12, 2021).