A GENUINE BLEND OF STATECRAFTS

Abstract

Spanish

Chinese

Power transition in the international order and the position of China in this order have triggered ramifications in China's foreign policy strategy toward the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Its foreign policy approach has evolved from strict non-intervention to an assertive policy at the international level and constructive engagement at the regional level. China has simultaneously been applying both soft and hard power to protect its national interests in MENA. This study aims to assess China's four-pillar MENA policy from the perspective of its smart power strategy by examining its hard power means and soft power tools.

Keywords

International Relations Foreign Policy China Smart Power Soft Power Hard Power Inclusive Diplomacy Partnership Diplomacy China’s Broad MENA Strategy BRI Economic Statecraft Beijing’s MENA Strategy

China's history in the MENA¹ region dates back to antiquity and continued with the Silk Road. Back then, oil was not a matter of interest. However, the country's need for oil and energy resources has transformed its approach to the MENA since the beginning of Beijing's economic boost (Jin 2017, 43–4). Pan (1997, 36–8) divided the People's Republic of China's (PRC) modern relations with the MENA countries into four eras. The first (1949–55) endeavored to “keep pace with the Soviet Union and to maintain an ideologically consistent set of policies” (Pan 1997, 36). Second, from 1956 to 1966, Beijing responded favorably to anti-imperialist movements in the region. Third, from 1966 to 1976, the Cultural Revolution paralyzed China's relations with the outside world. Fourth, from 1977 to the end of the 1990s—with the accession of Deng Xiaoping—China adopted a less ideological and more practical approach to diplomacy. Following Pan’s (1997) classification, this study argues that a subsequent era of Beijing's relations with MENA countries began after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military intervention in Libya in 2011. It is characterized by China's initiation of a smart power strategy toward the MENA region to protect its geoeconomic and geostrategic interests since 2011.

The evolution of Chinese foreign policy from acquiescence to assertive diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presents a stark departure from almost two decades of the Chinese policy of “keeping a low profile” to more assertive diplomacy. Collectively, Chinese foreign policy has spanned being less confrontational, then more assertive, and finally constructive toward MENA regional affairs. Although the changes in China's MENA policy have not been very radical, the implications of this change are critical not only for China's relations with the MENA states but also for its relations with the international community.

In light of this change in China's foreign policy toward the MENA, the purpose of this study is to analyze China's broad MENA strategy with a focus on its sources and practices. It aims to assess the objectives of China's relations with MENA countries. I seek to address the following question: what are China's key smart power tools and how has China used these tools in its MENA strategy? In addressing this question, the study develops a four-pillar approach to analyze Chinese foreign policy toward MENA from the perspective of its smart power strategy.

The scope of the first pillar involves partnership diplomacy, multilateral cooperation forums, and high-level diplomatic relations with all regional countries. The second pillar analyzes China's fast-growing economic statecraft such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), energy imports and trade, and Chinese military presence in the MENA region. The third pillar examines Chinese soft power tools, such as the operation of Confucius Institutes and public policy by the China Global Television Network (CGTN), Xinhua, etc., and the objectives of these tools. The fourth pillar analyzes the exercise of China's veto power in the UNSC.

China's assertive stance in the UNSC aims to protect its investments, projects, assets, and citizens in the region. Given this, it is important to clarify that some of the components of the four pillars have existed as platforms or channels in China's foreign policy and diplomacy that reinforce China's strategy toward the region. Several institutions and mechanisms spanning the four pillars have been key aspects of Beijing's foreign policy for a long time such as partnership diplomacy, multilateral forums, and the Confucius Institutes (CI). Others, like the BRI and Djibouti military base, are new. Although the present research mainly focuses on China's broad MENA strategy post-2011, a brief section is devoted to the evolution of the pre-2011 period of the PRC's MENA strategy to reflect the contrast and the change between pre- and post-2011.

Theoretical Framework

Power is probably one of the most discussed concepts in the field of international relations. Yet, despite the multitude of the discussions on the concept, there is no consensus among scholars either on the role or the nature of power (Baldwin 2002). The concept of power is “troublesome” as Gilpin (1981) noted; so, to start from the simplest conceptual foundation, he stated that “power refers simply to the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states.” These aspects of power have since been regarded as hard-power elements by neoliberal theorists (see, e.g., Keohane 1986; Nye 2011). Gilpin also argued that some additional aspects of power are important and intangible elements that affect the outcomes of political actions, such as public morale, qualities of leadership, and situational factors. Gilpin (1981) categorizes these intangible features of power via the concept of prestige. They remain extremely useful conceptual tools in international relations analyses today and, as I show, continue to illuminate several aspects of China's MENA strategy, especially when coupled with the newer and more nuanced concept of “smart power.”

Considering Gilpin's tangible and intangible elements of power, the research analyzes China's broad MENA strategy through the lenses offered by the concept of smart power developed by neoliberal theorists. Smart power is a phenomenon in the field of international relations which was coined by Nossel (2004) and pursued more deeply by Joseph S. Nye. Nye (2008, 165; 2011, 23) argued that smart power is a “genuine blending” of hard means and soft power tools, particularly as they intersect with effective leadership (Nye 2008, 1). Implementing the principles of smart power permits foreign policy makers to create a source base and furnishes them with a delicate toolkit to carefully compose integrated policies designed to achieve national aspirations determined by both hard and soft power (Singh 2018, 7). Practicing smart power enables a country to extend its influence without enforcing strong military power; it places a strong emphasis on building alliances and on fostering international and institutional cooperation at all levels (Koreh 2015). To illustrate, Hillary Clinton used smart power as a tool of diplomacy at her hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She stated that “[w]e must use what has been called ‘smart power:’ the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation” (Clinton 2009).

Smart power strategies require both an increase in soft power and in hard power—sometimes successively, sometimes together. Such strategies have come to characterize effective diplomacy at the global level and also sustaining the development of a country's economy and military capacity and practices (Nye 2009). Combining soft power with an already highly developed economic and military power has enabled China to implement a smart power strategy in its relations with the outside world (Nye 2011, 211). Here, the role played by balance in the concept and practice of smart power is worth emphasizing. Singh (2018, 8), for instance, claims that Mao Zedong's strategy of ‘strategic patience’ concerning the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Deng Xiaoping's “bide your time, keep a low profile, never take the lead” reinforced China's smart power by balancing hard and soft power.

The Evolution of the PRC's Foreign Policy Strategy Toward the MENA Prior to 2011

Before analyzing China's smart power strategy toward the MENA region from 2011 onward, it is useful to map out how the PRC's MENA policy evolved through time to underline the contrast. Yitzhak Shichor (1979, 1–22) offered an overview that is a good place to start. This author highlighted that the MENA region has held longstanding strategic importance in the PRC's foreign interests even if it was politically isolated from the region until the early 1950s. China's MENA policy was heavily affected by the two superpowers during the Cold War. As Beijing's geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in the MENA increased, it revised its policy toward the region. As an ally of the Soviets, Beijing's MENA foreign policy overlapped with the Soviet Union's policies from 1949 to the end of the 1950s (Abidi 1982, 10–28).

The Bandung Conference,² the first multilateral intergovernmental meeting held by nations of different continents in 1956 (Acharya 2016, 353), played a key role in China's bid to reconstruct relations with MENA countries (Harris 1993). After the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese strategy supported regional states and national liberation movements against the two “hegemonic superpowers” from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s (Abidi 1982, 7–25; Shichor 1979, 3; Harris 1993; Calabrese 1991). Beijing's support of movements against the United States and the Soviet Union was nevertheless limited to moral support (Pan 1997, 35–6).

With the rapprochement between the United States and China in the early 1970s, China revised its MENA policy and adopted a less ideological and more pragmatic strategy (Shichor 1979, 148). To cultivate close diplomatic relations with Iran and Kuwait and to gain the support of regional states in the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly 1971), China abandoned its prior “Third World strategy” of supporting armed groups in the region (Behbehani 2020; Chun 1989). However, Beijing maintained its non-aligned country discourse to promote unity against “hegemonism and imperialism” among African and Asian countries (He 1980, 15; Renmin Ribao Commentator 1971, 13). The ideology-free strategy was fully established when Deng Xiaoping took office in 1976. Since then, it underscored China's professed commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. During this phase, Beijing was concerned about the Soviet strategy of the encirclement of China (He 1980) and was determined to counter it, if indirectly (Calabrese 1991, 5–8; Chun 1989, 32–40). Chinese officials, for example, encouraged the United States to cooperate and stand firm against Soviet expansion in the MENA region and beyond, as can be seen in China's urging the United States to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan (Sutter 2017, 74; Yu 1980). Beijing's foreign policy strategy toward the region was shaped by Soviet and U.S. strategic considerations while Beijing's bilateral relations with the two superpowers and its own strategic choices were also influential during the Cold War (Calabrese 1991; Shichor 1979).

As China opened up its market to the world and its economy started growing, the strategic importance of the MENA in Beijing's foreign policy has increased in tandem because MENA has been number one in the production and export of fossil fuels in the world. This induced Beijing to revise its MENA strategy and pursue a foreign policy strategy independent of the superpowers’ influences. The road toward modernizing Chinese industry lay through the MENA because of its rich oil reserves and because it is an important market for Beijing's goods and arms sales (Harris 1993, 240–70). In the 1980s, arms trade was a leading factor in the normalization and improvement of China's relations with the MENA states (Alterman and Garver 2008, 30; 65–6; Lampton 2001, 266; Kumaraswamy 2005, 93).

The collapse of the Soviet Union spurred the change in China's strategic rationale. Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing maintained and strengthened close relations with the West (Lampton 2001, 65–7). China continued following Zhou En-Lai's “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (see Garver 1994, 136; Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] 2014; Jin 2017, 46) and Deng Xiaoping's “keeping a low profile in international politics” (Jisi 2011; Yan 2014) from the 1990s until the NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 (White 2014). During this period, China built close relations with the regional governments and focused on its industrial development and diversification of its oil import sources. One of the most important topics in this period was China's possible arms sales and transfer of nuclear technology to the MENA countries. This topic loomed large in the bilateral relations of China and the United States (Pan 1997). Overall, throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, China's role in regional issues was minimal. In the Iranian nuclear issue, for example, China allowed resolutions to be passed and upheld ensuring international security as a responsible power during the Iranian nuclear issue (Johanson 2019, 157–9).

The First Pillar: China's Inclusive Multi/Bilateral Diplomacy in the MENA Region

China's partnership strategy and inclusive diplomacy have balanced its relations with the politically polarized MENA region. An alliance is constituted by two or more sovereign states’ commitment to the security cooperation among each other, arranged either formally or informally (Walt 2013). From the Chinese government's point of view, war or conflicts are inevitable in the international arena in which the alliance system exists. Therefore, China's foreign policy traditions have rejected the alliance strategy, focusing instead on forming partnerships as a more modest tactic for Beijing to avoid any third party hostilities (Liu et al. 2017, 167; Zuokui 2017, 69). Beijing's partnership diplomacy is thus characterized by flexible political cooperation and an interest-driven form of relations.

The term “strategic partnership” was first introduced by the Chinese government in the mid-1990s to describe a new diplomatic mechanism. A strategic partnership is formed between countries or groups of nations. The “strategic” label refers to all aspects of a bilateral agreement such as economic, political, cultural, and military agreements, where both sides are committed to their long-term bilateral partnerships (Xi 2017, 53). Beijing's partnership policy has been effective to balance and deepen its relations with the regional states rather than seeking alliances with them. The success and sustainability of this strategy may show that there is no need to seek allies or to get involved in conflicts to build close relations nor pursue any sphere of influence. Each level of partnership represents the relative significance of the country with which China attaches. The partnership diplomacy also enables a system of enhanced cooperation with more frequent summitry and Joint Declarations outlining diverse areas of political exchange (Bayes 2019). Furthermore, it claims not to interfere in their internal affairs and has no conditions or demands regarding what type of regime is suitable for them (Sun 2020).

There are four types of partnerships that China has upgraded or signed with MENA countries since 2011. Algeria and Egypt in 2014, Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2016, and the UAE 2018 upgraded their partnership with Beijing to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Israel signed an Innovative Comprehensive partnership with China in 2017. Sudan and Qatar in 2014, Iraq and Jordan in 2015, Morocco and Djibouti in 2016, and Kuwait and Oman in 2018 signed Strategic Partnership agreements. The timing of upgrading these partnership agreements is very critical to ascertain how the importance of MENA has changed in Beijing's strategy. This intense engagement with regional states marks changes in Beijing's strategy toward the region (Sun 2020). Before 2011, China's strategic interests were mainly driven by oil imports and, to a lesser extent, were commercial-centric. Hence, signing and upgrading new partnership agreements have indicated a new era in Beijing's relations with MENA countries over the past decade.

Creating multilateral cooperation forums is another key diplomatic tool of soft power (Nye 2004) in its smart power strategy. The Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, established 2000 [MFA 2000]) and the China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF, established 2004) are two prominent tangible diplomatic tools within this strategy. FOCAC serves as a platform for African leaders to engage in different fields with China and the forum is the second largest gathering of African Heads of States after African presence in the United Nations (Bodomo 2009). CASCF has been an important platform of collective dialogue and cooperation between China and the Arab States. It has also played important roles in promoting bilateral relations of mutual political trust, economic cooperation, and cultural communication. Under the framework of CASCF, more than ten mechanisms have become the institutional platform of China-Arab strategic cooperation such as ministerial meetings, senior official meetings, business conferences, and investment seminars(Zongmin Liu 2011). FOCAC and CASCF have provided leverage to Beijing in deepening its relations with MENA states in various areas such as tourism, technology, and research (Tella 2016, 136). Moreover, these forums facilitate time-efficient bilateral diplomatic meetings between Beijing and MENA states (Bayes 2019). On the other hand, Beijing has launched a strategic dialogue mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (MFA 2016a) and started negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2005 (Ministry of Commerce PRC 2016). China and the GCC vowed to reach an agreement for the FTA and have met nine times since 2005; four of those meetings occurred in 2016. The increased frequency of meetings and their coverage in the Chinese media (Xinhua 2020b; Yi 2019b) indicates that Beijing attaches great significance to these strategic dialogue mechanisms in its broad MENA strategy.

In China's Arab Policy Paper,³ the importance and improvement of relations between the two sides were emphasized. Indeed, cooperation in all areas has been continuously developed since the establishment of relations between China and Arab countries 60 years ago. The publication of the Arab Paper and the establishment of such strategic dialogue channels mark the prominence of MENA in Beijing's foreign policy and show that it has assumed an active role in the region (MFA 2016a). Moreover, China also played an active and constructive role in the Iranian nuclear issue by considering international security (Katzman and Kerr 2016) and contributed to reaching “long-term and proper solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue, which culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)” (The UNSC 2015).

Beijing cultivates close relations with all MENA states and shows the significance China attaches to the region through the exchange of frequent high-level visits. Leaders of the region convey the impression of gaining Beijing's favor, and frequently pay visits to Beijing while signing bilateral agreements in a broad array of fields. To mention some of the recent high-level visits: Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sisi visited China six times from 2014 to 2019 (Dalay 2019; State Information Service Egypt 2019). In 2019, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman visited Beijing and said that “Saudi Arabia attaches great importance to China's positive role in global and regional affairs and wishes to further strengthen communication and coordination with China (Xinhua 2019a). Iran's President Rouhani visited Beijing in 2018. He told Xi Jinping: “Your 2016 visit to Tehran was a new turning point in relations between the two countries” (The Islamic Republic of Iran 2018). Crown Prince of Emirates of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed also visited China in 2019 and expressed that the UAE and China are creating a “road map” for a century of prosperity (The National UAE 2019). Netanyahu's visit to Beijing in 2013 and March 2017 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017b), and Chinese Vice-President Wang Qishan visited Israel in 2018 (Embassy of Israel in China 2018). During these two visits, the Global Entrepreneurship and Innovation Conference (GEIC)—a joint initiative between the China-Israel Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation—was held (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017b; Vilnai, Orion and Lavi 2017).⁴ It is evident from the statements of leaders of MENA countries that their relations with Beijing have moved to a new stage and they reserve high expectations of its role in the region.

Xi Jinping's official visit to Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in 2016 was welcomed by the leaders of these countries. According to Wang (2021a), during this visit, China signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran (see also The Islamic Republic of Iran 2018). Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited the MENA region twice in 2021 (see also Papa 2021) the first of which was to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, Bahrain, and Oman in March; the second to Syria, Algeria, and Egypt in July (Wang 2021b). These visits saw no profound change in Beijing's strategy toward the region. Indeed, they included promising agreements between Beijing and the Arab League to establish a data security initiative that involves the field of 5G, artificial intelligence, and big data. Beijing and Iran also signed a 25-year agreement that serves cooperation in security, economics, and cultural exchanges during this visit (Reuters 2021; Xinhua 2021). As a linchpin of China's smart power strategy, this no-strings-attached inclusivist diplomacy allows China to cultivate close relations with MENA countries.

The Second Pillar: China's Military Presence and Economic Statecraft

The capability of the PRC's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has dramatically increased as a policy tool, not only in terms of its combat potential but also in its role in security cooperation. Historically, the PLA has a very limited ability to project power beyond China's borders—however, its capability has increased significantly over the last decade (Shambaugh 2016, 372). Chinese military presence in the MENA region is slowly growing, however, although this growth has not yet posed any serious influence on the balance of power in the region (Sun 2018).

Chinese military activities in the region involve: arms sales and transfer of dual-use technologies; taking part in the UN peacekeeping missions such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) (The United Nations Peacekeeping 2021) missions (Gill et al. 2006; The United Nations Peacekeeping 2021); and limited military-to-military contacts (Flanagan and Levy 2009, 68). Beijing's involvement in UN peacekeeping missions has increasingly been expanded during recent years (United Nations 2021). China's participation in these missions has challenged its non-intervention principle while it has strengthened China's global image as a responsible power and the power that shares the burden of transnational issues (Moynihan and Muller 2019).

The establishment of the Djibouti military base is a milestone not only in Beijing's broad MENA strategy but also its global foreign policy. It marks Beijing's growing and changing geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in the MENA region (Xinhua 2017). The establishment of a military base outside China was almost unimaginable when analyzing China's foreign policy principles before 2011. The base aims to boost China's capabilities to swiftly deploy military missions which will improve its contribution to antipiracy operations and peacekeeping forces to protect the Chinese citizens living in the region, as well as exports and regional assets (Sun 2018). As a key component of China's broad MENA strategy, the Djibouti military base heralds a very important change and offers some evidence that China has abandoned its previous “low-profile” policy. China's military presence and actions in the region do not have a second target, neither is it openly pursuing any overarching hegemonic objectives. Rather, China's focus is on the geostrategic and geoeconomic imperatives of Beijing. The military presence and interactions in the region lead to an increase in China's strategic and political footprint in the region (Huwaidin 2002, 5). China's frequent military interactions with Iran have also been drawing attention over the last few years. China, Russia, and Iran held a joint naval exercise for the first time in the Persian Gulf in 2019 (Haider 2020) with a second exercise planned for the beginning of 2022 (Zhongping 2021).

Beijing's booming economy has certainly eased several levels of cooperation and engagement between Beijing and the MENA states (Dusek and Kairouz 2017). China has a favorable framework for economic and trade cooperation with MENA countries and is the largest trading partner for most. The MENA region is also both a supplier and a recipient of capital for China (U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA] 2021). Since the 1970s, the United States has been a major recipient of Middle Eastern capital, especially from the GCC states. Since the beginning of the U.S. antiterrorism assault, many entrepreneurs from the MENA region have ceased to rely on American funding and investment. This situation makes China a new destination for Middle Eastern capital since China is seen by regional investors as more promising, safe, and reliable. For example, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) purchased US$720 million-worth of shares in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Another example is the Sinopec and the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) joint venture agreement, which created an ethylene derivative production facility in Tianjin in northern China (Alterman 2009, 63–6). These purchases indicate the long-term strategic investment for both sides.

An important feature of the smart power strategy in the economic statecraft of China is captivating almost all the states in the proximal region to China (Wang 2021a). Chinese economic power works as a “carrot” rather than as a “stick” in its relations with regional countries (Fayazmanesh 2008). For now, the economic statecraft of China plays a soft power role in its broad MENA strategy. This does not, of course, mean Beijing will never use its economic power as a stick, but its strategy in the region could perhaps be seen more as “sticky”—in several senses. Mead (2004) in fact rightly called China's economic power the “sticky power,” which attracts others to gather around it nearly two decades ago. The Chinese economic power, then, is becoming stickier as time goes on. Put differently, the magnitude and charm of Beijing's economic power are increasingly growing—hence, regional countries are moving closer to China as their bilateral trade increases. This clearly gives China an upper hand in its relations with MENA states (Mohseni-Cheraghlou 2021).

In conjunction with the advent of the BRI, the MENA region has been one of the top-priority geostrategic zones for Beijing (Lyall 2019). As a result, China has continued its aim to forge closer diplomatic relations with the MENA countries through the BRI as a part of its broad MENA strategy (Sun et al. 2018, 228). The BRI is also considered a strategic countermeasure against the U.S. pivot to East Asia, which is seen as a containment strategy by China (Sidlo 2020, 14). The MENA region plays a key role in China's BRI both for its maritime route and for its land-based route (OECD 2018, 11). The BRI aims to optimize the distribution of resources, facilitate free and easy movement of goods, promote economic integration, and expand market capacity (OECD 2018, 7–12). This strengthens financial cooperation among neighboring countries and the economic development of these countries should contribute to the stability and progress of the global economy (Ehteshami 2017, 196–9).

This vision of Beijing's BRI project attracts MENA states to deepen their engagement with China in the realms of technology, security, and the economy. In 2019, the UAE and China signed 16 agreements in the fields of economy, oil, and environment. Sheikh Mohamed noted that the deals were aimed at “developing co-operation and a comprehensive strategic partnership, as well as opening new horizons for joint action in various sectors” (The National UAE 2019).⁵ China has, of course, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the BRI with 17 MENA countries since 2013 (Robbins 2020; Wang 2021a). Besides the contribution of the BRI to the regional and global economy (Xi 2019), this new and comprehensive economic network seems to be the basis for the formation of a new economic order or zone outside the current global economic order (Camille et al. 2019). Additionally, the BRI has the potential to facilitate interregional integration both economically and geographically. This has been achieved by constructing and connecting supply chains regionally through its “industrial park-port interconnection” projects such as the “Khalifa Port Free Trade Zone (KPFTZ) in Abu Dhabi, UAE; Oman's Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority (SEZAD); the Jazan City for Primary and Downstream Industries (JCPDI) in Saudi Arabia; and the TEDA-Suez zone in Ain Sokhna, Egypt, the ports are Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi (KIZAD); SEZAD in Oman; the People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti; and Port Said in Egypt (Fulton 2019, 7).” These projects are aiding in China's strategy of creating a free and safe trade area; thus, the active development of free trade relations with adjacent countries may improve regional economic integration, trade, increased investment liberalization, and open markets. The volume of trade among these countries and regions rose to 55.2 percent in 2017 (China Daily 2019). In an interview, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that the BRI would change the balance of power and global development would be more balanced and equitable. His argument was that it would make the developing countries’ voices heard and contribute to regional peace and stability (MFA 2016b). China has therefore presented the BRI as an instrument to contribute to the economic development and security of the MENA region rather than a threat (Kamel 2018, 5–6).

As a key component of China's economic statecraft, energy imports loom large in its broad MENA strategy. Beijing's rapidly growing economy has positioned it as the top energy consumer (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2021, 6) and producer of goods in the international market. In 2020, China was the largest global energy consumer and the largest oil and gas importer with 505 metric tons and 125 billion cubic meters, respectively. Correspondingly, five MENA countries were ranked among the top ten producers of crude oil and four countries were among the top ten exporters (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2021). As a consequence of the high energy demand of the Chinese economy, the MENA region is crucial for its development.

Another key element of China's economic statecraft concerns Chinese military activities. Its presence in this area has similarly been more visible in the MENA region as Beijing's energy imports from, and trade volume with, the region grow (Yung et al. 2014, 1–7). The security of MENA is the key component of Beijing's national security due to Chinese investments and the BRI projects (Lyall 2019). China has been more sensitive and active in regional conflicts since the inauguration of Xi Jinping and his announcement of the BRI. Chinese diplomats have actively engaged in mediation efforts and publicizing these activities both via top leadership remarks and the media. This policy shift is encouraged by Beijing's national interests based on the key role the region plays in the BRI. The free flow of oil and other raw materials to China and Chinese goods to the region (and beyond) were vital for China's uninterrupted economic development (Legarda 2018) before the pandemic, and are extremely likely to be so after it. Thus, the interdependency between China and MENA countries in the fields of energy, trade, infrastructure, and technology has deepened their cooperation (Dusek and Kairouz 2017). There is no doubt that energy imports and the region's strategic location on trade routes feature strongly in Beijing's strategy toward the region.

Finally, technology is another key area of engagement that has pulled Chinese investors’ attention to the region (Zoo 2019). Government initiatives such as “Smart Dubai 2021 (see also Smart Dubai 2021. 2021), Saudi Arabia's National Transformation Program 2030 (see also Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2016), Morocco's Mohamed VI Tangier Tech City (see also Africa News 2017), and the China-Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone” (Bao 2019). Both China's and other regional states’ interests are overlapping, therefore cooperation and collaboration are inevitable across a broad scale of fields. The BRI thus forms a road map of Beijing's broad MENA strategy, as it paves the way for deepening China's relations not only economically, but also politically and culturally with regional countries.

The Third Pillar: China's Soft Power Tools

The Chinese government has focused on increasing its soft power by enhancing its investments in the MENA area (Nye 2016, 306; 2018). As a constituent of smart power, China entails its soft power through diplomacy, economic assistance—including investment and trade preferences—humanitarian-scientific and educational exchange/scholarship programs (Nye 2005), Confucius Institutes, CGTN, and peacekeeping forces, as well as the promotion of moral values based on the spiritual and material culture of ancient and modern China (Gao 2015; Yellinek et al. 2020; Zreik 2021). One of the most effective instruments of Chinese soft power, perhaps, is the increase of Chinese investments abroad, which is continuously growing through the BRI (Atkinson 2010; Lo et al. 2021; Yang 2010). China has a much broader agenda to enhance its soft power by using media, organizing summits, conferences, publishing, education exchanges, organizing sports and arts events, and other domains (Shambaugh 2015, 100). These organizations not only help China to tell its story. They also enable other countries’ diplomats and academics to experience Chinese culture. In recent years, two key organizations—the China-Arab states political parties dialogue (Xinhua 2020a) and Beijing's first international forum on the Syria conflict (MFA 2018)—shed light on how the MENA region's strategic importance has changed in Beijing's policy toward the region.

China's state-owned media outlets have increasingly expanded around the world over the last decade. This expansion has contributed to the improvement of China's image and President Xi Jinping's profile in key parts of the world, especially in the MENA region. For example, the China Communication Center and Image Nation in the UAE (in collaboration) produced China-centered documentaries on Image Nation's Quest Arabia station, which broadcasts to 45 million households in 22 countries in the region (Cook 2020, 9). Chinese state-owned media outlets also have a high number of followers on Western-centered social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. For example, CGTN Arabic has over 15 million Facebook followers (CGTN Arabic Facebook 2021), and almost one million followers on Twitter (CGTN Arabic 2021). Other state-run media platforms have quite large numbers of followers on these global social media platforms. People's Daily, Xinhua News, CGTN, and China Daily each have over 75 million followers (Cook 2020, 7). China's image has improved not only in MENA but also at the global scale due to these efforts from Beijing. Public views of China have also improved in the MENA region. Pew Research Center (2019) surveys indicate that public views of China are positive for most of the Middle East and Africa in 2018 and 2019.

The creation of the Confucius Institute (CI)⁶ also reflects crucial cultural and educational cooperation between Chinese and foreign academic institutions, which mainly consist of universities (Yellinek et al. 2020, 517). According to a Hanban program director, the objectives of Confucius Institutes have three main purposes: teaching the Chinese language, promoting the Chinese culture, and forming a bridge between investors from China and other countries by facilitating business activities (Confucius Institute Headquarters 2016). Significantly, in 2019, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman agreed to include the Chinese language in the curriculum at all stages of education in Saudi schools and universities (Arab News 2019; Yi 2019a). The Crown Prince of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed added that “the two sides are laying pillars of a road map for the next 100 years, beginning with steps to teach the Chinese language in more than 200 schools in the UAE” (The National UAE 2019) during a visit to Beijing in July 2019. There are also other features like publishing language teaching materials, sending teachers to other countries to teach the Chinese language, organizing Cultural events such as Chinese art troupes, Chinese song competitions, and celebrations of Chinese holidays (The National UAE 2019). As a tool of Beijing's soft power, Confucius Institutes (The Economist 2009) have gained a positive reputation in the MENA region and are welcomed among its policy makers, universities, and students without any serious criticism (Yellinek et al. 2020, 528–30). As of 2006, Confucius Institute centers began to appear in Arabic-speaking countries, and by 2020 China had established 15 such institutes, operating from a number of universities in the region.

It is, perhaps, no surprise that cooperation between Beijing and MENA states has increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the early days of COVID-19, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE sent aid to Beijing (Kuwait Times 2020; MFA 2020; Qatar Airways 2020; Tu 2020). After the spread of the pandemic in the MENA region, Beijing returned the favor when MENA countries were in need. In light of this, the Confucius Institute project can be seen as a soft power projection (Tella 2016, 134). Such soft power tools have strengthened friendly relations between China and MENA states and constructive engagement both in bilateral relations and public perceptions of each other. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic (see Chaziza 2020), China's image in the region has improved recently thanks to close interactions of people with Chinese people and states in the region with China (Sim and Greer 2021). In the fall of 2020, a survey conducted by The China Africa Project on MENA public opinion toward China showed that more than half of respondents stated they had a favorable view of China in three of the six countries examined. The survey also showed that China is popular among elites and university graduates—who are in favor of having closer economic ties with China. Moreover, China was more popular than the United States and Russia in 2020 (The China Africa Project 2020). The Arab Barometer's latest survey in 2021 also shows that China remains the most popular country overall in the MENA region (Robbins 2021).

China's diplomatic visits, multilateral forums, Confucius Institutes, educational exchange programs, and state-owned media platforms are evidence of contribution to the improvement of China's soft power strategies in the MENA region. This Chinese toolkit of soft power instruments has been a key component of Beijing's broad MENA strategy over the last decade.

The Fourth Pillar: China's Changing Voting Behavior after the Libyan Crisis

Focusing on changes in China's voting behavior adds nuance and complexity to an understanding of its broad MENA strategy. This also makes salient the differences between China's constructive engagement with the MENA countries and China's assertive stance at the international level. Having veto power in the UNSC allows China to be self-dependent in the international arena. China mostly preferred to employ abstention instead of using its power of veto to express disapproval on matters in the UNSC until 2011. The prominent turning point for China's assertive diplomacy was the NATO airstrikes in Libya. Following these events, China changed its abstaining behavior in the UNSC and chose to take an active role in the organization. This pattern can be seen especially within the context of the resolutions considering the Syrian crisis (Swaine 2012, 10). Out of the 16 vetoes Beijing has cast in the UNSC since 1971, ten have been in regard to the Syrian crisis. Beijing's vetoes on the Syrian issue have comprised more than 60 percent of its vetoes since the PRC's admission to the UNSC in 1971 (UNSC 2021). China's UN Ambassador, Li Baodong, made it clear that using the resolutions of the UNSC regarding Resolution 1970 (UNSC 2011a) and Resolution 1973 (UNSC 2011b)) by NATO as a basis to intervene in the Libyan crisis cannot be the solution. Therefore, Li stated that a situation like the intervention in Libya would not and should not be forthcoming in Syria (United Nations 2011). The stance demonstrates Beijing's belief that military intervention and regime change would not solve the problems in Syria; indeed, they would make the Syrian crisis more complicated. The lesson was learned after NATO's intervention in Libya—where unrest in Libya has increasingly continued even after NATO's military intervention. Beijing's vetoes indicate that Chinese passivity and buck-passing in global diplomacy is over.

China has suggested that unrest in the MENA region stems from external involvement (Dorsey 2016, 194). As a result, China has been blocking the UNSC resolutions since they are seen as a way for Western powers to legitimate their intervention in the MENA (Dong 2021; MFA 2012). Contrary to conventional wisdom, the role of China in the MENA has always been significant, even crucial, concerning its veto power in the UNSC (Shichor 2016, 13). China's stance on the Syrian crisis has not, however, harmed its relations with MENA countries. As we have seen, China has deepened its economic and diplomatic ties in the region (Arab News 2019; The National UAE 2019) regarding the increase in trade and close high-frequency diplomatic visits between China and MENA countries (Sun et al. 2018, 242; Alterman 2013). China is, of course, pursuing long-term political outcomes when employing these vetoes. The vetoes can be interpreted as a signaling strategy to the MENA regimes that China can block intervention in their domestic affairs by Western powers through the UNSC.

The assertive stance of China in the UNSC may therefore be widely and correctly interpreted as a mechanism to free MENA countries from U.S. domination and its intervention in their domestic politics. During his official visits to Syria in 2021, Wang Yi said that “China opposes any attempt to seek regime change in Syria, and will continue its strong support for Syria in handling domestic problems” (MFA 2021). As—rather than if—Beijing's economic footprint expands in the MENA region, it will almost certainly be more assertive at international levels in order to protect its interests and assets in the region (Wuthnow 2013, 134). To maintain the support and trust with MENA countries, however, China will nevertheless be expected to grant its support if any international power uses the UNSC as a means to legitimate intervention in MENA politics in the future—no matter what the country's regime type is.

Conclusion: China's Smart Power Strategy in the MENA

Beijing's economic and security footprint has significantly continued to expand in the MENA region since 2011. China has increasingly used bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels to deepen its engagement with regional states. The Chinese media, educational exchanges between Beijing and MENA countries, and cultural engagement with the region have also expanded quite significantly over the last decade. China has promoted both its soft power and hard power simultaneously in MENA in a serious bid to eclipse the West. Regarding hard power, it has increased its military presence in the region by establishing a permanent military base in Djibouti, (Sun et al. 2018) and attending joint military exercises with regional countries such as Iran (Xinhua 2019b, 30). Although this military presence is lower than U.S. military deployment in the region, this is an important shift as it is China's first strong overseas presence. Simultaneously, Beijing's soft power tools are playing an important role in introducing Chinese culture to the region and teaching the Chinese language by organizing cultural and educational exchanges between China and the MENA as well as a bridge reinforcing friendship and cooperation between China and the region.

China's rapidly growing economy and economic strategies like the BRI are sustaining its expansion of economic influence in the region while its diplomatic activities facilitate closer ties with all regional states. These two aspects of China's broad MENA strategy also balance regional sensitivities such as Saudi-Iran regional rivalry and its relations with all states. By cultivating its soft power in the region, China has begun to introduce its culture and is demonstrating that its continued rise will be peaceful—as it has been over the few decades. The subtle military presence and activities show that China does not intend to be unduly involved in regional MENA affairs. Building new partnerships or upgrading its partnership with MENA countries and establishing multilateral forums have assisted China to generally stick to its principles of nonintervention in any countries’ domestic affairs and its non-alliance policy (in favor of “partnerships”). This multilateral and inclusive diplomacy also serves Beijing's long-term financial interests in the region. China has initiated this four-pillar smart power strategy in its broad MENA strategy alongside its global foreign policy.

China's smart power strategy toward the MENA aims to maintain a delicate balance of both regional rivalries while upholding its foreign policy principles, and also the complex competition between major powers. China clearly hopes that fulfilling these challenges will enable the achievement of its foreign policy objectives, expand its economic influence in the region, and cultivate a positive image of China among MENA states. Furthermore, the strategy may enable China to play an increasingly important political role in the region's issues through its partnership and multilevel diplomacies such as FOCAC and CASCF.

China's broad MENA strategy has hitherto prevented the PRC from being embroiled in regional conflicts. The well-crafted sets of tools underpinning the smart power strategy facilitate China's constructive engagement and win-win policy with the MENA states while employing assertive diplomacy have so far enabled China to protect its regional economic and geostrategic interests while setting itself up to play a critical role in the future of politics in the region. This new strategy is pursuing not only the enhancement of the Chinese economy and geopolitical power along with balancing its relations with regional differences. It also may contribute to an inclusive, just, and comprehensive political solution of at least some of the conflicts between the MENA states and the progress of the region's economic development.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the Editor of World Affairs, Dr. Emma R. Norman, and the anonymous referees whose comments helped to improve the final quality of the text.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

About the Author

Hasan Altin is a PhD candidate at Shanghai University, College of Liberal Arts. His research interests span Chinese foreign policy, China's broad MENA strategy, the political economy of sanctions, and the use of economic statecraft as coercion or inducement. His Ph.D. research focuses on factors driving Sino-Iranian rapprochement in the context of the last decade of Cold War.

Notes

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