A CRITIQUE BY DR. NABIL KUKALI ON AN ARTICLE ENTITLED

The idea of confederation sounds tremendous, albeit it seems for the time being utopic, as the three parties still have a long way to go to see it materialized. There are many central arguments regarding such a solution. In order to review and explore this concept and cover as many elements of Ben-Meir's argument (in the spring 2022 issue of World Affairs) as could be expected under the circumstances, it is necessary to likewise incorporate thoughts from actors who support different sorts of confederations with Israel and Palestine included. Indeed, other viewpoints may be significant, even though they were not referenced directly in Ben-Meir's confederation idea.

In Ben-Meir's (2022) proposal titled “The Case for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Confederation: Why Now and How?,” the author discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and offers a solution through the creation of a confederation that would include Jordan. His goal is to establish peace by using conflict resolution techniques based on a significant level of interdisciplinarity. An initial peace deal between Israel and Palestine that leads to confederation with Jordan would not only end the most devastating conflict since World War II, but it would also have far-reaching regional consequences. Under the umbrella of confederation, Palestinians would be able to form a free and independent state and coexist with Israelis in peace and security.

The framework for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation is not viable solely as a confederation; all sides profit by it, as it would not infringe on sovereignty of the states. Rather, it would ensure the sovereignty of free states. Most examinations, as well as past talks, propose that Palestine would be demilitarized, something the ongoing Palestinian Authority (PA) has seemed able to consent to on a fundamental level. In this critique, I investigate the content of the author's study while seeking to provide a novel research viewpoint emphasizing many emic and ethical considerations addressing this issue.

Alon Ben-Meir first analyzes the historical and geographical situation of the territory under discussion before returning to a political analysis of many levels—local and international—highlighting the globalized nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict. He subsequently offers strategies to defuse the tension and enable dialogue between the warring parties, placing a priority on political-economic relationships as well as the formation of a common culture—or at least a shared memory that transcends religion. To achieve this, the author participates in an interdisciplinary study of history, political science, sociology, anthropology, and educational science. It (may) appear innovative as the article finishes by highlighting the relevance of the individual in addressing the problem and the role of residents and citizens in developing mutual understanding and eventually peaceful coexistence with each other.

Process of Reconciliation

In recent years, several proposals have advocated the establishment of an Israel-Palestine confederation as a means of resolving the issue amicably, including Michael Wolffsohn (2021, 201–205). Such a confederation would ensure equality for both states, as in a two-state solution, as well as the right of the Israeli and Palestinian people to dwell wherever they choose in the allocated areas of both nations. It would highlight a symbolic return along with compensation and/or resettlement when it comes to Jewish settlements staying in place, and provide Israeli Jews unfettered access to holy sites in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Since more than 50 years ago, attempts to form a confederation or federation between Israel and Palestine have failed. Each side's distrust and hostility toward the other constitute significant obstacles to a bipartite confederation.

Historically, confederations, particularly those comprised of two states, tend to be short-lived. The Nordic Confederation is one of the few confederal organizations to endure for decades. A future multi-state confederation between Israel, the PA, and the Arab world is becoming more improbable. Strong anti-Arab sentiments among Israeli Jews and anti-Zionistic views among Palestinians living in the occupied territories constitute one of the greatest barriers on the ground. It is impossible to imagine how frequently anti-Palestinian messianic settlers may agree to submit to the local rules of the PA.

What should be done in the interim, given that the international consensus continues to favor the two-state solution as the preferable choice but is now moribund? This has included continuous bilateral security agreements with the PA, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as multilateral cooperation on energy and the environment. While waiting for the requirements for a two-state solution to be realized, a formal multi-state collaboration may generate a new dynamic that would ultimately permit an Israel-Palestinian connection sufficiently wide and deep to make a confederation necessary.

The polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) have shown consistently that Palestinians yearn for statehood, provided that establishing an independent Palestinian state is a prerequisite for the confederation (Kukali 2021). Building more settlements and extending the already existing settlements have previously repealed such a dream. On the other hand, the Palestinian National University published poll results which showed that 42 percent of Palestinians support confederation with Jordan, while an online newspaper in Ramallah published a poll in which 76 percent of Palestinians support confederation with Jordan. Other polls have shown a noticeable increase in the Palestinians’ support for confederation with Jordan from 25 to 31 percent between 2007 and 2013, while opposition has decreased from 52 percent to 40 percent (Abu Amer 2016). If more confidence were built in the future, would Palestinians be more inclined toward the confederation? My strong conviction is that a mere political settlement will not materialize without a concomitant historical reconciliation.

I could sense some aspects of such a reconciliation in Ben-Meir's (2022, 53) proposal when he discusses joint ventures and interfaith dialogues. Toward this goal, the three parties should thoroughly learn about the religion and its practices, culture, etc., of one another. Palestinians should empathize with the Israelis in terms of security, and Israelis should empathize with the Palestinians in terms of sovereignty. As far as I am concerned, five-to-seven years is quite short to achieve reconciliation, although it is appropriate to launch the process. At least two generations would have to pass away in order to obliterate the deep scars of agony and bitterness. Unfortunately, elements of Israeli society are growing more inclined to extremism, at least to a strongly right-drifted credo, which precludes any possibility for a settlement. May 2022 saw the public eruption of racist sentiments in Jerusalem where Israeli settlers chanted “Death to the Arabs” and the “Good Arab is a dead one” (see, for example, Doyle 2022). This widens the gap between the two parties and makes a peaceful coexistence more difficult.

Also for Ben-Meir (2022, 48), school curricula on both sides should be revised in order to alter the attitudes of students. I am deeply convinced that updating school textbooks should be reciprocal and simultaneous, as opposed to the current situation in which the Europeans are forcing—in part by way of withholding EU funds to the PA (see MEMO 2022)—the Palestinians to unilaterally change their textbooks (see Salacanin 2021).

Regardless of their challenges, confederal models of government have been generally fruitful in forestalling war, settling social orders against ethnic authority or intercommunal brutality, and giving more prominent financial and social open doors. The circumstances in Belarus, the EU, and other consociational half-breed states similar to Belgium, are far more desirable over those in Israel-Palestine. While the latter is the most unalluring of these confederal mixtures, it figured out how to save the harmony for more than a quarter-century, regardless of an exceptionally tricky political framework that was intended to end a conflict, instead of functioning endlessly without changes. The principal shortcoming of confederation is the danger of political gridlock emerging along ethnic lines and of ethnic interests becoming dug in (Gofman 2020).

After 50 years of unbalanced relations, the different sides could find it unusual and hard to communicate as equals (Yaghi 2022). To make a confederation functional, the huge financial, political, and social gaps between the different sides would need to be bridged. While there is little uncertainty that a Palestinian nation would take significant monetary steps (see Ben-Meir 2022, 47), given legitimate circumstances (particularly lifting the tactical occupation), it would be close to outside the realm of possibility for it to arrive at financial equality with Israel's much more high-level economy in the medium term. This significant irregularity could create a number of problems, such as industriousness being redistributed and people migrating from poorer Palestinian regions to wealthier Israeli ones. But it is also important to remember how connected the two economies still are, and that no recipe for peace has ever suggested separating them. Also, the two economies might offer sufficient complementarity to see them through the underlying phases of the financial union. Nevertheless, under any conditions, the idea of the monetary relationship should change.

Framework for Confederation

Disagreements about the sovereignty of airspace, ocean space, borders, or even the electricity supply could be simpler to resolve when they are dealt with at the confederal level, instead of the sovereign-state level, where one side is dependent on the other. Israel would not need to share its security with an autonomous Palestinian nation since Israel would be working with that nation continually in the pertinent areas. Any county under the sovereign jurisdiction of each nation would be for the two sides, and any county under common sovereignty would be for the two sides equally. If Israel needed a direct contribution to controlling Palestine's regional waters, for instance, all regional waters ought to fall under joint sovereignty (counting Israel's) and be overseen at the confederal level. If not, Palestinian regional waters ought to be left for Palestine to make do with limited Israeli oversight.

The purpose of the proposed confederation's critical thinking is to alleviate these concerns as much as possible, notably the political situation caused by removing and relocating the settlers. Permanent residence could help ameliorate the crisis by allowing settlers to remain in their current location in the event of a peaceful settlement while retaining Israeli citizenship.

Israeli pundits of the confederation would likely lay stress on expanded security challenges because of open borders and the disintegration of Israel's Jewish character. There is little doubt that open or loosened boundaries would convolute the issue of security. In any case, this strategy should likewise be perceived in the larger setting of confederation and the positive elements that would result from a peaceful settlement. These positive elements would, for Ben-Meir, include growing potential open doors for everybody; they also tend to address Jerusalem decently and make a veritable endeavor to determine the exile issue. Confederation may not be the best way to deal with security issues, but it is clear that the proceeded subjugation and dispossession of Palestinians will not bring security to Israel and could quickly start a new cycle of instability if it is not dealt with properly.

The same is true for Israel's Jewish population, which was achieved by expelling a large number of Palestinians from their homes, erasing their memory via the destruction or repopulation of their cities, and denying Palestinian nationhood for decades. Confederation attempts to fulfill Israel's concerns regarding its Jewish citizens while also supporting evacuees and broader Palestinian rights. Could Israel be required to make some changes? Indeed, doing so would also open up potential opportunities for Israel, which would finally have the option to guarantee Jerusalem as its sovereign capital and have it recognized globally; have the stability of a constitution and super durable borders; have its residents live in the West Bank as legitimate residents; and be recognized and accepted by the Arab world.

Maintaining Israel's Democracy

The Jewish character of Israel and democracy are incompatible. Israel will have a real dilemma in combining these two concepts in one formula. It is my conviction that, if pursued, the confederation suggested by Ben-Meir (2022) would wither away the feeling of internal insecurity of the Jews and sustaining the Jewish character of the state will no longer be a top priority. One cannot really be free and secure while occupying another country. The proposed confederation would not only release Palestinians from the burden of occupation; it would also alleviate Israel of its inherent existential vulnerability and give Israelis psychological and internal peace.

Israel itself considers the Land of Israel as a single unit between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River and has ended up persisting for the past 40 years to ensure Jewish control over the entire territory. Notwithstanding this, barely any governments—and clearly none in Europe and North America—desire to see Israel transformed from a Jewish country into a democratic one comprised of the ethnically diverse, large numbers of the country's inhabitants (Scheindlin 2020).

Security

Israel is currently reluctant to even ease its security control and share parts of its future security with a free Palestinian state, which it considers either threatening or feeble and shaky. Palestine is reluctant to yield central components of its sovereignty to Israel, which it considers to be intrinsically antagonistic, forceful, and shady. Under a confederal plan, Israel could keep up with security concerns through long-lasting coordination with Palestine's security forces. At the same time, Palestine would cede some sovereignty to joint collaboration partners with Israel, rather than fully relinquishing it.

There are at least five main areas to address regarding security: outer boundaries, inside security, airspace, ocean space, and the issues regarding electricity. A significant topic of Ben-Meir's (2022, 18–23) recommendations is that a multifaceted framework between Israel, Palestine, and Jordan would potentially provide the most powerful security system. This would include joint operation coordination, information gathering, and dividing security components between Palestine and Israel, Palestine and Jordan, and Palestine and Egypt, with joint monitoring abilities for all internal and external security threats.

Under a confederation where a Palestinian state is demilitarized, the proposal suggests that outer security for Israel and Palestine would stay in the possession of Israel, for a brief time, or until Palestine's security powers could be integrated into different frameworks, for example, line watch (Ben-Meir 2022, 22). In an exemplary parcel situation, Israel's control of Palestine's security is seen as a very risky infringement of sovereignty. In a confederation, nonetheless, expanded security coordination is normal and turns out to be less intrusive. At the same time that Israel diminishes its impression and permeability, Palestine's security powers would be improved and treated as equivalent partners. Palestine's command over its outer line intersections would be an unquestionable requirement at the start, albeit the ongoing process of observing and information offering to Israel would become normal.

Ben-Meir (2022, 22–23) argues that confederation would diffuse Islamic fundamentalism, since the latter finds a fertile soil with destitution, unemployment, lack of free movement, and extrajudicial killing. Should this wither away, Islamic fundamentalism will lose the justification for its existence. I totally agree with the author in firmly standing against the odious administrative detention measures that prove much more agonizing than convicted incarcerations. Indeed, administrative detentions are extremely detrimental on both the physical and psychological levels.

Jerusalem

A plurality of Palestinians agrees with Ben-Meir (2022, 24–26) concerning a politically divided yet administratively united Jerusalem. This formula would be optimal on the political, cultural, and religious levels. Jerusalem would then constitute an ideal multicultural, multireligious, and multi-ethnic city making both Israelis and Palestinians envied by the entire world rather than being pitied, as is the case nowadays. As a reminder to the author, however, the Hashemites are not only custodians of the Muslim holy shrines, but also of the Christian holy places in Jerusalem. As evidence, a Greek priest of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem is required to acquire Jordanian citizenship according to the 1958 protocol. For over nine decades, since Hussein Bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, the Hashemites have been designated by Arab and Palestinian officials to be the guardians of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. The peace treaty has ensured that the sanctuaries remain under proper care, as a vacuum would have occurred had the treaty not been signed.

Refugees

The dilemma of refugees constitutes one of the core problems, along with Jerusalem and the border issues, and without solving this issue, a lasting peace will not prevail. As I mentioned earlier, settling the issue can be achieved through different channels. Ben-Meir (2022, 22) mentions that Palestinians in 2000, during the Camp David negotiations, were offered a golden opportunity by Israel. Yet, Arafat was incapable of conveying that offer to his people without settling the refugee dilemma forever, be that through compensation, relocation, or returning to their hometowns.

Interspersed Populations

Confederation discusses leaps that are soon-to-be accomplished and are likely to stir up tremendous ethnic tensions. These jumps would incorporate Israeli residents living under the PA, likely subject to Palestine's general set of laws, courts, and detainment facilities, as well as Palestinian outcasts getting back to enhance relations and live under Israeli law. Dealing with these changes could be hard, and people who support the confederation should be aware of the practical, material, and mental challenges that come with them. However, confederation would expect both Israelis and Palestinians to deal with their own experiences.

A change in sovereignty over the West Bank to Palestine would probably lead settlers to move willfully back to Israel, although many may find the choice to remain residents of the nation of Palestine alluring, as it would permit them to be truly associated with the place that they know as Judea and Samaria, and appreciate the opportunity afforded to them. Settlers could partake in these rights, provided they accede to and acknowledge Palestinian sovereignty. A system could be feasibly set up to remunerate Palestinians for land that was dispossessed, especially personal property, while other land proprietorship issues can be arranged.

Since settlements would remain in regions of the nation of Palestine, the infringement of countrywide regulations that the settlements comprise would not be validated. However, the basic snag to compromise would be diminished and the settlements would not be solely Jewish networks. Their framework would be accessible for public use. However, in contrast to a customary two-state game plan, where the boundary essentially moves, settlers would not be expected to become Palestinian citizens. Likewise, people from the West Bank and Gaza could live in Israel as permanent residents. Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, would remain full-fledged citizens of Israel.

Therefore, Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper, will be dealt with by both Israel and the future Palestinian state on equal footing. The Palestinians’ biggest trepidation is being shunted into a Bantustan, a jailed nation that cannot address the requirements of their kin, presently or later on. The “two-stage” move outlined in Ben-Meir's proposal may offer an exit from this snare, regardless of whether the Israeli presence is decreased, but not essentially wiped out. The Palestinians could be pushed to accept a semi-suitable nation on certain aspects, but not on the whole involved area, even if there are some regional trades. However, an agreement would depend on the condition that the global-local area guarantees the rise of a provincial confederation within a reasonable time of five-to-ten years.

In this way, while the principal stage—the foundation of a Palestinian nation in the majority of the involved land area—resolves the issue of self-determination, the subsequent stage, a territorial confederation, would address that of suitability. It would give the Palestinians a local “profundity” in which to meet their drawn-out friendly and financial requirements (Wolffsohn 2021). Considering that Palestinian requests for self-determination address an important part of the conflict, the principal phase of the confederation approach allows for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This satisfies the Palestinians’ needs for public influence, political personality, and desire to be involved in the global and local area. Statehood, in any case, does not resolve the critical issue of reasonability (Rahman 2020, 15–17). On the off-chance that it was just a nation the Palestinians required, they could have one tomorrow.

Yet, the issue is not just a Palestinian state. Ben-Meir (2022) rationally proposes that Jewish settlers remain in the West Bank while keeping both residency and citizenship in the West Bank and Israel, respectively. Why can’t Palestinian refugees return to their homes in Israel proper and enjoy dual citizenship—that is, residence in Israel and citizenship in the future Palestinian state? A common error in other confederation proposals is the tendency to draw a false equivalence between displaced people and settlers, particularly when it comes to resolving these two issues on the basis of mathematical equality—that is, allowing an equal number of exiles to return to Israel as settlers who remain in Palestine.

Jordan's Role

I strongly agree with the author in including Jordan under the canopy of the proposed confederation. Besides the many factors Ben-Meir (2022, 30–35) mentions, Jordanians (even the indigenous people of Jordan) are the closest to Palestinians in several aspects which makes it hard to tell them apart. Needless to mention that more than half of the Jordanians are of Palestinian descent. Moreover, Jordan has historically constituted the lung through which Palestinians respire. Geographically, Jordan represents the natural extension of the historic Palestine. In ancient times, the Romans transversely divided Palestine and Jordan into three “Palestinas”: Prima with its capital at Caesarea, Secunda with its capital at Scythopolis (Bet She’an), and Salutaris with its capital at Petra. Jordan has enjoyed peace with Israel informally and covertly. The 1994 agreement gave it a good nudge toward overt normalization of relations with Israel. The proposed confederation would also boost Jordan's staggering economy.

Regional Impact of Peace

When suggesting negotiating techniques, Ben-Meir (2022, 46–54) emphasizes a scale that is more local. In fact, he emphasizes the significance of halting the mutually antagonistic public narrative, establishing an economic relationship, modifying textbooks, creating integrated schools, refraining from provocative action, maintaining security cooperation, establishing healthcare institutions, and working on housing projects. The author is innovative in proposing tools used by the residents themselves on an individual level, such as the significance of mutual visitation, women's activism, joint sporting events, student interaction, art exhibitions, public discourse, interfaith gatherings, business partnerships, and the role of the media as soft power.

Following the emergence of a Palestinian state, the international community would broker a regional confederation, a loose economic association of Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon that is suggestive of the European Community before it turned into a Union. After some time, Egypt and different nations of the region could join too. The vital component of this suggestion is the capacity of all individuals from the confederation to live and work anyplace inside the confederation's limits. That breaks the Palestinians out of their jail. Instead of troubling the little rising nation with liabilities it could not in any way, shape, or form satisfy, the confederation approach distributes that weight across the whole locale.

Confederation to a great extent addresses a journey into the unexplored world. There are also a couple of instances of confederation at present, and no point of reference for the concurrent emergence of a nation from under occupation and its consolidation into a joint system with its previous occupier. Additionally, those crossbreed frameworks of administration that have confederal characteristics are sometimes cumbersome. Belarus, for example, faces constant hardships in framing a central government. The EU is regularly blamed for having forms of organization that are byzantine and over-controlled, for encroaching on the sway of its constituent states, and for being overwhelmed by its most grounded powers (Hirschberger et al. 2021). A confederation that could ultimately bring lasting peace would not only undermine Turkish and Iranian political, religious, and territorial expansionism, but would also rejuvenate and revive Arab identity and power in the area to an extent that could potentially offset spiteful and malicious plans. Due to the absence of their own project, many Arabs are now split between, and obedient to, the goals of these two nations. The proposed confederate union would improve the Arabs’ standing across the whole Middle East.

The Role of Key Players

Ben-Meir's (2022) proposal relies on a highly regarded multi-scalar analysis that echoes what other writers and political scientists have stated and his in-depth policy advice directed specifically toward the United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt is perceptive and welcome. Palestinians have customarily surmised that whenever the U.S. administration talked about a Palestinian state, it was only lip service. They were not genuine or serious in pressuring Israel to withdraw from territories or freeze building settlements despite the fact that they publicly denounce such acts. In a nutshell, Palestinians do not trust the United States as an impartial party. Palestinians may have more faith in Germany than any other nation to play an unbiased role in the war. Consequently, I agree with the author that Germany's involvement is crucial and highly valued, notwithstanding the Germans’ sense of shame and moral responsibility toward Israel.

Being the leader of the Sunni world, Saudi Arabia will certainly play an essential role in forming this confederation and in the peace process as a whole. It is my conviction that the normalization steps taken by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain would not have been possible without the Saudis’ consent. The latter believe that the normalization steps on the part of the UAE and Bahrain will one day and at the right moment pave the way for them to normalize. Real and genuine reconciliation occurs only when normalization takes place at the grassroots level in terms of the political, economic, religious, and cultural aspects.

Religious Sciences and Applied Theology in Academia: The Lack of Visibility

One key point seems to be missing from Ben-Meir's (2022) article. Using religion in the political sphere, and particularly the intellectual sphere, is often not clear. Indeed, because the Western world tends to be more visible on the academic scene and because it has been significantly influenced by the ideas of the Renaissance and especially the Enlightenment—with a clear separation between “religion” and “knowledge”—it may appear challenging for a student or researcher to reconcile religion and politics. Existing conflicts between minorities or even across nations are feared to be exacerbated by this. Religion's role in academia is an issue that often arises in contemporary discussions. Concerning the importance of research in resolving political problems, we are now seeing an interdisciplinary tendency within the social sciences, which is being adopted by religious scholarship. Consequently, it is necessary to apply the sciences of religion to the job in order to account for the emotional reality of the concerned communities. As pioneers like Panikka and Ninian Smart have emphasized, this entails forging a strong and enduring connection between the sciences of religion and theology. Stendahl, Sharma, and Baichwald’s (1992) three guidelines for healthy interreligious conversation may be summed up as follows:

When attempting to comprehend another religion, you should question its adherents and not its opponents.

Conclusion

An agreement between the two nations may have good political, economic, and social consequences that Ben-Meir's (2022) proposal discusses at length. In order to materialize them, however, it is vital to take into consideration both the ethical and emic realities by combining the local and global scales and considering the conflict’s historical baggage.

By giving pathways toward open or delicate lines, super durable residency status, and parts of shared power, a confederal arrangement of administration would open valuable doors beyond those imagined under the exemplary two-state recipe, in manners that could limit losing contests over the most immovable areas of conflict and resolve the security/sway quandary. The confederal framework will be complex, convoluted, and perplexing, and its instigators and supporters will need to be ready to endure considerable pressure and repeating strains. It will likewise request enormous calculated and viable jumps to revamp hard-to-oust frameworks of honor. Breaking the gridlock that has forestalled a resolution so far will require marshaling phenomenal degrees of outer and inward tension, combined with an enunciated governmental framework that is acceptable to a greater part of Israelis and Palestinians. While many will likely continue to voice their qualms about the possibility of confederation, the equivalent could never be said for the two-state solution, which came to hold a restraining infrastructure over peacemaking endeavors.

Currently, the discriminatory one-state reality of an Israeli state and a national authority of Palestine as a stand-alone entity, imposed by Israel, is very distressing and hurting. In addition, no resolution to the core problem is provided. Despite the likelihood that would quickly lead to more instability, it offers a critical opportunity to reconsider how Israelis and Palestinians can one day live more peacefully on shared land. At this juncture, it is imperative that its present system be improved.

Ben-Meir's concerted attempt to think past the exemplary two-state model for settling the Palestine and Israel conflict and to introduce thoughts on how policy makers and common actors can apply a confederal system later on is heartening. Given the entrenched one-state reality, the liberation of Palestinians through emancipation in a solitary popularity-based nation is the most thoughtfully clear option in contrast to many years of failed endeavors at carrying out parcels.

Notwithstanding, the confederation is more receptive to the real factors frequently ignored by one-state defenders. Moreover, it does not block a solitary majority rule nation from arising in the long term, should such a nation be perceived as plausible and valuable. Confederation can act as a useful and commonly engaging model of administration that frees Palestinians from the ongoing truth of wearisome persecution, ends further settler expansionism, weak self-assurance, and public articulation for the two sides, and addresses Israeli and Palestinian desires and complaints in a mutually blending, viable way. In doing so, the confederal approach imagines a resolution to the conflict that forestalls or—if nothing else—limits further conflict in the near future.

I hope that this will materialize on the ground so that all parties can live in peace and prosperity.