Eyeball to Eyeball: Blinking and Winking,Spyplanes and Secrets

Dino Brugioni

During the Second World War, Brugioni had flown 66 bombing and numerous reconnaissance missions, and among his various decorations was the Purple Heart (a medal John F. Kennedy was also decorated with). He was one of the original cadre of 12 people who developed the photo-analysis during the Eisenhower administration, under the leadership of Art Lundahl (to whom Brugioni dedicated Eyeball to Eyeball) who became the first director of the NPIC. Brugioni had joined the CIA as a member of a unit responsible for creating the agency’s industrial register of foreign-production facilities and became an expert on Soviet industrial installations that drew upon wartime Luftwaffe reconnaissance photography. ¹⁰ His expertise in photo-intelligence developed during the Second World War, when he worked on photo-analysis, including on allied air photography of the Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz–Birkenau.

In October 1962, Brugioni was ‘chief of a unit responsible for providing all-source collateral information to the photo-interpreters as well as managing collation and processing of intelligence data derived from the exploitation of photography acquired by various national level aerial reconnaissance programmes’. ¹¹ Afterwards, he received a citation from President Kennedy. Brugioni was intimately involved in the procedures whereby the film from the U-2s was processed, analysed and distributed. Eyeball to Eyeball draws upon his expertise and experience. It also provides personal insight: as the crisis reached its climax on 27 October, he recalled that:

Like many privy to details of the burgeoning crisis, I succumbed to the general mood of apocalypse that evening. Seeing no earthly way out of this conflict except war and complete destruction, I told my wife, that on call, she should take our two children, get in the car and head for my parent’s home in Jefferson City, Missouri. ¹²

Among Brugioni’s subsequent publications is a recent monograph on the Eisenhower administration’s development of aerial photography, Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CIA and Cold War Aerial Espionage, which appeared just short of his 90th birthday. ¹³ In addition, he has written a large number of articles on photo-intelligence for a wide variety of journals, including the CIA’s in-house Studies in Intelligence, and engaged in public discussion of his work and the role intelligence plays in politico-military decision-making. One work of interest is Photo Fakery: The History and Techniques of Photographic Deception and Manipulation, which explained techniques of photographic deception. ¹⁴ This is of note as it belies the commonplace that photographs cannot lie. Arguably, one of the ironies of the role of intelligence in the missile crisis was that so much was taken on trust. While low-level photography from United States Air Force (USAF) and United States Navy (USN) jet reconnaissance aircraft could be understood by non-experts, the high-level photography required sophisticated analytical techniques and professional expertise.

High-level photography was little more understandable to the layperson than encrypted communication intercepts would have been. Robert Kennedy later commented on the work of the photo-analysts that, ‘I for one, had to take their word for it. I examined the pictures carefully and what I saw appeared to be no more than the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a home’. ¹⁵ He was ‘relieved to hear later that this was the reaction of virtually everyone at the meeting, including President Kennedy’. Even a few days later, when more work had taken place at the photographed site, he remarked that it ‘looked like a football field’. These remarks illustrate how decision-makers felt dependent on their technical experts, though Brugioni was at pains to point out that:

there was no scraping visible on the photography, no clearing of a field, and nothing that resembled the construction of a basement. Either the untrained eyes of those present were seeing things that were not on the photography or Bobby had forgotten those things that had been pointed out by Lundahl to him and the President. ¹⁶

Deception is inextricably interwoven with intelligence. Yet when it was made public, despite attempts of Soviet and Cuban officials to dismiss the photography, the veracity of the photo-intelligence was rarely challenged. As Sherman Kent observed:

Of the millions of people of many nations who saw the pictures that fourth week of October, only a handful, and these were Photo Interpreters, knew exactly what it was they were looking at … never have so many taken so much on the say-so of so few. ¹⁷

Sources and methods

Eyeball to Eyeball draws from the author’s memory as well as newly emerging sources, including some records of meetings Kennedy held with his advisers in the White House (known after 22 October as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm)). We now have published transcripts of these meetings, which the President had secretly recorded at the White House. These have clarified various issues though debates remain about American decision-making. Indeed, the accuracy of the transcripts themselves has been a source of dispute. ¹⁸

Declassification of American documents was also gathering momentum as the book was being produced and several valuable collections of documents appeared. To mark the 30th anniversary of the crisis, the CIA History Staff produced a collection of 112 documents dealing with intelligence aspects of the crisis, ¹⁹ while in 1993, the National Security Archive published a volume of 83 documents. ²⁰ The latter, in particular, provided details of attempts by the American government to destabilise and subvert the Cuban government, in the covert action programme, Operation Mongoose. Brugioni’s examination of CIA’s covert action is mainly through the debates within the administration and the often charged arguments between the key officials, in particular, involving the Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy. Eyeball to Eyeball circumnavigates more controversial and nefarious CIA activities, including assassination planning against Castro and attempts to engage the American mafia in this task. ²¹ One insight he does provide is that CIA saboteurs were given photography from the U-2s when mounting their attacks in Cuba, and Brugioni himself was involved in assessing the effectiveness of these attacks (see the following). ²²

Brugioni frequently fails to reference his information, including quotations from individual actors. The context usually suggests that the source is a participant in the room, to whom the author had access. ²³ Sometimes, it is clear that Brugioni himself was in the room. Accounts of Art Lundahl’s meetings with the President and his advisers usually seem to come from Lundahl himself (given his tendency to recount Lundahl’s emotions and calculations). In some places, the provenance of his source is made clear. The accuracy of the accounts can now be assessed by means of published transcripts of the secret recordings made by the President.

Some dialogue in Eyeball to Eyeball does not correspond with the transcripts. For example, on the eve of his televised address to the nation on 22 October, Kennedy held a bad-tempered meeting with Congressional leaders. Brugioni provides detailed exchanges between the President and the Congressmen. Most of this appears to be based on Lundahl’s observations. ²⁴ Eyeball to Eyeball does, however, accurately convey the hostile reaction of senior senators to the blockade. William Fulbright, the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Richard Russell, the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, opposed the quarantine and supported military action. However, accounts of the exchanges between Kennedy and Representative Thomas Morgan and Senator Alexander Wiley are nowhere to be found in the transcripts or accounts in May and Zelikow’s Kennedy Tapes or Stern’s Averting ‘The Final Failure’. ²⁵ While neither exchange is of great historical significance, this inevitably calls into doubt the reliability of the source evidence, although an alternative explanation is that the discussion occurred after Kennedy turned off the tape recorder or possibly outside the rooms with the microphones. ²⁶

Eyeball to Eyeball is also written with a technicians’ eye for detail and describes the technologies and processes of photo-analysis, which Brugioni explains, involved seven different disciplines: photo-interpretation, collateral information and data processing, photogrammetry, graphics and publication support, technical analysis and distribution and courier support. ²⁷ The photographic technologies at the heart of the enterprise reflected ‘breathtaking technological advances’, including the first use of computers in the production of highly sophisticated camera lenses with higher resolution optics than before. ²⁸ Details are also provided of the preparations of Major Richard Heyser before his flight over Cuba on 14 October, including his high-protein low bulk breakfast (for which he was charged 40 cents) and crucial cockpit procedures. ²⁹ Such details add authenticity to the narrative but, more importantly, show the acute attention to detail in all aspects of the photo-analytical process.

Brugioni writes about people he knew (as well as those he did not), along with assessments of their strengths and weaknesses. For example, the reader learns of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Marshall Carter’s indulgence in practical jokes and the predisposition of the CIA’s William Harvey towards alcohol and aggression. Eyeball to Eyeball devotes a rare footnote to recount a story about a drunken Harvey holding a gun to the head of an Italian policeman who stopped him for speeding. ³⁰ Brugioni’s own encounters with Harvey were not congenial. Aerial photography disproved claims about success in various covert missions. Such vignettes also reflect the importance that Brugioni attributes to personal relationships. Mutual hostility between Robert Kennedy and William Harvey may have weakened the effectiveness of Operation Mongoose and attempts to subvert the Cuban government (though the more important reason was that the operation itself was fundamentally flawed).

Eyeball to Eyeball weaves domestic politics into the narrative and specifically members of Congress. Senator William Fulbright, for example, is quoted in June 1961 publicly asserting that if Soviet missiles were based in Cuba, he was:

not sure that our national existence would be substantially in greater danger than is the case today. Nor do I think that such bases would substantially alter the balance of power in the world today. What would substantially alter the balance of power.

Senator Fulbright believed, ‘would be precipitate action by the United States resulting in the alienation of Latin America, Asia, and Africa’. ³¹ This attitude contrasted sharply with his view on 22 October 1962, when the President shared the photographic evidence of Soviet Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) with Congressional leaders and explained his intention to blockade Cuba. Fulbright argued that the blockade was the, ‘worst of the alternatives’ and made clear he wanted, ‘an invasion, and an all-out one, and as quickly as possible’. ³²

More immediately perplexing for Brugioni and his colleagues were the public claims of Senator Kenneth Keating who declared in August 1962 that Soviet surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in Cuba. The Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, went to lengths to reassure the Senator and briefed him on aerial photography prepared by Lundahl. When McCone showed Keating the photographs, he invited the Senator to disclose his information. ‘Tell me where they are and I’ll prove to you they are not there’, he said, promising to send a U-2 over any area that Keating indicated. ³³ Whatever the source, however, as the MRBMs did not arrive until mid-September, it is clear that Keating was, for whatever reason, in error. ³⁴

One interesting theme is how administration officials were economical with the truth during the crisis and beyond. Both McNamara and Rusk lied to Congress over whether the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were in any way involved in the resolution of the crisis. ³⁵ Bundy later observed, ‘we misled our colleagues, our countrymen, our successors, and our allies’. ³⁶ When questioned about the absence of direct U-2 overflights between 5 September and 14 October, John McCone attributed this to bad weather (which had indeed prevented some overflights) rather than to decisions of the Committee on Overheard Reconnaissance (COMOR), which put concerns about the diplomatic consequences of a U-2 being shot down before intelligence collection. ³⁷

Aerial photography

The principal focus in Brugioni’s study of aerial reconnaissance is the U-2, though, as he explains, the Eisenhower administration developed four aerial platforms: the Genetrix balloons, the U-2, the SR-71 high-altitude aircraft (operational from 1964) and the Corona satellite programme (referred to by its cover name Discoverer). The U-2 was a military reconnaissance aircraft but pioneered and developed by the CIA, a civilian agency. Brugioni provides insights into this curious procurement process and attributes particular importance to the role of Richard Bissell, the CIA Deputy Director of Plans. The suggestion is that CIA outmanoeuvred the USAF, though the CIA’s own history of the programme emphasises the importance of CIA–USAF partnership. ³⁸ At the heart of CIA U-2 operations was Eisenhower’s concern that uniformed personnel flying over USSR would be an act of war. This was in contrast to the British reconnaissance missions over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact (including U-2 flights) which were flown by Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots. The commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Curtis LeMay, Brugioni explains, wanted nothing to do with unarmed reconnaissance planes and remarked that the CIA should run with the programme: ‘we’ll let them develop it and then we’ll take it away from them’. ³⁹ Responsibility for the overflight missions over Cuba was indeed handed over to SAC in October, shortly before the overflights that photographed the MRBMs.

Strategic intelligence

Eyeball to Eyeball examines the role of US aerial intelligence in dispelling the bomber and missile ‘gaps’ – the exaggerated intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities provided by the US intelligence community, both heavily influenced by the USAF. Fred Kaplan argues that a key factor in the ‘bomber gap’ was the mistaken assumptions of American analysts about bomber production based on captured Luftwaffe aerial photography. ⁴⁰ This was an area of Brugioni’s own expertise, though curiously he provides no discussion of this aspect. While Eyes in the Sky has more detail on the role of the U-2 in dispelling ‘the bomber gap’, there is again nothing on aerial photography of Soviet bomber factories.

The ‘missile gap’ generated American fears of Soviet nuclear superiority, which provoked reactions from Washington that in turn accelerated the arms race. Eyeball to Eyeball suggests that the ‘missile gap’ was dispelled by the launch of the Discover satellite in August 1960. ⁴¹ While subsequent declassification shows the general importance of US satellite photography, it does not support Brugioni’s assertion that the original launch in August 1960 (ahead of the US Presidential election campaign) was decisive in changing US estimates. Declassification of key National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) reveals that the original satellite missions did not provide adequate coverage. Various accounts make clear the problems of the US satellite programme in the period 1959–1961. ⁴² It was not until the NIE of September 1961 that the US intelligence community agreed an end to the ‘missile gap’ (albeit with opposition from USAF). ⁴³

Brugioni is critical of Kennedy’s attempts to manipulate the ‘missile gap’ issue in the Presidential campaign despite briefings from the CIA. His account further suggests that Kennedy ‘would never recant his election-year speeches … [and] … gave McNamara the task of informing the public that the missile gap did not exist’. ⁴⁴ In fact, when the Defense Secretary met the Pentagon press corps for a background briefing in February 1961, his statement that ‘there is no missile gap’ was a faux pas. ⁴⁵ McNamara indeed felt compelled to offer his resignation. The briefing took place 6 months before the US intelligence community agreed an NIE that buried the ‘missile gap’ and which led to a public declaration by the Pentagon in October that America now recognised the Soviets did not possess superiority. Instead, the United States had ‘a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first’. ⁴⁶ From Moscow, this could readily be taken as a declaration of an American first-strike capability.

Later in Eyeball to Eyeball Brugioni suggests that it was the June NIE that concluded that the ‘United States strategic forces were clearly superior to those of the Soviets and that superiority would continue to grow’. ⁴⁷ In Eyes in the Sky, while providing a more accurate account, Brugioni suggests that it was the mission flown by the third successful Corona satellite in June 1961 that changed the view of the American intelligence community. ⁴⁸ Instead, as Roger Hilsman recounts, however, the June NIE showed the US intelligence community was ‘badly split’. ⁴⁹ It was the September 1961 NIE that made clear that a, ‘sharp downward revision’ of the estimates of Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) strength was necessary as a result of three types of evidence: read-out of electronic data on Soviet missile tests; photographic coverage including of the first Soviet deployment complexes, and ‘reliable clandestine reports’ that provided ‘useful evidence on the general status and organisation of long-range missile forces’. ⁵⁰ The latter clearly referred to the espionage of Oleg Penkovsky (discussed in the following). ⁵¹ The downgrading of the Soviet threat took place as American satellite reconnaissance affected a revolution in photo-reconnaissance. Brugioni’s account of one of the crucial encounters between intelligence and policy is surprisingly weak.

Washington

One of the strengths of Eyeball to Eyeball is that it focuses on more than what is happening in Washington and examines, for example, military activities and preparations for an assault on Cuba. One of the lighter moments is an amphibious assault training exercise on Hollywood Beach near Fort Lauderdale in Florida, which ended with marines ‘fraternising with attractive girls’ while ‘others busied themselves posing for photographs in their combat gear for the tourists, while an even greater number of soldiers headed for the bars’. ⁵² Similarly, as America confronted the possibility of nuclear war, there was panic buying of various goods, including cars and atomic shelters. Rather more curious is Brugioni’s account of refrigerators, television sets and dishwashers being purchased in huge quantities. ⁵³

One of the weaknesses of Eyeball to Eyeball is the insufficient attention given to the other side of the hill. Much was emerging of Moscow’s views in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in the updated version of Eyeball to Eyeball, reference is made to the 1992 conference in Havana when revelations were made about Soviet tactical nuclear deployments in Cuba. In general, however, the book provides limited analysis of the view from Moscow. Subsequent revelations enable assessments of Soviet behaviour and have informed debates about why and how Khrushchev deployed the missiles, and why he withdrew them. Opposition in Moscow to the deployment of the missiles, for example, was limited, though Brugioni suggests that Anastas Mikoyan was one of the four key supporters of the adventure. ⁵⁴ It is now clear that Khrushchev’s deputy opposed deployment ⁵⁵ and later in the crisis objected to military action that risked conflict. ⁵⁶ Brugioni also suggests that there were ‘conservative marshalls’ who had opposed the venture. ⁵⁷ No evidence has emerged of opposition from the Soviet General Staff or other senior military figures. For those who were aware of American strategic nuclear superiority, deployments in Cuba marked an opportunity to mitigate (though not eliminate) Soviet weakness.

The Joint Chiefs

The American military looms larger in Eyeball to Eyeball. Brugioni devotes a chapter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, providing a lively account of their personalities and personality clashes. General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is presented as ‘haughty, urbane, intelligent, and eloquent’. ⁵⁸ As Kennedy’s trusted military adviser, his role reflected sensitivity to the President’s concerns. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he was responsible for representing their views to ExComm and the President. And he was also, as Brugioni explains, his own man. General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff, is depicted as volatile and aggressive, and in Brugioni’s words: ‘arrogant, zealous and narrow-minded’. ⁵⁹ When, for example, the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, interceded to negotiate verification of the withdrawal of the missiles, LeMay complained to his colleagues, ‘I told you that yellow banty-legged bastard would fuck up the works’. ⁶⁰

The tensions between LeMay and Taylor are made clear. Eyeball to Eyeball provides other episodes in relations between military and civilian leaders. There have been very differing accounts of the exchanges between Defense Secretary McNamara and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George Anderson, including over how force might be used in the blockade. Brugioni’s portrayal is sympathetic to Anderson and shows him bettering the Defense Secretary. ⁶¹ In McNamara’s account, Anderson comes off worse (a version presented in the 2001 film, Thirteen Days). ⁶² Brugioni also provides a different depiction of the Joint Chiefs’ meeting with the President when Brugioni suggests it was General Shoup, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who told Kennedy, ‘Mr President you have a problem’. May and Zelikow, and Stern, identify LeMay as the person who says ‘You’re in a pretty bad fix Mr President’, which the President laughs off. ⁶³

Most significant is Eyeball to Eyeball’s portrayal of the American military leadership’s attitude to war. The Joint Chiefs, Brugioni explains, did not believe the blockade would succeed and favoured military action. He nevertheless defends them against the charge that they were ‘war-mongers or hawks during the Crisis pressing for an invasion and air strikes which is not true. It was, however, their duty to make contingency plans for the various developments’. ⁶⁴ Certainly, military contingency planning was important and its exact significance informs key debates concerning whether Kennedy intended an attack before the discovery of the missiles and later, whether he would have gone ahead with an attack if Khrushchev had not accepted a diplomatic solution. ⁶⁵ On 1 October, McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs to prepare contingency plans for an attack on Cuba. He later maintained that this did not indicate any intent on Kennedy’s part to launch an attack. Likewise, he claimed that the American preparations for an invasion after the discovery of the missiles were preparations but not indicators of immediate intent. McNamara believed that had Khrushchev not announced the withdrawal of the missiles on 28 October, Kennedy would have pursued other diplomatic avenues. An American invasion, while a possibility, was ‘highly unlikely’. ⁶⁶

The distinction that Brugioni draws between contingency planning and advocacy of war is unconvincing. Kennedy kept the Joint Chiefs at arm’s length during the crisis, using Taylor to represent their views and interests on ExComm. Taylor had been initially cautious about the use of force but moved behind invasion upon the discovery of the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) base on 18 October. ⁶⁷ When the President first met the Joint Chiefs on 19 October, he was left in no doubt about their attitude both to the blockade and to military action. LeMay told him there was no ‘choice except direct military action’. ⁶⁸ This ‘blockade and political action’, the air force chief declared, ‘will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich’. ⁶⁹ Kennedy’s father had been Ambassador in London in the 1930s when he supported Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement. LeMay’s remark was clearly intended as personal. Admiral Anderson and General Earl Wheeler also spoke for military action in more circumspect terms (though among the Joint Chiefs, Wheeler stated, ‘I never thought I’d live to see the day when I would want to go war’ ⁷⁰ ).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained consistent in recommending the use of military force against Cuba during and after the thirteen days. One of the most decisive moments was on 27 October when Major Rudolf Anderson’s U-2 was shot down by a surface-to-air missile (SAM), and the pilot killed. Kennedy took the decision not to retaliate against Soviet SAM sites. Brugioni recounts that when told not to launch retaliatory strikes, LeMay remarked angrily, ‘He chickened out again’. ⁷¹ Indicative of the attitude of the Joint Chiefs was their response to Khrushchev’s announcement on 28 October that he would withdraw the MRBMs (when the world, rather prematurely, celebrated the end of the crisis). The Joint Chiefs argued that unless there was ‘irrefutable evidence’ that the missiles were being dismantled, the United States should proceed with air strikes. ⁷² Maxwell Taylor, who had otherwise supported an invasion, distanced himself from this recommendation. There can be no doubt that the Joint Chiefs were hawks (even if Taylor was a less bellicose species of Accipitrinae than the others).

Yet one aspect that Eyeball to Eyeball rarely mentions (like most accounts of the crisis) is the prospect of nuclear war with the Soviets and how it would be waged. In none of the ExComm meetings, nor in any other declassified record, is there discussion of how America might launch nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union, either in a pre-emptive strike or in ‘a full retaliatory response’ threatened by the President in his televised speech of 22 October. McNamara recounts that he did not discuss with the President what to do if there was a nuclear attack from Cuba: ‘… we never discussed it. We should have, but we didn’t’. ⁷³ Brugioni’s depiction of LeMay provides chilling reminders of a man who had opposed atomic bombing Japan on the grounds that his B-29s could finish the job just as effectively, and who was to achieve lasting notoriety for his desire to ‘bomb North Vietnam into the Stone Age’. ⁷⁴ In October 1961, Kennedy had taken a close interest in how a nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union could be launched. ⁷⁵ Yet, curiously, at the moment in the Cold War when likelihood of nuclear war was greatest, there is no evidence it was discussed at the highest echelons of government. In that sense, to quote Sherlock Holmes in The Hound of the Baskervilles, the bomb was, ‘the dog that did not bark in the night’.

Whether it needed to bark, and how and why Khrushchev chose to draw back from the brink, remain crucial in understanding the outcome of the crisis as well as understanding the role of nuclear deterrence in October 1962. Brugioni’s account cannot tell us much here for the reason that Eyeball to Eyeball is an American view of the American crisis. The Soviet (and Cuban) view (or rather views) receives little treatment. Much recent work on the Soviet side emerged only after the publication of Eyeball to Eyeball. ⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the resolution of the crisis provides an opportunity to explore Brugioni’s method and analysis. In Washington, 27 October, marked the climax of events, as ExComm wrestled with Khrushchev’s various messages and his public demand to include the Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey in any deal. As this debate continued, news arrived that Major Anderson’s U-2 had been shot down. Eyeball to Eyeball draws upon various sources including Robert Kennedy’s, Thirteen Days, as well as the recollections of an unnamed intelligence officer to whom the Attorney-General confided (and who confided to Brugioni). ⁷⁷ New evidence has emerged about the resolution of the crisis and generated new debate. In 1989, for example, Theodore Sorensen admitted that he deliberately falsified Thirteen Days (when it was published after Robert Kennedy’s death) to preserve the idea that President Kennedy and his brother had not traded the missiles in Cuba for American missiles in Turkey. ⁷⁸ Brugioni alludes to this ‘unpublished deal’ that went ‘above and beyond the “no invasion of Cuba” pledge’, ⁷⁹ which in his preface, he condemns as ‘completely gratuitous’. ⁸⁰

Brugioni does not examine the implications of these revelations for understanding Kennedy’s handling of the crisis. Instead, he emphasises the importance of the ‘ultimatum’ Robert Kennedy delivered to the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, on the evening of 27 October. After the meeting, Robert Kennedy reported to Dean Rusk:

I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. ⁸¹

Bundy believed that while the assurance on the Turkish withdrawal was useful, it was, ‘far less important than the stick that Robert Kennedy carried to Dobrynin: the threat of further action within days’. ⁸² Brugioni’s account thus accords with Bundy’s view.

Evidence from Soviet records includes the telegram Dobrynin sent to Moscow explaining what Robert Kennedy said to him. ⁸³ This accords with Sorenson’s confession and explains that the Attorney-General made clear the missiles would be removed from Turkey only if the undertaking remained secret. ⁸⁴ Dobrynin reported that the Attorney-General had indeed said that the US government was determined to get rid of the bases even, ‘up to, in the extreme case, of bombing them’. ⁸⁵ Having outlined the Turkish assurance, Robert Kennedy ‘requested’ a reply by the following day while emphasising that, ‘it is just that – a request, and not an ultimatum’. ⁸⁶ Dobrynin accordingly reported back to Moscow that the Americans were not presenting an ultimatum. Historians nevertheless remain divided over whether Robert Kennedy delivered an ultimatum to Anatoly Dobrynin, and with what effect. ⁸⁷

Intelligence

The story of US intelligence and the missile crisis has emerged as the story of the crisis itself has taken shape through reflection, revelation and debate. ⁸⁸ In 2003, James Blight and David Welch, two pre-eminent writers on the crisis, provided the most comprehensive assessment of the role of intelligence including an authoritative and forensic analysis of American intelligence by Raymond Garthoff. ⁸⁹ Blight and Welch observe that the then existing literature on intelligence in the crisis while ‘fascinating and important’ was nevertheless ‘overwhelmingly narrow and technical’. ⁹⁰ Brugioni’s Eyeball to Eyeball, they noted, provided the ‘best and most detailed treatment’. ⁹¹

Other histories by participants have illuminated the interface between intelligence and policy. In 1964, Roger Hilsman, Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, published an account of intelligence and foreign policy under Kennedy that provided an early evaluation of US intelligence in the crisis. To Move a Nation also provided details of one of the more dangerous moments when, on the night of 26/27 October, an Alaskan-based SAC U-2 on a high-altitude air sampling mission flew off course into Soviet air space. There was a concern in Washington that Moscow might believe the aircraft was flying reconnaissance ahead of a US first strike (as American nuclear war planning envisaged) and decide to fire their ICBMs before they could be destroyed. The moment was described by Hilsman as the ‘Strangelove incident’ (after Stanley Kubrik’s then recently released black comedy). ⁹² In 1992, Scott Sagan published revelations that when SAC realised the U-2 was in danger, US fighters were scrambled in support. Owing to the prevailing DEFCON nuclear alert state, these were carrying air-to-air missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads that were not equipped with electronic locks (known as Permissive Action Links). ⁹³

Rather surprisingly, given its emphasis on U-2 missions, Eyeball to Eyeball contains nothing of note on this episode. Other dimensions of intelligence also receive scant attention. Mention is made of the USS Oxford, the electronic surveillance vessel operating off Cuba in international waters. Otherwise, signal intelligence remains hidden from view (including in the dispelling the missile gap). ⁹⁴ Brugioni does examine human intelligence and the agents and refugees whose reports were processed at the CIA-military station at Opa-Locka in Florida. Disentangling potentially accurate information from the much larger number of false sightings proved a formidable problem for the CIA. After the crisis, John McCone reported to the President that of 3500 agent and refugee reports, ‘only eight in retrospect were considered as reasonably valid indicators of the deployment of offensive missiles to Cuba’. ⁹⁵ Nevertheless, several of these were of great importance in identifying the San Cristobal site as a target for aerial reconnaissance. Humint did play a role. Here, Brugioni is dismissive of claims that trapezoidal configuration of the U-2s at San Cristobal alerted the intelligence community to the MRBM deployment. ⁹⁶

Arguably, the most significant humint involved Oleg Penkovsky, an agent run by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the CIA from within Soviet Military Intelligence. Brugioni describes this as ‘one of the most productive intelligence operations in history’, which provided information on Soviet weapons and strategy. Penkovsky provided no warning of the Soviet deployment and was arrested on 22 October in Moscow, thus precluding any possible involvement as the crisis went public. Establishing which missile system was being deployed by the Soviets was important and Brugioni makes clear Penkovsky’s information assisted identification of the R-12 (SS-4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation) though the principal source for the photo-interpreters was the collection of photographs taken at military parades in Moscow. Roger Hilsman’s conclusion in The Cuban Missile Crisis was that the photo-interpreters had much of the material they needed to recognise the MRBMs from photography but that Penkovsky’s information ‘made their task much easier’. ⁹⁷

Various studies of Penkovsky’s role had emerged by the time Eyeball to Eyeball appeared. ⁹⁸ Subsequent work by Schechter and Deriabin, in The Spy Who Saved the World, argued the crucial importance of Penkovsky’s espionage during the missile crisis. ⁹⁹ Richard Helms, then CIA Deputy Director for Plans, believed that he provided intelligence that enabled accurate assessments of when the MRBMs were ready to fire. ¹⁰⁰ This, it was argued, was crucial to Kennedy’s decision-making. McGeorge Bundy, on the other hand, was adamant that ‘Penkovsky had no discernible relation to the real assessments and actions of the United States government in the missile crisis’. ¹⁰¹ Eyeball to Eyeball, however, provides little help in assessing these bolder claims about Penkovsky’s espionage and does not illuminate or adjudicate on the importance of his role in assessing the readiness of the MRBMs. ¹⁰²

The publication of Hilsman’s To Move a Nation in 1964, so soon after the crisis, illustrates American attitudes to disclosure and declassification which American writers invariably take for granted. While Hilsman’s early account is incomplete, it successfully identifies key aspects in the relationship between intelligence and decision-making. Hilsman’s 1996 book is a more systematic and reflective account of the crisis, which emphasised the role of intelligence. Other former officials also contributed to understanding and debate. ¹⁰³

Many aspects of American intelligence did not need to wait for declassification. Much was publicly known at the time, most importantly about the aerial photography. This was made famous in the confrontation between US Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, and his Soviet counterpart, Valerian Zorin, in the United Nations Security Council on 25 October. American photographs of the Soviet missiles were brought into the Security Council and displayed on large boards. Photographs had already been released to the media in London as a result of a breakdown of communication with the embassy. ¹⁰⁴ They were then made available to the American media despite Defense Secretary McNamara’s previous refusal to release them on grounds of national security. ¹⁰⁵ Revealing sources and methods in intelligence is generally regarded as anathema. Yet the United States chose to put political presentation of its case above an axiom of intelligence practice. It remains one of the most successful uses of secret intelligence to inform public opinion (and public opinion across the world).

The Soviets had obtained details of the U-2’s photographic capabilities when Gary Powers’ plane was shot down in May 1960 and its cameras seized. It remained a mystery why, given their awareness of the U-2s, the Soviet military were so inept at camouflaging the missiles in Cuba. The American decision to publish the source of their intelligence reflected understanding of the potential impact on public opinion. It also reflected a very different attitude to sharing secret intelligence with opinion-formers outside government. Brugioni recounts how when Powers’ U-2 was shot down, and the four-power Paris summit in May 1960 was abandoned, there was a hostile reaction in Congress. Allen Dulles decided that Lundahl would brief the Senate on the U-2 programme to defuse the situation (which he did). ¹⁰⁶ On other occasions, Congressional figures were shown aerial photography, and some was shown to the press. ¹⁰⁷ This attitude to disclosure was in stark contrast to that of the National Security Agency, which made no attempt to brief or inform the Congressional leadership on its activities. ¹⁰⁸ Brugioni also explains that when Powers’ plane was shot down, General de Gaulle was briefed. ¹⁰⁹ Most importantly, in October 1962, Kennedy despatched emissaries to his four principal NATO allies (Macmillan, de Gaulle, Adenauer and Diefenbaker) who on 22 October showed them the photographs of the missiles. ¹¹⁰

Brugioni’s account traces the development of the U-2 programme and its role in overflights over the Soviet Union and, of course, Cuba. Chris Pocock, a specialist British writer, published a detailed account of the U-2 operations in 1989. ¹¹¹ Subsequently, other collections and accounts have emerged to provide detailed and authoritative histories of U-2 operations, notably the CIA’s official history of the U-2 ¹¹² and Chris Pocock’s later book, 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete History of the ‘Dragon Lady’. ¹¹³ The first U-2 mission in August 1956, however, was flown over the Middle-East, where Britain and France were soon conspiring with Israel to attack Egypt. ¹¹⁴ Brugioni thus provides an interesting example of allies ‘spying’ on each other. In the case of the British, the Americans were ‘spying’ on an ally who not only enjoyed close collaboration in signal intelligence, and on occasions humint and covert action, but also played an important role in U-2 operations. As Brugioni infers, U-2 operations were mounted from British bases, and RAF pilots trained to fly U-2s over the Soviet Union. ¹¹⁵ Any accusation of duplicity against the Eisenhower administration, it should be added, should be set in the context of the more intricate web of intrigue and deceit that underpinned British, French and Israeli efforts to disguise their joint conspiracy to attack Egypt, including calculated attempts to mislead Washington.

Intelligence failure? Intelligence success?

The concept of intelligence failure is a pervasive (and arguably unhelpful) way of exploring intelligence. The Cuban missile crisis appears an example of both intelligence failure and intelligence success. The failure was the estimative failure to predict Khrushchev’s deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba, contained in a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of 19 September 1962, completed a matter of days after the Soviet MRBMs arrived in Cuba. Brugioni provides interesting insights, including that the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, Sherman Kent, apparently told his staff that if he had to go back and do it all again, he would reach the same conclusion. ¹¹⁶ One factor in Kent’s error, Brugioni suggests, was the assumption that the Soviet embassy in Washington was providing sound advice back to Moscow on the likely American reaction. The embassy contained some of the best Soviet intelligence officers, Kent believed. ‘“Dobrynin”, Kent said, “was no dummy to the West and he certainly must have been warning Khrushchev on the dangers of a U.S. riposte if the Soviets place offensive missiles in Cuba”’. ¹¹⁷ According to Brugioni, Kent believed that Soviet intelligence officers had been guilty of telling the Soviet leadership what they wanted to believe. In fact, it is now accepted that Dobrynin knew nothing of Operation Anadyr until he learned of the missiles from Dean Rusk on 22 October. Moreover, Fursenko and Naftali provide a picture of Soviet decision-making under Khrushchev in which the KGB played virtually no role in advising the Kremlin on Soviet-American affairs, and where Khrushchev remained his own intelligence analyst. ¹¹⁸

The success lay in the widely held view that CIA had a good crisis. Brugioni’s account prior to the discovery of the missiles focuses more on the U-2s than on Kent’s analysts and shows the debates within the Kennedy administration (in COMOR) about the overflights. Roger Hilsman had previously provided a brief description, which explained concern at the possible shooting down of the U-2 (reinforced by the loss of a Nationalist Chinese U-2 over the People’s Republic of China), but navigated around decisions not to overfly Cuba in September. Eyeball to Eyeball discusses the arguments, which took place in the absence of John McCone who had chosen to spend nearly a month on honeymoon in France. Attempts were made to attribute the problem to the weather. Brugioni argued that, ‘It wasn’t the weather but rather the dereliction, bumbling, and intransigence of Rusk and Bundy that kept the U-2s from flying over Cuba and learning about the missiles far earlier than 14 October’. ¹¹⁹

Known unknowns

The U-2s discovered six MRBM and two IRBM sites in Cuba. Thirty-three MRBMs were detected (the arrival of the IRBMs having been prevented by the blockade). The US intelligence community remained exercised about the whereabouts of the missile warheads. When asked by the press on the 22 October whether there were nuclear warheads in Cuba, McNamara replied, ‘We don’t know’. ¹²⁰ Nuclear warheads, he said:

were of such a size that it is extremely unlikely we would ever be able to observe them by the intelligence means open to us. I think it is almost inconceivable, however, there would be missiles … without the accompanying warheads. ¹²¹

Brugioni recounts discussions about whether warheads could be flown into Cuba on long-range Soviet aircraft or transported in submarines. ¹²²

When the photographs were first shown to Kennedy on 16 October, McNamara argued that the absence of a fence at the missile site indicated the warheads had not arrived. ¹²³ The US intelligence community subsequently hunted for nuclear warhead storage bunkers. It was only after the crisis, Brugioni explains, that re-analysis of the photography, including of the 14 October mission provided evidence of nuclear warhead storage vans, as well as other equipment for handling warheads. ¹²⁴ Most recently, Michael Dobbs provided a series of revelations about Soviet nuclear warheads, which he depicts as failures on the part of CIA. ¹²⁵ The central nuclear storage bunker was near Bejucal. This was initially identified by the CIA as the best candidate for nuclear storage but subsequently dismissed. The absence of stringent security disguised the site, though Dobbs maintains the identification of the nuclear storage vans should have alerted the photo-interpreters. Brugioni explains that it was assumed the warheads were under control of the KGB and stored in separately controlled and secured areas. ¹²⁶

The Director of Central Intelligence reported to the President on the operational condition of the MRBMs and when they could be ready to fire. Initially, for some, including McNamara, this was crucial in any decision to attack them. Once they were ready to fire, McNamara suggested, the risk of launch under attack precluded an American pre-emptive (or rather preventive) strike. By 20 October, the Director of the CIA told ExComm that the first eight launchers had at least limited operational readiness. By 27 October, 24 launchers were deemed operational. Whether decision-makers understood operational readiness in the same terms as the CIA is unclear. It was only with Michael Dobbs’ account that we learned that on the afternoon of 27 October, eight warheads from Bejucal arrived at the MRBM site at Calabazar de Sagua. ¹²⁷

Unknown unknowns?

Disclosure in 1992 that tactical nuclear warheads had been deployed in Cuba came as a shock to many officials, including Robert McNamara. It is now accepted that there were some 100 warheads for a variety of weapons – short-range ballistic missiles, Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and air-delivered free-fall bombs. The Ilyushin-28 medium-range jet bombers were first identified on 28 September, en route at sea to Cuba in crates. Though they were understood to be nuclear-capable and had the range to reach Florida, Kennedy was prepared to live with them. American insistence on their removal arose only after Khrushchev’s announcement of the withdrawal of the MRBMs on 28 October. This was a political decision by Kennedy that did not reflect an intelligence reappraisal of whether they were armed with nuclear weapons. Indeed, while some of the bombers were assembled, the nine maritime strike aircraft configured to carry free-fall nuclear bombs (of which there were six) did not leave their crates on Holguin airbase in Eastern Cuba. ¹²⁸

The GLCMs also arrived in crates. Brugioni provides what Garthoff calls the best account of US intelligence’s identification of Soviet cruise missiles, which resulted in a report to the President in September that coastal defence cruise missiles were being deployed. ¹²⁹ It is now clear that while the Soviets had sent Sopka (SSC-2 NATO designation) coastal defence missiles that did not have a nuclear capability, they had also despatched FKR-1 GLCMs. US analysts mistook the latter for the former. Eighty nuclear-capable missiles arrived, as did their warheads. And as Michael Dobbs dramatically shows, some of these were forward-deployed with warheads mounted to missiles, as they moved to prepared firing positions in range of the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay. ¹³⁰

Brugioni does makes reference to Soviet tactical ballistic missiles – the Lunas (NATO designation FROG) – whose deployment in Cuba was first publicly revealed in 1992 by General Anatoli Gribkov, one of the Soviet General Staff officers involved in planning the operation. ¹³¹ It has been suggested that US intelligence failed to recognise the battlefield nuclear missiles, though David Coleman has argued that American military and political leaders were aware of them after one was photographed on 25 October by a USN F8U Crusader on a low-level photo-reconnaissance mission. ¹³² The Luna was dual-capable, and the President was briefed the following day.

It has been argued that the estimative failure of the CIA and the US intelligence community to predict the deployment of the MRBMs was of no great significance as it had no bearing on the agency’s search for Soviet missiles. ¹³³ What of the failure to identify tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba? The weapons played no significant role in the crisis or its resolution. Khrushchev took the decision in December to withdraw the FKR-1s and Lunas as quietly as they had been deployed. The suggestion that the intelligence failure was significant rests on the possibility that Kennedy considered (or might have considered) invasion. Even then, an American invasion would not necessarily have led to nuclear war. Khrushchev had given orders that no nuclear weapons were to be used without his authorisation. Whether those orders would have been obeyed in battle remains an unanswerable question. Whether Soviet nuclear weapons or their crews would have survived an American attack also remains unanswerable.

Among the more dramatic discoveries about Soviet nuclear deployments have been the revelation that Soviet diesel-electric submarines, despatched from the Northern Fleet at the beginning of October, were carrying nuclear ordnance. ¹³⁴ Each of the four Type-641 boats (NATO designation Foxtrot) was carrying a nuclear-armed torpedo alongside their conventional armaments. The 40th anniversary of the missile crisis saw the testimonies of Soviet submariners that on at least one boat, the captain was close to firing the nuclear weapon at the US warship that was dropping explosive devices to get them to surface. Brugioni provides important information on what some might consider a potentially disastrous American intelligence failure. He notes that the Foxtrots had been assessed to be capable of firing a nuclear torpedo. ¹³⁵ He also correctly explains, contrary to various accounts, that Soviet submarines surfaced because of ‘foul air and uncharged batteries’ rather than American naval action. ¹³⁶ No evidence has emerged of any American assessment that the submarines being depth-charged might be armed with nuclear weapons that the commanders might have authority to fire. Certainly, there was no intimation of such scenarios in ExComm on 24 October when the improvised procedures for enforcing the blockade were the subject of lively debate, including between Defense Secretary McNamara and the President. ¹³⁷

Conclusion

‘When we were eyeball to eyeball, the other fellow winked’, quipped Curtis LeMay in a rare moment of polite wit. ¹³⁸ The General was exercised over stalled attempts to negotiate the removal of Soviet nuclear forces including the Ilyushin-28 bombers from Cuba. He was far more than exercised at the outcome of the crisis as a whole. For LeMay and other hawks, the crisis was a lost opportunity to deal with Castro and strike a decisive blow against communism in Latin America. Brugioni does not share this belligerent view, though, equally, he does not agree with Kennedy’s ‘no invasion pledge’ or the negotiation of a discrete withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey. Nevertheless, for Brugioni, neither aspect detracts from Kennedy’s principal achievement of getting the missiles out of Cuba without a war.

Like many American books on the Cold War, Eyeball to Eyeball is an American book about the American Cold War. Unlike many such books, it is not exclusively about political leaders and their decisions. It is also a pioneering account of photo-intelligence under Eisenhower and Kennedy. The insider’s story provides much intrinsically fascinating detail about a form of intelligence that the United States sought to perfect and whose value in October 1962 was literally there for everyone to see. In places, the insight comes without perspective or rather without insight into other perspectives. Some of this reflects unwillingness to engage more systematically with the literature (a tendency with many insiders), which admittedly was burgeoning as an avalanche of publications and revelations about the crisis was forthcoming. Eyeball to Eyeball nevertheless remains a highly readable account of the crisis and the organisation of photo-intelligence, its procedures, technologies and challenges and an essential referent point for writers on the crisis (including this author) on matters of American intelligence. Yet the suggestion that Khrushchev blinked while Kennedy remained resolute remains open to question. Whether Kennedy’s willingness to trade NATO’s missiles in Turkey was important in the outcome or whether Khrushchev was already retreating is still an issue. What is clear is that Kennedy also blinked. And when the Jupiter IRBMs were removed from Turkey and Italy in 1963, and Khrushchev kept his silence, both sides winked too.