Democracy and world order: reflections on critical scholarship today

The previous (re)-examinations of democracy promotion are underlined by an interest in how democracy promotion has changed in the context of a changing world political (and economic) order. This is an important question to examine today, for, if indeed democracy promotion was and is a creation of a liberal internationalist ideology and world order, democracy promotion’s fate is in many ways a key test case for the evolution of the liberal world order. This order was firmly in place in the early 1990s when democracy promotion became institutionalized as a foreign policy agenda, not only by the United States but also by a number of international organizations, from the IFIs to the EU and the United Nations. But given that many developments have taken place in this world order, it is not insignificant to ask: what has changed, if anything, in the nature, modes and motivations of democracy promotion and what does this tell us of the current state and the future of the world order?

The authors come to somewhat different conclusions on this question. William Robinson recognizes that some shifts have taken place in democracy promotion, but in essence holds on to his view, described in detail in Promoting Polyarchy, that democracy promotion both in the 1990s and today is a tool of consensual hegemony. He notes not only that this practice still seeks to de-radicalise and disenable meaningful grass-roots democratization but also that it does so in order to stabilize a very specific kind of politico-economic order: a neo-liberal one. In essence, despite pragmatic adjustments and inclusions, little has changed. A capitalist project of consensual domination is played out through democracy promotion – in Arab Middle East today just as in Nicaragua in the 1980s.

Although Robinson has not changed his view, Jeff Bridoux and Rita Abrahamsen disagree with his reading. Bridoux notes that even in United States’ democracy promotion, various different conceptual premises have been played out, reflecting the oscillations and variations in American thinking on what democracy promotion and indeed ‘democracy’ entail. Although the Bush and Reagan years saw the ascendancy of a neo-liberal model of democracy and democratization, this model is not reflective in a straightforward way either of 1950s state-building projects in Germany or Japan, or today’s Obama administration’s efforts to redirect both American domestic and foreign policy thinking. Bridoux’s account raises questions as to the plausibility of Robinson’s reading of American democracy promotion. It raises questions about the ‘firmness’ of the ‘liberal’ conceptual foundations of it, and raises the possibility of different types of American democracy support in the context of the current world order – one that is more sensitive to the problems generated for democracy by capitalism. This is despite the fact that stability – if not unilaterally neo-liberal stability – is, Bridoux agrees, the end game of United States’ democracy promotion.

Rita Abrahamsen notes some even deeper shifts in democracy support. She draws attention to the shift towards new modes of democracy support altogether. The conditionality of the 1990s is, she admits, not the cornerstone of democracy promotion of the IFIs today. Instead, new modes of ‘self-responsibilisation’ and partnership- and consultation-based democracy assistance are now the name of the game. Instead of specifying for recipients blueprints on governance reform, the IFIs now put in place various poverty reduction matrices that seek to enable African states to willingly commit themselves to best practices, self-monitoring and thus participatory democratic development. Yet, even as more possibilities for meaningful participation are opened up, Abrahamsen also refers to the continuities that persist: notably, the continuation of a regime of truth in which IFIs seek to convince and persuade African states to pursue governance reform the ideals of which are set out in management guidance. Democracy is then still ‘disciplined’ even if in new and interesting ways.

Jessica Schmidt goes perhaps the furthest of all in pointing to crucial shifts in democracy promotion. She points out that the EU’s promotion of institutions and elections has in today’s context moved towards something quite new: encouragement of viable local management. Thus, not only is democracy a holistic aim, which bridges various policy agendas, but also its promotion is not about ‘blueprints’ at all anymore, it is rather about local management of challenges in politico-economic spheres. Stability may be the aim, but Schmidt suggests that this managerialization of democracy support is in fact reflective of the removal of emancipatory and political content of democracy from democracy support.

These interventions are important, and they chime with my own research on this topic, which has sought to examine the shifts and dynamics in conceptual premises of democracy promotion. The ‘Political Economies of Democratisation’ project based at Aberystwyth has noted numerous shifts in democracy promotion over the last 10–15 years. The project team has traced various shifts in democracy promotion and attached anti-corruption efforts. These include the following:

Opening up of the meaning of ‘liberal democracy’ in democracy promotion to exploration of various non-neo-liberal and extra-neo-liberal conceptions of democracy by democracy promotion agents. Reform liberalism as well as classical and neo-liberal forms of democracy are now, it seems, promoted, even if in somewhat unsystematic and far from clear-cut and thought-through ways.

Shifts in modalities of democracy promotion are evident. Managerial and depoliticized forms of discourse are now predominant. Thus, instead of promoting ideological models of democracy and blueprints, there has been a shift in ‘management’ practices which are now often reliant on self-responsibilisation of democratic agents, as the key site where democracy’s content is defined.

There has been a move to inclusion of various different types of actors within the global democracy promotion forces. Thus, NGOs and international institutions, not just individual states and their foreign services, are now involved in democracy promotion. These moves have both opened up democracy’s meaning and the content of democratization policies, as well as having, in somewhat subtle and complex ways, limited the nature and extent of debate on democracy’s varied and contested meanings through co-optation of previously critical and radical actors within the democracy promotion effort.

Inclusive and state capacity–enhancing efforts are central to democracy support today. Far from simply promoting institutionalization of elections or party politics – procedural democracy – civil society is now a key site of democratization. At the same time, the state’s capacity to regulate and positively encourage market liberalization has been seen as central to democratization’s success. It is not the case that minimal laissez-faire states are the end point of democratization, but rather that the active encouragement of workable, viable and thus protected and locally functional forms of governance are promoted. ¹

The project has found that far from being unchanged, democracy promotion practitioners have shifted their practices to accommodate changes in the liberal world order. No longer is ideological commitment to liberal ideals strong and unequivocal; rather, ideological belief in liberal democratic principles has gone in many respects into hiding behind managerial and technical language of governance reform. This shift to ‘small-l liberalism’ is important to note for it shows not only that liberal world order practices are shifting today but also that liberal world order can be maintained through modes not in line with the Big-L liberal provocations. ²

The recent critical studies then demonstrate the importance of recognizing shifts in democracy promotion practice in today’s world order. They call for attention for more detailed theoretical and empirical research into democracy promotion agendas and practices. Without resolving the issue of what democracy promotion is ‘about’ today, they raise (at least) four crucial questions that need further investigation in the years to come:

Questions of intentionality. Robinsonian account implies or assumes there to be some level of strategic or tactical intentionality to the modes of democracy support engaged in. It is implied, for example, civil society assistance to specific actors, is intentionally planned to provide specific kinds of assistance in support of specific kinds of stability. This implied intentionality, and the existence of a clear strategic, or even ideological, end game is called into question by some of the recent critical studies. Instead, Foucauldian governmentality logics are turned to by Schmidt, Abrahamsen and Kurki, for example, to explain ‘what motivates’ democracy promotion. These studies implied that there may not be a clear intentionality at all to the type of democracy support engaged in. What this tells us of democracy promotion and world order is an important question, for it raises the possibility that we may increasingly live in a ‘hollow hegemony’ characterized not by ideologies, capitalist forces or interests, but rather by technical and technocratic managerialism. ³

Nature of ‘liberalism’. The recent studies indicate the need to study in detail what liberalism and liberal world order actually means today. We need to appreciate the flexibility and dialogical nature of liberal thought, and seriously consider the internal shifts and adjustments possible within liberal thought and liberal world order practices. Democracy promotion policy, for example, demonstrates the ability of liberal practitioners to revisit, adjust and amend their ‘assumptions’ as well as practices in ways which fit, and redirect, foreign policy initiatives.

Question of coercion versus consent. Democracy promotion has moved away from harsh forms of conditionality towards ‘incentive-based’ matrices, peer groups and best practices. This means that neither coercive force nor conditionality on a knife’s edge is seen any longer as a central plank of democracy promotion. More subtle mechanisms of governance are turned to today. It is important to study in detail how these mechanisms function exactly and what their effects are.

Question of actorship. Recent scholarship highlights the need to study various democracy promoters and their differential roles in the promotion of democracy. Thus, appreciating the role of NGOs and international organizations, and the global ‘consensus’ on democracy support is now important. No longer are singular states ‘in charge’ of democracy assistance or support, but rather they are networked in complex ways with international NGOs (INGOs), NGOs, political foundations, parties, international organizations and advocacy organizations. This is not even to mention the rise of new actors in democracy assistance, such as regional organizations, emerging powers and sub-state actors. Paying attention then to who the actors are and how they are networked, linked and are co-operating is important in understanding democracy promotion, and the liberal world order of a more diffuse form, today.

Much then remains to be studied and interrogated for critical democracy promotion scholars. This forum has sought to review current literature but also to invite further debate and work on democracy promotion in the context of a changing world order. It is hoped that the reflections here prompt new empirical and theoretical lines of inquiry in an area of highly topical nature today.