Coalition building in the UN Security Council

Coalitions and International Relations theory: towards an interpretation of global change

Coalitions have attracted little attention in International Relations theory. Nevertheless, many IR theorists have referred to their presence, indirectly explaining aspects of their formation, persistence and change. Realists’ anarchy assumption makes long-term coalitions in the international system highly improbable and coalition formation within institutions irrelevant. ⁷ However, their focus on group solidarity within a polity explains the internal cohesion that can be generated within a coalition as a result of competition with other groups. ⁸ According to neoliberal institutionalists, institutions gain their own agency, so institutional dynamics prevail over power differences and coalitional dynamics. ⁹ However, it is the proliferation of multilateral institutions and the adoption of majority voting that has made evident an increase in the formation of coalitions. ¹⁰ Constructivists pay no attention to coalitions, but their focus on the construction processes of amity and enmity, and on states’ redefinition of national interests following the socialisation process and the internalisation of the norms of functioning of multilateral institutions, can explain the persistence of coalitions, once these are formed. ¹¹ Hegemonic theorists are more explicit about the importance of coalitions: the distribution of power among competing coalitions decides who will govern the international system and whose interests will be favoured. ¹² The ‘right to rule’ depends on victory in an hegemonic war and the resulting constitution of an order, which remains stable only for as long as the distribution of power remains the same, so the military dimension of coalitions remains prevalent. More emphasis on the political dimension of coalitions is placed by global leadership theorists: coalitions are crucial in the processes leading to structural changes and are aimed at finding organisational and institutional forms that are more responsive to global problems. The mechanism of change is a probabilistic learning process that allows the search for, and exploration, selection and amplification of, strategies. According to this perspective, the global political system is based on global leadership (or hegemony), but, deeply influenced by the dissemination of democratic practices and the emerging of a world public opinion, new forms of global institutions whose agenda is centred on building a democratic base for global governance have gradually been introduced. ¹³

The introduction and diffusion of multilateral practices and institutions is particularly relevant in the process of building a democratic base for global governance. Multilateralism as an institutional innovation emerged in the nineteenth century, consolidated and gained legitimacy over time to the point of becoming ‘politics as usual’. ¹⁴ This institutional innovation embodied an ‘ideological revolution’ that reflected new standards of legitimate authority at the state level and at the international level translated into the principle that social rules should be created by those subject to them. ¹⁵ The diffusion and widespread acceptance of multilateral institutions of global scope, especially after 1945, has had important consequences: multilateral institutions have been involved in areas in which no previous normative consensus existed, multilateral fora have progressively shared agenda-setting power with states, and multilateral diplomacy has embodied a procedural norm that provides international legitimacy. ¹⁶ States have progressively internalised the norms underpinning multilateralism, increasingly participating in decision-making processes and expecting to be heard in deliberation processes, and multilateral institutions have become fora in which global leaders have to compete for support. In fact, multilateral institutions have introduced formal procedures in the government of the global political system that have turned the political organisation of the present global system into an institution-based leadership organisation and, through agreed procedures for collective decision-making, have linked formal-legal institutions, political legitimacy and democracy. ¹⁷

To be clear, for global leadership theorists, the system is not democratic yet: the spread of rule-based long-term cooperation based on equality embodied in multilateral practices is promoting long-term changes in that direction, but the transition has just begun. Activated and led by the global leader and its rivals, coalitions are crucial in the support of competing agendas, in the selection process of the global leader, and in supporting (or opposing) the global leader to build up and maintain the institutions of its organisation. The political dimension of coalitions is therefore extremely important. Coalitions provide support to the global leader and recognise its political organisation and authority as legitimate, or they oppose the global leader and its organisation of the system, and propose alternatives. Coalitional solidarity and discipline can vary: rivalries may exist over specific political outputs, provoking occasional dissociations, but when the political authority of the system is at stake, coalitions become more rigid and binding. ¹⁸ However, despite the centrality of coalitions in their analysis of global change, global leadership theorists have devoted little attention to processes of coalition formation and variation, especially in view of the systemic transition towards a more democratic form of global governance.

Considering that in the global leadership perspective, the world is seen as a unit whose actors have created a public arena and constitute a global political system, insights from domestic systems might be helpful to understand processes of formation of and variation in coalitions aiming to rule in the international system. Indeed, while important differences remain, similarities between the two systems are also present: for instance, coalitional support of the global leader has analogies with coalitional support of governments at the domestic level. Analyses of coalition bargaining to create coalition governments at the domestic level in Political Science have shown that, besides the different strategies chosen by parties (maximising power or policy preferences being the two most relevant ones for the purposes of this article), coalition formation is affected also by structural factors, such as their different bargaining power and the bargaining environment. While bargaining power refers to resources controlled by the parties, the bargaining environment, which includes institutional rules, helps define the formal requirements for coalitions to form, the process by which they form, the ways in which they can make policy and the conditions under which they can be removed and replaced. ¹⁹

As an analogy, in an institution-based leadership organisation in which the capacity to control the decision-making outcomes in the most important institutional arenas becomes more and more important, it should be assumed that at the international level also, it is not only state interests and strategies (or policy preferences) but also structural opportunities that might be relevant for coalition formation and variation. In particular, distribution of power, previous coalitional experiences, presence of credible alternative coalitions, competition levels and ideological polarisation levels, mechanisms of global leadership change and the competitiveness of the international system can all be considered structural factors that affect coalition formation and variation. In the framework of global leadership theory and its phases (Table 1), ²⁰ this means that when power is concentrated and previously existing alternative coalitions have been defeated and the polarisation and competition levels are low (execution phase), the dominant coalition should be very cohesive, gain in strength and dominate decision-making processes, thanks to a ‘supporting coalition’ larger than the ‘cabinet coalition’. Other coalitions should lack the strength to challenge the dominant coalition’s right to rule. When power de-concentrates (agenda-setting phase), new preferences develop, and competition and polarisation levels start increasing. Coalitions around emerging issues should therefore be unstable and issue based, capable of influencing some decision-making outcomes but incapable of challenging decision-making roles. The dominant coalition should become less strong and cohesive, lose part of its supporting coalition and start negotiating ‘acceptable’ decision-making outcomes. The rise of multipolarity and lower concentrations of power, and an increase in levels of competition and ideological polarisation (coalition-building phase), should favour flexibility of alignments and the creation of new coalitions based on common proposals for the restructuring of the global political system that aspire to challenge the dominant coalition. Initially tentative and volatile, challenging coalitions should become credible and gain members and strength over time. Old coalitions should reshuffle and prioritise new issues, while requests and divergences materialise. However, previous experiences, appeals to substantive and procedural norms of the coalition and the habit of concerted action should increase chances of reviving a coalition, strengthening the bonds between core members of the dominant coalition, now called to preside over the main institutions of its organisation. Under very high levels of competition and ideological polarisation (macro-decision phase), the existing credible coalitions (i.e. those capable of challenging the dominant one) should be reduced in number and grow in membership and cohesion in order to select the new leader and agenda. However, the diffusion of democracy and the democratisation of international practices, expressions of the long-term move towards the democratisation of global governance, coupled with the increase in the costs of interstate wars and in particular the risk of a nuclear war, might induce political – rather than military – selection practices. ²¹ This may provide a new mechanism for global leadership change and an increase in the competitiveness of the system.

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Table 1.

Global leadership phases and dominant coalition.

Global leadership phase	Dominant coalition’s strength and cohesion
Execution	High and increasing
Agenda setting	High but decreasing
Coalition building	Low but increasing
Macro decision	Increasing and solidifying

Coalitions in the UNSC and methodological issues

Assuming that in an institution-based leadership organisation, states keep their preferences on important issues in the most important arenas, they should keep their crucial political alignments both at the systemic and at the institutional levels. Aggregations of states sharing interests along the lines of political conflicts have already been pointed out in the UNGA. ²² Existing studies, however, present contradictory results and focus on voting behaviour. Looking at voting behaviour alone does not allow for a distinction between states’ behaviour on the basis of stable political affiliations (i.e. where they feel bound as coalition members) and having occasional similar preferences (i.e. where their interests converge on a specific issue). Moreover, the UNGA does not deal with important conflicts, and its resolutions are not binding. This makes the UNGA less suitable than the UNSC for detecting institutional coalitions mirroring coalitions present in the international system.

The UNSC, which institutionally attempts to regulate competition among great powers, is the most suitable competitive arena for detecting coalitions present in the international system because it deals with the most salient conflicts, its resolutions are binding to all states, the legitimacy conferred by its support has become an attractive prize and it reflects the overlap between the fading global leadership organisation and the rising global governance organisation. Institutional coalitions in the UNSC should therefore reflect coalitions present in the international system and be subject to the same structural opportunities for coalition formation and variation.

Moreover, as democracy is increasingly accepted as a norm for political organisation, states expect the decision-making process of an institution like the UNSC to be inclusive and democratic and frame issues as if it were inclusive and democratic already. Complaints about an unrepresentative, undemocratic and arbitrary UNSC have gained strength over time, becoming a high priority on the Council’s agenda, and requests for a more democratic and accountable UNSC have been raised also by the 2004 Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which considered the veto ‘anachronistic’ and ‘unsuitable’ for the UN ‘in an increasingly democratic age’. ²³ The (initial) long-term move towards democratisation at the systemic level should be reflected in a progressive increase in competition and participation in the UNSC.

However, analysing the replication in the UNSC of coalitions present in the international system presents several problems. The first one is related to its composition: 5 members are permanent (P5) and 10 rotate on a 2-year mandate (E10). This enables a long-term analysis of permanent members’ behaviour to be undertaken but limits the possibility of analysing variations in other states’ behaviour. However, due to the increasing competitiveness of gaining a non-permanent seat, campaign platforms and the importance of working through, and with, friends to reach this goal ²⁴ are increasingly seen among elected members. Rotation normally occurs among members of regional groups, but candidate members go through competitive elections and must pay attention to positions expressed in their ‘regional constituency’. ²⁵ For some states, this has resulted in a higher frequency of UNSC membership, not in relation to their power but because of their campaigning as representatives of regional interests rather than national ones. Moreover, the permanent membership of the current major powers, the frequent non-permanent membership of other rising powers and the high number of formal and informal consultations within regional groups normally ensure that the main positions on the existing divisions are represented.

The second problem is UNSC members’ differing voting power. ²⁶ As pointed out by Coleman, because of this variation, elected members have much power to gain through building coalitions with permanent members, even though their power within the coalition would be very small. However, thanks to their veto power, permanent members have absolute power to prevent action, that is, to be the determining member in preventing the group’s action: because formally they do not need the support of a coalition in all those cases in which they are against a resolution, coalition building is less attractive for them. This lowers their incentive to coalesce and limits variations in voting patterns. ²⁷ However, we know that the presence of coalitions can change how states vote: if it is known that most members will vote for a resolution, expectations are that a further member will vote for it. ²⁸ Even when there is no formal commitment, the high probability that a specific group of states will vote together changes the distribution of voting power because in exchange for solidarity and long-term influence, members vote on the basis of loyalty to the coalition rather than on the basis of preferences on the issue at stake. ²⁹ Moreover, veto power use has become increasingly costly from a political point of view because of widespread opposition of non-veto holders, who perceive it as an out-dated privilege, and because of civil society anti-veto campaigns. Widely shared or politically significant DRs have been proposed in the knowledge that they would be stopped by a veto, while instances in which a certain threat of a veto has deterred potential sponsors from approaching the UNSC with a DR have become very rare. ³⁰ The purpose of this behaviour is to shame the veto user, to force it to publicly justify its vote. When a big majority exists in the UNSC, it becomes more difficult for a permanent member to justify the use of its veto power because no one wants to be seen as holding up the consensus. ³¹ As a result, permanent members now tend to use their veto power only when they perceive their vital national interests to be at stake, while they prefer to abstain or be absent on other issues, allowing DRs to be voted for and approved.

The third problem is that since the end of the Cold War, the habit of UNSC informal consultations has led to an increase in the number of decisions taken by consensus. Informal consultations have no legal standing, but that is when the real debate takes place and decisions are taken. They take place behind closed doors, and no official information is released. Moreover, the P5 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) and the P3 (the United States, the United Kingdom and France) have the habit of consulting separately. ³² Only when relations are strong and institutionalised are those who cannot participate informed of what actually went on in informal meetings and thus enabled to influence the subsequent decision-making process.

Finally, analysing voting behaviour in the UNSC to detect coalitions is not useful. In the UNSC, decisions are normally taken by consensus and proposals can be blocked by a hidden veto. Moreover, the literature has highlighted that elected members’ votes can be easily ‘bought’ in exchange for International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank or individual states’ aid programmes. ³³ If such exchanges constitute an effective coalition-building tool in the hands of a few permanent members, the alignments they create are short lived and temporary but also opportunistic. So analysing voting behaviour only risks identifying ad hoc alignments rather than coalitions.

It is proposed here that in order to analyse coalitions in the UNSC that may reflect coalitions in the international system, we should look at the sponsoring behaviour of UNSC members. Sponsoring a DR is a political act that indicates the political relevance of the issue for the sponsor (normally, the state originally proposing the agenda item leads the drafting process), but it also indicates issues characterised by greater conflict. On the other hand, non-controversial DRs are normally presented ‘according to prior consultation’. ³⁴ Sponsored DRs need not be sponsored by more than one UNSC member, so co-sponsoring is a way of signalling political support. UNSC members that are more active in sponsoring gain greater control of the agenda. However, while DRs that are presented according to prior consultation are normally automatically approved, sponsored DRs may encounter opposition and be rejected. By investigating the sponsoring of DRs, the states which oppose them, and their probability of being approved, we can gain a more reliable picture than that gained by investigating states’ voting behaviour alone. ³⁵ Looking at both sponsoring and opposition activities (negative votes and abstentions) in contested votes enables the detection of regularities also in the coalitional behaviour of elected members. Therefore, this article proposes an analysis of the sponsoring of all DRs presented in the period 1993–2012, and it integrates this with an analysis of voting behaviour in the period 2001–2012. ³⁶ Considering UNSC dynamics and the importance of informal consultations, only the behaviour of states that were UNSC members at the time has been taken into consideration in order to identify coalitions. ³⁷ Apart from the five permanent members, particular attention among non-permanent members has been paid to European Union (EU) members because changes in the EU since the Maastricht treaty may have affected the coalitional behaviour of France and the United Kingdom. ³⁸ Particular attention has also been paid to the behaviour of the traditionally stronger Western allies (Japan, Germany, Canada and South Korea) and of prominent states from different regions of the South (Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt and Syria) when they were holding a UNSC seat, as all of these states are deemed new powers or potential opponents to the existing global leadership organisation.

Coalitions in the UNSC will have to reflect a group of states that engage in collective decision-making among themselves and, without enforcement mechanisms, tend to act as a single unit over time, even when some coalition members have little stake in the outcome. This is operationalised as a subset of at least two UNSC active members that adopt sponsoring DRs together or with the same subgroup of UNSC members as their regular predominant strategy over at least a 5-year period (and in the period 2001–2012, they also jointly oppose the approval of DRs sponsored by UNSC members external to the subgroup). Because coalitions should be able to present proposals for (re-)organising the political system and attract support on those, being active refers to sponsoring activities. It is worth noting that a 5-year period introduces a bias towards coalitions in which there is at least one permanent member, but it is justified by our interest in UNSC coalitions reflecting coalitions present in the international system.

The period under consideration allows us to look at two phases of the global leadership cycle, agenda setting (1993–2000), and coalition building (2001–2012). ³⁹ This is a long enough period not only to assess whether, as suggested by global leadership theory, states have created coalitions in the UNSC that replicate coalitions present in the international system but also to check variations in the dominant coalition. The dominant coalition, which is the coalition that emerged as dominant after World War II, and consisting of the US and European states, should be present at all times. In the first period, however, other issue-based and unstable coalitions may be present, while in the second period, at least a coalition based on common proposals for the restructuring of the global political system and aspiring to challenge the dominant coalition should emerge. However, the forming of challenging coalitions should still be tentative and volatile:

If states replicate coalitions in the UNSC, then at least a group of two or more UNSC active members will tend to act as a single unit, that is, over at least a five-year period, they will exhibit regular patterns of sponsoring (and opposing) together DRs as their predominant strategy. (H1)

According to global leadership theory, the dominant coalition should always be present, but changes in its bargaining power and in the bargaining environment should result in variations in its stability and strength. In the analysed period, this means that in the first sub-period (1993–2000), the dominant coalition should be affected by the deconcentration of its power and the growing requests to address new issues, and because of that, it should lose part of its strength and cohesiveness. In the second sub-period (2001–2012), multipolarity and lower concentrations of power, together with an increase in competition and ideological polarisation, should allow credible challengers to arise and gain strength over time. For the dominant coalition, this means that its core members are called to defend the organisation they originally formed, and this should lead to an increase in its stability and strength. In the UNSC, it is variations in the preferences assigned by coalition members to acting with the dominant coalition rather than alone or with other UNSC members that indicates the cohesiveness of the dominant coalition and therefore its stability. The strength of the dominant coalition should translate into its capacity to control the agenda of the Council, so variations in its strength can be registered through the activity level of the dominant coalition and its capacity to control the UNSC decision-making outcome, that is, the percentage of approved resolutions that were sponsored by the dominant coalition. However, a long-term analysis is possible only for permanent members, so it is possible to analyse variations in cohesiveness and strength only in relation to the core members of the dominant coalition (the United States, the United Kingdom and France):

If the dominant coalition’s stability and strength vary as a result of changes in its bargaining power and bargaining environment, then in the UNSC, a) its activity level (sponsoring); b) the preference of its members to act with it over their choice to act otherwise; and c) the coalition’s control over UNSC decision-making outcomes will show a declining trend in the period 1993–2000 and an increasing trend in the period 2001–2012. (H2)

The period under consideration should also allow us to verify whether a long-term move towards the democratisation of global governance is taking place and whether the possibility of a mechanism for global leadership change different from a hegemonic war is a modification in the bargaining environment potent enough to affect coalitional behaviour. Such a perspective would imply an increase in the contestation and inclusiveness of the international system, so we should be able to register an increase in competition and participation within the main current institutions rather than outside of them. Indeed, counter-hegemonic coalitions do not have incentives to compete within the institutions created and dominated by the dominant coalition: they would rather abandon them and compete outside of them.

Verifying the impact of long-term structural changes towards democratisation on coalitional behaviour in the UNSC is particularly difficult because the institutional components of the bargaining environment have remained substantially the same and the permanent members are reluctant to allow any meaningful change. However, working practices have increased the involvement of non-UNSC members in the UNSC decision-making process, at least in the form of greater consultations. Moreover, although the UNSC decision-making process structurally favours the five permanent members, elected members should not be underestimated, as their coordination may lead to a ‘sixth veto’. If the long-term move towards democratisation is in place, we should see an increase in both competition and participation in the UNSC. This would translate into a preference for sponsored rather than according-to-prior-consultations DRs because there should be less agreement and members should put more controversial issues on the agenda. This would also be reflected in an increase of DRs sponsored by potential counter-hegemonic candidates and in greater veto usage as a defensive mechanism. Variations in participation in the UNSC would be reflected in the number of DRs sponsored by elected members and by states that are not part of the dominant coalition:

If competition is increasing, then in the UNSC in the period 2001–2012, a) the number of according-to-prior-consultations DRs will decrease; b) the number of sponsored DRs will increase; c) the number of DRs sponsored by potential counter-hegemonic candidates will increase; and d) veto usage will increase. If participation is increasing, then in the UNSC the number of sponsored DRs and the number of DRs sponsored by elected members will be higher in 2001–2012 than in 1993–2000. (H3)

Data and interpretation

Presence of coalitions

According to H1, if states replicate their coalitions in the UNSC, then we should be able to find at least one subgroup of active states that tends to act as a single unit in sponsoring (and opposing) DRs over at least a 5-year period. However, while the dominant coalition should be easily detectable, other coalitions may be more difficult to find because they should be issue based and unstable (in the first period) or tentative and volatile (in the second period). Nevertheless, the adopted methodology only allows for a long-term analysis of the permanent members and an analysis of the coalitional behaviour of elected members identified as traditionally stronger Western allies or prominent states from different regions of the South.

A comparison between the sponsoring activity of UNSC members helps to identify the active members in the analysed period and shows that the P5 are much more active than elected members, but differences are present also among them (Table 2). The United States, the United Kingdom and France are the most active members and have similar activity levels. Russia is very active in the 1990s, but becomes less so in the 2000s. China’s activity level is very low but increases.

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Table 2.

DRs sponsored by permanent and non-permanent UNSC members, 1993–2012.

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
US only	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	0	1	2	1	2	3	4	7	7
US + EU	13	18	23	12	15	21	11	4	0	4	6	12	14	20	17	22	19	26	31	26
US + non-EU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	3	1
US total	15	18	25	13	15	21	12	5	0	10	8	12	15	23	18	25	22	31	41	34
F only	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	3	3	4	8	8	5	1
F + EU	11	18	23	10	8	15	7	4	0	5	3	9	12	21	12	25	16	20	32	29
F + US	13	17	22	10	9	16	9	3	0	2	2	9	11	18	11	20	16	23	30	25
F total	13	23	25	11	10	16	10	4	0	6	5	9	13	24	16	29	24	31	41	32
UK only	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3	3	1	2	7	5	7	3	5
UK + EU	11	16	23	9	12	16	8	5	0	7	8	11	15	22	14	20	16	21	30	25
UK + US	11	11	22	10	13	19	10	4	0	4	6	12	14	20	15	19	18	21	27	21
UK total	12	16	24	10	13	20	10	7	0	8	8	15	18	24	19	28	23	28	33	31
Russia only	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
Russia + EU	6	13	15	7	6	11	7	2	0	2	2	4	4	9	6	9	6	11	12	4
Russia + US	6	10	15	6	6	11	7	3	0	2	1	4	4	8	6	10	6	11	12	4
Russia total	6	13	15	7	6	11	9	3	0	3	2	4	4	10	7	10	6	12	13	4
China only	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
China + EU	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	2	1	4	2	8	3	1
China + US	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	1	4	2	8	3	0
China total	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	2	1	4	2	8	3	1
Elected members	1	1	1	4	2	2	2	2	4	5	3	3	2	3	1	4	9	8	11	8

DR: draft resolution; UNSC: UN Security Council; EU: European Union member states; US: United States; F: France; UK: United Kingdom.

Comparing the total number of sponsored DRs each permanent member presents with the number of DRs they present with sponsoring partners (Table 2) is useful for identifying subgroups in their sponsoring activity. Permanent members’ opposition activity (vetoes or abstentions) to sponsored DRs (Table 3) can help confirm the existence of a subgroup in the second sub-period. In the analysed period, the dominant coalition is the only coalition present in the UNSC that conforms to our definition of coalition. However, since 2001, volatile behaviour typical of the beginning of the coalition-building phase is found, and two groups of states, one containing Russia and China and the other made up of potential opponents to the existing global leadership organisation, but much more volatile, show signs of potential coalitional activities in the making.

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Table 3.

Sponsors of DRs opposed by permanent members (veto/abstention), ⁴⁰ 2001–2012.

US		Russia		China		France	UK
6 UK 4 Tunisia (3) 3 Syria (3) 3 Pakistan (3) 3 Bulgaria 3 Algeria (2) 2 Singapore 2 Qatar (2) 2 Norway (1) 2 Mauritius () 2 Mali (1) 2 Jamaica 2 Ireland (1) 2 France 2 Colombia 2 Bangladesh (1)	1 Yemen 1 Ukraine 1 Sudan (1) 1 South Africa (1) 1 Russia 1 Malaysia (1) 1 Libya 1 Italy 1 Guinea (1) 1 Germany 1 Egypt (1)	16 UK (7) 15 US (6) 11 France (5) 6 Germany (4) 4 Slovakia 3 Portugal (3) 3 Denmark 2 Italy (1) 2 Croatia (2) 2 Belgium (1) 2 Argentina 2 Austria (1) 2 Turkey (2) 1 UAE (1) 1 Tunisia (1) 1 Togo (1) 1 Tanzania 1 Spain 1 Sierra Leone (1) 1 Saudi Arabia (1) 1 Romania 1 Qatar (1)	1 Peru 1 Oman (1) 1 Nigeria 1 New Zealand (1) 1 Netherlands (1) 1 Morocco (1) 1 Libya (1) 1 Liberia (1) 1 Lebanon 1 Kuwait (1) 1 Jordan (1) 1 Japan 1 Guatemala 1 Greece 1 Ghana 1 Gabon 1 Egypt (1) 1 Colombia (1) 1 Canada (1) 1 Bulgaria 1 Bahrain (1) 1 Australia (1)	15 UK (5) 14 US (4) 12 France (4) 7 Germany (3) 4 Slovakia 3 Denmark 2 Turkey (1) 2 Spain 2 Romania 2 Portugal (2) 2 Italy (1) 2 Croatia (1) 2 Belgium (1) 2 Argentina 1 Uganda 1 UAE (1) 1 Tunisia (1) 1 Togo (1) 1 Tanzania 1 Sierra Leone (1) 1 Saudi Arabia (1) 1 Qatar (1)	1 Peru 1 Oman (1) 1 Nigeria 1 New Zealand (1) 1 Netherlands (1) 1 Morocco (1) 1 Libya (1) 1 Liberia (1) 1 Lebanon 1 Kuwait (1) 1 Jordan (1) 1 Japan 1 Greece 1 Ghana 1 Gabon 1 Egypt (1) 1 Colombia (1) 1 Chile 1 Canada (1) 1 Bahrain (1) 1 Austria 1 Australia (1)	2 US 2 UK 1 Uganda 1 Turkey 1 Tunisia 1 Singapore 1 Russia 1 Nigeria 1 Mauritius 1 Mali 1 Lebanon 1 Japan 1 Jamaica 1 Gabon 1 Colombia 1 China 1 Bulgaria 1 Bosnia 1 Bangladesh 1 Austria	3 Tunisia 3 Pakistan 2 Syria 2 Qatar 2 Algeria 1 Sudan 1 South Africa 1 Singapore 1 Mauritius 1 Mali 1 Malaysia 1 Libya 1 Jamaica 1 Guinea 1 Egypt 1 Colombia 1 Bangladesh

DR: draft resolution; US: United States; F: France; UK: United Kingdom; UAE: United Arab Emirates.

The strong preference of the US and European UNSC members for acting as a single unit indicates the presence of the dominant coalition. They form a group of states that regularly and predominantly sponsor together during the entire period and in a systematic way, preferring that strategy to others available. The US and EU states form a coalition that sponsors most of the DRs presented. DRs are normally drafted by the US or British missions. These are shared informally with the French, then discussed at an informal meeting of the five permanent members and finally brought to the UNSC. ⁴¹ With few exceptions, the US sponsors almost all of its DRs with EU states, while France and the United Kingdom sponsor almost all of their DRs with the United States and other EU states. They do not act together on the basis of preferences on the issue at stake: sponsoring separately is an exceptional behaviour, and when coalitional support is not strong (as in 1999–2003), their activity level decreases, but they do not create alternative coalitions. During the Bush administration’s first mandate, the number of DRs sponsored by the dominant coalition reaches its lowest point. However, the United States prefers to act alone (rather than with its EU partners) only in 2002, and even then, it acts with its EU partners more than with any other state. The United States, the United Kingdom and France start acting alone more often than before, but acting together is still their dominant strategy. This shows how important the coalition is for its members: relying on coalitional support has become a habit, and internal norms to manage conflicts and disagreements prevail, to the point of overcoming diverging preferences. The presence of the dominant coalition is confirmed by the opposition activity of the five permanent members (Table 3). Americans and Europeans among the permanent members do occasionally disagree but only marginally when compared to the total number of their co-sponsored DRs. For instance, in the period 2001–2012, the United Kingdom receives one veto and five abstentions from the United States. In the same period, the United Kingdom and the United States co-sponsor 177 DRs. France receives one veto and one abstention from the United States, and it abstains twice on a US-sponsored DR. Also in the same period, France and the US co-sponsor 167 DRs. On the other hand, the list of vetoes the United States imposes and the list of countries the United Kingdom opposes coincide. Among non-permanent members normally considered close to the dominant coalition, South Korea (1996–1997) sponsors all of its nine DRs with the US and EU states. Canada (1999–2000) sponsors 12 out of 13 DRs with the US and EU states. Japan (1993, 1997–1998, 2005–2006, 2009–2010) and Germany (1995–1996, 2003–2004, 2011–2012) sponsor most of their DRs together with the US and EU states.

As for coalitions other than the dominant one, Russia and China in the period 2001–2012 present some elements typical of a coalition. They tend to sponsor with EU countries and with the United States, but their limited activity with the dominant coalition should be taken as an occasional convergence of preferences. On the other hand, their opposition mostly to DRs sponsored by the US and EU states in the period 2001–2012 (Table 3) clearly indicates that they are not members of the dominant coalition. The two countries have jointly abstained and jointly used their veto power against DRs sponsored by the dominant coalition. This is interesting because a second veto is not needed to block a DR, so it indicates that they share mutual interests and want to signal their opposition to the dominant coalition. China and Russia occasionally oppose DRs together with the same group of countries (South Africa, Qatar, Pakistan, Brazil, Indonesia and Algeria), and they all figure high in the list of opponents of US-sponsored DRs (Tables 4 and 5). They all signal increasing dissatisfaction with the existing organisation, but they do not form, as of yet, a structured counter-hegemonic coalition: they coalesce to play veto player roles, but they are not capable of presenting alternative proposals yet.

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Table 4.

States opposing (veto, negative vote or abstention) US-sponsored DRs, 2001–2012.

16 Russia	3 Libya
14 China	2 Lebanon
5 Turkey	2 Germany
5 Syria	2 France
5 Qatar	2 Vietnam
5 Pakistan	2 Azerbaijan
4 South Africa	1 Uganda
3 Indonesia	1 Philippines
3 Brazil	1 Mexico
3 Algeria	1 India
	1 Congo

DR: draft resolution.

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Table 5.

Partners of Russia and China in opposing resolutions, 2001–2012.

China		Russia
15 Russia	2 Vietnam	15 China	2 Libya
5 South Africa	2 India	5 South Africa	2 India
4 Qatar	1 United States	4 Qatar	1 Uganda
4 Brazil	1 Uganda	3 Pakistan	1 Syria
4 Algeria	1 Philippines	3 Indonesia	1 Philippines
4 Pakistan	1 Lebanon	3 Brazil	1 Lebanon
3 Libya	1 Germany	3 Algeria	1 Germany
3 Indonesia	1 Congo	2 Vietnam	1 Congo

Among states that are deemed new powers or potential opponents to the existing global leadership organisation, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt and Syria have made occasional attempts at creating coalitions of elected members. Indonesia co-sponsors prevalently with elected members during its first term in the analysed period (1995–1996) and then opposes the United States three times in 2001–2012. It is not active in sponsoring during its second term (2007–2008). Pakistan’s prevalent strategy during its first term (1993–1994) is co-sponsoring with the US and EU states. During its second term (2003–2004), it changes to co-sponsoring with elected members only. Pakistan becomes the country most opposed by the United States and one of those opposing the United States the most. For Egypt (1996–1997), joining elected members only has been the prevalent strategy, but no comparison can be made with the 2001–2012 period. Syria (2002–2003) sponsors three resolutions by itself and two with Pakistan. None of them prefers sponsoring with Russia or China to signal a counter-hegemonic coalition, but occasionally, with Russia and China, they oppose the United States. When they served both before and after 2000, for some of them, their sponsoring activity increases, showing signs of dissatisfaction and a potential for a coalition in the making. Their activity is still very limited, compared to that of the dominant coalition, and the transformation of their analogous preferences into a stable coalition is complicated by the absence of an institutionalised relationship with a permanent member acting as a conduit for their requests, so their attempts at coalescing remain, at best, tentative and volatile.

The most divisive issues can help understanding on which issues UNSC members coalesce. The analysis of non-unanimous votes (nays, abstentions and absences) in the period 2001–2012 (the UNSC failed to reach consensus 63 times) shows that the dominant coalition and the tentative coalitions in the making in the UNSC diverge significantly on sovereignty and non-interference and, in particular, on the UNSC power of intervention. Among supranationalism-related contested resolutions, DRs proposing to act under Chapter VII were the largest group (31). They were followed by DRs regarding UN peace operations (7), humanitarian intervention/regime change (6) and UN organs (2). However, it is the issue of humanitarian intervention/regime change that divides the most: it faced a veto three times out of six. European countries are firmly behind the sponsoring activity of these DRs, and are almost always backed by the United States. ⁴² China and Russia are on the opposite side, recently backed not only by Brazil, India and South Africa but also by Algeria, Pakistan, Indonesia and Qatar. Normally, the Russian representative justifies its position by condemning the greater attempt to take the UNSC beyond its Charter prerogatives, and the UNSC attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of states. Likewise, China has repeatedly justified its vetoes and abstentions with its respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-interference and has been particularly critical of the use of sanctions.

The other most divisive issue is the Israeli–Palestinian conflicts, on which Tunisia, Syria, Pakistan and Algeria have repeatedly put forward DRs. However, the issue is divisive not just for the UNSC but also for the dominant coalition.

Cohesion and strength of the dominant coalition

According to H2, the activity level (sponsoring) of the dominant coalition, the prevalence of its members’ propensity to act with it over their choice to act otherwise and its control over UNSC decision-making outcomes are expected to decrease in 1993–2000 and increase in 2001–2012.

Figure 1 shows that the activity level of the transatlantic dominant coalition in the UNSC was declining in 1993–2000 but progressively increasing in 2001–2012. It also shows that largely, the United States, the United Kingdom and France tend to sponsor with other EU members sitting in the UNSC (at times using this as a base to involve other UNSC members), while only rarely do they sponsor as ‘P3’. Likewise, Figure 2 shows that for the United States, the United Kingdom and France, choosing the transatlantic coalition was a declining strategy in 1993–2000, but a progressively increasing one in 2001–2012. France is the most attached to the transatlantic coalition, but the United Kingdom and the United States are close followers. For all of them, sponsoring together is the preferred strategy. As for coalitional control over UNSC decision-making outcomes, Figure 3 shows a declining percentage of approved resolutions originally sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in 1993–2000 and a rising percentage in 2001–2012. Considering the UNSC agenda, in the period 2001–2012, the dominant coalition is more decisive on difficult and possibly divisive issues than it was in the previous period.

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Figure 1.

Sponsoring activity of the dominant coalition, 1993–2012.

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Figure 2.

Percentage of DRs sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom and France with the dominant coalition, 1993–2012.

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Figure 3.

Percentage of UNSC resolutions approved sponsored by the dominant coalition, 1993–2012.

Transatlantic differences and disagreements are present in the decision of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to sponsor alone more than they did previously. However, the United States, the UK and France do not sponsor with other states but prefer by and large to sponsor with their coalition, and they use it to build consensus and aggregate other members. This does not mean that all the states that supported the United States and its coalition are as cohesive as they were at the beginning of the leadership cycle. On the contrary, during the coalition-building phase, a reshuffling of old alliances is expected, so peripheral members of the coalition are expected to detach themselves from the old alliance. In fact, signs of volatile behaviour due to the reshuffling of alliances that is a feature of the coalition-building phase can be traced to the behaviour of the elected members being analysed. Brazil, India and South Africa, for instance, keep sponsoring mostly with the dominant coalition but introduce in their behaviour sponsoring with non-permanent members only.

Competition and participation

According to H3, competition and participation within the main institutions of the international political system, and the UNSC in particular, are expected to increase in the 2001–2012 period as a result of the change in the bargaining environment provided by the on-going long-term move towards the democratisation of global governance and the perspective of a mechanism for global leadership change different from a hegemonic war. However, in the case of the UNSC, the five permanent members have been reluctant to grant their privileges to other states, no matter how close to them they are. In fact, the United States may be willing to concede UNSC enlargement, but it is not sponsoring it. The United Kingdom and France are resisting any change. Russia and China, although increasingly close to India and Brazil on global governance issues in the trade and financial sectors, have been rather lukewarm in relation to granting them permanent membership of the UNSC. However, new working practices have been introduced over time in response to requests for democratisation, and informal processes have allowed non-UNSC members a greater involvement.

Sponsored DRs started growing after 2001 and followed the opposite trend to DRs according to prior consultations (Figure 4). In fact, since 2006, the number of DRs according to prior consultations decreases sharply. This suggests that the pressure for more UNSC transparency, that is, a reflex of the normative change towards more democratic practices in accordance with the transition from a global leadership organisation to a global governance organisation may have played a role in diminishing the number of DRs according to prior consultations. Interestingly, in 2010, UNSC members prefer to sponsor three resolutions (S/2010/29 on Haiti, S/2010/95 on Timor Leste and S/2010/592 on Somalia) unanimously rather than present them as prepared according to prior consultations. The increase in sponsored resolutions also means that UNSC members have a harder time reaching consensus and proposing DRs according to prior consultations because the UNSC system has become more competitive. In fact, sponsored DRs presented in the 2001–2012 period also reflected different coalitional preferences on sensitive issues. For instance, DR S/2011/641, on women, peace and security, was sponsored in 2011 by most UNSC members, with the exception of Russia and China.

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Figure 4.

According to prior consultation and sponsored DRs, 1993–2012.

The increase in the competitiveness of the system should also result in the increase in DRs sponsored by potential counter-hegemonic candidates, such as China and Russia. However, as already highlighted, the two countries sponsor more but almost always with the dominant coalition. A slight increase in independent behaviour is shown by Russia. While in the 1993–2000 period, Russia sponsors independently from the United States or EU UNSC members only two DRs – in 1999 – in the 2001–2012 period, the number of sponsored DRs increases. Russia sponsors alone one DR for each of the years 2006, 2007 and 2010. This indicates that Russia and China at the moment still prefer the role of veto player to the one of agenda setter.

A greater veto usage should be another indicator of the increase in the competitiveness of the system. In fact, in 1990–2000, the US vetoes 6 DRs, and Russia and China, 2, while in 2001–2012, the US vetoes 10 DRs, Russia, 7, and China, 5 (always with Russia). The United States, in particular, has been forced to use its veto mostly on DRs on the Middle East sponsored by elected members, and Russia and China have used their veto mostly on issues related to sovereignty and non-intervention.

According to H3, participation is also expected to increase, and this variation should be measurable through sponsored DRs and DRs sponsored by elected members. Sponsoring in the period 2001–2012 (254 DRs presented, on average 25 per year) was much more intense than in the period 1993–2000 (99 DRs presented, on average 12 per year). Moreover, elected members were much more active in their sponsoring activity: they sponsored 15 DRs in the period 1993–2000, an average of 1.875 per year, but 61 in the period 2001–2012, an average of 5.08 per year. DRs sponsored by elected members progressively grew in 1993–2012. The approval rate for DRs sponsored by elected members has also increased, but DRs sponsored by elected members have occasionally encountered opposition from Russia and China. For instance, on S/2010/651, on international tribunals in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Russia abstained, and on S/2011/744, on Eritrea, sponsored by Gabon and Nigeria, Russia and China abstained.

Among elected members, EU states are very active. ⁴³ Among the elected members analysed, Germany and Japan were more active in 2001–2012 than in 1993–2000. As for the others, only Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia and Pakistan served their terms in both phases. Indonesia sponsored four DRs in 1996 and two in 1995 but none in 2007–2008. In contrast, Brazil and Nigeria sponsored more DRs in 2001–2012 than in 1993–2000. Only Pakistan’s level of activity remained approximately the same in the two periods. However, if we take into consideration India, South Africa and Syria, which only served in the second phase, their level of activity is certainly very high as elected members: India sponsored 8 DRs in 2011 and 2 in 2012, South Africa sponsored 9 DRs in 2011 and 10 in 2012, while during its term, Syria sponsored 6 DRs.

This suggests that states dissatisfied with the existing organisation of the international political system tend to be more active and want to be heard. However, the general increase in participation – and not only of opponents – and in forcing the United States, Russia or China to veto widely supported DRs as a manifest attempt to shame the veto user, result from expectations of greater UNSC inclusiveness and, ultimately, of a more democratic organisation. Although reforms in the working methods of the UNSC have already been introduced, the still limited possibility to participate and influence the UNSC decision-making process contrasts with the greater willingness to participate and the normative perception that, moving towards a global governance organisation, international institutions should be not only more effective but also more democratic.

Conclusion

According to the global leadership perspective, the coalitional structure of the global leader and changes in the organisational form of the international political system determine who governs and how decisions are made. This is reflected in the UNSC, where states create coalitions that reflect existing divisions along political lines. This article has highlighted the existence of coalitions in the international system, arguing that their formation and variation are affected by changes in their bargaining power and bargaining environment related to the global leadership cycle and by on-going long-term changes towards a more democratic organisation of the international political system. It has also proposed the analysis of sponsoring behaviour to overcome methodological issues for detecting coalitions in the UNSC.

Contrary to the realist perspective, coalitions can last in the long term and can persist despite changes in the distribution of power. Contrary to the institutionalist perspective, once established, coalitions – and especially the dominant one – can heavily affect decision-making outcomes. As suggested by constructivists, coalitional norm internalisation and socialisation lead to the redefinition of national interests, so being members of a long-term coalition leads to voting on the basis of loyalty to the coalition, rather than on the basis of preferences on the issue at stake, without necessarily formalising it. However, changes within coalitions do take place over time. In a global leadership interpretation of global change, coalitions and coalitional changes are functional to the selection process of the global leader and to the political programme to be implemented but also, ultimately, to the selection of the organisational form of the international political system.

Today’s most relevant political coalition is still the transatlantic one, which is centred on the US and EU states and which has created the current cycle of global leadership. The transatlantic coalition has distanced itself politically from other countries, especially Russia and China, on the issue of human rights and sovereignty and on the expansion of the UN’s capacities as a supranational institution. These issues have become particularly divisive now that discussions on a global governance organisation are taking place. A third group of countries, all elected members and distant from both the transatlantic coalition and Russia–China, is present and active, but its attempts at transforming analogous preferences into a stable coalition are complicated by the absence of an institutionalised relationship with a permanent member.

The core of the dominant coalition has remained the same, but coalitional changes are taking place in its periphery, with dissatisfied countries now engaging in more volatile behaviour. Previously existing coalitions are going through a heavier reshuffling and are rallying around new issues and potential challengers in view of the selection of the next agenda to be implemented. This has resulted in greater competition between coalitions. Although a stable counter-hegemonic coalition has not formed yet, the increasing activity of both the dominant coalition and of previously more passive actors, the decrease in the number of DRs presented according to prior consultation and the increase of sponsored ones, the greater competition on DR approval and the shifting positions of some of the countries analysed all indicate since 2001 a ferment not only in the periphery of the dominant coalition but also in the structuring of coalitions now more regularly opposing the dominant one. All of this conforms to expectations in the coalition-building phase of the global leadership cycle.

Participation has increased for all the states considered, both permanent and elected. This is related to the global leadership cycle, but it also has to be put in relation to the slow shift towards a global governance organisation influenced by the increasing acceptance of democracy as a norm for political organisations and the democratisation of international practices. However, the greater willingness to participate contrasts with the still limited opportunities to influence the decision-making process.

The capacity of the UN to answer to the requests that will emerge at the end of this phase remains to be seen, and changes towards better-fit institutions are a possibility. From the proposed perspective, the shift from a global leadership organisation to a global governance organisation is under way, and coalitions emerging in the current phase will heavily influence its direction.