Remembering the Roman past,building a European future

Historical context

To put the growth of the Romanian movement for national unity into context, it is worth recalling that in the fifteenth century, Wallachia and Moldavia (principalities that had developed in the Middle Ages in parts of the territory of Roman Dacia) were obliged to submit to the Ottoman Empire’s suzerain control through Charters called ‘Capitulatii’. ¹³ However, the relationships between Moldavia, Wallachia and the Ottoman Empire underwent some changes in 1828–1829, giving the principalities broader autonomy. It was in that context that the Romanian principalities’ process of entry into Europe started to acquire consistency. ¹⁴ Inspired by liberal and nationalist ideas elsewhere in Europe, a host of Western-educated intellectuals and boyars ¹⁵ started to demand new political reforms and an end to foreign domination. ¹⁶

Remembering the Roman past and the defence of Christian Europe

As in the cases of Serbia and Slovakia, memories of a distant, glorious past were systematically invoked and cultivated by Wallachian and Moldavian elites in efforts to secure admission to international society. ¹⁷ In this case, collective memories revolved around the idea of a direct link to ancient Rome. In the nineteenth century, the idea of the Roman past was systematically invoked in discourses through which Moldavian/Wallachian elites understood their world, mobilized the people of the two principalities behind the project of national unity and pursued international support for independence and European integration of a modern, united Romanian state. At the heart of the discourse on the Romanian nation lie two interrelated collective memories. ¹⁸ First, there is a memory that amounts to a foundational myth, stressing a direct, undiluted connection between modern Romanians and their Roman ancestors. ¹⁹ Thus, in the nineteenth century, the collective consciousness of prominent intellectuals from Moldavia and Wallachia revolved around the idea of Roman blood, referring to the Roman colonization of Dacia (broadly speaking, the territory of modern-day Romania) following Emperor Trajan’s conquest in 106 AD. Second, there was the collective memory of heroic defence of Christian Europe by the Romanian principalities during the Middle Ages. The implication of this collective memory is that, by virtue of their sacrifice in the fight against Europe’s others (particularly the Ottomans), the Romanians had not only demonstrated their virtue as good Europeans but had also earned a debt of gratitude – which the West should repay by supporting the project of national unity and accession to the European society.

Simultaneously, Wallachian and Moldavian elites sought to secure domestic support for their political project by engineering a process of imagining a (Romanian) community that stretched all the way back to the glory of ancient Rome, and had to fulfil its destiny by reclaiming its ‘natural’ place in Europe. In the early and mid-nineteenth century Wallachia and Moldavia, there was a systematic, (liberal) elite-driven campaign to disseminate historical accounts that stressed the Latin purity of the Romanian nation. Those accounts involved a convenient collective amnesia: they forgot that following the withdrawal of the Roman administration from Roman Dacia, several semi-nomadic peoples lived alongside – and mixed with – the local populations. In some of the most influential nineteenth-century interpretations of the origins of modern Romanians, the emphasis is placed almost exclusively on the Roman colonists, depicted as the embodiment of a particularly virtuous version of the Roman spirit. For instance, in the writings and speeches of Ion C. Bratianu (leading Wallachian intellectual and liberal politician, considered as one of the principal founders of modern Romania), we encounter the idea that the Romans who conquered Dacia embodied the true republican spirit. Those Romans had not come from corruption-ridden Rome, but from the rural areas, where traditional Roman virtues were still intact. According to Bratianu, in the new Roman colony, ‘democratic traditions were preserved with holy and pure reverence’ – and it is because of those traditions that the Romanian nation ‘has a mind and soul prepared for democracy’. ²⁰ In a similar vein, prominent Moldavian intellectuals also sought to highlight the Roman origins of all Romanians and the political continuity from Dacia, through the Roman Empire, to the Romanian principalities. ²¹

The Oriental other, the French connection and the politics of identity definition

In the collective memory of nineteenth-century Wallachian and Moldavian intellectuals and politicians, the theme of Roman origins was closely linked to the image of Romanians as defenders of Europe against numerous others – particularly the Ottomans. The theme of differentiation from/civilizational superiority to the Ottomans became especially important in a situation in which, as Neumann and Welsh have demonstrated, the Ottomans occupied a particularly powerful discursive position in European processes of identity-construction – as the inferior other against which Europe could define itself. ²²

The nineteenth-century theme of a West that was able to flourish, thanks, in part, to Romanian bravery and sacrifice, found a particularly potent expression in the speeches delivered by Ion C. Bratianu. In his words:

We were the advance guard of Europe from the thirteenth century until very recently; we were the bulwark of Europe against the Asian invasions of the past. The European states were able to develop then because others sacrificed themselves in order to shelter them. ²³

In a similar vein, Mihail Kogalniceanu ²⁴ depicted the Romanians as ‘the defenders of religion and civilization against Islam and Asiatic barbarism’. ²⁵

If, in the nineteenth century, the Ottomans were portrayed by Wallachian and Moldavian intellectuals and politicians as the other from which the Romanians needed to take distance, the Western powers were increasingly cast in the role of friends and protectors. A particularly powerful role in the Romanians’ collective consciousness was occupied by France – seen as the big sister by virtue of its Latinity, and a natural protector given France’s international influence. Thus, for the Romanian elites of the nineteenth century, the ‘Western model’ of civilization meant primarily the French model; almost annexed to it was the model of Belgium – as a small, partially Francophone country, that provided a French-style model of governance.

As the Moldavian and Wallachian elites were intensifying their efforts to pursue national unity and secure entry into Europe, they appealed to France for support in negotiations with the other Great Powers. In particular, they sought to persuade French leaders that supporting the Romanian project was the right thing to do for a Latin European power with a commitment to the mission civilisatrice. A particularly potent expression of this quest for French support can be found in Ion C. Bratianu’s 1853 memorandum to Napoleon III. The Romanian politician sought to persuade the emperor that the union of the two Romanian principalities and the integration of the new state into European society would constitute not only a natural development – given the Latin roots of Romanians – but also something that would be in the interest of France. In Bratianu’s words, ‘The army of the Romanian state would be the army of France, its ports on the Black Sea and the Danube would be entrepôts for French trade’. Furthermore, as ‘our second homeland’, ‘France will have all the advantages of a colony, without the expenses which this implies’. ²⁶ In essence, by articulating a discourse that placed a strong emphasis on the status of a future Romanian state as a quasi-colony of France, Bratianu was framing the question of national unity and integration into Europe via discursive categories that were familiar to France – indeed, categories through which France made sense of the world.

As Edward Keene has demonstrated in his critique of classical English School accounts, far from being simply the anarchical society portrayed by Hedley Bull, European international society only upheld the principles of equality of rights and peaceful coexistence within its boundaries; in its relationships with non-Europeans, the Europeans set out to ‘civilise’ the backward ‘barbarians’. ²⁷ In our case, what is surprising is that a leading European politician was willing to employ the French discourse of mission civilisatrice to place his own polity on the edge of European society, in a position of clear subordination to the fully ‘civilised’ core. For Bratianu and his allies, however, that position of subordination was a reasonable temporary solution, which would enable the orientalized Romanians to be (re)socialized into European values and thus resume their natural place in Europe. ²⁸

Following a complicated political process, on January 24, Wallachia and Moldavia achieved political unification under the leadership of Alexandru Ioan Cuza. The new state, however, would not have survived had it not been for the support of its Latin protector, France. Indeed, it was to France that the new Romanian ruler appealed in his quest for external support. In messages sent to Napoleon III on 5 February 1859, Cuza reiterated the idea that the Romanians, after centuries of sacrifice, both needed and deserved the support of their Latin relatives, the French, in the fulfilment of their legitimate dream of national unity. ²⁹

A full analysis of the process that led France to support the Romanian project is beyond the scope of this article. But it is worthwhile to note that in explaining to the French Parliament his support for the Romanian cause, Napoleon III embraced the role of protector highlighted in the Romanians’ discourse, and used the idea of both protecting and (re)civilizing the less advanced, but still Latin Romanians to re-affirm France’s identity as a civilizing force. This idea was clearly reflected in his address to the French Legislature on 7 February 1859: ‘If I were asked what interest France had in those distant countries which the Danube waters, I should reply that the interest of France is everywhere where there is a just and civilising cause to promote’. ³⁰

There is a rich literature that examines the ways in which the mission civilisatrice shaped the European powers’ definitions of identity in the nineteenth century. ³¹ But what is particularly interesting about the discourse employed by Napoleon III is that it reveals the important role that civilizing missions within Europe played in France’s definition of its own identity. The image painted in Napoleon III’s address is one of a multi-tiered international society, involving a certain possibility of mobility: with the right (French) civilizational guidance, the Latin Romanians could potentially (re)become fully European, and could move from the outer tier (of ‘distant countries’) towards the inner tier of civilized/fully European societies. ³²

Following his election as the ruler of the Romanian principalities, Cuza moved very quickly to establish modern institutions in the new state. Concern about the ‘Oriental ways’ of many Romanians, coupled with a desire to construct a viable state as quickly as possible, led the Romanian elites – often with the aid of French advisers – to copy many of the core institutions from countries like France and Belgium. In other words, Romanian elites became willing participants, even initiators of a ‘civilising’ process through which, by copying Western standards, they were hoping to turn their country into a polity worthy of admission into the European society. Thus, within a very short period of time, the young Romanian state borrowed institutions such as Parliament, legal codes, the judicial/administrative systems, as well as education and the army. The Romanian language, too, was subject to a process of modernization under French influence, leading to the marginalization of its Slav and Oriental components, and a massive ‘re-Latinisation’ through the adoption of numerous neologisms of French origin. ³³ In this process of de-orientalization of Romanian culture, pro-Western reformers systematically depicted Moldavians and Wallachians who were opposed to their ideas as representing the voices of the Oriental other, who were not legitimate participants in the construction of the modern Romanian state.

However, Cuza’s increasingly authoritarian governance style bred growing discontent, and in February 1866, he was forced to abdicate. Following Cuza’s removal from power, the Romanian political elites resumed their campaign to secure the support of European powers for the idea of a foreign prince as the leader of Romania. Finally, they settled on Prince Karl of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who had connections to the strongest aristocratic families of Europe (including France), and thus – Romanian elites argued – possessed the authority needed to support Romania’s dream of full unity and integration into Europe. With the support of France, Prince Karl was proclaimed Domnitor (Prince) and assumed the name of Carol I of Romania on 20 April 1866. Carol I (who reigned until 1914) continued the process of French-inspired liberalization. With the help of France, Carol also continued to build a modern army, which was to play a significant role in solidifying the independence of the modern Romanian state by helping to defeat the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878. Following that war, Romania was officially recognized as an independent state.

Returning to Europe after 1989

The theme of return to the Roman roots was once again mobilized by Romanian reformers after the collapse of communism, as they sought to re-enter European society – in this instance, via admission to the EU and NATO. It was only after 1996, with the ascension to power of liberal forces led by the Democratic Convention that a significant process of liberalization and return to Europe could begin in Romania. The new government insisted that its mission was to return Romania to its ‘natural place’ in Europe. ³⁴ As it became clear that the road to integration into the EU would be particularly complicated, Romanian reformers identified admission to NATO as their first priority.

In their effort to fulfil that aim, the Romanian reformers were facing serious challenges both domestically (given the obstacles created by nationalist forces) and internationally, as they had to persuade the West that despite its persisting problems, Romania deserved inclusion into Euro-Atlantic structures. Their approach in that context was reminiscent of the strategy adopted by the nineteenth-century reformers. Thus, they articulated a discourse that stressed the Romanians’ Latin origins and their history of defence of Europe from its Oriental others in an effort to persuade the West that Romania was inherently European and, hence, deserved inclusion into Euro-Atlantic ‘clubs’. Linked to this, the theme of historical debt also resurfaced after 1989. In discussions with NATO representatives, Romanian negotiators evoked the ‘Yalta betrayal’ (when the Western powers allowed the imposition of Soviet control over Romania). ³⁵ In the context of NATO accession negotiations, Yalta was repeatedly mentioned as part of the argument that the West had a special debt vis-a-vis Bucharest – a debt that required that Romania be (re)integrated into Europe.

Second, there was an emphasis on the idea that Soviet-imposed communism had corrupted Romanian society, much like contact with the Orient had done in previous centuries. Consequently, Romanian reformers argued, if their country was to resume its ‘normal’ position in Europe, it needed to transcend the malign influence of the Soviet Union/Russia. To achieve this, Bucharest needed to rely on the systematic advice/guidance of the West – as the embodiment of the values that were at the heart of the true Romanian identity, but had been forgotten by many Romanians. ³⁶ What followed was a fascinating period of international socialization, during which Romanian actors were systematically guided by NATO representatives, who were explicitly seeking to teach the Romanians the values, norms, principles of liberal governance, particularly related to civil-military relations. In 2004, Romania fulfilled its dream of joining NATO. Yet, in many ways, it has continued to be perceived as a country that still has much to learn from the West in order to complete its evolution into a fully liberal polity, transcending the legacy created by its long association with Europe’s others.

In conclusion, the memory of its Roman roots played a key role in nineteenth-century Romanian projects to achieve national unity and entry into Europe, just as it shaped the project of return to the West after 1989. The interlinked themes of a destiny shaped by the Romanians’ Latin origins and a long history of virtuous struggle in defence of European civilization shaped nineteenth-century nation-building practices and discourses aimed at persuading the European powers to support Romanian political projects, just as they shaped post-communist arguments in favour of inclusion into the Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, both in the nineteenth century and in the post-1989 era, there was a sense that due to contact with Europe’s others, Romanian society had been corrupted – and, in order to recapture its true identity, needed the guidance of Western states. Thus, the Western discourse of mission civilisatrice was mirrored in interesting ways in the discourse articulated by Romanian reformers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and legitimized a series of socialization practices in which Western experts and officials were systematically involved in disseminating liberal norms in Romania. It was only following such extensive socialization practices that, in the post-Cold War world just as in the nineteenth century, Romania obtained recognition as a member of the European society.