A comparative analysis of Chinese urban citizens’ attitudes towards the EU,the United States,Russia and Japan

Abstract

What are the attitudes towards the European Union (EU), the United States, Russia and Japan among Chinese urban citizens, and how can we explain these attitudes? These are the intriguing questions that we want to answer in this article. The image, social identity, trust, and political socialization theories proposed the various explanatory variables. We assessed their explanatory powers by analysing survey data from more than 2000 Chinese urban citizens. Most empirical evidence is found for the image theory: positive perceptions of the people (trustworthy and peaceful) and the bilateral relationship (friendly) clearly contribute to positive attitudes.

Keywords

China EU image theory International Relations political socialization

Introduction

It has been argued that public opinion has a growing influence on Chinese policy makers.¹ Even though citizens have relatively limited means to express their potentially deviating opinions and emotions, while Chinese political elites have access to the media to shape and influence public opinion,² the impression that public opinion tends to have little real impact on the China’s foreign policy is ‘outdated’.³ Popular protests (e.g. against Japan) and consumer boycotts (of Japanese products) challenge Chinese leaders’ positions and regime legitimacy.⁴ Support of Chinese citizens could therefore be necessary for successful policy implementation. In this respect, Chinese citizens’ attitudes towards foreign countries are important to study, as they may have an impact on foreign policy making and implementation, in particular to promote further co-operation and accommodation, for example, in international trade, investments, and willingness to study abroad.⁵

It is generally expected that the more positive citizens’ attitudes towards other countries are, the more likely it is that there is a willingness to cooperate politically, bilaterally, as well as within the context of international organizations. Various studies have demonstrated that attitudes do indeed have important effects on preferences, desires, behavioural intentions and behaviour.^6,7 Many countries and international organizations therefore deliberately campaign for public diplomacy in order to create and to strengthen positive attitudes abroad.⁸ The Commission of the European Union (EU), for example, wrote that ‘A more active information policy in China is essential to create a stronger profile for the EU’⁹ (paragraph E.1), and leaders of both the EU and China expressed their commitment to strengthen mutual understanding.^10,11

Another, more scientific, reason to study citizens’ attitudes towards foreign countries is to contribute to the theoretical development of how such attitudes can be explained. Various theories have in the past proved successful in explaining variance in attitudes towards out-groups and foreign countries. However, most of these theories have been developed and tested in a Western context, and it has been less well studied to what extent they are also applicable in a non-Western context like China.

In our previous studies, we focussed on attitudes of Chinese urban citizens towards the EU and the relationship between China and the EU¹². We found that the Chinese respondents were overwhelmingly positive towards the EU and EU citizens, with more than 80 per cent having a positive to very positive attitude. The main drivers behind these positive attitudes were positive perceptions about the EU and EU citizens. In this contribution, we expand our analyses and compare attitudes towards the EU with those towards the United States, Russia and Japan, posing two questions: (1) what are the attitudes towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan among Chinese urban citizens, and (2) how can we explain these attitudes? To answer these questions, we analysed the ‘Chinese Views of EU’ dataset.¹³

Attitudes

In this study, we analyse Chinese citizens’ attitudes towards four major international powers: the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan. The major characteristic of an attitude is its affective nature; an ‘attitude’ is ‘the amount of affect for or against some object’.¹⁴ Ajzen and Fishbein, as well as others, restrict the term to an individual’s evaluation of an object, and reject the three-componential conception of an attitude, in which the concept is made up of cognitions, affects and behaviours. We also think that a clear distinction between attitudes on the one hand and cognitions and behaviour on the other contributes to conceptual clarification and the explanation of attitude formation and change.

Chinese political leaders opt for a strong positive relationship with the EU¹⁵ besides the continuation of the positive relationships with Russia¹⁶ and the United States,¹⁷ while the relationship between China and Japan still seems to suffer from historical antagonism.¹⁸ We expect to see this pattern of China’s international relationships reflected in Chinese citizens’ attitudes. In other words, we expect to find a positive attitude towards the EU, Russia and the United States, and a less positive attitude towards Japan.

Explaining attitudes

The development of political attitudes is typically explained by reference to one of three complimentary processes: inference from one’s own thinking, processing one’s own experiences, and processing information received from relevant others. The first process is represented both by theories focusing on cognitive explanations, such as image/perception theories, and theories focusing on affective explanations, such as social identity and trust theories. The second process is represented by the direct contact theory. The third process is represented by political socialization theory.

In the cognitive inference approach, an attitude stems from cognitions developed earlier, and includes what the individual knows and/or believes to be ‘true’ (beliefs/images/perceptions). Knowledge is restricted to ‘the truth’, that is, what has been or can be proven to be ‘true’. A belief, on the other hand, is something that one believes to be true but which cannot be proven because, for instance, data are missing or the concept has more than one meaning. Positive beliefs or perceptions contribute to more positive attitudes; ‘we learn to like (or have favourable attitudes toward) objects we believe have positive characteristics, and we acquire unfavourable attitudes towards objects we associate with negative characteristics’.¹⁹ Image theory predicts that positive beliefs, images and perceptions result in more positive attitudes.²⁰ Conflict or friendship perception theory focuses on the perceived relationship between one’s own country and the foreign country or international organization.²¹ Value congruence theory predicts that perceived value congruence results in more positive attitudes.²² Based on these theories, we expect that positive perceptions about the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan, and about their relations with China, will foster positive attitudes towards these world powers.

According to the affective inference approach, an attitude stems from other, previously acquired, affects.²³ These affects can relate to the object under study as well as to individuals themselves. A central requirement for any relationship – whether between individuals, groups or societies – is trust. Following Ronald Inglehart,²⁴ we define trust as ‘the expectation that another’s behaviour will be predictably friendly, while distrust is the expectation that another’s behaviour will be harmful or unpredictable’.²⁵ Although ‘expectation’ could be a cognitive variable (‘I expect no problems today’), it becomes an affective variable in combination with the affective character of what one expects (‘friendly’). In many cases, it is more a feeling than cognition because the ‘truth’ on which trust could be based can hardly be known. According to trust theory, trust contributes to a positive intergroup attitude.^25,26 Based on this theory, we expect that trust fosters a more positive attitude towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan.

Social identity theory argues that people have a fundamental need for a positive self-identity, which is to a large extent derived from their social group membership.²⁷ To achieve a positive identity, people tend to compare their own social group with others and evaluate the group to which they belong more positively, whereas they evaluate other groups less positively, or even negatively. An important group for people’s social identity is their national group, that is, one’s own country and people.²⁸ Several studies have shown that very positive, or nationalistic, attitudes towards one’s own country and people can have a negative impact on attitudes towards out-groups.²⁹ Patriotism, or a more moderately positive attitude towards one’s own country, on the other hand, has been associated with more positive attitudes towards others.³⁰ Based on social identity theory, we therefore anticipate that moderate positive attitudes towards China are associated with positive attitudes towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan. Social identity theory further argues that it is especially people who suffer from a low self-esteem who are inclined to strengthen their self-identity through group comparisons, to develop a very positive attitude towards their own group, and consequently a more negative attitude towards out-groups. We therefore expect a positive relationship between self-esteem and the attitude towards the four foreign international powers.

According to political socialization theory, the cognitions and emotions on which people base their attitudes are influenced by informative and affective messages people receive from relevant others.³¹ Positive or negative messages from relevant others, such as parents, teachers, mass media, peers, colleagues and leaders, are expected to influence the socializee to the point of acquiring positive or negative perceptions and thereby a positive or negative attitude. In the current study, we focus on the influence of mass media because when asked, almost all respondents listed television, newspapers and Internet among their main sources of information about the EU. Other potential socialization agencies were rarely named. Previous research showed that messages from mass media, particularly from highly commercialized media, are powerful predictors of negativity towards the United States and Japan among Chinese citizens.^32,33 Furthermore, as our previous research also indicated that Chinese citizens’ personal experiences with foreigners and foreign countries is limited,³⁴ we expect that the use of mass media will have an effect on perceptions about the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan, and subsequently, on the attitudes towards these world powers.

In our analyses, we control for the impact of the demographic characteristics gender, age, educational level and social status. These characteristics have been shown to have an influence on out-group attitudes. Studies typically find less negative out-group attitudes among women, younger respondents, higher educated respondents, and among people with a higher social status.³⁵

Data

The EU FP7 Project ‘Chinese Views of EU’ (see Note 17) provided the data for our analysis. The survey was carried out in six cities in China – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xi’an, Chengdu and Nanning – in July and August 2010. These cities were chosen to cover differences across regions, levels of economic development, and integration into international markets. The original English questionnaire was professionally translated into Chinese. In each city, about 500 respondents, subdivided according to the various districts, were sampled. The samples were drawn separately for each city, based on probability proportional to size random sampling, with lists of registered residents, excluding migrant workers and rural population.

We selected only those respondents who answered all survey questions concerning the attitudes towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan. This resulted in a total sample size of 2233 respondents, of whom almost half (47%) was female. The age ranged from 18 to 70 years old (M = 41, standard deviation (SD) = 13.6). Respondents followed on average 13 years of education; one-fifth had junior secondary education or below (20%), more than one-third (36%) attended senior secondary education, and 4 out of 10 respondents pursued college (21%) or university (20%). A total of 3 per cent attended post-graduate education or higher. At the time of data collection, the majority of the respondents were employed (65%). Most respondents positioned themselves fairly low on the social status continuum; at a scale ranging from 1 (bottom) to 10 (top), 85 per cent positioned themselves at 5 or lower.

Attitudes towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan – the dependent variables – were measured by asking the respondents whether they had an unfavourable or a favourable impression of the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan and whether they had an unfavourable or a favourable impression of their citizens (all on a 4-point scale, ranging from very unfavourable to very favourable). The Chinese word for ‘impression’ has a stronger affective dimension than the English term. We constructed a scale for the overall attitudes towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan by combining the attitude towards the country with the attitude towards the people. The correlations between the attitudes towards the country and its citizens were moderate, and all four scales were reliable (EU: r = .44, p < .001; α = .61; United States: r = .54, p < .001; α = .69; Russia: r = .57, p < .001; α = .72; Japan: r = .63, p < .001; α = 77).

To test our hypotheses derived from image theory, we use measures that assessed various perceptions about the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan relating to their influence in world politics and international economy, their distance from China in terms of values, their relationship with China, as well as perceptions of their citizens as being trustworthy and peaceful. Perceptions of influence in world politics and perceptions of influence in international economy were measured by two questions asking which countries/regions – choosing two among the EU, United States, Russia, Japan and China – respondents perceived to be most influential. The correlations between a country’s perceived position regarding world politics and international economy were moderate at best (r < .41), and we therefore treat these variables separately in the analyses. We thus constructed two variables, relating to each country, reflecting whether or not it was mentioned (yes/no) as an influential player in world politics and in international economy. Perception of value distance between countries was measured by asking respondents to indicate to what extent they perceived a distance in terms of values between China and the four regions of interest (on a 4-point scale, ranging from very close to very distant). Perceptions of the relationship between countries were measured by asking the respondents to rate the friendliness of the relationship between China and the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan (10-point scale).

Perceptions of citizens were measured by asking whether respondents perceived Europeans, Americans, Russians and Japanese to be peaceful versus aggressive, and trustworthy versus cannot be trusted (all on a 7-point scale). As the two items only weakly correlate (Europeans: r = .25, Americans: .33, Russians: .26, Japanese: .38, Chinese: .24), we maintain them as separate variables in the analyses. We also included measures relating to general inter-nations and interpersonal trust (trust theory). Inter-nations trust was measured by asking whether, ‘generally speaking, China can trust other nations’. Interpersonal trust was measured by asking whether ‘most people are trustworthy’. Both were measured on a 4-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The correlation between international and interpersonal trust was low (r = .26, p < .001) and are therefore treated separately in the analyses.

To test our expectations derived from the social identity theory, we included measures that assessed patriotism, satisfaction with one’s own country, and the level of self-esteem. Patriotism was captured by the level of agreement (4-point scale) to three statements: (1) ‘I am proud of being Chinese’, (2) ‘I have a good feeling about what the Chinese people have done’ and (3) ‘China can be positive of what it represents’ (α = .76). Satisfaction with one’s own country was measured by asking how satisfied (4-point scale) respondents were with the Chinese economy, employment situation, environment, social welfare and public safety (α = .77). Self-esteem was measured by asking the respondents to what extent they agreed (1 = strongly agree; 4 = strongly disagree) with the statement ‘On the whole, I am satisfied with myself’.³⁶

To test whether the attitudes towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan are indeed influenced by mass media (as predicted by political socialization theory), we included measures on the use of mass media, the attention paid to international news in general, and to specific regions in particular. Mass media use was measured by how many days in the past week respondents watched TV, read newspapers, listened to the radio, and surfed the Internet to learn about the news (0–7 days). Based on the usage of the different mass media channels, we constructed an index combining the use of TV, newspapers, radio and Internet. Respondents were also asked to what extent they paid attention to international news in general (5-point scale; very much to not at all). Furthermore, respondents were asked to which two countries or regions – choosing between the EU, the United States, Russia, Japan and India – they pay most attention. We constructed four dichotomous variables reflecting whether respondents tend to pay attention to our four countries of interest (yes or no).

Control variables include gender, age, education, and subjective socio-economic status. Age and education were measured in years, subjective socio-economic status was measured on a 10-point scale, on which respondents positioned themselves on a socio-economic continuum.

For the analyses, all continuous variables were recoded into a 0–1 scale, with a higher score reflecting a more positive attitude or perception, or more attention paid to mass media and international news. The percentage of missing values on any of the explanatory variables was below 8 per cent. Considering the large dataset, we conducted the regression analyses without those respondents who had missing values (‘listwise deletion’). Inspection of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) (all below the value of 1.4) and the Tolerance Indices (all above .70) indicated that the inter-correlations between our predictor variables are not problematic for conducting regression analyses (Field³⁷ suggests that multicollinearity is problematic when the VIFs exceed 10 (and the average VIF > 1) and Tolerance Indices fall below .1).

Results

In the following, we present the results of our analyses. First, we provide a descriptive overview of the attitude towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan, as well as from the hypothesized predictors. Next, the results of the multivariate regression analyses are presented.

Descriptives

The Chinese urban citizens’ attitudes towards the four international powers indeed seem to mirror the pattern of China’s international relationships. The attitude towards the EU was most positive (M = .66, see Table 1). A great majority of the respondents (85%) had a positive to very positive overall attitude towards the EU and Europeans. Only few participants took a neutral stance (15%) or had a clear negative attitude (6%). A great majority of the respondents also had a positive to very positive attitude towards Russia and Russians (73% positive, 26% neutral, 13% negative; M = .63). Less but still a majority of the respondents had a positive to very positive attitude towards the United States and Americans (59% positive, 42% neutral, 22% negative, M = .58). The attitude towards Japan and Japanese citizens was predominantly negative (31% positive, 16% neutral, 52% negative, M = .42). Pairwise comparisons reveal that the differences in positivity towards the four countries are significant and, especially the comparisons with Japan, substantial (Cohen’s d > .64, Table 1). The difference in attitude towards the EU and Russia and the difference in attitude towards the United States and Russia are small, while the difference in attitude towards the EU and United States is considerably big (Cohen’s d = .48). For all countries, the attitude towards the citizens is slightly more positive than the attitude towards the country. The differences are significant, but small (Cohen’s d < .27).

Table 1.

Attitudes towards the EU, United States, Russia and Japan.

	Overall		Country		Citizens		Pairwise comparison of attitude towards country and citizens
	Mean ^a	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	t (df = 2232)	Cohen’s d
EU	.66	(.14)	.65	(.17)	.68	(.16)	−6.97	.15***
United States	.58	(.20)	.55	(.24)	.61	(.21)	−12.90	.27***
Russia	.63	(.17)	.62	(.20)	.63	(.19)	−2.67	.06***
Japan	.42	(.24)	.41	(.27)	.44	(.26)	−4.99	.11***

EU: European Union; SD: standard deviation.

Pairwise comparisons: EU–United States: t(2232) = 22.73, Cohen’s d = .48***; EU–Russia: t(2232) = 8.26, Cohen’s d = .17***; EU–Japan: t(2232) = 46.27, Cohen’s d = .98***; United States–Russia: t(2232) = −9.93, Cohen’s d = .21***; United States–Japan: t(2232) = 30.01, Cohen’s d = .64***; Russia–Japan: t(2232) = 35.09, Cohen’s d = .74***.

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Perceptions of influence in world politics and international economy

Almost all Chinese respondents perceive the United States as one of the most influential countries in the world, both with respect to world politics and the international economy (M = .90 and .89, respectively). After the United States, the respondents consider their own country, China, to be the most influential with respect to world politics and the international economy (M = .56 and .50, respectively). The EU arrives third (M = .37 and .30). Russia and Japan are not considered to be very influential (Russia: M = .16 and .07; Japan: M = .05 and .16 for world politics and the international economy respectively).

Perceptions of closeness between countries in terms of values

A majority of the Chinese respondents perceive China and Russia to be close in terms of values (M = .54). China and the EU, as well as China and Japan are considered to be rather distant in terms of values (M = .44 for both). Respondents perceive most distance in values, however, between China and the United States (.34).

The perceptions of the relation between China and the other countries also vary

A majority of the Chinese respondents perceive a friendly relationship between China and Russia (M = .61). A majority also perceive the relationship between China and the EU to be friendly (.55). Less but still relatively friendly is the perceived relationship between China and the United States (.47). The relationship with Japan is perceived to be less friendly (.41).

Perceptions of citizens

Turning to the perceptions Chinese citizens have of the citizens of other countries, we see that a majority of the respondents have a clear positive perception of Europeans and Russians. They are considered to be peaceful (M = .61 and .57, respectively) and trustworthy (.59 and .57, respectively). Americans and Japanese citizens are perceived to be less peaceful (.29 and .27, respectively) and less trustworthy (.46 and .38, respectively). In comparison, Chinese citizens are largely considered to be peaceful (.86) and trustworthy (.72). National favouritism thus also seems to be present among Chinese citizens. Corresponding with the finding that the citizens of the four countries are all considered to be relatively trustworthy, we find a high level of general trust in other people (M = .68). General trust in other nations is somewhat lower (.53), but in general, Chinese citizens seem to think that China can trust other nations.

Patriotism

The Chinese respondents display high levels of patriotism (M = .81). They are, however, not very satisfied with the situation in their own country regarding the economy, employment, social welfare, the environment and public safety (.46). Their self-esteem is relatively high: more than 8 out of 10 (84%) say that they are satisfied with themselves (M = .69).

Mass media use is limited (M = 49)

Television news is the main source for the respondents; almost half (49%) used this source every day in the week prior to the interview. A third of the respondents (33%) read the newspaper – the second main source of news – on a daily basis. Slightly fewer people – 3 out of 10 respondents (31%) – use the Internet daily to search for news. Radio is hardly used by the respondents for learning about the news; only 10 per cent had used the radio on a daily basis to learn about the news, while 61 per cent had not used the radio for a single day in the week prior to the interview for this purpose. Despite the limited use of mass media, relatively much attention is given to international news; a majority of all respondents say to pay considerable or very much attention to international news (58%; M = .66). Most respondents focus on international news related to the United States (87% of all respondents indicate that the United States is one of the two countries they focus on the most). This corresponds with the perception that the United States is the most influential power in world politics and international economy. Considerable less attention is paid to news related to the EU (37%), Japan (30%) or Russia (28%).

Origins

We examined, through four independent regression analyses, how well the various theories explain variation in attitudes towards the EU, United States, Russia and Japan (see Tables 2 to 5). The perceptions of the respective countries and their citizens have the greatest impact on the attitudes. Most notable is the impact of the perception that citizens are trustworthy (β_EU = .22; β_US = .28; β_Russia = .24; β_Japan = .21). The second most important predictor is the perception that the relationship with the respective country is friendly (β_EU = .12; β_US = .18; β_Russia = .15; β_Japan = .21), followed by the perception that citizens are peaceful (β_EU = .11; β_US = .14; β_Russia = .14; β_Japan = .21). All other effects are rather small (β < .10).

Table 2.

Multivariate regression analyses, attitude towards the EU.

	b	(SE)	Beta	95% CI b
(Constant)	.42	(.03)	***	.37 to .47
Image theory: Perceptions of
Influence of (country) in world politics	.02	(.01)	.06*	.00 to .03
Influence of (country) in international economy	.01	(.01)	.02	−.01 to .02
Closeness China-(country) in values	−.03	(.01)	−.05*	−.06 to .00
Relationship China-(country) is friendly	.09	(.02)	.12***	.06 to .13
Citizens of the (country) are peaceful	.06	(.01)	.11***	.04 to .09
Citizens of the (country) are trustworthy	.14	(.02)	.22***	.11 to .17
Trust theory
Trust in people in general	.02	(.02)	.03	−.01 to .05
Trust in nations in general	.02	(.02)	.03	−.01 to .05
Social identity theory
Self-esteem	.01	(.02)	.02	−.02 to .04
Patriotism	−.02	(.02)	−.02	−.06 to .02
Satisfaction with China	.04	(.02)	.05*	.00 to .08
Socialization by media
Mass media use	−.00	(.00)	−.04	−.01 to .00
Attention to international news	.06	(.02)	.08**	.02 to .09
Attention to news about (country)	.01	(.01)	.04	−.00 to .02
Demographics
Gender (female)	−.01	(.01)	−.03	−.02 to .00
Age	−.01	(.01)	−.01	−.03 to .02
Education (in years)	.05	(.03)	.05	−.00 to .10
Socio-economic status	−.00	(.02)	−.01	−.04 to .03
Explained variance (R²)				.16***

EU: European Union; SE: standard error; CI: confidence interval.

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 3.

Multivariate regression analyses, attitude towards the United States.

	b	(SE)	Beta	95% CI b
(Constant)	.27	(.04)	***	.19 to .34
Image theory: perceptions of
Influence of (country) in world politics	.00	(.02)	.00	−.03 to .03
Influence of (country) in international economy	.01	(.01)	.02	−.01 to .04
Closeness China-(country) in values	.05	(.02)	.05*	.01 to .08
Relationship China-(country) is friendly	.19	(.02)	.18***	.14 to .23
Citizens of the (country) are peaceful	.10	(.02)	.14***	.07 to .13
Citizens of the (country) are trustworthy	.22	(.02)	.28***	.18 to .25
Trust theory
Trust in people in general	.00	(.02)	.00	−.04 to .04
Trust in nations in general	.03	(.02)	.03	−.01 to .07
Social identity theory
Self-esteem	−.00	(.02)	−.00	−.05 to .04
Patriotism	−.03	(.03)	−.03	−.09 to .02
Satisfaction with China	−.01	(.03)	−.01	−.06 to .04
Socialization by media
Mass media use	.00	(.00)	.01	−.00 to .01
Attention to international news	.03	(.02)	.03	−.02 to .07
Attention to news about (country)	.02	(.01)	.04	−.00 to .05
Demographics
Gender (female)	.00	(.01)	.01	−.01 to .02
Age	.01	(.02)	.02	−.02 to .05
Education (in years)	.05	(.04)	.04	−.02 to .12
Socio-economic status	.02	(.03)	.01	−.03 to .06
Explained variance (R²)				.23***

SE: standard error; CI: confidence interval.

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 4.

Multivariate regression analyses, attitude towards Russia.

	b	(SE)	Beta	95% CI b
(Constant)	.30	(.03)	***	.24 to .36
Image theory: perceptions of
Influence of (country) in world politics	−.01	(.01)	−.01	−.03 to .01
Influence of (country) in international economy	.03	(.02)	.05*	.00 to .06
Closeness China-(country) in values	.07	(.02)	.09***	.03 to .10
Relationship China-(country) is friendly	.14	(.02)	.15***	.10 to .18
Citizens of the (country) are peaceful	.09	(.02)	.14***	.06 to .12
Citizens of the (country) are trustworthy	.18	(.02)	.24***	.15 to .22
Trust theory
Trust in people in general	.03	(.02)	.04	−.01 to .07
Trust in nations in general	−.00	(.02)	−.00	−.04 to .04
Social identity theory
Self-esteem	−.01	(.02)	−.02	−.05 to .03
Patriotism	.06	(.02)	.07**	.02 to .11
Satisfaction with China	.04	(.02)	.05	−.00 to .09
Socialization by media
Mass media use	−.00	(.00)	−.02	−.01 to .00
Attention to international news	.01	(.02)	.01	−.03 to .05
Attention to news about (country)	.03	(.01)	.08***	.02 to .05
Demographics
Gender (female)	.00	(.01)	.00	−.01 to .02
Age	−.04	(.02)	−.06*	−.07 to –.01
Education (in years)	−.02	(.03)	−.02	−.08 to .04
Socio-economic status	−.02	(.02)	−.02	−.06 to .02
Explained variance (R²)				.22***

SE: standard error; CI: confidence interval.

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 5.

Multivariate regression analyses, attitude towards Japan.

	b	(SE)	Beta	95% CI b
(Constant)	.09	(.04)	*	.01 to .16
Image theory: Perceptions of
Influence of (country) in world politics	−.02	(.02)	−.02	−.07 to .02
Influence of (country) in international economy	.04	(.01)	.06**	.01 to .06
Closeness China-(country) in values	.06	(.02)	.07**	.02 to .10
Relationship China-(country) is friendly	.25	(.03)	.21***	.20 to .31
Citizens of the (country) are peaceful	.18	(.02)	.21***	.15 to .22
Citizens of the (country) are trustworthy	.18	(.02)	.21***	.15 to .22
Trust theory
Trust in people in general	−.00	(.03)	−.00	−.05 to .05
Trust in nations in general	.06	(.02)	.05*	.01 to .10
Social identity theory
Self-esteem	−.01	(.03)	−.01	−.06 to .04
Patriotism	−.08	(.03)	−.06*	−.14 to –.02
Satisfaction with China	.08	(.03)	.06**	.02 to .15
Socialization by media
Mass media use	.00	(.00)	.03	−.00 to .01
Attention to international news	.02	(.03)	.02	−.03 to .07
Attention to news about (country)	.03	(.01)	.05**	.01 to .05
Demographics
Gender (female)	.02	(.01)	.03	−.01 to .03
Age	.07	(.02)	.08**	.03 to .11
Education (in years)	−.00	(.04)	−.00	−.08 to .08
Socio-economic status	.04	(.03)	.03	−.02 to .10
Explained variance (R²)				.31***

SE: standard error; CI: confidence interval.

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

The explanatory power of our model varies between 16 per cent explained variance for the attitude towards the EU and 31 per cent for the attitude towards Japan. The model accounted for 23 and 22 per cent of the variances in attitudes towards the United States and Russia, respectively. There are only a few differences in the explanatory models. While perceived similarity of values between China and the respective countries has a positive impact on the attitude towards the United States, Russia and Japan (β_US = .05; β_Russia = .09; β_Japan = .07), it is negatively related to the attitude towards the EU (β_EU = –.05). General trust in other nations has a positive impact on the attitude towards Japan (β_Japan = .05) but is not significantly related to the attitude towards the other countries. Examination of the 95-per-cent confidence intervals (CIs) reveals, however, that the impact of general trust in other nations on the attitude towards the respective countries does not significantly differ. Patriotism has no significant effect on the attitudes towards the EU and the United States but is associated with a more positive attitude towards Russia (β_Russia = .07) and a more negative attitude towards Japan (β_Japan = –.06). Satisfaction with one’s own country China is, on the other hand, related to a more positive attitude towards Japan (β_Japan = .06), as well as a more positive attitude towards the EU (β_EU = .05). The strength of the effects does, however, not differ significantly across the attitudes towards the four world powers. Paying attention to international news has a positive impact on the attitude towards the EU (β_EU = .08), but not on the attitude towards the other countries. Paying more attention to international news related to Russia and Japan in particular has a positive impact on the attitude towards these countries (β_Russia = .08; β_Japan = .05), but we do not find these effects for the attitude towards the EU or the United States.

We expected that the impact of mass media, in particular paying attention to a specific country, on the attitudes towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan, is mediated through perceptions, images and beliefs about these countries. To assess whether there is indeed an indirect effect, we used the SPSS macro INDIRECT.³⁸ Results show that the impact of attention paid to news about the specific country on the attitude towards that country is indeed mediated through images, perceptions and beliefs about this country. Paying attention to news about the EU, for example, contributes to the perception that the EU is influential in world politics (b = .15, standard error (SE) = .02, p < .001), that the relationship between China and the EU is friendly (b = .04, SE = .01, p < .001), and that Europeans are trustworthy (b = .05, SE = .01, p < .001). These perceptions subsequently result in a more overall positive attitude towards the EU and EU citizens (total indirect effect: b = .02, SE = .00, 95% CI: .01 to .02). Similar results are obtained for the attitude towards the United States (total indirect effect: b = .04, SE = .01, 95% CI: .03 to .05), the attitude towards Russia (total indirect effect: b = .03, SE = .00, 95% CI: .02 to .04), and the attitude towards Japan (total indirect effect: b = .04, SE = .01, 95% CI: .02 to .05). The indirect effects of paying attention to a specific country in the news on the attitude towards this country are most notably mediated through the perception that its citizens are trustworthy.

Finally, we find that older respondents tend to have more negative attitudes towards Russia (β_Russia = –.06), but are more positive towards Japan (β_Japan = .08). The impact of age on the attitude towards Japan differs furthermore significantly from the relation between age and the attitude towards the EU (β_EU = –.01).

Conclusion and perspectives

What are the attitudes of Chinese urban citizens towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan? How can we explain these attitudes? These are the key questions of this contribution. The predictive model was based on various complementary theories that have been successful in explaining attitudes towards out-groups in general: image theory, trust theory, social identity theory, and political socialization theory. We used data from the 2010 ‘Chinese Views of EU’ research project (N = 2233).

A great majority of the respondents had a positive to very positive overall attitude towards the EU. Furthermore, the relation between China and the EU is generally considered to be friendly, but the EU is not considered to be very influential in world politics or the international economy. In terms of values, the EU is considered to be somewhat distant from China. EU citizens are considered to be peaceful and trustworthy. A clear majority of the respondents also had a positive to very positive attitude towards Russia. As can be expected from the historical political traditions in both countries, China and Russia are considered to be relatively close in values, and the bilateral relationship is largely perceived as a friendly one, and Russian citizens are perceived to be peaceful and trustworthy. A small majority has a positive attitude towards the United States. The United States is perceived to be one of the most influential countries in the world, and their relationship with China is considered to be friendly. Yet, most people perceive a relatively large distance in terms of values between the two countries, and Americans are considered to be aggressive. The historical antagonism of the Chinese–Japanese political relationship seems also to be present in the attitudes of Chinese urban citizens; the attitude towards Japan was predominantly negative, its relationship with China was considered to be unfriendly, and Japanese citizens are seen as aggressive and not trustworthy. Our results thus support our expectation that Chinese citizens’ attitudes mirror the international relations between China and these four world powers. We should note, however, that our findings do not warrant the conclusion that public opinion fuels international relations or vice versa.

Results of our multivariate regression analyses show that each of the four included theories contribute to the explanation of variances in the attitudes. Positive images and perceptions about a particular country seem to be particularly important drivers of a more positive overall attitude towards that country. We found that perceptions of citizens being trustworthy and peaceful, and the perception of having a friendly bilateral relationship, have the biggest impact on the attitudes. In addition, we found a mainly indirect influence of mass media use on attitudes: paying attention to news of a country in particular contributed to the positive images and perceptions, and, in turn, to a more positive attitude towards that country. This finding is in line with political socialization theory, which predicts that positive messages from relevant others result in positive perceptions and subsequently in a positive attitude. We should note, however, that in the current study we only incorporated the attention paid to the media, as indicated by the respondents themselves, and not the content of these media, nor how the respondents perceived this information.

Even though the included theories contribute significantly to the explanation of variance in the attitude towards the EU, the United States, Russia and Japan, the percentage of explained variances are not very high (varying between 16% and 31%). One of the reasons may be that not all theoretically relevant variables were included in the survey. A future study should, for example, not only include perceptions but also objective knowledge about the respective countries, and not only patriotism but also nationalism as an attitude towards one’s own country. Furthermore, it was not possible to account for the impact of emotions, although we know from brain research that cognitions and emotions are closely intertwined,^39,40 and that emotions have a strong effect on attitudes towards out-groups.⁴¹ For the cognitions and affects that people may rely on for their attitude inference, we solely focused on the use of mass media. Future research should include other potentially important socialization agents. Another influential source of these perceptions is personal experiences. The intergroup contact theory posits that more, and more positive contact with the attitude object results in a more positive attitude.^42,43 A positive experience in a foreign country can spill over to include the whole country, while affection for one or more foreigners can spill over to include the majority of the foreign out-group.⁴⁴ Although we know that Chinese citizens’ personal experiences with the EU in particular are limited (see Note 34), future research may want to include personal experiences as an additional explanation. A further limitation of the study is the cross-sectional research design, making any interpretation of causal direction merely tentative. The likely causal order of the variables has been reconstructed within a correlational design. Although the proposed causal order of the variables is plausible and based on findings from previous studies, we cannot be certain that the relations proposed are correct in terms of causality. Finally, the predictors we included in our analyses are correlated. Although additional analyses showed that this potential multicollinearity was not problematic for our analyses, the unique impact of the predictors may as a consequence of their inter-correlations be underestimated in our model.

Notwithstanding these limitations, our analyses show that Chinese citizens have clearly different attitudes towards these four world powers, and that theories concerning out-group attitudes developed in Western context are also applicable in China.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all members of the ‘Chinese Views of EU’ research group and the coordinators Lisheng Dong (Professor of Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and Zhengxu Wang (Associate Professor, China Policy Institute, Faculty of Social Sciences, the University of Nottingham) in particular. The research consortium members were the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China), Renmin University (China), the China Policy Institute of the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom), Leiden University (The Netherlands), Jacobs University Bremen (Germany), and the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London (United Kingdom).

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author biographies

Jolanda van der Noll obtained her PhD (2012) from Jacobs University Bremen, Germany, and is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Chair of Community Psychology at the University of Hagen, Germany. Her research is focused on intergroup relations and cultural diversity.

Henk Dekker is professor emeritus of Political Socialization and Integration and the director of the Centre of Education and Learning of Leiden University, Delft University of Technology, and Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. His research focuses on explaining national and international political behaviour.