Abstract
Cyberspace appears to offer limitless possibilities for collaboration and economic opportunity in the twenty-first century, but cyber-attacks, breaches of privacy, and security threats also have become commonplace. In the face of these challenges, a number of governments have been locked in debates over the future of cyberspace governance, including the Russian Republic, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States. This study examines the ongoing contestation of the international normative architecture for cyberspace, with a focus on the United States’ role as a norm ‘antipreneur’, seeking to defend the status quo multi-stakeholder norm for a more open Internet from entrepreneurial efforts by Russia and China to establish multilateral governance with ‘cyber-sovereignty’. Drawing on recent advances in constructivist theory, the study explores antipreneurial strategies to contest efforts by entrepreneurs to introduce new norms, as well as implications for norm development and change. Process tracing is employed to examine cyberspace governance debates. The study concludes by discussing prospects for an International Code of Conduct for Cyberspace, as well as theoretical and political implications of antipreneurship in modern norm contestations.
The term ‘cyberspace’ denotes the virtual realm in which a communication network between computers and electronic devices allows the storage, modification, and exchange of data. 1 Many believe there may be limitless possibilities for cyberspace as an arena of empowerment and opportunity. At the same time, however, cyberspace clearly involves new and inherently transgressive information and communication technologies (ICTs). Great powers today face threats in cyberspace from other countries and non-state actors, including hackers, criminal syndicates, and terrorist organizations. 2 These developments have prompted new debates about Internet governance. For some, the solution is to support a new system of multilateral governance: agreement by the international community on the applicability of new regulations on the boundaries of the Internet freedom, with a role for both multilateral institutions and state governments to regulate behavior in cyberspace. 3 Others counter that the current ‘multi-stakeholder’ approach that empowers private actors and restricts the role of governments is essential for freedom and prosperity in cyberspace. 4 According to this prevailing norm, no single body dictates or enforces the Internet development, technology, or use. Rather, international committees and private–public partnerships set standards, such as defining Internet addresses and protocols.
This article offers an innovative take on the cyberspace governance debate by drawing on advances from critical constructivist theories of norm contestation, with special attention to Alan Bloomfield and Shirley Scott’s work on antipreneurship. 5 The article explores how great powers have engaged in debate over possible multilateral formulas for both greater cooperation and control of the Internet. 6 Specifically, it addresses struggles that developed in the last decade between norm entrepreneurs, including the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (i.e. those who view existing standards as a threat to state sovereignty and favor multilateralism with state-centric governance and ‘cyber-sovereignty’), and ‘antipreneurs’ led by the United States (who support a more ‘democratic’ model of ICT governance, or multi-stakeholderism, a system in which all major actors in the public and private sector collaborate on an effective, informal architecture of management of the Internet activity). 7
The research question for this study is as follows: ‘How do antipreneurs in the cyberspace governance debate effectively contest efforts by entrepreneurs to introduce new norms, and what are the implications for cyber norm development and change?’ This article employs a norm antipreneurship framework to examine this debate, providing more detailed perspectives on the interplay between agents and norms in episodes of contestation. This represents a contribution to critical constructivist studies of norm contestation. It casts the governance debate in new light, advances theories of the strategies of antipreneurial contestation, and highlights the power of antipreneurship.
This article proceeds as follows: It begins with a survey of contemporary scholarship on critical constructivism and norm antipreneurism. Next, it describes different strategies of norm antipreneurism that may be invoked in cases of defense of traditional norms. It spells out the application of practices of norm validation, including how contestations in multilateral settings have helped identify shared organizing principles as a compromise, as well as application to other sectors of global governance where organizing principles are achieved through engagement of multiple stakeholders. It then employs process tracing of international diplomacy on cyber issues during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidential administrations, drawing on archival records and proceedings in multilateral institutions to explore struggles between entrepreneurs and antipreneurs over the cyber norm. Evidence from the study shows how antipreneurial strategies have effectively slowed or stalled negotiations on global governance for cyberspace. The study concludes by discussing theory implications as well as the practical political challenges of governance in a range of related issue areas.
Cyberspace, constructivism, and norms
The origins of cyberspace date back to work by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the late 1960s on an experimental prototype network for linking computers. The project, called ‘Arpanet’, was intended to create an alternative, secure means for military command, communication, and control during a nuclear war. 8 The success of this connectivity soon generated new terminology and ways of thinking about interactions in a virtual realm. Networks and procedures developed by DARPA for the routing of messages between computers in the 1970s came to be termed ‘Internet protocols’ – the foundation of a modern, universal language allowing information to be routed across multiple interconnected networks. By the late 1980s, scientists, researchers, and even average citizens started communicating and sharing information online. 9
Conceptually speaking, the Internet has become a vast ecosystem with many different ‘stakeholders’ but few established rules or restrictions on behavior. 10 The United States and Western allies support a public–private partnership in development of online connectivity, which includes a constrained role for government and the promotion of an open Internet. This remained a principle conviction even as the increasing integration of these technologies into daily life has created new risks and threats. 11 The rise of non-state hacker groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec, as well as state-supported groups such as the Syrian Electronic Army and PLA Unit 61938, further complicates the picture. 12 Russian government-supported hacking during the 2016 US presidential election also has increased the saliency of these concerns. Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Leon Panetta warns, ‘The Internet is open. It’s highly accessible, as it should be. But [it] also presents a new terrain for warfare. It is a battlefield of the future where adversaries can seek to do harm to our country, to our economy, and to our citizens’. 13 To minimize this potential for conflict, governments have grappled with the question of whether cyberspace should come under the authority of state sovereignty in a multilateral governing structure or continue to be directed through a multi-stakeholder approach.
Constructivist International Relations theories are especially well suited to capture political dynamics of the new realm of cyberspace. 14 Constructivists contend state identities and interests should be seen as social constructs. Early works focused on the emergence of new norms, how they develop over time, and how they constitute and affect state behavior (e.g. through shaming or public pressure). 15 They defined norms as ‘expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community’, deriving from a combination of beliefs, standards of behavior, international conventions, and decision-making procedures. 16 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s norm life-cycle model describes stages of norm life, including emergence, broad acceptance (also referred to as a ‘norm cascade’), and internalization. 17 State interactions can be seen as ‘organized by sets of shared meanings and practices that come to be taken as given’. According to this logic, institutional cooperation and identities are mutually constitutive, providing legitimacy and reinforcing positive practices.
Viewed through a traditional constructivist lens, US-based Internet companies and perhaps even government officials might be characterized as entrepreneurs in the emergence of a cyber norm in the 1990s and 2000s. These actors contributed to the establishment of basic principles. They then helped guide others toward an open Internet norm – striving to create a new norm that would resonate ‘with broader public understandings’ and promote different ways of ‘talking about and understanding issues’. 18 The goal was to establish a decentralized network for cyberspace that would be ‘democratic’ and treat the views of major corporations, governments, civil society, and even academics as equally important to help establish standards for the Internet activity. 19 The government’s transfer of control of both the Domain Name and Internet Protocol systems to the private sector in 1997 (instead of to a multilateral institution) underscored its commitment to an informal network approach involving multiple stakeholders to catalyze opportunities in cyberspace. Through the influence of the Government Advisory Council (GAC) and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) contract, the United States fostered the norm, and then continued to work to maintain a strong private sector involvement in a bottom-up approach to Internet governance. 20 Similar to its approaches to regulation of behavior in international waters or outer space, officials claim this is based on the principle of democracy, arguing that a range of vested actors should engage in constructive dialogues over an informal governance structure. 21
However, a number of new threats and challenges have put this norm to the test – and the roles and interests of actors engaged in debates about cybernorms have changed. Today, cyberspace pushes questions of traditional boundaries of sovereignty, as well as blurs lines between the civilian and security sector. The Internet activity raises questions about the reach of government authority in the digital age. ‘Cyber-warfare’ also has emerged as a revolutionary new kind of conflict – moving from the traditional battlefield to the cyber world of information technology. Cyber-attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks or malware could produce direct and indirect damage and quickly draw noncombatants into the realm of conflicts. Dozens of countries are openly integrating cyber-warfare in their military planning and organization, and cyber-crime, cyber-espionage, and threats of cyber-terrorism appear to be on the rise. These challenges also have fostered significant norm contestation. Today appears to be a fascinating dialectical process at work, what Mlada Bukovansky calls a ‘complex interplay between elite discourses about political legitimacy and strategic struggles for power within and among states’. 22
Norm contestation and antipreneurship
The foundation for this study lies in critical constructivist works on norm contestation and antipreneurship. 23 In contrast to early constructivist scholarship focused on norm development and strength, contemporary studies explore the potential for norm change in the face of determined actors or exigent circumstances. These newer works highlight the dynamics of norm evolution, arguing that even seemingly internalized norms remain contested and subject to situational interpretation processes. 24
There have been two important waves of innovation in critical constructivism. First, the 2000s brought attention to the dynamics of contestation and challenges to assumptions of norm internalization and robustness. Antje Wiener, a leading theorist in this area, defined contestation as ‘interventions on the normative structure of world politics’ and began to highlight the importance of these dynamics in global politics. 25 Sandholtz and Stiles proposed a cyclic model of normative change, where disagreements about ‘which norms apply and what the norms require or permit’ in a given situation cause dispute and eventually change a norm’s content, formality, specificity, or authoritativeness. 26 Later, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann shifted focus to different forms of contestation, including validity and facticity, which could impact norm strength. 27 Robustness was viewed as relative norm strength and health in constitution in the face of challenges or perturbations that might otherwise upset a prevailing structure. For example, Panke and Petersohn argued that noncompliance cascades or erosion processes can result from a mismatch of ‘preferences, beliefs or identities, on the one hand, and an international norm, on the other hand’. 28
Attention by critical constructivists to the importance of contestation suggested new directions in the evolution of the literature. However, these works were often fairly broad in their treatments of these dynamics. Critical constructivists argued that the legitimacy of norms hinged on contestation and dialogue over their viability. In 2004, Wiener stated it was important to identify ways that ‘social change occurs as a result of discursive interventions uttered by both norm setters and norm followers’. 29 These works also devoted a great attention to the question of norm strength or robustness. While this scholarship has defined some interesting avenues of inquiry, it was less definitive in terms of identifying specific actors and processes of norm debates. In turn, reactions to these limitations have sparked multiple new strands of exploration of contestation dynamics. 30
Bloomfield and Scott’s pathbreaking work on norm antipreneurship represents a compelling work in this second wave of advances in critical constructivism. They identify specific dynamics and types of actors in contestation processes, and their framework sets the stage for further investigation of strategies. Counterbalancing attention to norm entrepreneurs in the life-cycle model, Bloomfield and Scott argue other vested players matter as well. Antipreneurs may be individuals, rival advocacy coalitions, or states that defend normative status quos in processes of contestation. They also can be very effective. Bloomfield argues, ‘antipreneurs arguably enjoy inherent strategic and tactical advantages in all, or at least most, international issue-areas when defending the status quo’. The Bloomfield and Scott research program presents empirical evidence from nearly a dozen case studies of antipreneurship in action. They find that both elites and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play roles in contending coalitions seeking influence on policy outcomes and institutional cooperation. In some cases, antipreneurs resist advancements creatively by refining status quo norms and proposing them in opposition to the entrepreneur’s new norm. But the very act of engaging in creative or critical discourse itself tends to change dynamic understandings of norms. In select circumstances of ‘normative flux’, actors may say they agree on the need for a new norm while disagreeing on its content or application.
The concept of antipreneurism owes its origins to developments in sociology, as well as contemporary studies of norm challenges. For example, Jonas Claes categorizes players in the R2P debate as ‘advocates’ and ‘rejectionists’, with the latter group speaking out against new initiatives in multilateral settings, demanding renegotiation, and denying that consensus has ever been achieved. As Michael Barnett suggests, ‘the normative structure that constitutes and constrains actors also provides the wellspring for social practices and allows for strategic action’ which might be ‘designed to rewrite the cultural landscape in order to legitimate foreign policy change’ (p. 6). Bloomfield and Scott’s framework also was inspired by Clifford Bob’s work examining ‘strange bedfellow’ coalitions of actors that become involved in norm contestation. 31 Bob characterizes norm contestation as involving different and antagonistic normative communities, which he terms ‘rival entrepreneurs’. 32 This attacks the liberal bias in traditional norm theory and focuses on contested structures and directs needed attention to how social processes of contestation may contribute to the evolution of a surprisingly dynamic normative structure. 33
Strategies of antipreneurship
Antipreneurs may adopt several different strategies in resisting proposed normative changes. First, the process of norm argumentation necessitates bolstering understandings of norm parameters in the domestic political arena. Government leaders engage in discursive interventions to rebut alternative interpretations of commitments to international treaties in domestic politics when raised by others. Bolstering refers to processes of recalculation of a state’s approach to a traditional norm or proposed changes in the norm, as well as discursive establishment of principles or standards for defending current assessments related to the meaning of norms and implications for policy behavior. 34
As noted above, antipreneurs may have certain advantages in the discourse on norm frames. Bloomfield uses past sociological research to demonstrate how, in the absence of complete disaster, actors will exhibit a preference for the current status quo norm. Any norm entrepreneur seeking to change a norm must combat not only the resistance of antipreneurs but also the resistance from any agency or mechanisms set up to implement or protect the status quo. Bloomfield and Scott’s research program recognizes an advantage in inertia, including a range of avenues for opponents of change to suggest high costs and uncertainty.
This process may be most transparent in democratic states, where accountability and power-sharing necessitates the constructive exchange of ideas among leaders. This often occurs through rhetorical means, as entrepreneurs raise questions of normative utility or legitimacy. Risse argues that actors critically evaluate normative guidelines through ‘logic of truth-seeking or arguing’ about the effectiveness and appropriateness of international norms relative to their own assessment of interests and national security. 35 By redefining or bolstering normative commitments based on an assessment of strategic developments and determining a preferred alternative policy course, leaders use frames to challenge old normative commitments and champion new ones.
Second, antipreneurs can use this incumbency advantage to strengthen their efforts in multilateral forums to block or stall international diplomacy on norm frames. They also may try to divert these discussions to exclusive forums. Antipreneurs often refuse to negotiate or attempt to obstruct progress in development of new conventions in multilateral institutions. Bloomfield states, ‘antipreneurs arguably enjoy inherent strategic and tactical advantages in all, or at least most, international issue-areas when defending the status quo’. This is significant in that it suggests resistance offers inherent advantages. ‘Regarding strategic advantages first, norm entrepreneurs “have to make the case for change,” meaning they must make “two moves” to succeed: they need to first persuade others there really is a problem and delegitimize the existing norm; then they must also offer a workable solution (i.e. a viable new norm)’. Bloomfield adds, ‘Antipreneurs can, initially, simply defend the status quo norm by refuting claims it is problematic and requires a solution’. 36 Even if they fail to convince other players that there is ‘no problem’, antipreneurs have strategic advantages in blocking efforts to find practical solutions it.
Incumbency strategies reflect, to some degree, Bloomfield’s discussion of ‘maneuvering’. By claiming that normative challenges represent a fundamental disruption to the system that could promote inefficiencies, diversion may have the effect of stalling progress on reforms. 37 Case studies from the Bloomfield and Scott’s project illustrate this approach. In the case of contestation over the outer space norm, for example, the United States denied that there was an issue to address and stopped talking about issues that had previously been on the agenda. 38 Zahava identified similar tactics in debates over abolishing nuclear weapons, and Bloomfield shows how antipreneurs have tried to stifle debate about R2 P. Empirical studies show that antipreneurs use multiple techniques for influence, such as ‘counter-framing’ (Adachi on cluster-munitions, 2017) and ‘ungrafting’ (Bob on targeted assassination, 2017). 39
Antipreneurs also may have inherent advantages in blocking or stalling progress on norm change in highly technical policy areas where other actors have limited knowledge or resources. In many ways, the United States has enjoyed a certain measure of dominance on technical questions ranging from space exploration to nuclear weaponry to the Internet. Governments work closely with corporations on some cutting-edge technological innovations, and thus are often the first players to see the potential of these new systems for state behavior. In areas such as cybersecurity, this study assumes that specialized knowledge and understanding plays a key role in norm development as well as bolstering. The establishment of some rudimentary norm frames has occurred in areas that are so complicated and technology-intensive that neither grassroots transnational advocacy networks nor some nations would have the resources to oppose them when they began to emerge. In addition, powerful antipreneurs also may attempt to divert discussions to exclusive forums and meetings in which cyberspace governance deliberations might take place. Recent work also suggests that great powers are often more inclined to favor policy coordination in bilateral, mini-lateral, or informal forums given opportunity costs. 40
The third strategy employed by antipreneurs – if and when issues are brought up for debate in international governmental organizations – is direct diplomatic opposition to norm change. A key part of this strategy is active diplomatic engagement in multilateral forums. Multilateral institutions often serve as venues for norm validity to be encountered, but contestation of forms of validity may be more likely during certain times. 41 Actors can attempt to persuade other players to support traditional or alternative interpretations of normative architectures and may use rules of procedure to their advantage. As Michael Barnett argues, actors may be inclined to defend frames of reference that help ‘fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems’. 42 Finally, it should be noted that even in the face of these dynamics, Bloomfield acknowledges that antipreneurs may not always ‘win’ contestation over norms.
Taken together, this study asserts, these strategies of antipreneurship may empower challengers in debates over normative architectures. This offers greater potential perspective on the interplay between agents and norms in episodes of contestation – and advancement in critical constructivist studies of norm contestation.
Norm contestation: cyberspace, sovereignty, and security
As noted above, the normative architectures in conflict in this case are multilateralism versus multi-stakeholderism in governance of cyberspace. Robert Keohane defines multilateral institutions as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’.
43
They can help provide management of international affairs through scores of interlocking institutions around the world, operating effectively across different issue areas.
44
This stands in contrast to multi-stakeholderism, a less distinct institutional form with significant variation in the types of actors involved and the nature of authority relations among those actors.
45
Raymond and DeNardis define multi-stakeholderism:
as two or more classes of actors [consisting of states, formal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), firms, or civil society actors] engaged in a common governance enterprise concerning issues they regard as public in nature, and characterized by polyarchic authority relations constituted by procedural rules.
46
The United States represents the antipreneur in this study, defending the status quo multi-stakeholder norm against challenges. The US government and private corporations worked together to help establish and shore-up multi-stakeholderism at the dawn of the Internet, and they have vested interests – both material security and principled interests – in the maintenance of the status quo. Meanwhile, Russia and China are identified as entrepreneurs promoting norm change in this case. Both governments, along with a number of developing nations, came to adopt a countervailing orientation toward cyberspace. Put simply, they believe that the multi-stakeholderism is a front for maintaining Western-centric dominance of this new ‘global commons’, and they openly worry about the lack of protections for cyber-sovereignty. China, Russia, and their allies have begun to call for norm change to accommodate the new realities of cyberspace.
Bolstering
From the US perspective, cyberspace came of age as a multi-stakeholder system and thrived by creating platforms for exciting economic, political, social, and technological developments. This is an arena in which a variety of actors could, and should, have a say. Similar to its approach to regulation of behavior in other global commons, the US emphasis on such a multi-stakeholder approach has cited principles of openness and democracy, with the assumption that a range of vested actors should engage in constructive dialogues over an informal governance structure. 47 Indeed, as the Internet developed beyond the military to academia and businesses in the private sector, the executive branch seemed committed to a laissez-faire approach to governance, allowing a whole new branch of information communication technologies to emerge outside of the previous status quo norm of a natural governmental monopoly. 48 Notably, the United States also had geopolitical interests in such an approach given that it dominated global private sector initiatives and enjoyed significant technological advantages. 49
As noted above, the United States held strategic advantages in early dialogues: Many of the world’s leading companies and cyber experts were based in the West, and the development of cyber resources and infrastructure has been inextricably linked to economic growth and exchange. Western experts engaged in the first-ever meetings on the implications of the Internet for commerce and economic development in the late 1980s. Since then, the United States has hosted thousands of cyber conferences and meetings of professional organizations, ranging from the Conferences on Computer and Information Security (established in 1993) and the Annual Symposium on Information Assurance to the Internet Society’s Network & Distributed System Security Symposiums and the Annual Computer Security Applications Conferences (one of the oldest information security forums in the world). The Clinton administration also came to embrace the privatization and commercialization of the Internet, recognizing potential advantages for Western countries. 50
Multi-stakeholder meetings in the 1990s included participation from government officials and leaders from the private sector and civil society. And most participants championed multi-stakeholderism, openness, and inter-reliability in cyberspace to support innovation and international commerce. This continued through a series of Global Conferences on CyberSpace sponsored by the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) and west European and Asian governments and NGOs, as extensions of the so-called London Process. 51 Diplomats were also engaged in discussions of cyberspace in ‘friendly’ forums where the United States had greater influence, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 52 For the Clinton administration, this public–private partnership represented the ‘cornerstone’ or the ‘hub’ of cybersecurity strategy.
The US government also took a number of actions to shore-up multi-stakeholderism. Among these was the steady ceding of authority over domain names and Internet protocols to the private sector. 53 For example, the government’s transfer of control of both the Domain Name and Internet Protocol systems to the private sector in 1997 (instead of to a multilateral institution) underscores its commitment to an informal network approach involving multiple stakeholders to catalyze opportunities in cyberspace. Through the influence of the GAC and the IANA contract, the United States has continued to work to maintain a strong private sector involvement in a bottom-up approach to Internet governance. 54 The Commerce Department also had long standing interests in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a California-based nonprofit company created in 1998 and dedicated to implementation of Internet protocols that is run by a board of directors from the public and private sectors (with no significant role for foreign governments). ICANN’s authority covered the Internet activity not just in the United States, but globally. Washington made clear that it intended to scale-back its public role in ICANN and encourage the organization to find broader support from business and civil society actors.
Some of the actions taken to shore-up multi-stakeholderism came in the face of new challenges. 55 Entrepreneurs, including the governments of China and Russia, began to recognize the potential power of fundamentally new, disruptive Internet technologies to change global politics in the 1990s. These two countries led the way in questioning the existing multi-stakeholder approach and its potential challenges to state sovereignty, and they began to advance discussions in multilateral institutions on change. The resulting debates highlighted how contestations in multilateral settings have been essential toward identifying shared organizing principles, a development relevant to other sectors of global governance where organizing principles are achieved through engagement of multiple stakeholders.
The government of China began advocating in the United Nations (UN) for a shift away from the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance toward multilateral decision-making among governments. They framed this as an appropriate, ‘fair’ system to regulate this important area for global engagement. In statements at the UN, Chinese diplomats called for ‘broad participation, sound management and democratic decision-making’ but maintained that a new multilateral regime would help regulate these activities. Chinese officials raised concerns about restrictions on market access for Chinese telecommunications firms, charging that the United States practised a form of Internet ‘hegemony’, since the infrastructure supporting the early Internet was effectively controlled by US firms. They also privately expressed serious concerns about how the Internet could promote the spread of ideas and sharing of information that would effectively violate their cyber-sovereignty. 56 In short, China began to propose entrepreneurial revisions for the rules of cyberspace that would allow it greater leverage in international competition, as well as control over how Chinese citizens would use the Internet.
The Russian government grew increasingly concerned about the rise of the Internet and potential cyber threats in the 1990s, punctuated by Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 1999 and new preoccupations with security and intelligence. For example, the decision by the US-based National Science Foundation to allow former Soviet Bloc countries to connect to the global Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) network in the 1990s was clearly perceived by Russia as a threat. Russian intelligence agencies began to monitor the Internet activity in the 1990s and recognized this as a route for both economic opportunity and political expression. They sought ways to ‘protect’ Russian citizens by generating their own infrastructure capacities and limiting the degree of control of data by outside entities. These measures, including a broad initiative for data localization, represented Russia’s goal to change the architecture for development of the Internet. Russian authorities sought to challenge the prevailing model of a decentralized collection of loosely structured committees and the Internet stakeholders (and de facto Western dominance), and offer a potential solution in multilateralism, with each country’s government having the ultimate say in rules for their citizens. 57
It is also noteworthy that over time, China and Russia found common ground in their effort to challenge the prevailing multi-stakeholder norm on the grounds that its infrastructure and power centers were all based in the United States. These initiatives reflected their geopolitical situations and were demonstrated in related efforts to serve to counter US economic, political, and military power, their similar visions of network security and Internet governance serve to challenge what they perceive as a US-centric Internet – one that also conflicts with their national security interests. Meanwhile, both governments undertook major efforts to build domestic defenses and monitoring network to oversee the activity of their own citizens on the Internet, such as China’s development of the ‘Great Firewall’. What followed was a push by Moscow and Beijing for global Internet standards that would better suit their geopolitical needs as well as promote global network security. 58
The September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States did prompt greater attention to all dimensions of security in Washington, but the White House consciously attempted to balance homeland security interests with multi-stakeholderism. 59 The Homeland Security Act did outline some provisions for protection of a variety of vulnerable industries that made up the ‘critical national infrastructure’, such as chemical plants and the electrical grid. 60 The government also granted agencies new powers of surveillance on the Internet in the name of security, though these practices were not without significant challenges. But the government continued to try to balance off concerns with private sector reluctance to support legislation related to cybersecurity. Private corporations maintained independence over concerns that government or multilateral oversight of cyberspace might hurt commerce by imposing new costs or liabilities on corporations or providing public access to proprietary and confidential business information. 61
Stalling and diversion: GFCE, World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS), and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
The US emphasis on a multi-stakeholder approach was premised on the assumption that a range of vested actors should be engaged in an informal governance structure. The UN sponsored the first WSIS in Geneva, Switzerland, in 2003, to address the issue of governance of the Internet and the associated ICTs. 62 In many ways, this represented the first major international forum for entrepreneurs to confront some of the challenges of multi-stakeholderism. US officials knew this, and they and their private sector partners became engaged in trying to shape the summit agenda during preparatory committee meetings (PrepComs) in the 2 years prior. As an attempt to block or at least delay any direct challenges to multi-stakeholderism, Western countries encouraged the summit to focus on worldwide innovations of ICTs and bridging the digital divide between less developed countries (LDCs) and economically developed countries (EDCs). Ambassador David Gross, the US coordinator for Communication and Information Policy, declared ‘three pillars’ of the US position toward cyberspace governance in Geneva, including (1) a commitment to the private sector and the rule of law, (2) security from cyber-attacks for international commerce and communication, and (3) the protection of intellectual property. 63
Facing Western resistance to more concentrated forms of Internet governance, the summit ended without a resolution on major questions. Instead, its final report focused most heavily on the spread and development of ICTs, but it included a statement of the importance of good governance and a ‘resolve to strengthen respect for the rule of law’. The conference’s published plan of action also called for the international oversight of the Internet to be ‘transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations’.
As an indirect challenge to the authority of ICANN, the plan also proposed a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the ‘full and active participation of governments, the private sector and civil society from both developing and developed countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and international organizations and forums, to investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of Internet by 2005’. Again, even the creation of the WGIG was politically charged: It would be made up of dozens of participants from the private sector, governments, and civil society, and was designed in part as a response to address the perceived dominance of the US Commerce Department in global administration of the Internet. In other words, the codification of existing law into the foundational architecture was to be one that was sympathetic to private and public sector interests, pro-economic competitiveness, and democratic. 64 The United States would not formally participate in the Working Group, but it issued an interpretive statement for the WSIS conference report in which it defined good governance as ‘sound economic policies (including pro-competitive policies), solid democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people and transparent to them’. 65
In an interesting twist, challenges at the summit actually catalyzed greater engagement by NGOs and private groups. For example, the ICT4Peace Foundation was established in the wake of the WSIS meeting. Its goal was to facilitate improved and effective communication between governments and stakeholders for international cooperation. In turn, NGOs helped foster and encourage a series of regional and international policy discussions over cybersecurity that recognize the growing severity of the challenges. 66 For example, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) sponsored a series of cyber-stability seminars in conjunction with NGOs designed to provide opportunities for stakeholders to discuss how to take practical steps toward more stable and predictable cybersecurity environment. Significant progress on confidence-building measures also was made in regional and transnational meetings.
The 2005 WGIG Report helped establish a working definition of Internet governance as, ‘the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet’. 67 Notably, this framing reaffirmed multi-stakeholderism as a core normative principle in the lead-up to the second meeting of WSIS in Tunis in 2005. The Tunis meeting involved direct discussion of the role of state actors in Internet governance, and delegates seemed to support the principles of multi-stakeholderism, including both the private sector and civil society as actors in the creation of norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. 68 Due to strong pressure from the United States and its allies, diplomats also created a Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) in 2006, which played a substantial role in providing background information and support for subsequent international conferences. The 2007 IGF convened in Rio de Janeiro appeared to further consolidate international support – and thereby, norm internalization – for multi-stakeholderism. 69 Since then, this body’s mandate has been included to multiple clauses of direct interest to this norm, including a call to ‘discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the Internet’, and ‘strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in existing and/or future Internet governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries’. These would be grounded on ‘the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet governance processes’. 70
Direct resistance and norm contestation
The multi-stakeholder norm architecture for cyberspace governance was clearly under pressure, but the United States and its allies seemed successful in stalling or diverting attention from these issues in different forums for nearly a decade. This dynamic changed, however, as rival great powers China and Russia ramped up their calls on the West to cede greater control of the Internet to multilateral institutions and establish universal codes of conduct. They were able to enlist support from an increasing number of developing countries, who also began pushing for multilateral oversight and authority. The situation was further complicated by increasing cyber-attacks and threats to information security. Collectively, these entrepreneurs cited the high costs of participating in multi-stakeholder governance forums and expressed feelings of marginalization by the broader ‘democratic’ process as it had developed in its first decade. By the time of the 2013 IGF meeting in Bali, Indonesia, entrepreneurs were promoting contestation to change the normative architecture to one of multilateral governance, not multi-stakeholder control.
Norm contestation among great powers emerged into the open in international forums sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU was originally founded in 1865 to promote guidelines for control of the first international telegraph lines, and over time it evolved into a major institution to address regulation and control of communications across the radio spectrum, satellite orbits, and telecommunications. In the 2000s, plenipotentiary meetings of the ITU, held every 4 years, became a battleground for state debates over the future of cyberspace management. China, Russia, India, and a growing bloc of developing countries also called for the UN to play a larger role in addressing cyberspace management. In 2012, China won a small victory toward this end when Wu Hongbo, a career Chinese diplomat, was appointed the UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, the body that oversees meetings of the IGF and implementation of actions from WSIS conferences. 71 Russia and India also began speaking out as advocates of a shift toward a multilateral governance norm through proceedings in the UN and the ITU. 72
Chinese and Russian engagement on the question of the normative architecture for cyberspace should not have been a surprise to the West. The prevalence of the Internet usage in China has skyrocketed in the past decade as technological developments have allowed a wider range of its citizens to engage online. While China has emerged as an advocate for the growth of the Internet, the government also has maintained a strong hand in domestic Internet governance. By routing the Internet traffic through a limited number of computers, this traffic can be monitored for material that is deemed to be subversive. This goal of controlling the flow of information across their sovereign borders and restricting the Internet’s potential as a means of political activism appear to be the main motivators behind China’s views on Internet governance. 73 Like China, the Russian government considered cyberspace an important tool for both foreign and domestic policy and has become a greater champion for multilateralism with restrictions for sovereignty. This view of sovereignty was consistent with the regime’s approach to other ICTs.
China and Russia called for UN initiatives to create mechanisms for the Internet security that would empower multilateral institutions and ensure a strong role for state governments. Their engagement on these matters began through the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. And in 2004, Russia and China supported the establishment of the UN’s first Group of Governmental Experts (GGEs) to ‘examine the existing and potential threats from the cyber-sphere and possible cooperative measures to address them’. The mandate for the study called for the GGEs ‘to move international, multilateral discussion of this matter to a qualitatively new phase. The group will give the international community a unique opportunity to examine the entire range of issues involved’. While no consensus was reached on a final report in the first GGEs, clear dividing lines in the debate began to emerge. China and Russia appeared to support a multilateral regime for the Internet that would include special protections for state sovereignty, while the United States and its Western allies favored the perpetuation of the multi-stakeholder model that would recognize the importance of governments and the private sector on such matters. Russia and China also began trying to formalize an international treaty to govern cyberspace in the face of Western opposition. 74
This pressure built to a series of showdowns between entrepreneurs and antipreneurs at ITU conferences in Dubai and Busan, South Korea, in the 2010s. At the 2012 World Conference on Information Technology sponsored by the ITU in Dubai, the US government defended a multi-stakeholder approach through informal networks of Internet government. Officials argued that multilateral solutions through the ITU or other formal institutions were not acceptable, as the Internet was outside the historical mandate of the ITU. US delegates also rejected additional formal initiatives to change standards through telecommunications and technology, including expansions of a treaty-based mechanism grounded in the establishment of International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs). Proposed amendments to the ITRs would have effectively revised the agreement to place key dimensions of cyberspace activity under the jurisdiction of the ITU. The United States and a group of more than 50 countries opposed the revisions and refused to sign the new draft treaty. When a dispute over voting rules arose, the US delegation walked out of the conference. To observers, this appeared to confirm a ‘digital cold war’, with deep divisions between ‘cyber paternalists’ and ‘Internet freedom’ advocates. 75 Meanwhile, at home, US opposition seemed to reflect popular sentiments. The US House of Representatives held a hearing in 2012 entitled ‘International Proposals to Regulate the Internet’, where one of the expressed goals was to consider a future ‘possible takeover of Internet governance by the United Nations’. 76
These issues came to a head in the 2014 ITU plenipotentiary meeting in Busan, South Korea. At issue was whether the ITU should have much greater governance authority over cyberspace – granting multilateral authority to a body with greater representation and say for rival great powers and developing countries – or if multilateralism should guide continuation of informal networks and conferences for the Internet regulation. Russian delegates approached the meeting intent on reaffirming the revised International Telecommunications Regulations and emphasizing the binding nature of the Dubai agreement. 77 Russia decried the lack of an international legal norm for cyberspace and called for a new normative architecture that would have strong grounding in the UN system. 78 Yet, just as entrepreneurs sought to challenge the multi-stakeholder norm, the United States argued that the ITU had limited authority in this area. US diplomats claimed that the ITU’s authority only extended to the ‘radio spectrum, satellite orbits, telecommunications, and technical standards’ 79 and that any amendments to the ITRs (as proposed in the 2012 conference) would not be supported.
The Busan meeting yielded a mixed outcome. In total, 89 countries at the meeting did sign the revised treaty that supported the ITU’s role in Internet governance and network security, granting a shift to multilateralism significant momentum. The United States continued to resist some wording but also signaled a new openness to some change. US delegates proposed to add recognition of the WSIS principles of multi-stakeholderism and acknowledge the work of the Multi-stakeholder Preparatory Platform. While the WSIS event series and its sequels, the WSIS + 10 series were sponsored by the UN, they occurred before strong resistance to the multi-stakeholder norm had emerged, and its supporters were able to successfully allow the inclusion of nongovernmental actors in the negotiations. Under US pressure, references in the final outcome document were changed from ‘entities’ to ‘stakeholders and entities’ and recognition was given to ‘accomplishing the work of the broader community’. 80 By citing the importance of various meeting outcomes, the United States was both adding support for their norm and attempting to dilute the authority of the ITU over the UN activities in Internet governance to favor multi-stakeholderism. 81 A clause stating the derivation of the Internet authority from all international stakeholders was immediately followed with a statement that ‘all governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international Internet governance’.
The outcome of the 2014 ITU plenipotentiary conference was perhaps most notable for its air of compromise. The meeting did not feature diplomatic fireworks, intense controversy, or walkouts by great powers. For the most part, diplomats appeared to seek areas of agreement, including producing nearly 20 new resolutions for action on issues ranging from online protection of minors to global flight tracking. On critical issues of Internet governance, players made only minor changes beyond the issues raised in Dubai. Small concessions were offered by the United States and its allies on resolutions, such as inclusion of new wording promoting affordability and access. And where contestation was most acute, the participants agreed simply to withdraw or remove the most controversial language from final texts.
Outcome: a Code of Conduct for the Internet?
Deliberations at global conferences on ICTs demonstrated significant give-and-take between entrepreneurs and antipreneurs on broad issues of Internet governance reform. States made gradual progress on some themes, such as promotion of the Internet access in developing countries and confidence-building measures. Prospects for a new agreement on a multi-stakeholder International Code of Conduct for Information Security (ICCIS) also emerged during the Obama administration, and officials appeared more open on the question than their predecessors. Track 2 negotiations between US and Russian officials began in Washington, in 2009, and ‘made progress in bridging divisions that had long separated the countries’. By the end of 2009, US diplomats ‘agreed to discuss cyber-warfare and cybersecurity with representatives of the United Nations committee on disarmament and international security’. 82 In January 2010, the Obama administration shared a position paper outlining clear goals to bring great powers together on cybersecurity. 83 Track 2 diplomacy widened to include Chinese officials, as well as to address confidence-building measures and stability.
In December 2011, Russian and Chinese diplomats, along with several allies, submitted a proposal for an ICCIS to the UN. They requested that the Secretary General distribute it as a formal document for consideration in the 66th session of UN General Assembly. The goal of the Code would be to establish an international consensus on Internet governance, providing principles of information and network security for all issue areas. 84 Subsequently at the UN, the draft language that began to emerge in diplomatic discourse suggested a third way through the debate: the code would allow for a voice for multiple stakeholders, but the direction of agreements between major players would support progress toward more formalization. A new version of the code was advanced by some states participating in the 2015 Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
A comparison of the 2011 and 2015 proposed drafts of the ICCIS suggests the impact of antipreneurial activity on norm development. Key elements and wording provide benchmarks demarcating change from earlier, more radical entrepreneurial efforts by Russia and China, to much more modest goals by 2015 as they appeared to adapt to resistance from antipreneurs. 85 Changes made for the second draft submitted in 2015 suggest some concessions by entrepreneurs to antipreneurs in several ways. Much of the language of the first draft that would have allowed states to classify many popular uses of ICTs as violations of state security, and subsume many aspects of cyberspace that have emerged as a global commons into the realm of state sovereignty was toned down or removed because of opposition by the United States and allies. Because China and Russia originally chose to include both ICTs and networks, this would have included not just DDoS attacks, cyber-espionage, and defacement attacks but also email and social media networks that can be used to share information and communicate. The removal of another clause promoting cooperation in ‘combating criminal and terrorist activities that use information and communications technologies’, also suggested that entrepreneurs had begun seeking less ambitious norm change. In sum, comparing the two drafts (2011 and 2015) demonstrates significant moderation in the goals of the entrepreneurs toward a compromise with the antipreneurs.
The Obama administration also shifted its diplomatic approach somewhat in other venues. Officials began discussing ways to extend UN Charter commitments to the right of self-defense to cyberspace. Such changes were recommended to Secretary Kerry in a report on an international framework for cyber-stability submitted by the International Security Advisory Board in the State Department in 2014. 86 In response to a request from State officials, the board undertook a study of potential architecture for enhanced international cooperation to promote a peaceful and secure cyberspace environment. It argued, a framework for ‘international cyber stability would enhance continuity of relations between nations in the face of attack or exploitation through cyber means’. The board advocated, ‘building on areas of consensus while exploring norms that relate to core US values’, and a primary focus should be on seeking ‘international consensus on the rules of the road’.
In the spring of 2015, the State Department proposed a set of peacetime principles for cyberspace to the active UN GGEs in New York. The US submission went a step further, adding a trio of peacetime norms that it believes nations should honor in cyberspace for the sake of global stability. This move was soon followed by an articulation by Secretary Kerry of US principles and reflections on the balance of the Internet freedom and multi-stakeholderism and multilateral principles. He argued that the US government’s goal was to ‘promote international cyber stability … to create a climate in which all states are able to enjoy the benefits of cyberspace; all have incentives to cooperate and avoid conflict; and all have good reason not to disrupt or attack one another’. While the United States steadfastly believed ‘the basic rules of international law apply in cyberspace’, he stated, the government now supported a set of additional principles that mirrored ideas under discussion in the UN. The resulting GGEs consensus report, published in August 2015, provided evidence of the power of discourse in contestation.
Conclusion
This study offers new perspectives on the dynamics of contestation over the global cyber norm. It shows how the rapid development of cyberspace and the Internet allowed technology to outpace the growth of previous status quo norms and helped force critical dialogues. It identifies different types of actors, as well as successful strategies in shaping the evolution of the normative architecture.
This study clearly demonstrates that traditional theories of norms as static and internalized and fall short of explaining this evolution. Instead, norm entrepreneurs Russia and China have used the protection of sovereignty in the UN Charter and worked within the ITU to challenge the validity of the multi-stakeholder norm status quo. At the same time, antipreneurial strategies by the United States have contributed to ongoing contestation of formal validity of the norm. US diplomats practised all three strategies of antipreneurship effectively – bolstering support at home for a multi-stakeholder norm, stalling international negotiations using its incumbency advantages, and direct diplomatic opposition in international forums. Indeed, the United States has appeared to enjoy strategic advantages as a defender of the status quo, demanding that the international community effectively agree on the applicability of existing international law. US diplomats actively employed legal and political arguments regarding possible Internet governance, and they sometimes rebutted alternative interpretations of commitments to international treaties in domestic politics (such as from congressional critics or NGOs). They practised strategies of diversion and challenge that yielded results.
Antipreneurs clearly have played an important role in contestation over the cyber norm, parlaying strategies into results in debates over norm architectures. Bloomfield and Scott’s assertion that antipreneurship can be effective is borne out by evidence that differences slowed or stalled negotiations on global governance for cyberspace. In some cases, the introduction of new arguments by entrepreneurs regarding the norm’s meaning in use were changed or limited by antipreneurial resistance. Contestation of norms in this case also fits Wiener’s arguments about their ‘dual quality’. Cybernorms development seemed to simultaneously structure, and be structured by, social interaction. Some actors sought to challenge the validity of assertions of their opponents, and they worked to try to build support for their preferred positions. This is consistent with predictions in the literature. This study also confirmed the value of this new model of strategies of antipreneurial resistance: (1) US leaders first worked to define and bolster their antipreneurial stance in the domestic arena through discursive interventions and collaboration with private companies, (2) they used their incumbency advantage to strengthen their efforts in multilateral forums to block or stall international diplomacy on norm frames, and (3) they engaged in direct diplomatic opposition to norm change for a period of time that appeared effective. This pattern seems likely to repeat for democratic states facing challenges to norm interpretations, and it serves as a useful conceptual framework for analyzing different players and strategies in norm contestation.
However, events in this case also raise important points regarding further theory development. For example, diplomatic positions clearly shifted during the Obama administration. The power of the executive to shape international negotiating stances – and the potential for antipreneurial positions to evolve toward those of the entrepreneur – suggest that these labels must be more dynamic than current treatment in the literature allows. Leaders may pressure other states to adopt a standard norm meaning, or they may challenge proposed initiatives for norm change due to principled concerns and prevailing geopolitical interests. Treatments thus may need to be both issue-specific and temporally bound. This work also would benefit from even stronger links to emerging critical constructivist studies of norm change and contestation. Greater comparative study and emphasis on theoretical cumulation will continue to advance our understanding of these dynamics of international cooperation.
Finally, at this writing, Russia and China continue to pressure the international community for stronger standards of multilateralism backed by ‘cyber-sovereignty’. In 2015, the governments of Russia and China signed a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the field of international information security. Some dubbed this a ‘nonaggression pact’ for cyberspace, which outlined cooperative measures, information exchanges, and increased scientific and academic cooperation. This move occurred in the broader context of increased challenges to cybersecurity around the world. From Russian hacking of the Ukrainian government to foment nationalist separatism in that country to interventions in the US presidential election in 2016, these debates remain very much alive. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies have held firm. Following the fifth round of the GGEs’ study process in 2016–2017, international efforts to bridge differences appear to have failed. US diplomats contended that there was no foundation for changing the normative architecture. In 2017, Michelle Markoff, deputy coordinator for cyber issues in the State Department, argued that the current UN report ‘falls short of our mandate and doesn’t meet the standard that the previous GGEs have set for us’. Regarding the application of international law, Trump administration officials made clear that they wanted to see explicit outlines for how international law applies in cyberspace, especially in relation to the right of self-defense. Anything that oversteps the boundaries of sovereignty and multi-stakeholder interests, Markoff said, would be incompatible to principles of ‘peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention’. 87
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.