Abstract
Hierarchy is a persistent feature of international politics. Existing accounts recognize that there are many ways in which actors can stand in relation to one another. Yet they struggle to make sense of this complexity. This study considers Max Weber’s contribution to understanding international hierarchy. It discusses three ideal types of stratification based on the distribution of capabilities (class), estimations of honor and prestige (status), and command relationships (authority). Following the neo-Weberian approach, these dimensions matter because they make social action intelligible. Furthermore, Weber clarifies how class and status are connected and how these two dimensions relate to authority through the process of ‘social closure’. The study concludes that scholars who focus exclusively on authority structures miss the fact that authority typically derives from other forms of stratification: although based on different logics of social stratification, class and status hierarchies often coalesce into (legitimate) authority.
Introduction
The last decade has seen a lively interest in the role that hierarchy plays in world politics. There is now a sprawling body of literature that makes the case for taking relations of super- and subordination among states more seriously. This debate has produced myriad conceptions of hierarchy from different theoretical angles. Rationalists, 1 constructivists, 2 critical theorists, 3 and scholars in the English School tradition have all waded in. 4 Yet, in some ways, their contributions have muddied the waters rather than clarifying things. While refraining from outright paradigm wars, this literature remains largely disconnected, missing out on opportunities to engage in fruitful debate. Only recently have attempts emerged that have sought to build bridges by offering conceptual clarification. 5
Authors agree that hierarchies are ubiquitous features of world politics and deeply imbued with power, that the prioritization of the state in contemporary International Relations (IR) reflects its hierarchical nature, and that there are multiple ways in which actors can stand in relations of super- and subordination. 6 Furthermore, scholars accept that hierarchies are ‘intersubjectively constituted’ social facts generated and interpreted by purposive actors – even if there is disagreement as to what precisely this entails. 7 Yet despite the recent search for common ground, the literature remains divided between those who take a ‘broad’ view of hierarchies as patterned inequality and those who adopt a ‘narrow’ conception focusing exclusively on authority structures. 8
Although both sides of the debate draw heavily on insights from other disciplines, arguably the most influential account of social stratification is conspicuously absent from this debate. 9 To fill this void, this study considers Max Weber’s contribution to understanding the nature of stratification and the way in which hierarchies shape social actions, as applied to international relations. It asks a simple question: what can Weber bring to our understanding of international hierarchy?
First, following a neo-Weberian typology of the distribution of power in societies, the study shows how existing accounts conform to his three ideal-typical dimensions of stratification: the distribution of capabilities (class), social estimations of honor and prestige (status), and command relationships (authority). 10 This scheme greatly reduces the current conceptual complexity, creating a common ground for debate among scholars interested in international hierarchy. However, rather than highlighting what all conceptions of hierarchy have in common, the Weberian approach highlights what typically sets them apart.
Second, in line with the Weberian approach, the study argues that these dimensions matter because they are linked to different logics of social action. How actors respond to hierarchy depends fundamentally on how they perceive the international realm to be stratified. Although others have argued that actors’ understandings of hierarchy affect their behavior, 11 this study discusses the question considering Weber’s ideal-type approach and notion of adequate causation.
Third and finally, Weber provides insights about how class and status are connected and how these two dimensions relate to authority through the process of ‘social closure’. 12 In that sense, this study warns that the narrow conception of hierarchy as legitimate order misses the fact that authority derives from other forms of stratification. Although based on different logics of social stratification, class and status hierarchies will often coalesce into (legitimate) authority.
The remainder proceeds as follows: the next section defines the three ideal-typical dimensions of stratification and outlines the neo-Weberian argument linking each dimension to different logics of social action. The subsequent sections discuss IR conceptions of hierarchy along the dimensions of class, status, and authority; they also develop the relationship between these dimensions – something that is notably missing in the current literature. The conclusion discusses how the neo-Weberian approach contributes to resolving conceptual confusion surrounding (a) the anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy and (b) the relationship between class, status, and authority in international politics.
International stratification and ‘social action’
The neo-Weberian account of international stratification builds on three theoretical propositions. The first is the simple and uncontroversial claim that the position a state occupies – its international standing – matters to actors who identify or act on behalf of that state. For Weber, ‘vertical social ordering’ is a central feature of the distribution of power in society. 13 He defines power as actors’ chance to impose their will upon others even in the face of resistance. 14 This chance is conditional on social structures that distribute advantages unevenly, shaping both actors’ living conditions and their experiences. Although Weber developed his arguments with domestic societies in mind, he argues that the logic of stratification operates independently from the concrete level of analysis, which implies that it also applies to the relations among states. 15 Recent proponents of hierarchy-centered approaches share this understanding. 16
Second, international hierarchy does not comprise a single rank order. There are many ways in which states can stand in relation to super- and subordination. This, too, is an increasingly accepted claim. Yet there are almost infinite ways in which these dimensions can be conceived, a fact that is reflected in the eclectic literature on international hierarchy. 17 Zarakol and Bially Mattern, for example, identify three ‘logics of hierarchy’ around which perspectives cohere, depending on whether authors treat hierarchies as the outcome of ‘functional bargains’ (‘logic of trade-offs’), as structures that distribute behavioral roles differentially (‘logic of positionality’), or as processes through which hierarchies generate and reproduce inequality (‘logic of productivity’). At the same time, they draw a distinction between ‘narrow’ conceptions of hierarchy as structures of legitimate political authority and ‘broader’ understandings of hierarchies as patterned inequality. Adding yet another layer of complexity, in the ensuing edited volume, Zarakol further groups these approaches according to whether they focus on structural or agentic forces. 18
Although Bially Mattern and Zarakol set out to create an integrative approach, they face the problem that hierarchies tend to cut across all three ‘logics’, which is why they introduce them as non-exclusive ‘analytical poles’. 19 However, rather than presenting a framework that unites different perspectives, their typologies reveal a deep-cutting cleavage within the literature. Critics such as Donnelly explicitly reject the ‘broad’ view of hierarchy on the grounds that it provides an inadequate basis for theorizing structure in international politics. 20 Extending this critique, McConaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon find ‘roughly five major categories of stratification’ in the literature, namely, ‘socio-cultural’, ‘class’, ‘military capabilities’, ‘economic capabilities’, and ‘governance (or political)’ hierarchy. 21 Although they do not develop the other categories, they insist that only ‘governance hierarchy’, based on authority relationships, is actually a form of hierarchy since the others do not contradict the assumption of international anarchy. 22 In their view, Bially Mattern and Zarakol’s account overemphasizes the content of hierarchies at the expense of rigorous theorization of structural differences.
Finally, Barder comes perhaps closest to Weber’s theory of stratification, distinguishing between hierarchy as a ‘function of material power’, a ‘relation of authority’, or ‘ordering language’, criticizing existing accounts for conflating hierarchy with hegemony, as only the latter refers to legitimate leadership or authority. 23 Barder offers one of the few accounts that dialogue with Marxist theory, which has long recognized the unequal nature of international politics. Yet his overview does not flesh out the relationship between the three ‘logics’ he identifies, and the way in which material capabilities and discourses of difference ultimately relate to authority.
All these authors agree that we need a conceptual map that reduces the universe of possible conceptions and guides empirical research. However, they fundamentally disagree on what the map should include and whether we should treat structures of inequality that differ from authority as hierarchies. Weber’s theory of stratification speaks directly to this debate. It not only distinguishes between three ‘logics of stratification’ – the distribution of capabilities (class), estimations of honor and prestige (status), and command relations (authority) – it also develops the relationship between these dimensions – something that existing accounts have struggle to resolve.
Weber argues that political communities are stratified by different types of power relations. In some societies, power derives predominately from control over property and income-generating skills. Such ‘class situations’, in Weber’s terminology, arise from the uneven allocation of assets and abilities among actors. 24 This corresponds closely with the idea that states are primarily differentiated by the distribution of material capabilities that is central to realist theories. Dependency and world system theory, too, have long argued for the relevance of international stratification based on resources and the division of labor among states. Weber is usually thought to have influenced the development of modern realism, especially through the work of Hans Morgenthau. 25 Yet, ‘class’ represents only one form of social stratification. Weber’s idea of the distribution of power makes him a rather awkward proto-realist. In fact, he developed his argument in response to Marx’s claim that ownership of the means of production, in the long run, determines an actor’s social position and living conditions. 26 This is because, for Weber, status is another type of social stratification, defined as the ‘effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges’. 27 Weber recognizes that status may often derive from property, but property does not determine an actor’s status because honor and prestige ultimately depend on prevailing social values. 28 Other social theorists, most notably Bourdieu, have elaborated on the view that social distinctions are manifold and by no means determined by material factors such as wealth. 29
Neo-Weberians further argue that Weber implied – but did not fully develop – a third dimension of social stratification, ‘command situations’, based on the uneven distribution of authority in society. 30 Authority refers to the acceptance of an actor’s command as binding, which requires ‘a certain minimum of voluntary submission’, without relying on violence or persuasion. 31 For Weber, having authority means that an actor’s command is accepted by others as valid irrespective of that command’s specific content. This means that command relations rest on legitimacy, and Weber famously discusses three sources of legitimate authority claims based on tradition, charisma, and formally enacted rules. 32
The neo-Weberian account of social stratification, as Keene points out 33 , comprises three ideal types: class, status, and authority. Ideal types are not approximations of reality, but conceptual abstractions highlight analytically crucial aspects of real-world phenomena. Ideal types only appear in mixed forms in the empirical world. Analytically, however, distinguishing between them helps us understand the way in which international order is structured, and how agents typically deal with its complex hierarchical nature. Weberian ideal types are analytical constructs and should not be confused with accurate descriptions of empirical social structures.
This leads to the third point. Weber’s interpretative sociology builds on the notion of purposive social actors whose conduct depends on both material interests and intersubjective understandings. 34 His work represents an important intellectual predecessor of IR approaches that seek to overcome the rigid distinction between material and ideational factors. 35 Weber was skeptical of Marx’s claim that individuals in underprivileged class situations (‘class in itself’) will eventually become aware of their common interests and organize for action (‘class for itself’). 36 ‘We shall speak of “action” insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his [sic] behavior – be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence’. 37 In his view, an actor’s class situation does not necessarily lead to social action, because other forms of stratification (such as historically contingent status distinctions based on nationality, religion or race) undermine class solidarity. 38 Individuals who share the same social position may act according to similar patterns (‘mass action’), but only if they become aware of the causal relationship between their social position and associated ‘life chances’ will they engage in collective action. In contrast to early constructivists and current critical theorists, Weber argues that material factors do shape people’s life chances irrespective of the meaning that they attach to them. Material factors therefore matter independently from socially constructed meaning. However, ‘social action’ does not arise from material factors but is mediated through culturally contingent understandings. Because constructivists have struggled with the relationship between the material and ideational, some recent accounts draw on Weber-influenced social theory as part of the ‘practice turn’. 39
Weber’s methodological stance suggests that ‘adequate’ explanation of social phenomena – as opposed to explanation in the natural sciences – is achieved when events are made intelligible by subsuming them under hypothetical ‘pure types’ of social action. 40 It is clear from the discussion of social classes and status groups that Weber’s dimensions are closely linked to specific logics of social action. It follows from the Weberian account of stratification that hierarchies matter not only because they distribute advantages and disadvantages unevenly, but because the type of hierarchy that actors perceive to be salient shapes their actions. Per Barbalet, ‘Only as an account of cultural structure, of the way in which social differentiation is perceived in the social consciousness is Weber’s theory of stratification formally coherent [with his methodological principles]’. 41
It is important to note that, unlike Marx, Weber sees the relationship between social structure and action as indeterminate. Whereas for Marx (and many materialist IR theories) objective social structures will ultimately lead to specific types of action, for Weber action depends on culturally contingent understandings of structure. A particular course of action may typically result from a structure, but this depends on actors’ perceptions of that structure. Weber’s notion of ‘adequate causation’ then requires that social scientists attempting to explain action should do so in reference to ideal-typical structures. 42 Therefore, a structure may or may not result in a particular action, but a purposive action should always be understood as corresponding to a particular understanding of structure. Although many hierarchy approaches use ideal types to describe structure, they do not follow this Weberian methodological approach.
For instance, the operation of the balance of power is conditional on actors’ conceptions of the international system as being stratified along material capabilities. The absence of this understanding does not mean that actors will abstain from balance-of-power politics, nor does its presence mean that states will necessarily balance against other states. Yet we should expect balancing to become less likely without such understanding and inadequate as an explanation for actors’ purposive action. 43 The goal of Weber’s approach is to make social action intelligible. It is not the development of a nomothetic theory that seeks to explain social phenomena through general laws. The purpose of the Weberian account of stratification is conceptual clarification and the development of theoretical reference points against which to examine concrete empirical cases.
Table 1 summarizes the relationship between Weber’s three dimensions of stratification and their corresponding typical modes of social action, as applied to IR theory.
Three dimensions of standing.
As developed below, Weber’s ‘class’ is based on the uneven distribution of property and income-generating skills. 44 It is a distinctively material form of social stratification based on capabilities. By contrast, status refers to estimations of honor and esteem, and, as such, is inherently social. Authority relations are different. They are based on actor’s recognition of command relationships, in which some have a ‘legitimate right to expect willing obedience to their command’. 45 Unlike Bially Mattern and Zarakol’s ‘analytical poles’, which emphasize characteristics present in all hierarchies, the neo-Weberian dimensions clearly differentiate between three distinct types of stratification. As analytical constructs, they are not reducible to one another. As empirical phenomena, these dimensions only occur in mixed forms and are only relevant in so far as they inform the actions of social actors.
Salience
Weber’s theory of social stratification raises the obvious question of how the dimensions are related and when we should expect them to become salient. Realists and Marxists argue that class is always the most important dimension, treating other types of stratification as derivative and ephemeral. Others suggest that the salience of status depends on an actor’s position in a pecking order. In this view, status becomes crucial after humiliation, 46 for example. In these accounts, the relationship between class, status, and authority remains unclear. Weber does not provide a fully formulated theory for when and why a dimension becomes more relevant than the others. This is an important limitation. Nevertheless, he does provide two important guidelines.
First, Weber argues that actors’ perceptions of their social environment form part of a community’s shared belief system or ‘complex of meaning’; 47 they are socially embedded and historically contingent. By contrast, the analysis of prevailing ideas in a political community would be an empirical question. Weber suggests that class emerged as the dominant form of stratification in capitalist societies. 48 More generally, however, the salience of either class or status depends on the scope and pace of social change: ‘When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favored. Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground’. 49 Following Weber’s logic, stable orders will be characterized by status concerns, wherein social parvenus become stigmatized. 50
For example, during the height of absolutism, status among European princes was primarily a question of lineage and tradition. This resulted in a stable status order based on precedence, in which the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor occupied the top ranks. It was not until the eighteenth century that the idea of a ‘grading of powers’ supplanted the precedence order, which, as Wight posits, introduced notions of state size and strength into international legal and political thought. 51 In other words, it was not until this time that the long-standing status order was disrupted by class concerns, likely as a result of the onset of the Industrial Revolution.
Second, Weber maintains that social stratification is the result of ‘social closure’. Actors monopolize socially valued resources to improve or maintain their position in society. As Parkin elaborates, actors in positively privileged positions recur to ‘exclusionary closure’. 52 By contrast, ‘usurpation’ is the response by those who find themselves excluded, ranging from ‘marginal redistribution to complete expropriation’. 53 Importantly, for Weber, usurpation often relies on extra-legal means. This is because powerful actors entrench their advantages in legal orders. 54 Ultimately, ‘conventional preferential opportunities’ are transformed into legal monopolies. 55 This is how ‘class’ and ‘status’ become translated into (legal-rational) ‘authority’.
Weber discusses the emergence of property rights as the result of ‘social closure’ whereby privileged actors established legal regimes to protect their privileged access to scarce resources. 56 By extension, the emergence of the modern state followed a similar logic of social closure through the appropriation of material and symbolic resources, leading to the establishment of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 57 The rational-legal authority of the modern bureaucracy derives from legal orders that are themselves the result of actors’ struggles to preserve their class and status advantages. By extension, as class and status hierarchies become more stable, they will crystallize into authority structures. This is how Weber understands the relationship between these three dimensions.
Class as dimension of standing
It is impossible to talk about class without referencing Marx, whose conception treats class as a social configuration determined by property relations and which transcends the state. For Marxists, the sovereign state is an ill-suited building block for IR theory, because it represents the historically contingent institutionalization of class interests that began in early modern Europe. Although Marxists do not claim that states are undifferentiated ‘like-units’, viewed from this theoretical angle it makes little sense to distinguish between different classes of states. That being said, recent debates among Marxist IR theorists ask whether the competitive pressures generated by capitalism lead to a system of multiple states in which capitalists are pitted against the working class and, at the same time, against each other. 58 In this view, the ‘uneven and combined development’ of capitalism intensifies inequality and differentiation at a global scale. 59 This is in keeping with a long-standing argument that societies do not develop in isolation and that this development produces patterned inequality. 60 Hence, some neo-Marxist variants, most notably dependency and world system theory, distinguish between core and peripheral states, defined by their position within the international division of labor. While social forces are inherently transnational, capabilities influence the life chances and experiences of the vast majority of a state’s population.
As elaborated above, Weber built on Marx’s class conception, but treats class as an ideal type and not a concrete empirical entity. Whereas Marx sees class structures as real and social classes as collective actors, for Weber, ‘class’ exists only as a social-scientific concept. 61 It also follows from the Weberian approach that material conditions do not necessarily precipitate action, as they do for Marx, but that particular kinds of actions should be understood as motivated by actors’ understandings of the importance of material conditions.
Like Marxists, realists also believe that material conditions structure international order. That is not to say that realists share the Marxist understanding of class, rather they agree that material capabilities are the primary determinants of international hierarchy. Here, class refers primarily to the position a state occupies within an international rank order based on the distribution of material capabilities, especially military strength and wealth. This is the most common way IR theorists have thought about and conceptualized hierarchy, generically referred to as ‘material power’. Yet Weber’s ‘pluralistic conception of class’ is broader than the conventional view; 62 his emphasis on class situations as being determined by both property and income-generating skills suggests that international understandings of class should encompass human capital, access to technology and finance. Although these elements do not feature in many materialist conceptions of capabilities (e.g. they are wholly absent in the Correlates of War CINC score), they are nevertheless crucial components of modern international stratification.
Geopolitical competition as a logic of social action
From a Weberian perspective, class matters insofar as it makes actors’ actions intelligible. What sort of actions can class help us to understand? Materialist theories emphasize geopolitical competition, a pattern of conflictual relations that result from states’ struggle over power and resources. For Marxists, this has traditionally implied imperialism, whereby political communities seek to impose their will upon others, ultimately leading to military confrontations between expansionist powers. By contrast, realists focus on the balance of power. For some, the balance of power materializes with law-like regularity because of the unintended consequences of states seeking their survival in a self-help system. 63 It is therefore a quasi-automatic process. For others, the balance of power results from deliberate policy choices and therefore presupposes purposive agents. This is how Morgenthau understood the balance of power to operate, which Turner attributes to the coherence of his Weberian approach. 64 Likewise, English School theorists maintain that the existence of an ‘international social consciousness’ conditions power politics in very much the same way. 65
Again, the neo-Weberian approach and the associated logics of social action speak to this debate. Realists, for instance, tend to take the salience of class distinctions for granted. However, numerous empirical studies have tested the validity of the balance of power in different geographical and historical settings. What they consistently show is that the balance of power is confined to modern Europe and does not manifest with any regularity outside of this highly specific context. 66 This is because actors in modern Europe began to understand international politics as governed primarily by this logic and have subsequently been socialized in this understanding. For the balance of power to occur, agents need to understand the international order as principally organized by class, and act accordingly. Critics who point to the lack of balancing outside this context miss the point. As Levy explains, the ‘scope conditions’ (i.e. that actors view international order as being stratified according to class) have not been met. 67
This not to suggest that balancing is the only possible course of action for actors who perceive the international realm being stratified according to class. Nevertheless, it follows that if we seek to explain balancing behavior, we cannot do so without reference to actors understanding of class hierarchies, as defined here.
Status as a dimension of standing
Status is the second dimension of stratification and derives from social evaluations of honor or esteem. 68 There is now a large and expanding literature that deals with the role of status and related questions of prestige in international politics. Prestige, in particular, has attracted the attention of scholars interested in the intersubjective aspects of great power competition. 69 This focus has introduced a bias in the debate associating status primarily with the position of high-ranking states, as the ‘reputation for power’, 70 the ‘public recognition of eminence’, 71 or what Weber identified as Machtprestige: the ‘glory of power over other communities’. 72 Only recently has status-seeking by smaller powers received scholarly attention. 73
Weber considers status distinctions as a key aspect of the distribution of power, 74 including in the relations among states. Modern bureaucrats, just as feudal lords, seek prestige for their political communities, which, in turn, means more power for themselves. 75 Weber emphasizes the ‘unavoidable “dynamic of power”’ that pits the interests of larger political communities against each other. 76 His brief discussion of the politics of prestige among states suggests that status-seeking is limited to great powers and essentially a zero-sum game where one’s status gain is another’s loss. 77 Status competition would therefore heighten tensions, as in the case of the Franco-German rivalry in the decade leading up to WWI. 78
Morgenthau closely follows this reading, arguing that secondary powers can only ‘bluff’ for so long since the prestige of a state must eventually correspond to its material capabilities. 79 The argument that (temporary) ‘status inconsistencies’ lead to international conflict also underpins hegemonic transition theory. As Gilpin asserts, status ultimately depends on the distribution of material capabilities: ‘Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular’. 80 Hence, for realists, status is either epiphenomenal, and therefore analytically irrelevant, or part of the struggle among states for power. This understanding, however, is not in line with Weber’s general point about the role of status differentiation among social actors. Whereas materialist conceptions of hierarchy posit that status is derived from class, Weber insists that these two dimensions of stratification should be treated as analytically distinct. The problem with hegemonic transition theory (and accounts that follow Morgenthau more generally) is that they conflate class with status and authority. The very notion of ‘status inconsistencies’ suggests that status cannot be treated as a mere derivative of the distribution of material capabilities – otherwise, it is hard to conceive how misalignments between power and status occur in the first place.
Status management as a logic of social action
Status matters to states. Before the Vienna Congress of 1815 clarified questions of precedence, disputes over diplomatic ceremony were common among European sovereigns. Status also played a role in the relations between Europeans and non-European rulers. The refusal of Lord Macartney to kowtow to the Chinese emperor in 1793 is well known. It is taken as a historically significant episode that illustrates the incompatibility of European sovereign equality with the Middle Kingdom’s Sinocentric worldview and imperial pretensions. 81 But it also seems plausible to interpret Macartney’s conduct as a case of status assertion by Britain, which emerged at that time as the world’s foremost naval power. 82
Social psychology suggests that status concerns are ‘hard-wired’ into human nature. Social identity theory (SIT), for example, maintains that people strive for positive self-concepts. They identify with social groups that compare favorably to relevant out-groups. 83 SIT is frequently employed in studies on international status. These accounts suggest that actors implement ‘status management strategies’, depending on their perceptions of the permeability and stability of a given status order. Actors who regard a status order as permeable will attempt to move from low- to high-status groups. In cases where actors perceive the status hierarchy to be closed, they will turn to either ‘social competition’ or ‘creativity’. Studies that draw on SIT often associate ‘social competition’ with confrontational policies, which is why the theory has been popular in explaining great power competition. 84 However, as Ward clarifies, ‘social competition’ only generates conflict ‘when consensually valued characteristics include geopolitically significant resources – like control over territory, administration of colonies, or possession of certain kinds of weapons systems’. 85 Otherwise, states are more likely to try to rise in the ranks by emulating the members of high-status groups, or by redefining in-group attributes in positive terms – a strategy termed ‘social creativity’. 86 To give an example of the latter, during the nineteenth century, Europeans regarded widespread racial miscegenation in Latin America as one reason for the region’s relative backwardness in comparison with the thriving United States. Following the destabilization of the European civilizational ideal after WWI, Latin American intellectuals reversed this stigma by reframing racial mixing as virtuous, including the ‘ideology of mestizaje’ in Mexico and ‘racial democracy’ in Brazil. 87 A former stigma is thereby transformed into a source of self-esteem and, pending on collective recognition, status.
‘Status management’ strategies depend not just on states’ perceptions of the nature of status orders but also on their perception of their place within that order. Paradoxically, although authors agree that positionality is important, they disagree on the implications of this. Lebow, for instance, suggests that status concerns are only salient for great powers. 88 By contrast, Volgy et al. 89 and Wohlforth et al. 90 argue that status should matter more to those who occupy the lower ranks due to their ‘status insecurities’. Scholarship on the proliferation of rankings and international benchmarks indicates that positionality matters throughout the scale. 91 In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting views, Towns and Ramili propose that positionality creates differentiated pressures, and actors will respond differently depending on the type of order and their place therein. 92
The literature agrees that status refers to an actor’s position on a rank order defined by collective beliefs about what is valued in society. 93 This is very much in line with Weber’s understanding of status as a dimension of social stratification. Weber also emphasizes the importance of cultural values and agents’ perceptions of their social position. The status literature is largely constructed in opposition to materialist theories and studies are quick to point out that status cannot be reduced to material capabilities. Yet these accounts struggle to disentangle the complex relationship between status and class. For while it is true that states often seek ‘certain kinds of weapons systems’ as status markers, quite often the desire for advanced weapons is motivated by material security concerns (i.e. ‘life chances’).
Although Weber and the status literature agree that status orders are based on shared values, a state’s status and the status management strategies available to it will also depend on its other resources. While status is not determined by class, large and wealthy political communities can use ‘conspicuous consumption’ to improve their lot. In this case, some assets are acquired not because of sheer necessity, but because of what they communicate about one’s lifestyle and corresponding social standing. In international politics, examples include the development of costly weapons programs and the hosting of mega-events such as Olympic Games or football world cups. 94 Yet the costly signals are not available to all. Hence, although we may distinguish analytically between different ideal-typical dimensions of stratification, a state’s status will be affected by its class.
The need to disentangle status and class is evident in the recent literature on status-seeking by smaller powers, which draws almost exclusively on the experience of Scandinavia. 95 Norway, in particular, has positioned itself as a facilitator of international peace and security acting through multilateral settings. Undoubtedly, Norway ranks among the richest countries in the world. Wohlforth et al. recognize this fact but argue that Norway’s status-seeking predates its wealth; they also claim that its status management strategy is targeted and employs minimal resources, ‘not outside the scope of most comparable states’. 96 In their view, Norway’s status derives from the acknowledgment of its social peers, which, in this case, happen to be other rich, like-minded democracies with similar values. However, Norway’s peer group is generally regarded as a high-status group. The high regard that this group enjoys derives from the fact that countries like Canada, Switzerland, and Sweden are all wealthy, stable, and reasonably egalitarian peaceful democracies – all factors that are not independent of their material condition, or class. In the end, this implies that other, poorer countries could emulate Norway’s strategy – and spend similar resources – but will most likely fail to gain the same recognition.
Finally, the Norwegian example also points to another conceptual conflation: that between status and authority. Wohlforth et al. argue that Norway’s status-seeking should also be understood as a ‘quest for moral authority’. In other words, Norway’s high status confers a certain type of power and access to decision-making (‘a seat at the table’) that is not dissimilar to the influence that great powers enjoy, even if the source of this power is different. This is symptomatic of the larger status literature, where status is regarded as a type of political currency that provides states with power, without developing the connection or differentiating between the two. However, as Weber highlights, status and authority are analytically distinct dimensions of stratification. Authority orders rest on legitimacy claims, whereas status orders do not. ‘Moral authority’ as a form of stratification only makes sense if actors accept the rightfulness of authority claims. Status is different because status orders can be stable but illegitimate. 97 The next section develops this point.
Authority as a dimension of standing
Authority refers to the distribution of command relationships among states. In stark contrast to the Waltzian view of states as ‘like units’, authority, as an ideal-typical dimension of stratification, assumes that states are indeed ‘functionally differentiated’. This is precisely why those who take the ‘narrow view’ see authority as the only proper dimension of hierarchy: it is the only dimension that challenges anarchy. Although the false anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy has received ample criticism, authors like Donnelly and others remain trapped by the same ‘Waltzian straightjacket’ they criticize. 98
It follows from the neo-Weberian theory of stratification that authority is but one dimension of hierarchy. Authority implies that some states have the legitimate right to lead, while others are expected to obey. 99 Naturally, this goes against the grain of much IR theory, which is premised on strong notions of state sovereignty and formal equality. 100 Yet viewed in historical perspective, empires have been more common than international orders comprised of sovereign and formally equal states. Nor did the Westphalian Peace of 1648 mark the end of hierarchical authority relations. In Europe, the Holy Roman Empire continued to exist until 1806, while European colonialism and imperial rule did not abate until well into the twentieth century. 101 Decolonization has led to the globalization of sovereignty as the principle of organizing international life, but it did not end all authority differentiation among states. Today there are many different types of authority distinctions, with the special privileges of the permanent members of the Security Council being the most obvious case.
For authority to be any different from domination by force, less powerful states must recognize the legitimacy of the prerogatives of certain states. For neo-Weberians, ‘[t]he distinctive feature of authority is a belief system that defines the exercise of social control as legitimate’. 102 An example of such a belief system is international society. English School theorists argue that international order comprises a social space in which actors share a common understanding about the underlying practices, norms, and rules that structure their relations. 103 Although this space is populated by sovereign states, its principle agents are foreign policy elites, especially diplomats and international lawyers. As Clark clarifies, this order rests on historically contingent beliefs about rightful membership and conduct. 104 It follows that the members of international society are formally equal; ‘outsiders’, by contrast, neither recognize the same institutions nor possess the same rights and obligations that international society confers on its members. Hence, central themes in English School research are the emergence of international society and the process through which new members gained entry into this ‘club’. 105 The English School further agrees that sovereign states differ in terms of the authority they command. Bull, for instance, argues that great power management sustains international order and is based on the recognition of certain special rights and duties by the members of international society. 106
Bull’s notion of great power management is a good example of ideal-type conceptions of hierarchy. The fact that great powers have often been military powerhouses is empirically important, but great powers, in the English School conception, are not defined by material capabilities alone. Rather, what characterizes a great power is the recognition of its authority by other members of international society. ‘States which, like Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany, are military powers of the front rank, but are not regarded by their own leaders or others as having these rights and responsibilities, are not properly speaking great powers’. 107 We may distinguish international orders according to the justifications that provide the basis for this recognition – charismatic, traditional, or legal-rational – but the logic of stratification remains the same: authority rests on a ‘certain minimum of voluntary submission’ that operates independently from class. 108
Authors who do not clearly distinguish between these dimensions run the risk of conflating privileged class positions with hegemony. 109 As legitimate leadership, hegemony refers to a privileged position in an international order structured by authority. Weber clarifies the relationship between class, status, and authority. Over time, the process of social closure, whereby privileged actors monopolize scarce resources, may lead class- and status-based social orders to crystallize into authority structures. Typically, elites achieve this monopolization through the establishment of legal orders, which are more durable than authority justified by tradition or charisma. Although underprivileged actors must accept the rightfulness of this order for it to be legitimate, they can counter ‘exclusionary closure’ through usurpation, which, as Weber maintains, often requires them to act illegally.
Consider Ikenberry’s account of the emergence of the liberal international order, according to which the United States created a rule-based system at the height of its power following WWII that provided ‘secondary states’ with opportunities to voice their concerns and institutionally bind the hegemon. 110 Or take the example of ‘relational contracting’. 111 Hierarchy, according to Lake, is defined by ‘the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled’. 112 By treating sovereignty as divisible, Lake conceives of hierarchy as the outcome of a negotiated settlement, in which states trade in some of their sovereign prerogatives in exchange for certain goods, such as security or economic benefits from trade. Hierarchy is not necessarily derived from material capabilities, but from the distribution of ‘residual rights’: the authority of one contracting partner to decide over those affairs that were not explicitly settled in the initial compact. 113 Thus, Lake’s conception of hierarchy is based on a differentiation of command relations (differentially allocated rights) and not on status or material capabilities.
All of this suggests that the ‘narrow’ view of hierarchy as structures of legitimate rule is in fact too narrow in that it lacks any space to develop the relationship between authority and other dimensions of stratification. This indeed is the primary advantage of the neo-Weberian framework.
Authority and social action
The English School and rationalist theories make unusual bedfellows. Yet these approaches share a common conception of hierarchy based on command-obedience relations among formally equal states. The different logics of social action are captured by Weber’s distinction between Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität. Both types involve the conscious adjustment of action to ends. But whereas social action in the first case is oriented toward the practical results of individual decisions (weighing the costs against the benefits of those decisions), in the latter case, actors orient their actions toward a single higher end. 114 Hence, in the English School understanding, subordinate actors accept the right to rule of some selected few because they expect this arrangement to promote order; 115 rationalists, by contrast, argue that the acquiescence of subordinate actors is transactional depending on the expected returns.
What types of actions can an understanding of international order as being structured by authority help us explain? The answer lies in Weber’s account of the origins of authority, and the way in which this relates to class and status. As elaborated above, Weber sees the emergence of authority structures as the result of social closure, which involves the creation and maintenance of institutions (legal-rational orders) that serve to legitimate the rule of the privileged.
Weber argues that privileged actors seek to consolidate their positions through ‘social closure’. The privileged position of the permanent members of the UN Security Council is one example. The nuclear non-proliferation regime is another. 116 Initially, the acquisition of nuclear weapons was entirely dependent on a states’ class (material capabilities and human capital). Historically, the first states to achieve this technology monopolized this resource and closed it off to others through the creation of a legal regime, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As a result, it is no longer the case that access to nuclear weapons relies on a state’s capabilities alone. Today, states that seek nuclear arms must reject the legitimacy of the order by not signing or denouncing the NPT. Alternatively, they can seek to ‘usurp’ the resource for themselves by illegally pursuing a nuclear program. Subscribers to the non-proliferation regime will then attempt to use legal means such as economic sanctions to block the development of such weapons. The creation and maintenance of international institutions and treaties and the use of economic sanction can all be understood as the kind of actions that follow from an understanding of international order as being stratified by authority.
Conclusion
Much of the existing hierarchy literature is framed in opposition to Waltz’s Theory of International Politics and the premise that international relations are characterized by the absence of relations of super- and subordination. 117 His distinction between (domestic) hierarchy, on one hand, and (international) anarchy, on the other, is often taken as evidence of Waltz’s failure to conceptualize hierarchy in world politics. 118 Yet this view is misleading. Viewed through a neo-Weberian lens, it is apparent that Waltz has a very specific type of international hierarchy in mind, despite his insistence on the contrary. While it is true that Waltz explicitly denies hierarchy as the ordering principle of the modern international system, he does not call into question the existence of an international ‘pecking order’. 119 Rather, he rejects the analytical relevance of authority and status differentiations. The terms of the debate, then, should not be framed as hierarchy-versus-anarchy, but center on the particular type of hierarchy that theorists invoke.
The conceptual clarification presented in this study demonstrates how this distinction between anarchy and hierarchy is misconstrued. Not only is the juxtaposition misleading because hierarchy is possible amid anarchy, but because Waltz’s theory in fact proposes one specific type of hierarchical stratification, while discarding others. The neo-Weberian framework leaves little doubt that Waltz, while explicitly rejecting hierarchy at the international level in the sense of status and authority, embraces the notion of hierarchy as class. At best, recent attempts do not make this clear enough. 120 At worst, by overstating the distinction between anarchy and hierarchy, Waltz has been made a strawman that is too easily torn down in order to exaggerate the novelty of hierarchy thinking in international politics. 121 Recent hierarchy debates continue to be framed in opposition to Waltz. This has led authors to adopt a narrow view to argue that only authority structures are in fact hierarchies. The inability of the narrow conception to come to terms with Waltz’s understanding of class-based hierarchies is a major limitation of that approach, as is their inability to see how class and status contribute to the creation of authority structures.
The neo-Weberian approach contributes to conceptual clarification in three important ways. First, it clearly distinguishes between three ideal-typical dimensions of stratification that cannot be reduced to one another. Second, it links each dimension to a particular logic of social action. Third and most importantly, it specifies the relationship between these three dimensions, something that existing frameworks have struggled to do. Weber offers a straightforward account of how class and status hierarchies coalesce into authority structures. The persistence of conceptual confusion, especially the conflation of class and hegemony, and status and authority, points to the need for further research in these areas. For example, the current status literature frequently argues that status matters because it provides a ‘seat at the table’ which implies that status confers some form of authority. Yet, legitimate rule and, by extension, decision-making powers cannot be simply assumed to be elements of status. At present, this relationship remains largely underspecified.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
