Abstract
Literature of small state’s foreign policy-making has mostly focused on the structural factors and less on the perceptions of the weak state. This article adopts a cross-level analysis framed by role theory to investigate Vietnam’s China policy. Two role conceptions are provided to illustrate Vietnam’s management of bilateral relations with China. The main demarcation of these two roles lies in their perceptions of hierarchy embedded in the asymmetric relations. The independent role is ego-driven and identity based that it views hierarchy as mainly the discrepancy of material power. By contrast, the interactive role is relational oriented and interprets hierarchy from the angle of distribution of responsibilities; the higher role expectation of the other actor and the pursuit of relational security are especially emphasized by this interactive role. Finally, this article utilizes the case of South China Sea dispute to explain how and why inter-role conflict and domestic role contestation occurred.
Among China’s neighboring countries, Vietnam is the one that shares the closest tie politically as well as culturally; yet its China policy keeps shifting and is described as a ‘calibrated mixture of deference and defiance’. 1 Since the two nations restored diplomatic ties in 1991, Vietnam seemed hesitant to act assertively toward China, regardless of the numerous reports from Vietnam’s official media complaining of China’s bullying behaviors in the South China Sea. In recent years, while deepening its military cooperation with the United States, Vietnam is strengthening the party-to-party ties with China through frequent high-level mutual official visits. 2 These phenomena sparked the research question that this article plans to answer: why has Vietnam’s attitude toward China been inconsistent?
To answer the abovementioned question, this article plans to bridge two categories of International Relations (IR) literature: small state’s foreign policy analyses and role theory. Although this article is not the first to use concepts and a framework provided by role theory to investigate small states’ foreign policies, 3 it helps to broaden the application of role theory by conducting case studies of East Asian states’ foreign policy-making. On the other hand, in past decades, the literature on small states’ foreign policy analyses shifted the research focus from the states’ power possession to their power projection ability. 4 Many scholarly works further redefined the small state by emphasizing the relational factors of disparities between the small and great powers, and their major focuses are small states’ capability to exercise power and the contexts of such process. 5 Scholars have even proposed the ‘smart state’ and ‘alliance shelter’ strategies for small states to manage their relations with great powers. 6 However, these new theoretical developments fail to provide a convincing explanation of the frequent changes in small states’ attitudes and policy-making when facing great powers.
Brantly Womack’s argument of asymmetric relationships complements the abovementioned deficiency by pointing out that the obvious disparity of size and capability between the small state and great power results in a discrepancy in the degree of attention exerted by both sides. Womack’s analysis broke through the static, imprecise interpretations that focused mainly on structural factors. He adds the factors of policy-makers’ perceptions of the asymmetric structure, arguing that the weaker state’s over-attention and misinterpretation of the great power’s deeds often led to breaches of the bilateral relationship. 7 Nevertheless, this is insufficient to explain why changes and inconsistency occurred in Vietnam’s China policy. A small state might have diverse interpretations of the asymmetric relationship under different spatio-temporal contexts, and different policy-makers would make different judgments based on their interpretations of the existing asymmetry. Through analyzing the weaker state’s role conceptions and the corresponding interpretations of hierarchy embedded in the asymmetric bilateral relationship, changes and inconsistency in states’ foreign policy behaviors could be better explained and even predicted.
Based on Womack’s theory of asymmetric relations, this article further argues that there are mainly two role conceptions shaping Vietnam’s China policy: the ego-driven, structure-orientated ‘independent role’ (as suggested by KJ Holsti) 8 versus the ‘interactive role’ that involves more alter-driven, responsive, and relational-oriented behavioral patterns. This article assumes that the mixture and conflict of these two role conceptions significantly contributed to Vietnam’s somewhat vacillating policy toward China. Also, the controversy of Vietnam’s twin roles might be due to the domestic role contestation which occurred between the elites and the masses. Domestic role contestation could arise between different elite groups too; nevertheless, the communist regime’s foreign policy-making process tends to be more opaque; it is challenging to investigate the contestation among different political factions inside the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).
The following sections begin with an introduction to role theory and the implications for this research. Afterwards, the two role conceptions which have often been materialized through the diverse propaganda and strategies of the small states in their management of bilateral relations with the great powers will be introduced. Here, the concepts of independent role and interactive role are specifically designed for studying Vietnam’s China policy; however, this work assumes the potential application of these two roles on other small states around China’s borders. The third section provides examples of Vietnam’s enactment of the two roles, the inter-role conflict, and the domestic role contestation in the process of China policy-making. The conclusion evaluates how Vietnam’s case could contribute to the application of role theory in researching small states’ foreign policy-making.
Role theory and asymmetric relations: the role conceptions of the weaker state in the hierarchy
Several mainstream IR theories propose that a state’s identities, ideas, and historical experiences influence the policy-makers’ decision-making. Nevertheless, the original definition of identity is a relatively static concept, for ‘it is not a concept that has an action-driven meaning at its heart’. 9 Jacques Hymans’ argument of ‘national identity conception (NIC)’ transcends the conventional definition of identity through adding the state’s agency and the vigor of domestic society to the meaning of NIC. Such renewed definition of identity is similar to the independent role of this research. Yet, as Hyman has recognized, NIC is individual, subjective, and composed mainly of the belief of the state. 10 The responses from the international community and interactions with other state actors weigh little in the composition of the NIC. Identity does guide the state’s actions; however, it needs a medium to link these to the state’s interactions with the external environment and management of struggles. Role as an analytical metaphor can function as the intermediary of identity and present the state’s agency more vividly, because a role conception of the state is not subjectively decided but inter-subjectively defined and practiced.
Role theory also takes the agency of the Other into serious consideration and develops a more dynamic approach to analyzing change(s) in a state’s strategic behavior. In the case of Vietnam, constructivism indicates that states with a similar ideology and political systems (which form their identity) tend to be cordial toward one another. The fact that Vietnamese leaders and people viewed China as the biggest threat to national security could hardly be explained from the angle of identity. 11 This article further proposes two types of role conceptions that could more comprehensively analyze Vietnam’s actions in the asymmetric relationship with China. These two roles diverge from their interpretations of hierarchy embedded in the asymmetric relationship. The ego-driven independent role pays more attention to the distribution of power and material interests in the asymmetry, while the interactive role emphasizes responsibility and the fulfillment of the role enactment of each side in the bilateral relationship. Both roles might appear in turn or in the same spatio-temporal context (which causes inter-role conflict and/or domestic role contestation); which role becomes dominant depends on the policy-makers’ judgments and agency of change.
The two dimensions of role-playing and the debating process of role enactment
Role theory in IR was an approach imported from and inspired by other disciplines and first employed by scholars in the 1970s. It argues that a state’s understandings of its own role(s) and the perceptions of the outside world where its role(s) are enacted determine how it designs its policies and corresponding behaviors. States also suppose that others take on and enact certain roles. Role enactment means ‘how well an individual performs a role in a social setting, once it is selected . . . . Role enactment is different to role claims (which are often made subjectively by the role beholder), because the key to judging whether or not role enactment is fulfilled depends on the responses of the audience (the other actors in the international arena). The audience establishes the consensus reality of a role and the standard of role performance. An individual state selects and performs appropriate roles according to the social structure and the consensus between itself and the audience. 12
States’ selection and adoption of roles has never been an easy procedure; neither is a role purely determined by the structure. A role needs to be practiced and performed based on the role-beholder’s interpretations of its assumed role and predicted audience responses. Such an inward, self-centered process of a state’s role-taking often results in the reconstruction and redefinition of the role; hence, inevitably, much role-taking becomes role-making. 13 In this process, how policy-makers interpret the national role conceptions (NRCs) is crucial; they could solely rely on their understanding of the structural conditions (ego-driven), or might act mostly in accordance with other actors’ responses or assumed feedback (relationship-driven). 14
Role is a relational social position. 15 A state’s role-playing always includes the two dimensions of role-taking and role-making. 16 Role-taking relies on the role beholder’s self-image regarding receiving recognition by the other actors, which assumes a deeper concern about relationships with others and the reputation of the role-beholder itself. 17 The consideration of the audience’s feedback is crucial for this role-taking logic, albeit it tends to be the actor’s subjective prediction. In contrast, role-making is identity-based, where the actor’s ego dominates how it should perform the role, and the audience’s responses count only to a limited degree. These two diverse role-playing logics deeply reflect the characteristics of the two roles initiated in this article: the interactive role which assumes the guideline of role-taking and the independent role that follows the role-making mentality.
States normally hold multiple roles and oscillate between role-taking and role-making. KJ Holsti once proposed 17 different typologies of NRCs. 18 Each type of role corresponds to a specific set of social rules and rituals that guide the role-beholder to act and interact with other actors. In reality, a state commonly faces situations that require it to play diverse roles. Shifting among different roles could be a spontaneous action and occasionally arises from compulsion. In any case, the state’s readjustment of its role represents ‘a major first step toward a change in policy’. 19 Contradictions caused by a state’s shifting between/among divergent role conceptions constitute inter-role conflicts, which result in incompatible policy expectations of state and controversy or even conflict in managing foreign relations. 20
The concept of inter-role conflict is useful for analyzing the clash between the ego-driven independent role and the relational-based interactive role; however, inter-role conflict focuses more on the external dimension of a state’s role-playing while overlooking the domestic dimension of a state’s role selection. As a type of role conflict, domestic role contestation refers to ‘the social process among individuals, groups, and organizations within states and societies regarding the selection of a role among the menu of available choices’. 21 There are two types of role contestation. In this work, the horizontal role contestation, which pays attention to disagreements among the political elites over foreign policy-making, is more difficult to apply, for the internal decision-making process of the communist regime is rarely transparent. Hence, this article focuses more on the vertical role contestation of Vietnam, which refers to the conflicting perspectives between the elites and the masses regarding role selection and the corresponding attitude toward China. 22
Methodology
How to identify a state’s role and role conceptions? As Cameron Thies indicated, ‘there is no definitive methodological account of the best way to identify roles’. 23 The first generation of role theorists adopted what Thies called ‘primary sources’ to investigate a state’s role conceptions; the data included policy-makers’ speeches, parliamentary debates, elites’ interviews, articles written by political elites, documents from press conferences, and so on. Researchers coded these data and summed up the national attributes for understanding a state’s role expectations and those of its counterparts in the international arena. In addition, these role theorists focus mainly on structural factors. Nevertheless, roles are the product of the inter-subjective process between/among the state actors. To trace such process, narratives appearing in the domestic and international societies regarding the NRCs of a specific state are crucial for depicting its role frames.
Narratives that are related to a state’s NRCs are also available through interpreting the existing scholarly works. This is what Thies called a ‘secondary source’, which is frequently used by recent role theorists. Thies indicated that ‘previous studies reporting intercoder reliability suggest that roles are easy to identify’. 24 From the existing literature, researchers can extract a state’s role conceptions and expectations through decision-makers’ statements recorded in the scholarly account of events; the effect should be equivalent to coding the primary sources directly. The major problem with relying on secondary sources is selection bias, yet bias and selectivity are always key issues for most social science researchers. The best way to minimize bias is by avoiding searching and selecting secondary materials in a specifically limited way. 25
In practice, researchers who adopt role theory would rely on a standard process-tracing case study analytical technique. As Kaarbo and Cantir indicated, ‘the cases were not selected to “test” particular propositions, but to provide illustrations of the theoretical arguments’. 26 Overall, the analytical framework of role theory does not aim to provide causal explanations of a state’s behaviors. Rather, it is a constitutive theorizing process. This research follows such typical technique; it relies on the most crucial scholarly works of Vietnam’s China policy and extracts the two role conceptions through studying the inter-subjective process of the role expectations of diverse political actors in Vietnam. The primary source of data gained from the Vietnamese mass media was also used; however, due to the very limited access to the internal official documents, the secondary sources remain the major data utilized to support the arguments of this article.
Independent role versus interactive role
Stephen Walker and Sheldon Simon also used secondary sources of data to analyze Vietnam’s role conflicts during the period of the Sino-Soviet rupture. According to them, the role conceptions adopted by Hanoi to manage the pressure from the two great powers were ‘dependent’ (economically) and ‘belligerent’ (politically). 27 Nevertheless, Walker and Simon mainly focused on the impacts of structural factors on Hanoi’s role conceptions. Hanoi’s interactions with Beijing and Moscow and the inter-subjectivity that impacted on the Vietnamese leaders’ role expectations weighed little in their investigations of dependent, belligerent roles. This article does not negate the effect of structure on a state’s NRCs. On the contrary, the importance of the hierarchical essence of the asymmetric power structure is well recognized here. Decision-makers’ different perspectives of the embedded hierarchy in the asymmetric relationship might drive the small state to change from the strategy of showing deference toward the great power to expressing defiance against it.
How a small state interprets and manipulates the hierarchy embedded in the bilateral relations with the great power is the crucial factor that affects its role-playing. This article assumes that there are two roles that small states can adopt to manage the asymmetric power structure and, while both roles recognize the hierarchy embedded in the bilateral relations with the stronger power, both roles develop different correspondent behaviors for responding to the hierarchical structure and managing interactions with the great power.
The first type of role of the small state in the asymmetric relations with a great power is the independent role. As defined by Holsti, 28 the main attribute of this role is that such a state makes decisions based only on its national interests, and the commonly adopted strategies under this role conception include commitment to the policy of nonalignment and self-determination. This Westphalian style of role option fits well with the basic assumption of the rational choice model, as suggested by the majority of the mainstreams IR theories. It assumes that a cautious evaluation of the global power structure and protection of the national interest are the doctrines for the small- to median-sized states to act in the international arena. Such a strategic calculation process of the independent role is ego-based; the policy-makers’ interpretation of the external structure forms the actions and reactions for dealing with the hierarchical relations with the great power(s). It is noteworthy that the interpretation of hierarchy under the independent role conception is material-oriented; that means that the evaluation of power discrepancy is based on the calculation of material resources, especially military and economic capabilities. The independent role thus guides the small state to yield to the hierarchy for potential material gains and to reduce the possibility of loss.
Although different decision-makers within the same state might interpret the hierarchical power structure differently, once they agree that complete independence and the full control of sovereign rights are the most crucial national interests and should be prioritized over all else, they are practicing the independent role logic. The strategies of both nonalignment and national determination serve to maximize the state’s interests. To a great extent, this role is unilaterally determined by the small state’s self-centered judgment (ego-based) when facing the multiple, intertwined layers of the global network. For a state that possesses less power in a bilateral relationship, adopting the independent role to manage the evident discrepancy in power is a common strategy. Responding to the material restraints of the asymmetric political structure, the independent role would push a state to shift between the balance of power and bandwagoning, depending on how the decision-makers of the small state evaluate the situations.
The enactment of the independent role is guided by the universally applicable self-references. Therefore, role-making is the common style of the state actor when adopting the independent role. This ego-driven role-playing style hence indicates the self-centered interpretation of the bilateral relationship and could easily trigger conflicts between the two sides. For the Vietnamese, being colonized by French colonial power inspired them to learn a new world order, that is, the Westphalian idea of the modern state system, which encourages the actor to be self-centered and pursue the maximization of material interests. This identity-based independent role evaluates the hierarchical structure of the bilateral relationship from the perspective of material interests; when the role beholder labels such as asymmetric relations between the great power and itself with positive and beneficial indications, it tends to maintain the status quo while urging for recognition of its equal status with the stronger party. Bring in the interference of a multilateral framework (i.e. international institutions) to push the great power to recognize and respect its sovereign rights and equality becomes a commonly preferred strategy.
Nevertheless, in the context of East Asian international politics, there is a long tradition of interpreting the hierarchical structure embedded in the bilateral relations with China from the civilizational and relational points of view. Such tradition forms the core of the interactive role conception that guides the role beholder to transcend the material-oriented calculation of national interests. On the surface level, part of the behavioral pattern of the interactive role might appear irrational; for instance, giving up the apparent and immediate material interests in exchange for symbolic gains, such as a keen, stable bilateral relationship with the significant other. Such pursuit of relational security remains rational, for a stable, positive relationship guarantees national security in the long run, and this is especially crucial for small states neighboring a great power. 29
One of the characteristics of the small state adopting the interactive role is challenging the stronger counterpart by shaming the latter’s wrongdoings or even initiating confrontation when the bilateral relations are perceived as a negative condition by the weaker side. The interactive role holds a higher standard in its altercasting of the other’s role enactment. The small state which takes the interactive role makes judgments according to the stronger party’s role performance; whether the stronger party plays its supposed role well is more important than the degree of discrepancy in material power between the weak and the strong. In other words, hierarchy, under the interpretation of the interactive role, does not merely indicate a discrepancy in material power, but is more about the distribution of responsibilities. Hence, the interactive role is more relational than the independent role; this role emphasizes the role-taking and correspondent responsibility of both sides in the structure of asymmetry. Under the interactive role logic, the stability of the bilateral relations, albeit remaining asymmetrical, is better guaranteed so that the weaker party could secure its national interests in the long run.
The concept of the interactive role is constructed on the basis of the interactions between the two actors in the asymmetric bilateral relations, and the impact of the significant other weighs more than it does on the independent role. The interactive role requires the role-beholder constantly to re-adjust its strategies depending on its perception of the significant other’s motivations and movements. Hence this role adapts ‘to the context and remain negotiable to acquire the recognition of the other’. 30 Vietnam’s performance of the interactive role could intrinsically trace its roots to the order of the China-centered tribute system and its duplicating hierarchy in the relations with Cambodia and Laos. Even after these nations entered the modern state system, the hierarchical essence remained present in Vietnam’s relations with China (while arguably continuing to exist in Vietnam’s relations with either Cambodia or Laos). The historical and cultural memories of being China’s vassal state and the profound influence of the Chinese civilization have significantly contributed to the conception of Vietnam’s interactive role. By succumbing to the hierarchical relations while remaining responsive to the sensitivity of the suzerain, the vassal state suffers the anxiety of losing autonomy and the vested interests gained from a strong counterpart. To reconfirm that the strong state pays enough respect and exercises sufficient care regarding its status and needs, making a mountain out of a molehill becomes part of the behavioral pattern of the interactive role. Vietnam’s holding of a higher position in its relations with both Cambodia and Laos also led it further to emphasize the role-playing in the hierarchical relations with the significant others. The historical experiences of duplicating the tribute system in which Vietnam was the suzerain inform observers how Vietnam altercasts China in their asymmetric relations. 31
The source of Vietnam’s interactive role conception arises not only from the historical, China-centered tribute system but also from the crucial fact of being in the socialist camp with the PRC. The socialist brotherhood continues to be frequently adopted, at times, by the Vietnamese leaders to define the relationship with their counterparts in Beijing. 32 Interestingly, Beijing has rarely responded to Vietnam’s call to a socialist brotherhood since the two nations restored the official tie in 1990, 33 although the Chinese Communist Party does recognize the socialist comradeship with their Vietnamese counterpart. Identifying itself as a socialist brother to China has driven Vietnam to altercast Beijing to behave like a big brother who should have fulfilled its obligation to care for a weaker member in the socialist camp. Once big brother failed to fulfill what was expected of him, Hanoi tends to accuse Beijing of unfaithfulness and then responds with an overreaction.
Under the China-centered tribute system or the socialist ideological comradeship or the Westphalian state system, Vietnam has never entirely accepted any edicts but twisted and tweaked the orders to suit its own visions and interests. Vietnam’s tributary relations (the interactive role) with China combined the elements of asymmetry and parity, as did its state-to-state relations (the independent role) with Beijing after the mid-twentieth century. 34 Hence, inter-role conflicts occur frequently, albeit the Vietnamese leaders have tried hard to handle it and prevent the inconsistent role-playing from damaging its relations with China. Also, the masses and elites often hold different views regarding how Vietnam should handle China. Neither side sticks to a specific role. The Vietnamese elites keep shifting between the independent and interactive roles according to their interpretations of the context and Beijing’s behaviors. By the same token, the Vietnamese public responds to each episode in the bilateral relations inconsistently, depending on how the conditions of the episode were presented and interpreted. The recent developments have shown that the Vietnamese authority’s ability to monopolize Vietnam’s roles in managing the relations with China is weakening. The Vietnamese people have been more capable of shaping their government’s China policy, or at least influencing its direction, through protests and the manipulation of social media, which trend has forced Hanoi to face more frequent domestic role contestations.
The enactment and contestation of Vietnam’s two roles in its management of China policy
The unique characteristic of contemporary Vietnam’s history explains why Vietnam adopts both the independent and interactive roles when facing China. The anti-imperialist war of Vietnam in the early twentieth century marked the beginning of the relations between Hanoi and Beijing as ‘comrades plus brothers’. 35 Whenever Hanoi needs favors from its northern counterpart, the communist brotherhood was assumed and practiced, especially on occasions wherein the bilateral relationship prevailed over other conditions. Nevertheless, Vietnam’s relations with China began to sour since the early 1970s, and the two communist brothers even fought a war over border disputes in 1979. The broken relationship with China gave Vietnam no choice but to rely heavily on Moscow, which worsened the Vietnamese-Sino relations. Hanoi attributed the breakdown of the bilateral relations to Beijing’s misdeeds, and China was deemed by the Vietnamese elites to be the party that betrayed the socialist brotherhood, 36 albeit the Chinese literature depicts an entirely opposite narrative. The socialist brotherhood once again became a popular rhetoric in 1991. 37 However, the peaceful restoration of bilateral relations seems unable to compensate for the insufficient mutual trust, and the South China Sea territorial disputes further intensify the situation.
Such historical context led to the mind-set that guides Hanoi to adopt two different interpretations of hierarchy embedded in the Vietnamese-Sino relations, and the two roles are the products of such context. Hanoi often plays the two roles well, yet inter-role conflict occurs due to the escalated disputes which can no longer be managed through either role solely. Domestic role contestations also happen frequently, especially regarding Vietnam’s handling of the South China Sea crises.
Vietnam’s independent role
One of the most crucial attributes of Vietnamese foreign policy-making since the late twentieth century is Hanoi’s support of multilateralism, which encourages small states in the international arena to pursue nonalignment, self-determination, and national interest maximization. 38 This attribute fits with the characteristic of the independent role. One of the default settings regarding the rules embedded in the inter-state multilateral framework is the equality among the member actors and respect for each other’s sovereign rights. Vietnam’s need for autonomy and dignity in the hierarchical relationship with China can be satisfied through the defense of multilateralism.
Vietnam has been conscious of the importance of participating in a government-based multilateral framework since the late 1980s. The initiative of widening Vietnam’s foreign connections and forgoing the style of ideology-led policy-making was deeply related to Hanoi’s resolution to proceed with national economic reforms. In late 1986, at its Sixth National Congress, the CPV announced the ‘Doi Moi’ policy, which involved a series of reforms that includes the shift to a market-based economy, the promotion of science and technology, the renovation of the economic structure, and the creation of a stable domestic and international environment. 39 Paralleling the ‘Doi Moi’ policy, Vietnam readjusted its foreign policy and emphasized ‘diversifying and multilateralizing’ foreign relations. The Resolution ‘Tasks and Foreign Policy in the New Situation’ was then promulgated in May 1988, aiming at getting ‘more friends and fewer enemies’ in order to create a stable, beneficial external environment for the execution of the ‘Doi Moi’ policy. 40
‘Doi Moi’ and the readjustment of foreign policy direction encouraged Hanoi to pursue ‘supreme national interests’ and defend ‘independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity’, which echoed the ego-oriented style of role-playing, that is, Vietnam’s independent role. 41 Such a shift in foreign policy eventually resulted in the redesigning of Vietnam’s China policy since the end of the Cold War. The presentation of such a connection is demonstrated by two facets. One is Vietnam’s inclusion in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995. The other is Vietnam’s restoration of relations with other regional great powers (other than China). The Vietnamese scholar, Pham Quang Minh, attributed one of the reasons for Vietnam’s ASEAN membership to concern about China’s rise. 42 Before officially joining the ASEAN, Vietnam’s determination to redefine its regional status was described in an article written by its Deputy Foreign Minister, Dinh Nho Liem, in 1992. The article, ‘Vietnam in the Common Trend of the Asia-Pacific’, argued that Vietnam’s national interests were deeply linked to the development of the Asia Pacific area; thus, Vietnam should make its connection with the region as a whole the priority of its foreign policy. 43
Vietnam also redefined its China policy by aligning its national interests with the regional ones. As claimed by a Vietnamese official, ‘Sino-Vietnamese relations will be meshed within a large regional network of interlocking economic and political interests. It is an arrangement whereby anybody wanting to violate Vietnam’s sovereignty would be violating the interests of other countries as well’. 44 Redefining its regional status and corresponding policies pronounce Vietnam’s equality with other regional players, its infrangible sovereign rights, the determination of nonalignment, and the pursuit of material interests, which correspond to the behavioral pattern of the independent role. These correspondent goals are also constructed under the Vietnamese leaders’ self-centered interpretations of the international structure. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, Vietnamese-Sino relations were relatively positive; hence, Hanoi’s readjustment of its China policy through the reunion with ASEAN was not due to antagonism against Beijing, but an intention to pursue a relatively equal status in the hierarchy.
On the other hand, the ‘Doi Moi’ policy not only encouraged Vietnam to rebuild its relations with ASEAN but also pushed Hanoi to begin the normalization of relations with the Western countries. One of its most crucial efforts was Vietnam’s restoration of relations with the United States in the early 1990s. In July 2003, the Central Committee of the CPV made a significant readjustment to its foreign policy guideline. Through its approval of the ‘Resolution Eight’, a new national security strategy was created, and ideology was no longer a criterion for deciding Vietnam’s allies and enemies. 45 This policy, ‘doi tac, doi tuong (partners or targets of struggle)’, marked the change, indicating that the Vietnamese policy-makers had abandoned the norm wherein cooperation with China, based on their shared socialist bond, was the only option for the country. Moreover, Vietnam ceased labeling Washington an imperialist (i.e. an enemy). This readjustment of the foreign policy guidelines not only reflected the clash in national interests between Vietnam and China but also marked a growing convergence of interests with the United States that the Vietnamese leaders recognized. 46
In 2013, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang visited Washington and launched the Joint Statement of the ‘US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership’ with President Obama. 47 Such an act seems to indicate that Vietnam is attempting to involve the United States power to balance the increasing influence of China in the region, especially in the South China Sea. 48 However, as argued by Carlyle Thayer, ‘Vietnam’s improved relations with the United States should be seen as a sign of its autonomy and not the exercise of the option (identified by Brantly Womack) of allying with another country to balance China’. 49 Vietnam’s more frequent interactions with other regional powers, including Japan and Russia, signify a similar attempt to expand foreign relations and prove Vietnam’s status as an independent state with equal rights which deserve respect from other countries, especially China.
Another key point is that the Vietnamese political system used to be ‘four pillars’, which means that four political leaders rule the nation. According to custom, two of them should be Southerners and in charge of economic development and connections with Southeast Asia, while the other two are political elites whose political backgrounds are from the North (born or trained in Hanoi) and are assigned to manage ideological works and the relations with China. The diffused power among the four top leaders and their diverse political backgrounds and perspectives contribute to Vietnam’s different interpretations of the hierarchical relations with China. Even for those leaders who adopted independent role conceptions, their preferred strategy might differ; for instance, the Vietnamese former Premier Vo Van Kiet (1991–1997) emphasized that Vietnam must not rely on any great power but seek to create a balance among diverse actors, 50 while his successor, Nguyen Tan Dung (2006–2016), is famous for his pro-American stand and deeds.
Vietnam’s interactive role
The former Premiers of Vietnam, albeit their strategies were different, saw the independent role as a crucial principle, while the party (CPV) might see the independent role a constraint. Given the historical experiences driving Vietnam to act in accordance with the hierarchy of its bilateral relations with China, the interactive role requires Vietnam to pay more attention to the stability of the Vietnamese-Sino relations and China’s role enactment (as the suzerain of the tribute system and the socialist big brother). Such role mentality remains vigorous nowadays among Vietnam’s top leaders. For instance, in 2011, Nguyen Duy Chien, a Vietnamese diplomat who was also vice chair of the Vietnamese government’s Borders Commission, once ‘portrayed the Sino-Vietnamese tension as one within the family and likened Chinese aggressive acts toward Vietnam to a father’s tough love for his child’ in a lecture delivered to Vietnamese university-level educators. Meanwhile, Chien severely criticized China’s brutal exploitation of Vietnam’s interests when facing the international media and audience. 51 Such inconsistency in the Vietnamese leader’s responses toward China’s behaviors reveals the Vietnamese elites’ acceptance of the hierarchy and their serious concern about Beijing’s role enactment, so that they attacked and shamed China outwardly while internally trained their people to understand and accept the essence of the hierarchical relations with China.
As Womack indicated, in the asymmetric relations, ‘stability did not require a balance of equal powers, but rather equilibrium based on a proportional relationship’. 52 Here, the ‘proportional relationship’ refers to the order of hierarchy presented and maintained through the recognized role-taking by both the strong and the weak in the bilateral relationship. To achieve the proper proportional relationship, deference must be paid to the strong side by the weak party. Under such mentality, performing ritual(s) is crucial for showing deference and stabilizing the bilateral relations. By the same token, the stronger party must demonstrate its will to take care of the weaker counterpart’s needs and interests. These principles are crucial for Vietnam’s interactive role. A famous example is the Vietnamese leaders’ official visits to Beijing under opportune circumstances, such as CPV leader Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to Beijing in May 2015 before his record-breaking trip to Washington.
Paying official visits to China was intended to show respect to the hierarchical order embedded in the bilateral relationship between the two nations. By doing so, the stability of the hierarchy is assumed and confirmed. The diplomatic practice of the CPV requires the Vietnamese decision-makers to arrange their official visits to foreign countries in line with how they rank the importance of the target states. Previously, CPV leaders always visited the Soviet Union before they went to China. 53 Nguyen Phu Trong’s showing of deference to Beijing before his official visit to the United States was exactly the ritual performed in accordance with the interactive role enactment. Such act might appear trivial and lack a substantial implication but is symbolically meaningful. It is exactly these symbolic behaviors carried out under Vietnam’s interactive role conception that provided space for both sides to negotiate and cooperate, albeit the maritime disputes on the South China Sea remains.
Moreover, the hierarchy in the eyes of the interactive role of Vietnam requires more rigid role-playing; this means that the expectation of China’s role enactment is higher. Once China fails to fulfill its role as expected by Vietnam, the latter tends to fuss over issues that might possibly humiliate Beijing. The recent developments regarding Hanoi’s official protests against China’s actions regarding the South China Sea could be interpreted from such an angle, despite the fact that the opposition against China could also be the outcome of Vietnam’s performing its independent role. Under most circumstances, when the bilateral relations with the great power are perceived as positive and promising, the interactive role would opt to sacrifice the immediate and apparent interests for long-term stability and retaining the order of the hierarchy. This explains why Hanoi quelled the news of the killing of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese police in 2005 and suppressed the anti-China movement in 2011. 54
Vietnam’s interactive role in managing the relations with China is also entangled with its desire to unite the power of socialism worldwide. To defend its faith in the communist ideology and the hierarchical order within the socialist camp, Vietnam often yielded apparent and immediate material interests. One famous example was the CPV leaders’ turning down of Beijing’s generous offer of aid which came with the condition of betraying Moscow and accepting China as the new center of the socialist world in the 1960s. 55 Maintaining and even promoting international socialism was viewed as the main mission of Vietnam’s foreign policy before the late 1980s, yet Vietnam kept its ideological faith even after the Cold War. 56 Since the early 1990s, the CPV leaders exalted such a theme and sought China’s support to form an ‘ideological ally’ to execute the grand strategy of anti-imperialism. 57 In the early 2000s, CPV General Secretary Nong Duc Manh even took the lead in defining the bilateral relations with Beijing as ‘comrades plus brothers’. 58 For the current Vietnamese leaders, governing the country through the socialist doctrine is an undeniable mission, and the relationship with China is the key to reaching that goal efficiently. Current party leader Nguyen Phu Trong has reclaimed the brotherhood between the two nations, which marked Vietnam’s inclination toward a united socialist front under China’s leadership. These facts correspond to the interactive role’s behavioral pattern that emphasizes the hierarchical order and ideology. Such behavioral pattern urges the actors to pursue relational security that seems reasonable only under the logic of the interactive role.
Nevertheless, the interactive role that Vietnam adopts also guides its policy-makers to overreact to certain issues, such as Vietnam’s competition for the expansion of the riverbank along the Beilun River (a cross-border river shared with China). Vietnam claimed that it detected China’s intention to expand and sent civilians to throw stones at the Chinese workers in order to halt the construction work on the embankment of the Chinese side. 59 Meanwhile, Vietnam kept expanding the riverbank of its own side, causing the Chinese to suspect that Vietnam planned to alter the river border in its favor. 60 Interestingly, although the conflict occurred in 2004, the incident was reported in the Vietnamese media only 9 years later. Avoiding the proliferation of conflict is also a significant characteristic of the interactive role, for then it ensures the stabilization of the bilateral relations.
Alternation of roles, inter-role conflict, and domestic role contestation in Vietnam’s China policy
The competition between the independent and interactive roles in Vietnam’s management of China policy has continued, while most of the time the two roles coexist for the Vietnamese policy-makers to deal with the relations with Beijing. However, the definite rules regarding role alternation can only be identified by future empirical studies. So far, this article provides a simple (and hopefully not oversimplified) assumption of role alternation and a case study to illustrate the inter-role conflict that has occurred in recent decades. The assumption of role alternation is: Vietnam takes the independent role when it needs the multilateral framework, supported by the international institutions or other regional forces, to balance China’s influence; by contrast, Vietnam opts for the interactive role when the bilateral approach suits its interests better in the process of managing its relations with China. The key to the execution of role alternation not only relies on the policy-makers’ judgments and evaluations of the current status of hierarchy but also depends on the reactions of the stronger party. Vietnam shifts from interactive role to independent role when China fails Hanoi’s expectation of role fulfillment (as a responsible, respectable suzerain and socialist big brother); one example was communist China’s building of diplomatic ties with the United States, leaving Hanoi feeling betrayed and abandoned in the 1970s. At that time, the Vietnamese-Sino relations turned sour quickly, and the CPV identified itself as the vanguard of world revolution while snubbing Beijing and Moscow for abandoning the international communist camp after 1975. 61 Here, Vietnam transformed from following the hierarchical order led by the interactive role into an independent socialist vanguard state and fought a border war with its former suzerain in 1979.
However, when an issue or dispute is too complicated to solve via either the multilateral or bilateral approach, inter-role conflict occurs and causes Hanoi’s apparently contradictory attitudes toward Beijing. The most current and obvious example is the South China Sea territorial dispute. The dispute itself involves the dimensions of multilateralism and bilateralism, and this mixture of dimensions has made Hanoi’s role-playing highly complicated and dynamic. In 1958, the CPV publicly stated (in its newspaper, Nhan Dan) that China’s claimed sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys archipelagos was legitimate. This was because both areas were controlled by South Vietnam in 1958, and Hanoi was allied to China so that submitting to the communist comradeship was the preferred option. 62 Nevertheless, the Vietnamese-Sino relations experienced dramatic ups and downs in the following decades, and so did Hanoi’s attitudes and role-playing with regard to managing the South China Sea sovereignty dispute. In a way, since the early 2000s, Vietnam wishes to utilize the multilateral framework provided by ASEAN to strengthen its sovereignty claim regarding the South China Sea. However, the fact that ASEAN is an organization with less strict group regulations and the indifferent attitudes of the non-claimant state-members made Hanoi realize that the regional multilateral platform is unreliable. 63 Importantly, the sudden shift in the attitude and stance of the Philippines after President Duterte leaned toward China prompted Vietnam to continue oscillating between both roles in order to reduce the potential costs of a confrontation with China. This is why Hanoi kept sending special envoys to Beijing to ease the tension caused by the conflicts over the South China Sea. 64 Moreover, the Vietnamese leaders would condemn and shame China when facing the international media, while internally trying to pacify the people and reduce the domestic antagonism against China. 65
The South China Sea crisis also revealed the domestic role contestation in Vietnam. The Vietnamese masses urge for the nation to adopt the independent role, while the political elites keep struggling over the inter-role conflicts and seem more inclined toward the interactive role after the Philippines gave up its confrontational position against China. In May 2014, an anti-China protest erupted after Beijing moved the drilling rig HD981 to disputed waters that Vietnam claimed to be its domain. This fierce protest, along with the attack on Chinese- and Taiwanese-owned factories and workers in Southern Vietnam, was deemed as the venting of the anger of Vietnamese society, targeting China’s aggressive actions regarding the South China Sea. One Vietnamese scholar argues that the anti-China protest served as a tool to show a weak state fussing over the actions of its stronger counterpart. 66 The Vietnamese authorities pacified the movement in a couple of days, rendering the entire event as more akin to an accident than an intended action that might have caused a deep breach in Vietnam’s relations with China. Such attitude of preserving the leeway for bargaining with China without breaking off the bilateral relations fulfills the enactment of the interactive role which is preferred by the political elites; meanwhile, the Vietnamese masses remain dissatisfied with the government’s deeds and continue to call for the independent role-playing of Vietnam. 67
Besides, there have been leaks about domestic role contestation among the Vietnamese elites regarding Vietnam’s attitude toward China, albeit these internal disagreements are excluded from the official stance. One instance is Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to Beijing in May 2015 before the trip to Washington. Internal opinions on the CPV General Secretary’s trip to Beijing diverged. Some held somewhat positive views about the visit and wished that it could result in a breakthrough in the South China Sea dispute, such as former chair of the Border Committee of Vietnam Tran Cong Truc. Others disapproved of the opinion that the General Secretary yielded to pressure from the Chinese government, such as former Vietnamese Ambassador to China Duong Danh Di, who asserted that Beijing was extremely concerned about the potential improvement in Vietnam’s relations with the United States through Nguyen Phu Trong’s trip to Washington in 2015. 68
In terms of the result of domestic role contestation, the recent development has shown that the Vietnamese political elites sometimes yielded to public pressure and temporarily held their policy-making direction. A recent example occurred in May 2018, when the Vietnamese government’s announced plan to develop special economic zones sparked a fierce anti-China protest. This event forced Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc to declare that the government would remain open to public opinion and take it as important advice on this matter. 69 Nevertheless, in terms of Vietnam’s contemporary China policy, the political elites and the public continue to hold divergent preferences. This is because the mainstream narratives about China and the Chinese in Vietnamese society (since the mid-twentieth century) have been negative, assuming that the Vietnamese public would rather adopt the independent role which assumes Vietnam’s equal status in the international area. However, when facing a third party that was related to the Vietnamese-Sino relations, the elites and the public’s preferences regarding the national role might converge. For instance, both the elites and the public would agree to adopt the independent role when managing the relations with Washington and utilize this to balance China’s influence. In addition, both elites and the public might prefer to adopt the interactive role (and be the big brother) when dealing with Cambodia and Laos, which were once Vietnam’s vassals and are now gradually leaning more toward China. Finally, foreign policy-making is mostly the domain of the political elites, and Vietnam is no exception. Hence, Hanoi’s China policy remains, to a great extent, controlled by the political leaders, and the elites’ interpretations of the hierarchy embedded in the Vietnamese-Sino relations remain the key to Vietnam’s role-playing decisions.
Conclusion
This article adopts the theoretical framework of role theory of foreign policy analysis to analyze the inconsistency within Vietnam’s China policy. It argues that the asymmetric power structure per se is not fully convincing in explaining the small state’s strategies for dealing with its relations with great power(s), for it does not fully explain how and why changes occur in the small state’s attitudes and policies toward the stronger side. This article proposes that, through investigating the ‘role(s)’ that small states hold in asymmetric relations, the changes might be better analyzed. The major concepts extracted from role theory include NRCs, role-playing (including role-taking and role-making), inter-role conflict, and domestic role contestation. The development and debates between the structuralist and interactivist approaches for accessing the formation of the state’s role conception are crucial for further understanding the two roles proposed in this work.
The two roles, the independent role and the interactive role, are designed from the angle of the decision makers’ perceptions and interpretations of the asymmetric bilateral relations. It is argued that Hanoi has adopted both roles under different contexts and time periods. The main demarcation of these two roles lies in how they guide the role-beholder to perceive and interpret the hierarchy embedded in the asymmetric relations. Hierarchy, in the eyes of the ego-driven, identity-based independent role, is mainly the result of a discrepancy in material power, and adaptation to the multilateral platform in order to balance the influence of the great power is a preferred strategy of the independent role state. By contrast, the interactive role interprets hierarchy from the angle of the distribution of responsibilities and emphasizes the fulfillment of role performance by both sides, albeit still recognizing the power embedded in hierarchy. The enactment of roles is viewed by the interactive role as the foundation of stable bilateral relations that will secure the long-term interests. Hence, the performance and influence of the Alter is crucial under this role conception, especially the role-playing of the great power.
Vietnam is not a rare case that adopts the two roles discussed in this article; a similar mentality may be observed in other nations located around China’s borders, especially those which participated in the China-centered tribute system during the imperial era and later experienced the invasions and occupations of the Western imperialist powers. Post-colonial nations in Asia find the ego-driven, identity-based independent role attractive for their national building projects, and the interactive role which they inherited from the long history of interacting with China guides them on how to deal with Beijing through a bilateral mechanism, even in the absence of any shared socialist tie, such as Myanmar, which won 89% of the disputed land from China in the 1960s. 70
However, despite providing examples where the Vietnamese decision makers have adopted the independent and interactive roles, this work does have limits regarding the research scope. The current stage of this research has not yet built the pattern of role-switching. It needs more empirical case studies to build the model; in addition, the mechanism of inter-role conflicts and domestic role contestation also needs to be further tested and verified. This work makes a simple assumption that Vietnam’s independent role is linked to its manipulation of the multilateral framework to balance China’s influence, and the interactive role that Hanoi adopts prefers to follow the bilateral venue to solve disputes with Beijing and secure the benefits it gains from maintaining long-term, stable bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the South China Sea crises have brought challenges to Vietnam’s switching between the two roles due to the complicated essence of the issue at stake. Both the scenes of inter-role conflict and domestic role contestations occurred in Vietnam’s management of South China Sea sovereignty disputes. This ongoing event has not yet found a positive solution, yet it provides a good starting point for further researching the controversy within Vietnam’s role conflict, and the two role conceptions proposed in this article indicate that Vietnam’s strategy toward China is in constant flux.
Footnotes
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Ministry of Science and Technology, R.O.C. (MOST 103-2410-H-004 -035 -; MOST 104-2410-H-004 -102 -MY2) and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (RG002-D-14).
