Abstract
The realist theoretical tradition has never enjoyed a strong position in Europe. During recent decades, although it is commonly claimed otherwise, it even seems to have lost its limited traction and most of its relatively few representatives. The aim of the article is to analyse this evolution, highlight how realist theorists have contributed limited conceptual or theoretical innovation, been unable to adjust their research agenda to current analytical challenges, and produced relatively few comprehensive empirical studies informed by one or more realist theories. Instead, we observe three main activities. Some realists do meta-studies on realist theory. Others do retrospectives, for instance, (re-)discovering the qualities of classical realist scholars or classical concepts such as the security dilemma. Still others practice ideology that may enjoy certain functions in legitimising national foreign policy orientations but has limited theoretical quality. Thus, textbooks are probably the only remaining context in which realism is presented as constituting a dominant orientation; a fact that highlights the complex and problematic relationship between reality and representation.
Introduction
The discipline of International Relations (IR) is marking its 100-year anniversary (1919–2019). 1 That calls for a thorough and comprehensive appraisal of achievements and failures in terms of the production of theories, methodologies and empirical studies. This article focuses on the realist theoretical tradition during the last 100 years and critically examines progress and regress within the tradition. Yet the article delimits the analysis to the trajectories of realist theorising in Europe and, thus, does not examine realist theorising coming out of continents other than Europe. 2
Seemingly, there are reasons to approach the anniversary in a congratulatory mood. Realism is typically regarded as the par excellence European theoretical tradition, kicked off by innovative scholars such as Morgenthau, Carr, Schmitt and many other scholars – and drawing on a rich pedigree, including Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Moreover, realism is routinely characterised as the dominant theoretical paradigm, not least in textbooks introducing IR theory. 3 Similarly, foreign policy studies frequently use the label ‘realist’ to characterise distinct foreign policies. Finally, the number of European scholars who self-identify as realists is nothing but impressive. Particularly, Italy, France, Poland and Norway show relatively high numbers as can be seen in the tables (see Appendix 1). 4
However, this article argues that the tradition in Europe is far from dominant and that self-image numbers – while probably indicative of something – are a misleading indicator of the strength and well-being of a theoretical tradition. Moreover, we find the idea that realism somehow is ‘more’ European than other traditions not to be particularly compelling. Finally, studies of so-called ‘realist’ foreign policy simply seem to get key categories wrong and rarely mirror the key features of the theoretical tradition. The article concludes that we are witnessing the end of the realist tradition; indeed, it questions if ever the tradition in Europe enjoyed more than a marginal existence.
Thus, the article is about the state of affairs within the realist theoretical tradition but not about the state of the tradition worldwide or its fate in various regions around the world. Instead, it is specifically about the end game of the realist tradition in Europe, implying the obvious fact that scope makes a difference. Whereas the realist tradition attracts numerous accounts, 5 very few of these accounts pay much attention to the history of realist international theorising in Europe. Granted, Smith does include Max Weber, but concerning the post-WW2 scene, he only focuses on realist analysts from outside of Europe. 6
The structure of the argument is as follows. First, we argue that it is difficult in terms of numbers to identify that many realist theorists. Thus, if there still is a tradition, it is certainly not popular or thriving. In their book on neoclassical realism in Europe, Toje and Kunz state, ‘The hope with this book is that it will spark a debate that, in time, might lead to the re-emergence of a distinctly European realist school which draws on the roots of the historical, non-American realist tradition, benefiting from insights in the liberal-constructivist paradigm’. 7 By contrast, the article argues that a re-emergence of the tradition is unlikely simply because there has never been a golden age of realist theory in Europe. The realist theoretical tradition never enjoyed a strong position in Europe, making the historical European realist theoretical tradition an imagined tradition. In short, there was no golden age, implying in turn that narratives of decline and revival have very fragile underpinnings. Second, we examine the tradition’s capacity to generate new theories and argue that the tradition’s representatives seem unable or unwilling to spin off concrete applicable theories, which is one of the key characteristics of a living tradition. The notion of ‘applicable’ should not suggest that we only have empirical explanatory theories in mind but also consider first order constitutive and normative theorising. Likewise, we do not observe much theoretical or conceptual innovation, suggesting that realist theorists do not have much to offer to this feature of a living tradition. Among the last prominent examples of theoretical innovation is Buzan, Jones and Little’s reconstruction of neorealism as well as conceptual work on, for instance, the security dilemma. 8 Third, we argue that realists have been unable to adjust their research agenda to current challenges and produce relatively few comprehensive empirical studies informed by one or more realist theories. Hence, most of the major actors, structures and processes in global politics and economics have been left largely untouched by the few realists who are actually based in Europe. Realism-focused research is either predominantly meta-studies on realism – and this genre has even almost ceased to be studied by analysts of the realist tradition – or retrospectives, for instance, (re-)discovering the qualities of classical realist scholars. In line with Bell, 9 we argue that realism to some degree has turned into ideology that in national capitals in Europe may enjoy certain functions in legitimising certain foreign policy orientations at the expense of others. However, within the academic discipline of International Relations, such contributions tend not to be regarded as having analytical value. In the following section, we proceed to explicate analytical scope and key concepts.
Explicating scope and key concepts
In historiographies of the discipline, the notion of tradition is not widely employed. This is partly because a certain disconnect characterises relations between historians and IR scholars. 10 While the former have an interest in the history of international thought and the history of ideas as well as conceptual history, the latter tend to focus on the history of the discipline and its theories. Some scholars seem to be influenced by a certain degree of existential Angst and others by a triumphalist attitude. Others again are on a mission to promote a given epistemological or methodological fashion, using disciplinary history instrumentally to suggest that their paradigm is the best of all paradigms. Still others abandon the ‘traditions tradition’, an expression coined by Jeffery, 11 and use contextual, discursive or genealogical approaches instead. However, the notion of ‘tradition’ might experience a comeback now. At least, Hall and Bevir make a compelling argument for its re-emergence. 12
Traditions have been defined in different ways. Whereas Laudan highlights certain features, ‘a research tradition consists of a family of theories sharing a common ontology and methodology’, 13 Bonanate defines traditions as, ‘a corpus of centuries of research, characterized by classics, schools of thought, original proposals and a specialized debate’. 14 Both definitions are relevant for a critical appraisal of the realist theoretical tradition, for instance, looking for the family of realist theorists and the theories they built, underpinned by more or less common ontologies. Moreover, while the article focuses on twentieth-century developments, theorists can draw on or claim family resemblance with the rich oeuvre of classical thinkers, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes.
In its conception of tradition, the article draws on three main sources of inspiration. First, Hall and Bevir 15 eminently point out that the notion of tradition at some point went out of fashion and was replaced by three new approaches in the study of political and international thought, that is, contextualism, internal discourse analysis and genealogical methodology. Representing the discursive approach, Schmidt argues that thinking in terms of traditions ‘serves as an unreflective orthodox regulatory ideal for research and teaching’. 16 However Hall and Bevir reject Schmidt’s argument and reintroduce the tradition approach, spicing it up with the notion of dilemma, and using the approach to analyse Traditions of British International Thought. In this article, we focus specifically on the realist theoretical tradition, not only in Britain but in transnational Europe, a move that is bound to annoy scholars who lean towards reifying national traditions.
Second, Matthew and Zacker’s chapter on the liberal tradition, ‘Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands’, 17 provides an excellent model example of a concise and balanced (includes both commonality and diversity) appraisal of a theoretical tradition. The questionable part is that they claim to analyse a universal tradition, thus downplaying regional specificities, nuances and emphases of philosophical underpinnings, theoretical substance and methodological techniques.
Third, in terms of outlining an intellectual tradition, Anderson’s Considerations on Western Marxism 18 has been a source of inspiration. This is not least because Anderson manages to review a very rich intellectual and political tradition critically by means of pointing to its main centres of research, focusing on the philosophy and theory production of the main theorists and emphasising significant, innovative ruptures within the Marxist tradition. Anderson highlights that living theoretical traditions should be understood as dynamic and innovative and thus characterised by ruptures or discontinuities while at the same time preserving a degree of continuity. If we apply Anderson’s approach to the world of IR theory, neorealism is markedly different from classical realism, yet both strands belong to the realist tradition. In this perspective, Waltz’ introduction of neorealism represents and was meant to be – for better or worse – a very significant rupture within the realist tradition. 19 The image of rupture also applies to the introduction of neoclassical realism. 20 Significantly, and in line with our argument, both ruptures – the former more radical than the latter – were initiated by realists in the United States, not in Europe. One way in which European realists could remain relevant would be to drop unscientific claims about realism as timeless wisdom and initiate a third rupture that would bring the realist theoretical tradition into the twenty-first century.
Regarding discipline, we draw on Turton’s thought-provoking definition, ‘what constitutes a discipline [. . .] are the institutions, discourses, professionalization and the identity of academics who self-identify as belonging to a given discipline’. 21 It is thus important to acknowledge that disciplines comprise an entire infrastructure, consisting of conventions, associations, specialised journals, a body of research literature, specialised discourses, textbooks, book series and mythologies of origin as well as what Hopf calls ‘a particular well-known consensually foundational literature’. 22 When it comes to Europe, such a ‘foundational literature’ exists, yet its European parts are not particularly well-known, connected or integrated. This applies to both the IR discipline as such and to the foundational literature that contributes to the constitution of the realist tradition. The article is based on the idea that it is both possible and desirable to (re-)construct such a European literature, specifically on the basis of the bits and pieces that actually do exist. In the following, we will skip the prominent philosophers of an orientation that could be called realist – for instance, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes – and instead examine twentieth-century contributions from realist theorists.
The realist theoretical tradition
Modest beginnings of IR as an academic discipline can be traced back to the early twentieth century where the first academic chairs were established, an important League of Nations committee began work on defining the study of International Studies and several professors outlined templates for an International Relations scientific discipline. Yet IR did not become a discipline of significance until the 1950s and 1960s, and these moments of foundation happened at different times and with different emphases in different parts of Europe. 23 Moreover, it is well-known that while origins matter, it is the repetitions or reproductions that turn glimpses into a sustainable scientific discipline. Over time the discipline of IR has come to comprise at least six major theoretical traditions: liberalism, realism, international political economy, international political theory, the post-positivist tradition and the international society tradition. It is thus a discipline characterised by considerable theoretical diversity and genuine pluralism.
Regarding the specific dynamics of the realist theoretical tradition, the point of departure for this section is the rather widespread idea that within IR, realism is a dominant if not hegemonic theoretical tradition. Many authors of IR theory textbooks present realism as the default theoretical orientation against which other orientations are situated or evaluated. The tendency applies to accounts of realism as such, but also accounts of realism in distinct geographical settings, be it the United States, Europe or elsewhere. However, Mearsheimer states in his usual bold fashion that there are no realists in Europe. 24 If he is right, it follows logically that a living tradition cannot count on contributions from Europe. The remaining part of the article examines the state of affairs within the realist theoretical tradition critically, focusing on the degree to which realists in Europe have contributed to theory building, conceptual and theoretical innovation or applied realist theory in significant empirical studies. In order to remain relevant for studies of the ever-changing dynamics of world politics and economics, theoretical traditions need to strike a delicate balance between continuity and change.
Beginnings are continuations (with a twist)
During the first decades of the twentieth century, international thought thrived in Europe. However, such thought was most often without realist characteristics. Thus, the first many winners of the Nobel Peace Prize were all of an orientation that E.H. Carr later would call ‘utopian’; the negotiations in Versailles in 1919 prompted a definition of IR in a liberal image; and the important League of Nations committee that worked on defining International Studies was not exactly a hothouse of realist thought. 25 Hence, there were very few realists as we have come to know the tradition. However, something was surely cooking, and this something was later put into conceptual packages of different sorts and presented as ‘realist’.
The concept of power was introduced and gained increasingly currency among specialists of foreign affairs. In this process, the German Machtschule and German historicism more generally served as an important source of inspiration. 26 Due to this origin, it was not only the notion of power that was gradually brought into international thought, especially into the branch that is now known as a realist orientation; what was also brought in was the strong focus on the state and Leopold Ranke’s bold claim about simply describing the world as it is. 27 The Italian sociologists Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto contributed to the emerging intellectual fashion of engaging in power analysis. The notion of power played an important role in theorists’ endeavour to point to the limits of international law and old school institutionalism. However, the sources of inspiration for realist thought go well beyond studies of power, state and naturalism.
In his Machiavellism, Meinecke highlighted the role of reason d’état. 28 Moreover, Hawkins 29 has analysed how social Darwinism was applied in political and international thought in Europe and elsewhere. Realists might also have found some sources of inspiration in Marxism and the priority given to materialist explanations. In this context, we should not forget that Karl Marx himself found Auguste Comte’s positivism a most useful and emancipatory methodological platform. 30 Finally, realists often seem to carry the burden of a certain degree of Kulturpessimismus. 31 These observations are not meant to imply that realist international thought is embedded in social Darwinism, that realists necessarily are heirs of Treitschke and his Machtpolitik, or that they are predisposed to follow Marx’ emphasis on materialism and positivism. However, it does seem to us that many – if not all – conceptual building blocks in realist thought can be traced to currents of European thinking between the 1848 revolutions and WW2. In short, the realist theoretical tradition did not emerge from nowhere. It is rather the case that its theorists drew inspiration from numerous intellectual and political sources. Indeed, these sources seem to be considerably more important than far-fetched connections to Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. In reality, Europe never managed to recover from the brain-drain of realist minds who all contributed to consolidate both the IR discipline and the realist theoretical tradition in America.
Hence, there are many promising beginnings of realism as we know it, yet these beginnings are continuations of other intellectual and political traditions with different aims and means. Moreover, and crucially important for our understanding of the realist tradition in Europe, the origins examined above often proved to also be ends. Hence, the realist tradition did not take foot in Europe but in the United States, partly because most of its representatives, that is, Morgenthau, Herz, Wolfers, Liska and others, 32 had to flee Europe and settle in the United States and to a limited extent elsewhere.
The ‘fifty-year crisis’ (1939–1989)
Realists in Europe have previously been capable of significant theoretical innovation. Thus, several classical realists came from the discipline of law. Yet in order to understand the dynamics of world politics better, they left legal formalism and old school institutionalism behind. They introduced concepts of politics and power and began to theorise international power politics and balances of power. 33 It was during the ‘fifty-year crisis’ in 1939–1989 that some of the discipline’s foundational texts appeared, and some of them were of a realist orientation. 34 E.H. Carr published his ‘Twenty Years Crisis’ days before the outbreak of WW2. The aim of the book was to slam (a tendency within) the liberal tradition of international thought labelled utopianism. 35 The second aim was similar to the endeavour of the League of Nations committee, namely to define the study of International Relations. In the case of Carr, the aim was to define IR as a discipline that balances ought and is, thus aiming at transcending the discipline’s first phase during which, according to Carr’s interpretation, the focus predominantly was on the ought dimension. Carr later abandoned the project of launching International Relations and inferred from this the need to build IR theory, including realist theory. Moreover, his caustic criticism of certain currents within liberalism from a realist perspective did not imply that realism took root in the United Kingdom. However, the strength of realism in Britain is contested. On the one hand, we find Donnelly arguing that realism during the 1960s declined in the United States, ‘whereas in Britain it is perhaps not hegemonic but still dominant’. 36 On the other hand, Hall points out that, ‘It has been argued that the failure of “realist” international thought to take root in Britain in the aftermath of the Second World War, as it did in the US, was a function of declining power’. This article also challenges the ‘still dominant’ view, suggesting that for the British, the term ‘realism’ had been discredited, in the late 1930s, by its associations with appeasement and the ‘power politics’ of the dictators’. 37 Also Bull rejects the idea that realism gained ground, ‘the stream of thinking and writing that began with Niebuhr and Carr has long run its course’. 38 Given the difficulty in identifying major figures of realist thought in Britain, we find Hall’s and Bull’s assessments more compelling than Donnelly’s. In Germany, the situation seems to be similar. Concerning the Critical Theory philosopher Hauke Brunkhorst’s perception of realism as dominant, Deitelhoff rightly points out that this does not apply to the German-speaking parts of Europe. 39 Rohde shares Deitelhoff’s assessment, pointing out that after WW2, political realism did not really find any traction in Germany. 40 Lucarelli and Menotti 41 claim somewhat surprisingly that realism is dominant in Italy, yet this raises the issue of what it takes to be dominant. In this regard, it seems to us that Maliniak et al. 42 have a point when pointing out that while IR scholars continue to believe that realism is dominant, there is in fact ‘no evidence that realism dominates the IR literature’. This seems valid for the state of affairs in general, and it applies exceptionally well to the specific case of Europe.
As we have seen above, the German Machtschule was very efficient in putting power on the research agenda and thus functioned as a source of inspiration for what became the realist tradition. Carr and Morgenthau picked up the focus on power in the 1930s. Carr 43 was efficient in polemics, but he did not contribute to realist theory and subsequently abandoned the very idea of developing an IR discipline. 44 At the time, innovation was to a high degree a question of going beyond the conventions and doctrines of international law. Like Morgenthau, Schwarzenberger 45 used the notion of power to escape from the limits of law; similar to Charles Manning, Schwarzenberger emphasised the importance of sociological perspectives and employed the notion of international society; similar to Martin Wight, Schwarzenberger opted for the title Power Politics for one of his main book publications. During the 1940s, Wight contributed to classical realist studies. 46 Yet, while Wight left realism behind, at least to a degree, 47 Herbert Butterfield continued within the tradition but (being a historian) not within the discipline and, thus, beyond the scope of the article.
It is a common feature of most of the realists of this generation that they are difficult to categorise. Contending interpretations of Georg Schwarzenberger indicate that also his thinking has multiple facets. Donnelly interprets Schwarzenberger’s Power Politics 48 as ‘one of the most radical expressions of realism’. 49 By contrast, Brian Schmidt 50 highlights Schwarzenberger’s consistent employment of the concept of international society and other characteristics close to the English School. 51 If Schwarzenberger is a complex thinker, Raymond Aron is an exceptionally complex thinker whose reflections on international affairs make a dense fabric of ideas including both realist and liberal threads. Being a highly complex thinker, Aron has been interpreted as a realist, even a neoclassical realist several decades before the term was coined. 52
During the 1970s and 1980s, the European crisis in realist theorising was increasingly acknowledged and scholars began to line up with explanations of the poor state of affairs. Kal Holsti points to increased competition from especially liberal scholars and the general extension of the research agenda, leading to disciplinary disarray. 53 Others point to the aftershocks of the behavioural revolution changing the profile of many departments from predominantly traditionalist (including realists) to modern social science. 54 However, both Holsti and Puchala pay most attention to the American scene. If we look at the European scene, dynamics were different and explained by three main factors. First, the effect of the substantial brain-drain caused by the migration of realists to especially the United States was a factor in itself but it also had a derived effect in the interrupted intellectual reproduction processes. With most of the realist masters gone, there were very few left to keep the theoretical tradition alive. The second factor is the resistance to the two school approach that was the rationale for creating the English School. Finally, Mark Bevir and Ian Hall point to the emergence of modernism in the social sciences. 55 While contextualising disciplinary dynamics in wider metatheoretical trends is very helpful and an often neglected way of understanding developments within the social sciences, we notice that they acknowledge major differences between developments in the United States and in the United Kingdom. In the latter case, modernism was much less pervasive and, we would add, this also applies to the parts of Europe that exist beyond the United Kingdom.
The end
With the end of the Cold War, we enter into a new phase including a decade, the 1990s, that was characterised by profound and widespread ‘realism bashing’. In their evaluation of international theories, Allan and Goldman 56 as well as Lebow and Risse-Kappen 57 were very explicit and pointed in their critique of (neo-)realism to its failure to predict the end of the Cold War. A few self-identified neorealists soldiered on, but not for long. Thus, Smith engaged in dialogues with Hollis on explaining and understanding international relations 58 and took explicitly a neorealist position, whereas Buzan, Jones and Little 59 engaged in a thorough reconstruction of neorealism. However, a few years later, Smith moved on and enthusiastically engaged in post-positivism and reflectivism. 60 Also Buzan left realism behind and shifted to the English School, issuing invitations to reconvene the School. 61 Hyde-Price’s brief affair with realism also came to an end. 62
Contemporary realists in Europe are challenged not least in terms of theory building and theoretical/conceptual innovation. Among the few thorough innovative contributions during the last 25 years, we find Buzan, Jones and Little 63 and Murray’s 64 reconstructions of realism. While Buzan engaged in reconstructing neorealism, suggesting a broader repertoire of structural factors, Murray focused on dimensions of morality and ethics. Kindermann’s Munich school of neorealism proposed constellation analysis; with its six categories for inquiry and analysis, this is an approach intended to be more comprehensive and more nuanced than the über-parsimonious neorealist strand of realism. 65 While the Munich School of realism was one of the representatives of realist thinking, it did not manage to attract many followers (but see Carlo Masala, Werner Link, Christian Hacke, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Alexander Siedschlag und Christoph Rohde). In their predictions about the future of International Relations in Germany, Wolf and Hellmann suggest that neorealism is ‘Nach wie for randständig’ (remains marginal). 66 Similarly, Hellmann 67 has described how foreign policy analysts in Germany tend to be multilateralists; hardly a gold ore in realist international thought, neoclassical realism included. In France, it is mainly Dario Battistella and Jean-Jacques Roche that are seen as representatives of the realist tradition, but they have not engaged in theory building or innovative conceptualisation.
In terms of major empirical studies informed by realist theory, it seems that realist analysts perform as badly as in the field of theorising and conceptual innovation. The last 25 years have not been without major actors, structures and processes that appear to be obvious challenges perhaps even soft cases for scholars of a realist orientation. Thus, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a direct impact on the configuration of systemic polarity, including the global position of the United States. Subsequently, the rise of China and other emerging economies/powers present analytical opportunities although of a different type. Processes of globalisation are said to undermine the relevance of analysing the units in the international system and their foreign policy. However, realists in Europe seem happy with Waltz 68 explaining away the impact of globalisation. In terms of regional dynamics, both the ever-closer European Union and the ever more fragmented Middle East present challenges to realist theory. The last word on balance of power dynamics in the Middle East might not be Walt’s. 69 Nevertheless, how would a contemporary realist analysis of the Middle East be conducted? In and around East Asia, security dilemmas are on the rise and seem ever more capable of producing serious insecurities. The changing role of military alliances, dynamics of alliance politics (including NATO) and the general global restructuring of armed forces have been significant. Major wars were conducted, including the Iraq-Iran war, the US-Iraq war, wars in former Yugoslavia, and new nuclear powers have joined the exclusive club of countries that have nuclear weapons. The global balance of power is ever-changing, and similar dynamics characterise most regional balances of power.
In spite of all such opportunities and challenges, realists in Europe have shown a remarkably limited interest in addressing global issues and have generally cultivated a very limited empirical research agenda. European integration and European foreign policy have never been an obvious choice for realists. This is due to factors such as a preference for state-centric analysis, balance of power focus, an orientation towards conflict rather than cooperation as well as arguments about the limited relevance of multilateral institutions and economic determinants. If processes of European integration provide fair weather sailing for analysts within the liberal tradition, theorists within the realist tradition have been profoundly challenged by the subject matter. The challenge explains the nature of realist encounters with European integration. They are predominantly preoccupied with explaining why not more has been achieved or the lack of cooperation and integration (Pijpers, 1991). Moreover, they downplay achievements 70 or explain why processes of integration are epiphenomenal to other more important factors, including first and foremost the ever present and changing balance of power. 71 Occasionally, realists claim that European integration is bound to fail. Examples of realist theory being used to actually explain (aspects of) European foreign policy are very rare. 72 Wivel 73 examined encounters between European integration and realist theory, but his main research interest is the role of small states, especially the small state Kenneth Waltz commented on, ‘Denmark does not matter’. Pijpers 74 applied realism in research on European foreign policy, and Reichwein 75 produced a major review of how realist theory has been applied in research on European foreign policy. In summary, theory-informed empirical analysis of major world politics events and processes is not absent but rather limited.
Inventing the tradition by appraising it or prescribing policies
Instead of theory building, theoretical/conceptual innovation or theory-informed empirical studies, realists write about realism or offer practical knowledge to decision-makers in foreign affairs.
In his eminent critical review of the Marxist tradition in Europe, Anderson 76 concludes that during the twentieth century, studies within the tradition turned from economic to cultural factors, and went increasingly meta. Instead of using Marxist theory in their analysis of class, capitalism and colonialism, Marxists were increasingly doing research on other Marxists. It is not possible to draw a similar conclusion regarding the realist tradition simply because there are very few attempts by realists to critically appraise the tradition. Indeed, most meta-studies are conducted by analysts who do not belong to the realist tradition. 77
Frei 78 as well as Behr and Rösch 79 have published excellent retrospective studies of Hans Morgenthau and interpreted both author intent and audience reception. 80 Rösch 81 has examined how European realists transferred realist ideas to America. Reichwein 82 has provided useful accounts of both classical realism and neoclassical realism. These and other retrospective studies highlight the innovative function of retrospectives and critical appraisals. They show that theoretical traditions do not just exist and await discovery and description. They are invented, reproduced, appraised or reappraised. Sometimes critical studies contribute to sustain theoretical traditions. In this sense, nothing is more unpredictable than the past. IR theoretical orientations gain significance when interpreted in the context of international political thought or international political theory. Deeper structures of ideological, political and social reasoning emerge as informants of contemporary IR theorists.
In his reappraisal of political theory and its main methods of interpretation, Ball 83 makes use of the distinction between author intentions and audience receptions. Above, we have seen how realist theorists are fewer and fewer and have fewer and fewer intentions. This leads to the intriguing hypothesis that the realist tradition somehow is kept alive by its audiences. It is an indisputable fact that the number of interpretations of major realist thinkers is increasing and that the distribution of appraisals or reappraisals is highly uneven. Whereas Morgenthau, though not the early European Morgenthau, seems to be a clear winner, interest in Aron and Wight is significant. 84 Concerning Kindermann and others, interest is significantly less.
Given that both theoretical innovation and theory application have been limited, the idea of realist dominance has to draw on other sources. Ideology is one such source and is operational in the following fashion. In probably each European capital of some international significance, it is possible to identify one or more foreign policy networks consisting of institutions and individuals involved in debates on the future direction of the foreign policy of a given country or of the European Union. These networks are more or less extensive, and the institutions are blessed with resources to varying degrees. In each of these networks, realist ideas have a function in legitimising the foreign policy of country x, y or z. As the world is as it is, so the argument goes, we need to do this and this. In this context, realism is usually presented as ‘timeless wisdom’ – as highlighted by a reviewer of Neoclassical Realism in European Politics. Bringing Power Back In. 85 One of the features of timeless wisdom is obviously that innovation is unnecessary. However, what Guzzini 86 calls the conservative dilemma persists, and it seems that in choosing between practical knowledge and scientific rigour, contemporary realists have chosen the former, seemingly counting on timeless wisdom and faith.
In Anarchy, Power and Death: Contemporary Political Realism as Ideology, Bell 87 examines political realism as ideology, that is, examines the degree to which political realism is more ideology than theory. He points to the ontologies (worldviews, fundamental beliefs etc.) that theorists, diplomats, politicians or journalists share. This might explain that almost a quarter of the scholars who contributed to the TRIP survey in France declare that they consider themselves to be realists or imagine that others would think they belong to the realist theoretical tradition. This is a remarkably high number, especially for a country where scholars generally are not fond of theorising or applications of theory in empirical analysis and is almost without major realist theorists.
Conclusion and perspectives
The realist theoretical tradition never enjoyed a strong position in Europe. Mearsheimer got it right. The tradition failed to take root in Europe and largely disappeared or became trapped in being solely second order theory about theory. During recent decades, it seems to have lost traction almost completely. It is difficult to find evidence supporting claims that ‘realism is making a comeback in Europe’. 88 Not only is it difficult to find a living realist tradition, it is also difficult to find much of a tradition in the past that could experience a ‘comeback’. The Rockefeller Foundation did not repeat the 1954 conference in a European setting and instead of promoting the creation of a discipline based on a hegemonic realist tradition, Rockefeller sponsored the British Committee, which subsequently morphed into the English School.
We have analysed this tragic endgame by examining realist contributions to theory building, conceptual/theoretical innovation and major theory-informed empirical studies. For each of these three criteria, we found relatively few contributions. Representatives of the tradition are currently unable to generate specific or distinct applicable theories. Within the tradition, theoretical/conceptual innovation is limited; realists in Europe have not produced significant studies of major world actors, processes and structures.
However, theoretical traditions can be reproduced in several ways. The absence of theorists does not imply that a tradition necessarily is in complete disarray. The distinction between theorists and appliers indicates how a tradition can live on for some time even without theorists but only if there is a critical mass of appliers producing empirical studies of lasting value. A ‘classic’ is not necessarily a theoretical flagship; it can also be something similar to Kissinger’s study of A World Restored. 89 As we have demonstrated above, realists in Europe have not produced such empirical flagship publications. In Europe, the realist tradition lives on in three other ways. First, textbook authors tend to the present realism as a very prominent tradition, sometimes described as dominant or hegemonic. Given that textbooks are kept in universalist terms and are not focusing on Europe, this might or might not be an accurate general description. Second, the realist tradition is kept alive by the increasing number of interpretations of major classical theorists. In some cases, realist scholars interpret one or more realist theorists – for instance, Battistella interpreting Aron – but European scholars who work within the realist tradition are generally unaware of each other or simply lack interest in fellow realists. Hence, in most cases, scholars from outside the realist tradition interpret realist theorists. Thus, research with an interest in realism has predominantly turned into meta-studies on realism, and given that realist theorists in Europe have made some significant contributions during the twentieth century, there are classics to be interpreted. Third, the realists tradition lives on as an ideological orientation that may enjoy certain functions in legitimising foreign policy orientations but contributes little to the academic IR discipline. In summary, we found limited theoretical advance, few comprehensive empirical studies, an excessive interest in meta-study and a questionable tendency to replace sound theorising with political commitments.
Footnotes
Appendix 1
The strength of realism relative to other paradigms.
| 2008 | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constructivism | English School | Feminism | Liberalism | Marxism | Realism | Other | Non-paradigmatic | |
| Ireland | 21 | 0 | 4 | 21 | 7 | 14 | 4 | 29 |
| UK | 14 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 11 | 8 | 17 | 30 |
| Average | 17.5 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 15 | 9 | 11 | 10.5 | 29.5 |
| 2011 | ||||||||
| Constructivism | English School | Feminism | Liberalism | Marxism | Realism | Other | Non-paradigmatic | |
| Austria | 14 | 9 | 8 | 19 | 11 | 19 | 18 | 20 |
| Denmark | 13 | 14 | 3 | 23 | 6 | 26 | 23 | 17 |
| Finland | 11 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| France | 15 | 9 | 4 | 22 | 9 | 25 | 9 | 23 |
| Ireland | 11 | 7 | 6 | 16 | 10 | 16 | 8 | 16 |
| Norway | 17 | 8 | 9 | 19 | 10 | 20 | 8 | 18 |
| Sweden | 18 | 5 | 9 | 19 | 10 | 24 | 15 | 8 |
| UK | 11 | 10 | 7 | 16 | 10 | 19 | 12 | 19 |
| Average | 13.75 | 8.37 | 6.25 | 17.87 | 9 | 20 | 12.87 | 16.5 |
| 2014 | ||||||||
| Constructivism | English School | Feminism | Liberalism | Marxism | Realism | Other | Non-paradigmatic | |
| Austria | 21.43 | 0 | 0 | 28.57 | 7.14 | 14.29 | 7.14 | 21.43 |
| Belgium | 0 | 12.5 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 37.5 |
| Denmark | 33.78 | 8.11 | 0 | 4.05 | 5.41 | 12.16 | 13.51 | 22.97 |
| Finland | 33.33 | 5.56 | 0 | 0 | 5.56 | 5.56 | 16.67 | 33.33 |
| France | 24.47 | 2.13 | 0 | 3.19 | 2.13 | 23.4 | 7.45 | 37.23 |
| Germany | 34.09 | 1.36 | 0.45 | 15 | 3.18 | 4.55 | 11.82 | 29.55 |
| Ireland | 30.3 | 0 | 6.06 | 9.09 | 6.06 | 6.06 | 6.06 | 36.36 |
| Italy | 34.82 | 7.14 | Not asked | 8.93 | 1.79 | 25.89 | 6.25 | 15.18 |
| The Netherlands | 18.6 | 6.98 | 0 | 18.6 | 6.98 | 6.98 | 16.28 | 25.58 |
| Norway | 17.14 | 7.14 | 1.43 | 17.14 | 1.43 | 17.14 | 8.57 | 30 |
| Sweden | 33.73 | 2.41 | 3.61 | 4.82 | 3.61 | 6.02 | 15.66 | 30.12 |
| Switzerland | 28 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 12 | 44 |
| UK | 20.48 | 6.63 | 3.92 | 6.02 | 6.33 | 6.63 | 18.37 | 31.63 |
| Poland | 22.35 | 4.47 | 0 | 15.64 | 1.12 | 32.4 | 6.7 | 17.32 |
| Average | 25.18 | 3.93 | 1.39 | 11.71 | 3.62 | 12.68 | 11.36 | 29.44 |
Source: TRIP 2008, 2011, 2014.
TRIP surveys are helpful to understand the general picture of theoretical trends among European IR scholars. Although the number of surveyed countries is small in 2008 and 2011, that is, two in 2008 and eight in 2011, respectively, the last survey in 2014 was carried out in 12 European countries. In addition to several questions about personal viewpoints on current politics, ideology or teaching habits, their paradigm orientation was also examined. In 2008, the only surveyed European countries – Ireland and the United Kingdom – showed a clear constructivist trend with an average of 17.5 per cent, while the realist segment was around 11 per cent after liberalism with 15 per cent. In the 2011 survey, Ireland and the United Kingdom increased the realist segment to 16 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively, and the average European trend showed 20 per cent, while liberalism was at 17.87 per cent and constructivism was at only 13.75 per cent. However, in the 2014 survey, configurations changed again. The rising popularity of ‘constructivism’ is striking as we look at Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Germany or Ireland, where the ratios are above 30 per cent. The second most preferred theory paradigm is ‘realism’ yet with barely 10 per cent and, in Ireland, the second most popular is actually ‘liberalism’. In Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, there is more interest in constructivism or liberalism than in realism. However, it is noteworthy to mention that Italy and Poland depict a different theoretical trend and vote for realism with 25.89 per cent and 32.5 per cent, respectively – perhaps not surprising considering their relatively more ‘conservative’ attitudes in the social sciences. Overall, the 2014 survey depicts a realist camp that with an average 14.4 per cent is losing ground, well behind constructivism with 23.09 per cent. Laying aside all possible reservations about the country numbers or weaknesses of the survey, we think that the overall analysis of the surveys supports our claim that the realist tradition in Europe is on a downward slope.
Acknowledgements
Our thanks to editors Ken Booth, William Bain, Milja Kurki, and editorial assistant Rachel Vaughan, as well as this journal’s anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. We are solely responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
