Abstract
This, the second edition of The Western Front (2003), is a valuable account and one that reflects recent work as well as the strength of the original, notably its clarity and its comprehensive character. The interaction of the front line with the home front provides the key means of approach. Tooley argues that what he terms ‘mind control’ broke down more in the former than in the latter. He is ably in touch with recent perspectives, notably the defeat of the German army in the Hundred Days battle, although he claims that Ludendorff exaggerated the scale of the defeat. More generally, Tooley argues that commanders came to the understanding of the new warfare at different rates: their personal learning curves. He also suggests that the alacrity with which commanders saw the need for more preservation of their troops’ lives was very clearly connected with a whole web of intellectual, social and cultural considerations prevalent in their own time. A comparable work for the eastern front would be valuable.