Abstract
Conservatism as a continuum in Russia’s ideological history is not as readily discernible as, say, revolution, reform, radicalism or even reaction. Nevertheless, Paul Robinson seeks to trace its evolution from the early nineteenth-century reign of Alexander I to the early twenty-first-century regime of Vladimir Putin. In order to bring this synthesis together, the author relies on a selection of published sources – books and articles – in both English and Russian, most of them dating from the last 20 years. Such an approach is understandably chronological, though it is combined with a thematic approach too in that, following the opening chapter devoted to defining Russian conservatism, each chapter is divided into sections on ‘cultural’, ‘political’ and ‘social-economic’ conservatism. The author concedes, however, that there is considerable overlap between these strands. The many case studies of the most prominent conservatives, from Aleksandr Golitsyn and Nikolai Karamzin in the early nineteenth century to Boris Mezhuev and Nataliia Narochnitskaia in the early twenty-first, and their individual contribution to conservatism at each stage of its evolution, are a useful feature of the book.
Among its most important themes is the place of the Orthodox religion, so central a part of Russian national identity, in Russian conservatism, and the extent to which its adherents have succeeded in resolving the paradox between societal ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’. Robinson suggests that the two converge and are reconciled in the Russian conservatives’ historic mission ‘to save the West’ while protecting Russia’s own special identity. He identifies a definite anti-capitalist strand within Russian conservatism which he argues has consistently promoted ‘organic’ change, albeit strictly in accord with existing traditions.
Robinson finds that the emergence of a conservative ideology in Russia is traceable from Alexander I’s reign, and that Admiral Aleksandr Shishkov, a champion of national ‘tradition’, is a strong contender for the title of ‘founder of Russian conservatism’, which for most of this period was ideologically (if ‘loyally’) opposed to the state and its policies. National identity, ‘organic’ conservatism and Orthodoxy became even more closely allied in Nicholas I’s reign with the implementation of S. S. Uvarov’s ideology of Official Nationality. These themes are discussed in an eponymous chapter which generally takes a relatively benign view of the reign of the ‘gendarme of Europe’, and in particular resists the notion of political (as distinct from cultural) stagnation often associated with this 30-year period of Russian history. This is evidenced by the contemporaneous emergence of Slavophilism which, as Robinson argues in a brief but effective survey, ‘remained a project for social and economic reform, not a defence of the existing system’. Alexander II’s Great Reform era was, in the author’s view, ‘something of a golden age for Russian conservatism’, which while keen to ensure that the reforms did not spark revolution, was ‘more about managing change than it was about stopping it’. The tenets of Official Nationality continued to underpin the counter-reforming thrust of Alexander III’s reign, in which conservatism is generally viewed as ‘increasingly nationalistic, chauvinistic, and anti-Semitic’. However, the inability of Russian conservatives either to agree on the kind of inevitable changes generated by the 1905 revolution, or to arrange an effective organization, resulted in their political paralysis in the run-up to 1917.
In a useful chapter entitled ‘Emigration’, here described as ‘an integral part of Russian history’, Robinson considers the displaced torchbearers of Russian conservatism, and disputes Marc Raeff’s view that they ‘thought only in terms of restoration’. Rather, there was a belief that Imperial Russia had collapsed because of its moral failings, and they therefore urged renewal and change, but not restoration. Moreover, this should eschew the blind copying of Western models, particularly liberal democracy, in favour of authoritarian models of government based on the core principles of Orthodoxy, a strong state and nationalism. Given the state of Russian politics and society a century later, one can but marvel at the prescience of émigré Russian conservatives’ aspirations.
The last two chapters, respectively on conservatism in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods, constitute the strongest section of the book, and could indeed well have been its exclusive focus. It complements such related recent (but uncited) works as Mark Galeotti, We Need To Talk About Putin: How The West Gets Him Wrong (London, 2019); Michel Eltchaninoff, Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin (London, 2018); and Andrew Monaghan, The New Politics of Russia: Interpreting Change (Manchester, 2016). This final section is underpinned by interviews which the author conducted in Moscow in 2017 with three leading conservative figures, Aleksandr Dugin, Egor Kholmogorov and Mikhail Remizov. Their albeit quite disparate views (for example, on the West, abortion, gay rights and same-sex marriage) confirm the contemporary importance of conservatism, and the centrality of both Orthodoxy and nationalism in today’s Russia.
The continuing convergence of church and state is symbolically illustrated on the book’s cover by an uncredited photo of Putin and a high priest. A web-search revealed that it shows Putin at a service in the Annunciation Cathedral on 7 May 2018, following his inauguration for a fourth term as president, standing humbly before the authoritative figure of a gorgeously robed Patriarch Kirill. Robinson’s conclusion that entrenched conservative reaction is set to strengthen would seem unarguable. His book facilitates an understanding of just how conservatism has triumphed in Russia.