Abstract
Clemens Wenceslaus Lotharius Nepomucenus Metternich was born on 15 May 1773 and died on 1 June 1859. It was a rich, long life, full of incident, people, events, problems, achievements and failures. Wolfram Siemann’s monumental biography is well written (and translated) and extremely readable. It is roughly chronological in structure with many short sections containing helpful titles. There are, as pauses in the narrative, three thematic diversionary chapters on war, women and economics. Siemann’s book will no doubt become the standard work on Metternich, primarily due to three aspects.
First, Siemann has utilized an extremely wide variety of archives including the family papers housed in Prague, regional repositories in Czechia and numerous files in Vienna. He has also mastered the immense secondary literature on Metternich and his times. In particular Siemann challenges the work of Heinrich von Srbik, whose book appeared in 1925 and has hitherto occupied a distinguished place in Metternich studies. According to Srbik, Metternich was cunning, womanizing, effeminate and cosmopolitan, and his overall assessment is ambivalent. Siemann challenges these notions and accuses Srbik of biological racism, teleological German nationalism, a search for a mythical Führer and unresolvable contradictions (pp. 11–19). Throughout the book Siemann often cites Srbik’s judgements and then dismantles them with copious supporting evidence. In general, Siemann has a very positive view of Metternich and continually upholds and defends Metternich’s autobiography, writings, opinions and policies, especially contra Srbik.
Second, Siemann advances a clearly argued thesis that ‘Metternich’s long-term master plan was to secure peace based on solidarity and consensus’ (p. xiii). Metternich emerges from the biography as a practical, flexible, empirical, intellectual statesman with a clear long-term ‘vision’. He had, according to Siemann, a particular gift for grasping complex, multifaceted, interrelated issues, then extracting certain principles upon which to base decisions. Throughout the book, Siemann frequently uses Metternich’s memoranda (both private and official) to illustrate both this analytical gift and his particular thinking at a certain moment in time. For example, when faced with Napoleon’s will for global domination, Metternich focused on outlasting his opponent and achieving a peaceful European order anchored in international law (p. 390). With this vision in mind, he showed remarkable flexibility and adaptation to circumstances, most notably when he brokered an alliance with France in 1809, sealed with the marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise. He even toasted the future heir, the ‘King of Rome’, and hosted an extravagant party to celebrate the wedding (pp. 293–5). He stated that ‘my principles are unchangeable, but to necessity we must yield’ (p. 260). Siemann is detailed and judicious in this key period of Metternich’s life, from his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1809 until the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In general, he agrees with the enormous body of work in diplomatic history from the last few decades that postulates an evolving new norm in diplomacy, encompassing personal meetings, shared goals, mutual restraints and co-operation. Siemann, unsurprisingly, places Metternich at the very heart of this process. Here was Metternich’s vision in action. In subsequent years, he aimed to maintain these hard-won achievements, stating at the end of his life that he had been a ‘rock of order’ (p. 741).
Third, the periods either side of the pivotal Napoleonic confrontation – Metternich’s formative years (1773–1809) and then the decades in charge of Austria from 1815 to 1848 – are covered by Siemann in admirable detail and depth. Metternich’s two tutors, John Simon, a Protestant adherent to the Enlightenment who would become a Revolutionary, and Abbé Ludwig Bertrand Höhn, a dedicated Catholic of the Piarist order, reflected two strands of European intellectual life. The outbreak of the French Revolution overshadowed the final years of Metternich’s education and made his apprenticeship years full of intense and varied experiences. Metternich accompanied his father Franz Georg on various postings and duties, learning about negotiation, compromise, contrasting opinions, interest groups, intrigues, military matters and personal ambitions along the way. Franz Georg was one of the most distinguished nobles in the Holy Roman Empire and a loyal servant of the Habsburg family. In a long career Franz Georg worked both within the Holy Roman Empire and on various missions and tasks for the Habsburg Emperor, including minister plenipotentiary to the Austrian Netherlands from 1791 until its fall to French forces in 1794. Metternich learnt at his father’s shoulder, including intense engagement with the institutions, traditions and ceremonies of the crumbling Holy Roman Empire, even attending the coronations of Leopold in 1790 and of Franz in 1792. Metternich’s understanding of historical layers of complex, intersecting and overlapping legal rights and obligations, so characteristic of the Holy Roman Empire, would be influential on his thinking. Another important factor in his formation, argues Siemann, was his encounter with Britain, which he visited from March to June 1794. For the young Metternich, Britain provided a model whose development combined a sense of history, a working political system and an advanced economy. Metternich’s career was dominated by an attempt to plot a peaceful, stable course between tradition and change.
His significant failing was the 1848 Revolutions, which ended his long career. Did this invalidate his lifelong attempt to achieve peace and order? Siemann does not directly address this question but generally exculpates Metternich of responsibility. Siemann outlines Metternich’s push for reform in 1836 (this was stymied by his rival Franz Anton Kolowrat), openness to limited political participation (he created a commission in October 1847 to look into relations with the provincial diets) and limited political power, especially in domestic matters (principally because Kolowrat and the royal family intrigued against him) (pp. 698–715). Could Metternich have attempted more wide-ranging reforms at more opportune times? Could he have been more consultative? Could he have handed over direction of the Austrian state (or even delegated some functions) to a younger generation? Was he too static and reactive, rather than proactive and forward-looking? In private, Metternich frequently portrayed himself as the only person who could hold back the dangers of Revolution, betraying a highly personalized mindset that could easily justify clinging to power. It is significant, I believe, that he did not create a group of younger talented bureaucrats who could advance Austria’s interests after his departure, though Austrian diplomats generally followed his tenets for the next few decades. He did not leave behind any institutions or school bearing his name. Here, as in so many other aspects, he differed from Napoleon, who, in his short period in power, both continued and smoothed the Revolution’s reforms to create the basic framework of the modern French state.
Metternich was an outstanding statesman of his time. He saved what he could, adapted when necessary, and dutifully served his monarch and royal family. Could he have done more? Siemann does not pose contingencies or possibilities. He lays out the case for Metternich and his pragmatic, empirical approach to government based on maintaining peace and order. This biography and its arguments will form the basis for all future discussions about Metternich’s principles, decisions and legacy.