Abstract
This is an important work for scholars on both the Second World War and the Holocaust. Based on rich archival holdings, oral interviews with veterans, contemporary periodicals and extensive printed primary research, Grant Harward’s study demonstrates Romanian commitment to the Axis. He argues that Nazi policies readily accorded with the ideology of the Romanian army which is presented as a combination of nationalism, antisemitism and anticommunism with religious identity seen as a further key element. There is also a focus on a key trigger, the Soviet occupation in 1940 of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, which disturbed and angered Romanians far more than Hungarian and Bulgarian gains in Transylvania and Dobruja, respectively. The army was anxious to assuage its wounded honour (Soviet soldiers had humiliated Romanian officers) and take revenge on Jews and Communists, who were conflated and seen as a Fifth Column, for the humiliating territorial losses. There was antisemitic violence during the withdrawal. Pogroms saw both civilians and soldiers take part in murderous rampages, with mid-level officers playing a role in torture and mutilation alongside murder. Romanian motivation was also intensified in early 1941 by German success in Yugoslavia and Greece.
Once the Romanians moved onto the attack against the Soviets, there were large-scale massacres of Jews, again with killings by both soldiers and civilians. Some commanders used the fear of opposition by Jewish civilians as the excuse for large-scale murder. There was also much rape, in part from a lust to humiliate. Once Odessa fell, there were fresh killings of thousands. As another example of their ‘Holy War’, the Romanians also carried out mass baptisms of Moldavians. There was also large-scale looting. The 1942 offensive saw ideological beliefs if anything hardened in part due to losses, including at the hands of partisans. The slaughter of civilians continued.
Once onto the defensive, fear was a key motivator. The Holy War was now seen as a defensive conflict. While the Italians and Hungarians withdrew support from the Germans, the Romanians continued to deploy large numbers of troops. Morale, however, was hit, and Harward shows how this was accentuated by growing weaknesses on the German part, as well as by the withdrawal of German armoured units. There was no longer confidence in Germany’s final victory. The nature of wartime propaganda is ably analysed, as is discipline, which included summary executions, but far fewer than in the case of the Germans, let alone the Soviets. The experience of minority soldiers is also assessed. Most minorities, for example ethnic Hungarians, did what was expected. This is an excellent book that overturns conventional views of low Romanian morale.