Abstract
This valuable addition to work on British political and military history by Hannah Smith overcomes the traditional chronological divide at the Glorious Revolution to look at a longer period in the genesis of the army and, more particularly, its relationship with successive political regimes. This was a period of flux in army–political relations that has never been repeated in Britain, which raises instructive points about British history, British exceptionalism, and, by extension, British perspectives on the military history of other states where such flux was far more common. The last include France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Spain, but not the United States. And yet, Anglophone historians have a tendency to write as if the Anglo-American experience is both norm and paradigm. As a consequence, they are apt to underplay the significance to military history of political control and interaction, and, linked to that, the role of political reliability in force structure, doctrine, and individual promotion.
Smith offers a valuable corrective, both in general and in particulars. She links her account not only to regime shifts but also to changing attitudes among Whigs and Tories. Contingency and expediency play a role alongside ideology.
The book has been long in the genesis, but some important recent work leaves no trace, notably, but not only, Geoffrey Plank on Cumberland’s influence and clientele, Sarah Kinkel’s valuable book on the navy, and the significant publications of Stephen Conway. This only shows, however, the scope, scale, and ambition of Smith’s book, because she ranges widely.
The frequent role of pretenders to rulership and power emerge, as with Monmouth. Military reputation is shown to rest in part on activity but also on presentation, as with James II/VII. Smith points out that after 1688, the latter never found a Monck, and, indeed, Jacobitism was weakened by its lack of support from within an army that, from 1689 to 1760 was under four monarchs, three of whom had had extensive military experience of their own. Indeed, as in each case this preceded their position in Britain, there is room to consider how far their military patronage and practices there were affected by the earlier experience. Within Britain, more could have been made of Cadogan’s political position in the 1720s.
Smith engages with the political views of soldiers and non-commissioned officers as well as the development of attitudes to the army. She demonstrates the continued strength of anti-army feeling as well as the development of an army geared to a parliamentary monarchy. Her account might appear overly sanguine from an Irish or Highland Scottish dimension but it deserves attention.