Agassi on Morality and Ethics

1.1. Mapping Moral Philosophy

Agassi points to two prototypes of moral philosophy, the collectivist and the individualist. Following Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and Popper, Agassi endorses a third option, which his predecessors viewed as sheer common sense: “To heed tradition while attempting to criticize it and to improve it in the light of criticism” (Agassi 1987b, 120). This option is based on a critique of Immanuel Kant’s individualism, particularly his views of knowledge, ethics (Agassi 1987b), and education (or discipline, which is salvaged at the cost of considering children as non-human beings [Agassi 1987a]).

But it is also based on a critique of utilitarianism. Enlightened self-interest (eudaimonia), which lies at its origin, can refer both to science and to common sense; thus, failure of its application can be blamed on the insufficiency of the enlightenment involved rather than on the proposal itself. The best option, he argues, is Benedict Spinoza’s philosophy, which was endorsed by Russell, “the doyen of twentieth-century rationalist philosophy”; yet its application is problematic. The minimal version of this theory, formulated by Hume, is that one can be trusted to take care of one’s own interest better than anyone else (see also A&M, 104–5). Therein lies also its failure. While the initial preference of utilitarianism was the wish to eliminate morality altogether, its force rather lies in the motive behind it: the wish to eliminate moralizing. Thus, the best version of utilitarianism is the idea that we should act in our enlightened self-interest as best we can while being self-critical so as to improve; yet we do not always know what our enlightened self-interest is.

The traditional discussion between Kantians and Utilitarians “goes nowhere,” he notes, because it is either utopian or heartless to construe interpersonal interaction without a society:

The desire to build a system of ethics on mere interpersonal bases is bound to get stuck, regardless of what rules of ethics we hold: we need a society to adjudicate rules of conduct. (1990b, 222)

Aiming at improving on both these theories, which he takes to constitute the entirety of contemporary moral discussions, Agassi proposes a psychological theory of moral judgements, because moral judgements are not freely chosen but rather given as the result of psychological processes.

We still can change our values, even our ultimate ones, through rational persuasion, which is not necessarily manipulative; even if it is, Agassi (and Jarvie) suggest that it is morally and culturally superior to all forms of manipulation (A&J, 158–60). Thus, Agassi (and Meidan) provide a tentative psychological theory of change of beliefs. Whilst Popper excluded psychology, especially any psychological hypothesis regarding the change of beliefs (A&M, 84), they formulate a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for the endorsement of a belief: the function of ordinary belief is to reduce surprise, the unexpectedness of the apparent role (69). Further assumptions (no rational person willingly desires to believe falsehoods; repeatable refutations impose the relinquishing of the refuted views) lead them to maintain that “we may train ourselves to open up to all the alternatives that we can find, and do so critically,” although they concede that “it often takes more courage than is readily available” (85).

Ethics is not reducible to psychology, because psychology cannot account for the notion of duty. The theory proposed, a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for endorsing ethical judgments, is supplemented by duties to self and by the commendation of the supreme value of autonomy.

1.2. Psychological Theory of Moral Judgements

Agassi’s view of morality follows his epistemological skepticism, the view that proof is impossible. Deemed a “skeptical ethics,” it argues that there is no moral knowledge and no final justification of any moral judgment, and that no moral judgment is certain or even plausible. However, some moral judgments “are right, valid, correct, happy, and so forth.” Not only can an uncertain moral judgement be right, disagreement about reasonable and uncertain possible judgments can be rational. Rather than justifying ethics or morality, it is better to strive to improve them, and to pave the way to their implementation. The three main refutations of skeptical ethics, namely, that it implies nihilism, that it blocks all rational resolutions of moral disputes, and that it leads to the view that punishment is immoral or amoral, are addressed in this way.

Moral judgements are not freely chosen; as they largely (A&M, 90) result of psychological processes, they are given (88). The psychological question, under which conditions does one endorse a given (right or wrong) moral judgement, is an ontological question that has been studied by few psychologists and no philosophers. Instead of studying this interesting question, philosophers are over-concerned with the search for justification of moral judgements. The ethics of intentions and the ethics of consequences are the two traditional answers that philosophers have advanced, on which Agassi hopes to improve. They both declare the rules of ethics absolute (103), which is at odds with repeatable observation that the advantage due to trust or betrayal in the prisoner’s dilemma situation depends on their frequency, that is, on social context.

Agassi improves by pointing to a lacuna that originates in the desire to justify: as recent history taught, moral inhibition should be the focus of interest rather than moral motives. Moreover, he gives a tentative answer to the psychological question, under which conditions does one endorse a given moral judgment? It includes the sympathy principle (Hume’s principle), and the welfare principle (the maximization of the welfare of humanity as considered by people who would imaginatively legislate as rulers of the world), where “welfare” stands for the most standard, also too technical and pretentious, notion of “utility” (94):

1. The sympathy principle: People tend to sympathize with the suffering of others and to consider immoral any act that increases it needlessly.

From the two principles, various ethical consequences are drawn, including the moral imperative to confess ignorance and to seek to remedy it through consideration of the factual issues (to be resolved by natural science and technology, and by social, especially political, considerations). Disputes should be fun, then, rather than frustrating. Avoid frustration by refraining from arguing with moral relativists. Finally, following George Bernard Shaw: boredom is sufficient reason for not doing something

1.3. Morality in Legislation and Politics: Responsibility

When moving from morality to legislation and politics Agassi presents the idea of minimal moral standards and distinguishes it from the idea of minimal political standards. The idea of minimal standards, he explains, is central to Critical Rationalism as it facilitates error correction. This deviates from western political and moral thought which is usually overambitious and hence takes on the costly task of attempting to avoid in advance all possible errors.

The implications of skepticism for moral questions within political life are spelled out in PSP (Chapter 5). A third tenet is added here to the sympathy principle and the welfare principle: the conservative principle. It suggests moderation in political experimentalism:

People are normally afraid of suffering from social disorders resulting from changing the current method of government, and this fear is at times quite reasonable. (A&M, 119)

Like disputes in morality, moral disputes in politics can result from differences in basic intuitions, either in regard to sympathy for the sufferings of others, or to what best increases human welfare, or to what best decreases human suffering, or about the possible primacy of considerations based on sympathy over those based on welfare as different intuitions may result in conflicting political proposals. The third principle, which favors a conservative attitude explains “most historical moral disputes” as the result of different parties having different expectations regarding acceptable political risks (A&M, 120). The moderation principle also implies tolerance, especially towards such controversies that cannot be decided.

While it is possible to destroy society over an irresolvable ontological disagreement, and “history is full of cases of this kind,” commonsensical skepticism is conducive to “tolerance––for good or ill” (A&M, 121). There are also ways to minimize the dangers involved in changing the system of government. We can, for example, test the change proposed on small scales and then gradually increase their size to reach national scale.

Political thought for Agassi involves a defense of democracy. This is so because “the best way to acquire democratic education is to establish democracy, however imperfect it may be,” and we know of “no better way to help our neighbors to democratize than by improving our own democracy” (A&M, 125, 124). This view too has interesting philosophical implications. Since both the Enlightenment and Romanticism had no need for democracy, philosophy lags behind social engineers and politicians. In The Siblinghood of Humanity (1990b, Chapters 25–26), philosophy’s new role within global politics is therefore introduced: the urgent task of addressing the possible annihilation of humanity. Philosophers should overcome their reluctance to get involved in political matters in order to answer the need for a new democratic leadership; this would also bring philosophy to a new level.

1.4. Duties

Agassi (and Meidan) improve on both Kantianism and (Hume’s) Utilitarianism by introducing into Ethics a psychological theory (A&M, 108). They formulate a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for the endorsement of ethical judgments. They resist reductionism in ethics because a reduced ethics will explain away duty as a sense of duty (110). Because their view is psychological, they have to implement it “with an ethics proper,” yet not with Kant’s view, which they consider “too simplistic and much too vague” (107).

A. One duty that is neither reducible to psychology nor discussed sufficiently by psychologists is the duty to be as critically minded as the situation allows. Agassi and Meidan preach the autonomy of the individual as a supreme value, which covers “the duty to be responsible and thus the duty to be critically minded” (A&M, 111). They define value not solely as “certain norms or criteria by which to determine norms,” but also as “whatever makes life worth living” (154).

Autonomy is presented in IP and elsewhere as part of the problem of rationality: What is the best lifestyle for the autonomous individual? (1990b, 243). Since the problem of rationality is the choice of one’s principles, values and lifestyle, the question of how one changes ultimate values (discussed in Part V, among other places), is just a variant of the problem of rationality. And, as Agassi recognizes that there are degrees of autonomy (see A&J 1987, Chapters 28–29), so he argues that the change of ultimate values is both rational and varied and thus more gradual and diffuse than previously thought (1990b, 35).

Taking pride in his advocacy of autonomy––Agassi confesses to making souls for the highest club he knows, The Open Society (Agassi 1976, 161). One should tempt or court others into autonomy, he says. Liberation should not be imposed; responsibility should be personal and its reach short of the other’s liberty. This kind of responsibility is the mark of the members of this exclusive club: they embrace their autonomy even if it leads them to hell. Not only encouragement, but permissiveness is needed, which may involve sexual issues, too (Yaguri, forthcoming). While the approach he recommends is playful, anguish may ensue.

He argues that “the process begun by philosophy is irreversible” (1990b, 33), yet regression may often occur. Autonomy implies that there is no one to rely on and no axiom which we can follow irrespective of circumstantial contextual conditions; thus, Agassi agrees with Jean-Paul Sartre that we are, in a sense, condemned to freedom. His notion of autonomy recalls Sartre’s view of authenticity in that he regards liberation from “spiritual servitude” as a civic duty to stop moral and social degeneration (1976, 162). However, he dismisses Sartre’s existentialism as “a reactionary social philosophy thinly disguised as progressive and [which] scarcely hides its contempt for common people” (A&M, 152).

Discarding the Romantic view of autonomy, Agassi reworks the Enlightenment notion of autonomy while taking its classical criticisms as valid. Kant points to laziness and fear as the reasons that hinder autonomy (Kant 2017). Nietzsche’s view of autonomy focuses on fear only, and so does Agassi when describing the obstruction facing those who are aware of the possibility to strive for autonomy. To focus on the gifted student is a waste of time; it is the courageous who should attract the attention of teachers (Agassi 1976, 162). Although “fear toward doubt in and of itself is irrational,” because “there are countless repeatable observations of gain, improvement, and even positive emotion experienced in various processes of new belief formation possible only because of the ability to doubt” (A&M, 149), the change required often takes more courage than is readily available (85).

Agassi agrees with Walter Kaufmann that the notion of autonomy is the “main watershed,” which divides “all moral, social, and political discourse, from the most abstract to the most concrete and pragmatic, from the ideological to the everyday” (BA&A 182). Yet he follows Russell’s view that autonomy entails a (self-imposed) moral code which includes significant political concern, and that one’s ethics should take into account one’s social and political concerns. Most texts on morality discuss private affairs, since morality concerns individual conduct; yet Agassi’s interest lies in public morality or the role of individual conduct in public affairs.

Since public morality, not merely individual morality, is what makes for both democracy and science (Agassi 1993, 232), it is public morality which should be on the agenda. To take an example, rather than thinking how a medical doctor should address ethical dilemmas, we should instigate institutional measures that would void these dilemmas (1990a, 12). All approaches to morality that abstract it from circumstances, facts, novelties, politics, and law are barren; so are all attempts to teach it in the Academy as an independent discipline which is disconnected from practical cases in everyday life, where social, economic, legal, and political events take place.

There is a sense of justice that appeals to the autonomous, which differs from that of the heteronomous or the obedient: social responsibility. As democratic justice is future oriented and open to improvement, it is the responsibility of the autonomous to improve it. Thus, autonomy does not merely imply independence of mind but also the ability to decide when to conform and to what degree. Education should therefore center on inspiring autonomy and social responsibility.

The notion of autonomy should be stripped of its romantic guise, which makes it the capacity of the selected few at the price of being alienated from society (the mad genius). The radical Enlightenment's view of autonomy should be redefined as well, so as to admit that autonomy is by necessity partial. Thus, the new notion of autonomy which Agassi (and Judith Buber Agassi) advance is sensitive to the context of gender as well as to social and economic factors. It also becomes the object of practical considerations. This directly opposes standard practices in education, sociology, politics, etc., Finally, Agassi’s novel notion of autonomy invites pluralism as the spirit of democracy and democracy as the politics of autonomy (BA&A 180).

Between the extreme and restricted view of Romantic autonomy and the overly radical and optimistic view of the Enlightenment Movement, Agassi seeks a place for (moderate) reformism “because it is liberal and fallibilist” (A&M, 119), and for its commonest version of parliamentary democracy. In this he gives moral and ethical dimensions to Popper’s recommendation for piecemeal social engineering (Popper 1945). Thus, modern parliamentary democratic society is to be mirrored in the life of its citizens. The autonomous not only lives a more meaningful existence, she critically contributes to the values and norms of her society.

A major predicament of modern democracy is that it is based on an ideal of autonomy that is impossible to achieve. Agassi considers addressing this situation by relinquishing the traditional goal of moral philosophy, ignoring the question of the foundation of morality, and discussing the fact that autonomy, both morally and politically, is partial and scarce.

What constitutes autonomy? As this question is very difficult to answer we might perhaps inquire instead about the minimal requirements of self-education: what autonomy facilitating characteristics are required, and to what degree? Agassi’s approach to teaching considers rationality a natural process that needs encouragement and some direction, perhaps, in order to go its own way and attain its ends. Like Spinoza, he sees rationality as a natural expression of human nature. Thus, he differs on that point from Popper who argues in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) that humans decide to be rational in order to control and even eliminate their own natural tendencies (Agassi 1987a, 5).

Philosophy, then, should promote autonomy (Agassi 2003, 48–53). However, parents do not know what autonomy is: we are all ignorant about it. Preachers usually preach against it, and “few teachers advocate autonomy, and fewer know how to teach it. Nor is this easy…” (53). Yet autonomy has to be instigated and encouraged by means which I have addressed elsewhere (Amir 2018, Chapter 3), when assessing Agassi’s views of education (Agassi 1984; 1985).

B. The duty to take care of oneself is an important duty that the psychological (and sociological) explanation of Agassi and Meidan does not cover. One’s duty is to oneself, first, before helping the elderly and the poor in one’s community, and before addressing the needs of humanity at large. One should also be grateful for the little luck one has and appreciate one’s life by shunning occasions for suffering and avoiding self-flagellation. Self-flagellation in all forms is immoral, Agassi argues. Kindness to oneself is recommended as a duty because it leads to gratefulness for one’s life, which “is morally commendable on its own” (A&M, 111).

The topic of self-flagellation has been central to human concerns as one of the main ways to attain to peace of mind. The question, how to get peace of mind, is at the origin of the most important controversy in the history of humankind (1990a, 63). Peace of mind is tied up with science as the instrument of ideal life. While there was no controversy among all thinkers in all generations about peace of mind being the earthly ideal, the controversy was about the way to get it, either through satisfying our desires or not. Most religious traditions endorsed the latter path, while the technological tradition of the rational human being advanced by Bacon and Descartes recommended the former. Among those who oppose the flesh, Agassi differentiates between those who strive to conquer their base desires by punishing or self-punishing through flagellation and minimizing food and sex, and the ascetics, who, like Socrates, kill the flesh. Agassi follows the Enlightenment in recommending the opposite, deeming immoral all forms of self-flagellation.

There is a this-worldly affirmative stance in Agassi, who, refusing any unnecessary suffering also aims at imparting his vision to others, especially to academics (Agassi 2020): Life is hard enough without the unnecessary wounds that education inflicts on us (Agassi 1979; 1984; 1985; 1987a; 1993, 2). In a recent interview (Vaisman 2020), Agassi frames his aim in terms of helping the individual prevail against society by equipping him in his struggle against the Academia with tools which are meant to make life easier.

The existential view that lies at the basis of Agassi’s philosophy and its practice is easily overlooked. His entire philosophy is at the service of life, the lack of certitude that marks his commonsensical skepticism aims at liberating rather than burdening the living. Existentialists should not monopolize existential problems, he argues, nor should we be impressed by the diagnosis of the human condition as fear (Heidegger), and boredom (Schopenhauer) or nausea (Sartre). Defined as “the philosophy that says that life is purposeless and that realizing this is the only salvation of the individual––it thus seemingly says nothing about society” (A&M, 151), existentialism is condemned as elitist. Rather than lamenting the autonomous’ loss of blind reliance on authority, the existentialist injunction that we are doomed to be free becomes a simple recognition of the liberating playful activity that fits our ignorance.